Case Resources
Search this Case
in Google Scholar
on the Web
Google Web Search
MSN Web Search
Yahoo! Web Search
in the News
Google News Search
Google News Archive Search
Yahoo! News Search
in the Blogs
BlawgSearch.com Search
Google Blog Search
Technorati Blog Search
in other Databases
Google Book Search
Justia Research Resources
Justia.com
Supreme Court Center
US Regulation Tracker
US District Court Opinions
Federal District Court Civil Case Filings
Legal Blog Search
Legal Podcast Search
USA Constitution Annotated
Online Research Resources
Cornell LII
Cornell Wex Dictionary & Encyclopedia
LLRX.com - Legal Research
Expert Witness Directory
Nolo Consumer & Business
US Court Forms
WashLaw Directory
World LII
Cases Provided By
Creative Commons
public.resource.org
41 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 1011,34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,543equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Chrysler Corporation, Defendant-appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. - 738 F.2d 167
July 18, 1984
Joseph C. Marshall, III, Detroit, Mich., John Corbett O'Meara, Thomas G. Kienbaum, argued, Henry W. Saad, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellant.
Dorothy M. Smith, Detroit, Mich., J. Kenneth L. Morse, Detroit, Mich., Mark S. Flynn, argued, Appellate Div., E.E.O.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LIVELY, Chief Judge, MERRITT, Circuit Judge; JOHNSTONE, District Judge*.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
A majority of the Court having not voted in favor of an en banc rehearing, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the hearing panel for disposition.
In its petition for rehearing, Chrysler focused solely on the question whether we erred by affirming the District Court's conclusion that the EEOC had established the requisite irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction. In addition to those reasons given in our opinion, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.1984) affirming the judgment of the District Court, we point out that the instant case does not involve, as does Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974), the usual order of reinstatement by a preliminary injunction. Rather, the District Court here sought to have Chrysler place the forced retirees on the status which the District Court found Chrysler should have placed them on originally, namely, layoff status. See E.E.O.C. v. Chrysler Corp., 546 F.Supp. 54, 72 (E.D.Mich.1982). It is clear that in fashioning its preliminary injunctive relief the District Court took into account the possible injury a delayed order of reinstatement might have had on individuals hired by Chrysler during the pendency of this lawsuit. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.1983) (where excessive delay in complying with reinstatement order, District Court may bump employee hired to fill comparable job during period after which original order issued). The District Court's preliminary injunction, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion, even if it ultimately had the incidental effect of reinstatement. Accordingly, we deny Chrysler's petition for rehearing.