Case Resources
Search this Case
in Google
Scholar
on the Web
Google Web
Search
MSN Web
Search
Yahoo! Web
Search
in the News
Google News
Search
Google News
Archive Search
Yahoo!
News Search
in the Blogs
BlawgSearch.com
Search
Google Blog
Search
Technorati Blog
Search
in other Databases
Google Book
Search
Justia Research Resources
Justia.com
Supreme Court Center
US Regulation Tracker
US District Court Opinions
Federal District Court Civil Case Filings
Legal Blog Search
Legal Podcast Search
USA Constitution Annotated
Online Research Resources
Cornell LII
Cornell Wex Dictionary & Encyclopedia
LLRX.com - Legal Research
Expert Witness Directory
Nolo Consumer & Business
US Court Forms
WashLaw Directory
World LII
Cases Provided By
Creative Commons
public.resource.org
Jack Neilson, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant, v. Chicago Insurance Company, Defendant-appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. - 450 F.2d 156
Oct. 25, 1971
William L. Von Hoene, Von Hoene & Becker, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
William A. Porteous, III, Porteous, Toledano, Hainkel & Johnson, New Orleans, La., for Chicago Ins. Co., defendant-appellee.
Before BELL, AINSWORTH and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jack Neilson sued the defendant insurance company to recover on a marine insurance contract affording hull coverage, for damages incurred in the sinking of the tug M/Margaret. At the close of plaintiff's case the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the insurer, on the basis that plaintiff claimed that the cause of the sinking was a recent grounding of the vessel and that plaintiff had failed to prove that the grounding actually was the cause.
It appears that the court did not consider the question of whether Tropical Marine Products v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 247 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1957), might apply, a possibility which is for consideration by the trial court in the first instance. See also Gulf Coast Trawlers, Inc. v. Resolute Ins. Co., 239 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.Tex.1965). The District Judge is not to be faulted. The state of the pleadings and the stipulations in the pre-trial order were far from clear as to just what the respective parties undertook to prove and where they considered the burden of proof to fall.
Other issues are of such nature that they can be removed by sharpened pleadings, or involved incidents of trial which presumably will not arise again, and, therefore, we need not comment on them.
Reversed and remanded. Costs are divided equally.