Justia Federal District Court Opinions

Three separate actions were filed in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Tucson Division, seeking to recover death benefits under three separate policies of life insurance. The insured under each of the policies was one Newton S. Pfeffer. All three were subsequently consolidated for trial.

After the close of the defendants' case, the Court entered a finding that there was no issue for the jury to determine and that under the law the defendants were entitled to directed verdicts. Subsequently, judgment was entered in favor of each of the defendants against the plaintiffs.

Each of the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for a new trial. The motion was denied in each of the cases. Thereafter Appellants' Notice of Appeal was filed.

We adopt material portions of the Statement of Facts relied on by appellees.1

Two issues are raised:

1. Was the evidence such that any conclusion, other than suicide, could be reasonably drawn? Our answer is, it was not.

2. Was the denial of plaintiff's motion for new trial proper? Our answer is it was.

Our answer as to issue 1. is based on the leading cases of Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. De Johnson, 36 Ariz. 428, 286 P. 817 at 818, 819 (1930); Pacific Mutual v. Young, 40 Ariz. 1, 9 P.2d 188 (1932); and New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hunter, 60 Ariz. 416, 138 P.2d 414 at 416 (1943).

In the Equitable Life case, the court said:

'. . . where the evidence is of such a nature that a reasonable man could find only one state of facts to exist, a verdict which necessarily is based on the assumption of an opposite situation will not be allowed to stand. The law applicable to cases of this nature may be stated as follows: Where the defense of suicide is set up in an action by a beneficiary on an insurance policy, the burden of proving that the deceased committed suicide is upon the defendant. In the absence of proof of the cause of death, the presumption is against suicide. These principles are supported fully by the adjudicated cases. In addition thereto, it is almost universally held that when circumstantial evidence is relied on, the defendant must establish facts which exclude any reasonable hypothesis of anything except suicide (cases and other authorities cited), and in cases where either conclusion could be reached, the question is one for the jury. (cases cited)

'On the other hand, there is a limit beyond which even a jury may not go, and that is the line of reasonable probability. If the evidence be such that there is no reasonable theory which can be deduced from the evidence--even though there may be a possible or conjectural one not based on the testimony--on which the jury may find the death was not the result of suicide, a verdict which negatives suicide cannot be sustained. (cases cited)

'In determining whether or not a chain of circumstances necessarily as a matter of law leads to a given conclusion, we think the following to be a reliable test: First, is the assumed conclusion consistent with all of the known circumstances; and second, are any of these circumstances inconsistent with any other conclusion? If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, then the assumed conclusion is a matter of law for the court, and a verdict should be instructed in conformity therewith. If on the other hand, there is more than one conclusion consistent with all of the known facts, the question is one for the jury, and their decision will not be disturbed by the appellate court.'

On the insufficiency of Mrs. Dunham's evidence to require a new trial we conclude that she saw 'a body falling.' This was not new evidence. She also saw a man's hand 'extend from a window' and close the window on one of the upper floors of the hotel. She did not see Pfeffer or anyone else leave a window. In denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the district judge remarked to the effect that even if he accepted all of the alleged new evidence of Mrs. Dunham, his conclusion on the issue of liability would not be altered. The district judge obviously deemed the alleged new evidence to be without significant substance, and with that conclusion, we agree. Ordinarily, the test for determining the propriety of denying a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. In this case, there was clearly no such abuse.

We can only conclude that the trial court's conclusion of suicide was consistent with all of the known circumstances.

Affirmed.