American Security Vanlines, Inc., et al. v. Robert J. Gallagher, Appellant

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. - 782 F.2d 1056

Argued Jan. 15, 1986.Decided Jan. 31, 1986

Douglas J. Rykhus, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Bruce E. Mitchell, for appellees.

Before GINSBURG and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges, and McGOWAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion Per Curiam.

1

PER CURIAM:

2

Defendant-appellant Robert J. Gallagher, an attorney, dishonored an agreement settling an action in which he had been charged with malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The agreement, incorporating modifications suggested by the trial judge, was entered as a district court judgment on March 1, 1984. Gallagher made initial payments pursuant to the agreement but soon defaulted, prompting plaintiffs' application to the district court, on May 22, 1984, to enforce the settlement. The district court considered Gallagher's several challenges to the agreement and, in a comprehensive Memorandum, rejected the attacks as meritless. American Security Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, No. 83-0074 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1985). Gallagher now appeals from the district court's order enforcing the settlement.

3

We affirm and, on our own motion, direct appellant and attorney for appellant to pay the costs and counsel fees reasonably incurred by appellees in responding to an appeal that fully warrants the characterization "frivolous." See 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1912, 1927; Fed.R.App.P. 38; cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.

4

Gallagher offers no tenable argument for disturbing the careful adjudication of this case by the district court. In the main he repeats implausible, far-fetched, or tardily-raised objections answered with thoroughgoing clarity in the district court's Memorandum. His central thrust is that he should be released from an undertaking he now regrets because, when he entered into the settlement agreement, he was in a "distraught frame of mind occasioned by his belief that he would lose the [malpractice/breach of fiduciary duty] case," whereupon he would face a judgment he could not pay and, eventually, referral to the Grievance Committee leading to disbarment. Brief of Appellant at i, 9, 10.

5

Neither in his brief nor at oral argument did Gallagher suggest any distinction between his case and that of any other attorney charged with malpractice or serious breach of duty who enters a settlement, understandably with a heavy mind, and later regrets his agreement. Instead, Gallagher urged that his plight is "virtually the same" as that of a personal injury plaintiff, destitute, sorely disabled, unfamiliar with the language of the law, indeed, barely able to speak English, who is pressed into signing a release for a relatively modest sum by her own attorney. Id. at 10 (asserting as authority controlling the instant case Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197 (D.C.Cir.1949)). The analogy is not well made. However, it typifies the quality of argument imposed upon the district court, and now upon us, in this case. For further exposition of Gallagher's stout resistance to the objectively reasonable settlement, we include as an appendix to this disposition the cogent Memorandum filed by the district court. No additional comment from this bench is necessary. See D.C.Cir.R. 13(c).

6

This appeal, we conclude, has unconscionably delayed secure receipt by appellees of the periodic payments Gallagher agreed to make in exchange for the termination of the malpractice/breach of fiduciary duty claims that opened this litigation. Both Gallagher and counsel who advanced frivolous argument for him, thereby multiplying proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously, may be held accountable for the expenses and counsel fees reasonably incurred by appellees in responding to the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1912, 1927; Fed.R.App.P. 38; In re TCI Limited, 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir.1985). We accordingly order that appellees' costs and counsel fees reasonably incurred on appeal shall be borne jointly and severally by appellant and attorney for appellant. The parties shall endeavor diligently and in good faith to agree upon the fee. If they are unable to reach an agreement promptly, appellees shall submit to the court a statement setting out their counsel's hours and rate for the representation reasonably furnished in this appeal.

7

The court's mandate in this case shall issue forthwith.

8

It is so ordered.

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APPENDIX

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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[Filed Feb. 27, 1985]