Justia Federal District Court Opinions

Sixteen-year-old Roger Fain was arrested November 12, 1970, in Volusia County, Florida, for breaking into the home of a woman and raping her. Eleven days later Fain was adjudged delinquent by a juvenile court. Nine days after the juvenile proceedings, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Fain with the criminal offense of rape. After the state courts of Florida rejected Fain's argument that prosecution of him for rape would violate the former jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, Fain obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The state now appeals the granting of the writ. We affirm.

Although this case involves complicated constitutional and statutory questions, the facts are simple and undisputed. On November 12, 1970, Roger Fain, then aged sixteen years and nine months, was arrested by Ormond Beach police officers for the alleged rape the day before of Mary Frances Oswald in Volusia County, Florida.¹ Five days later, a counselor of the juvenile court system filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that Fain was a delinquent child by reason of having assaulted and raped Mrs. Oswald.² On November 23, 1970, a hearing was held in the Volusia County Juvenile Court, during which an assistant state attorney appeared and urged the judge to waive jurisdiction and certify the case to the circuit court.³ After hearing argument on this question, the judge declined to waive jurisdiction, found Fain delinquent and committed him to the Division of Youth Services for an indeterminate period not to extend beyond his 21st birthday.⁴ Since November 23, 1970, Fain has remained in the custody of the Division of Youth Services at the Dozier School for Boys.

On December 1, 1970, the state attorney for the Seventh Judicial Circuit urged the juvenile court judge to stay the issuance or execution of its order of commitment; the judge did not do so. The next day, an indictment was returned alleging the same acts on which the delinquency adjudication was based.⁵ Two weeks later, on December 17, 1970, the state attorney urged the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction.⁶

In the circuit court, Circuit Judge Melton of the Seventh Judicial Circuit dismissed the indictment against Fain on January 7, 1971, on the grounds of former jeopardy. The state appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which reversed Judge Melton's ruling on August 17, 1971. State v. R. E. F., 251 So.2d 672 (Fla.App.1971). The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the court of appeal, but stayed its mandate to allow Fain to pursue any remedies he might have in federal court. R. E. F. v. State, 265 So.2d 701 (Fla.1972). Fain filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Middle District of Florida, and a hearing was held before the U. S. District Court on November 21, 1972. On January 15, 1973, the district court issued the writ requested by Fain. The state filed a notice of appeal February 7, 1973.

Three questions confront us in this appeal:

1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to entertain Fain's application for a writ of habeas corpus?

2. Was the district court correct in determining that the actions of the State of Florida violate the former jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment?⁷

3. Was the district court correct in determining that the actions of the State of Florida violate the Fourteenth Amendment and notions of fundamental fairness?

* As in all cases in federal court, the first question to which we must address ourselves is that of jurisdiction provided by a statute, for if there is no jurisdiction, a determination of the merits of a case is futile. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1869); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807). In this case, Fain asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241.⁸ We must therefore determine if that statute permits the district court to grant the writ. The statute iself contains no definition of the term habeas corpus. To ascertain its meaning and the appropriate use of the writ in federal courts, recourse must be had to the common law, from which the term was drawn. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934). The traditional use of the Great Writ was to inquire into the detention of a prisoner for the purpose of commanding his release if that detention was contrary to the law. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038 (1970) and H. Hart and H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 2d Ed. (1973), 1426-29. The purpose of this writ is not to examine the validity of any judgment, but merely to inquire into the legality of a detention. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). Thus, an obvious prerequisite to the issuance of a writ is detention, or custody.