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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Forrest Anderson, Defendant-appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. - 468 F.2d 440
Oct. 18, 1972
Lynn S. Patton, Longview, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Donald E. Walter, U. S. Atty., D. H. Perkins, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Shreveport, La., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and GOLDBERG and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for violations of federal firearm regulation statutes. Finding that the trial judge made remarks to the defendant that to a significant degree could have inhibited defendant's right both to demand a jury trial and to testify on his own behalf, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
Defendant-appellant, Forrest Anderson, was charged under 26 U.S.C.A. Secs. 5861(d), 5861(i), and 5871 with illegally possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun that was not identified by the required serial numbers. During a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress evidence, appellant testified concerning the circumstances of his arrest and the seizure of the shotgun. The version of those events related by appellant and another person arrested at the same time differed markedly from the version told by the several police officers who had effectuated the arrests and seizure. At the conclusion of the hearing, the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: "It is plainly apparent this was a legal search and seizure . . .
"We believe the officers instead of the defendant insofar as the manner in which [the events occurred] . . .
Appellant alleged in support of the motion that
"The Court erred in instructing the Defendant, Forrest Anderson, that unless he plead guilty to the charges filed against him, the Court would see that the Defendant was charged with the criminal offense of perjury. Defendant Forrest Anderson was placed in such a state of emotional pressure that he in effect was coerced by the Trial Court to enter his plea of guilty. Defendant, Forrest Anderson, would show that had such statements not been made by the Trial Judge, he would not have entered a plea of guilty but would have stayed with his original plea of not guilty and gone to trial on the merits of the case."
When constitutional rights are in issue, formalistic recitations regarding the voluntariness of a guilty plea will not prevent an appellate court from inquiring into the totality of circumstances surrounding the plea. See, e. g. Gallegos v. United States, 5 Cir. 1972, 466 F.2d 740