Justia Federal District Court Opinions

Twin brothers J. and H. Doe¹ took summer jobs with the City of Belleville, Illinois. They quit after two months, fed up with the unrelenting harassment to which they had been subjected by their male co-workers. By their parents, they subsequently filed suit against the city, contending that they were sexually harassed in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they were constructively discharged in retaliation for protesting the harassment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Belleville, reasoning principally that because both the Does and their harassers were heterosexual males, the plaintiffs could not show that they were harassed "because of" their sex. We conclude that sexual harassment of a man by other men is actionable under Title VII and that the evidence in this case, construed in the Does' favor, permits the inference that they were harassed because of their sex. The fact that the Does' harassers are not gay--a fact that some courts view as dispositive--is, in our view, immaterial. Consequently, although we affirm the entry of summary judgment in Belleville's favor on the plaintiffs' retaliation claim, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on their Title VII and Fourteenth Amendment claims of sex discrimination and remand for a trial on those claims.

For purposes of summary judgment, the city has not disputed the plaintiffs' account of what occurred during their employment. We are, in any event, bound to credit the plaintiffs' version of events at this juncture. Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir.1991) (en banc). We therefore accept the following facts as true.

J. and H. Doe were sixteen years old when they were hired by the City of Belleville in 1992 to cut weeds and grass in the municipal cemetery. From the first, both young men were subjected to a relentless campaign of harassment by their male coworkers. For the ostensible purpose of differentiating between the brothers, the other men (all of whom were significantly older than the plaintiffs) nicknamed J., who apparently was overweight, the "fat boy" and dubbed H., who wore an earring, the "fag" or the "queer." Day in and day out, both brothers were subjected to such ridicule, but it was H. who was the main target of the daily verbal abuse, most of which was served up by co-worker Jeff Dawe. Dawe, a former Marine of imposing stature, constantly referred to H. as "queer" and "fag" and urged H. to "go back to San Francisco with the rest of the queers." Dawe also repeatedly inquired of H., "Are you a boy or a girl?" Dawe soon took to calling H. his "bitch" and said that he was going to take him "out to the woods" and "get [him] up the ass." Dawe regularly made these sorts of remarks in the presence of other co-workers, who joined in the harassment with derogatory remarks of their own. On one occasion, for example, Dave Harris encouraged Dawe to take H. out and "get a piece of that young ass." Like Dawe, Stan Goodwin, the plaintiffs' supervisor, referred to H. as a "queer" or "fag" because H. wore an earring. Once, in reference to Dawe's repeated announcement that he planned to take H. "out to the woods" for sexual purposes, Goodwin asked Dawe whether H. was "tight or loose," "would he scream or what?"

For the most part, the co-workers spared J. from these sorts of taunts, content to deride him as the "fat boy." One day, however, after H. contracted a case of poison ivy on his arms, chest, and crotch, Dawe inquired of J. in graphic terms whether H. had passed along his own case of poison ivy to J. through anal sex. Before J. could respond, Goodwin and Harris chimed in that if that were the case, then Dawe must have contracted a rash as well, since he was always taking H. "out to the woods."

The verbal taunting of H. turned physical one day when Harris, noting that H. was in ill humor, told Dawe that his "bitch" appeared to be grumpy and urged Dawe to do something about it. Dawe, who had just returned from a lunch that included a few drinks at a local tavern, walked toward H. saying, "I'm going to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy." H. stepped backward in an attempt to avoid Dawe, but found himself trapped against a wall. Dawe proceeded to grab H. by the testicles and, having done so, announced to the assemblage of co-workers present, "Well, I guess he's a guy." In his deposition, H. testified that following this episode he came to believe that Dawe was actually willing and able to take him out to the woods and sexually assault him.

Following the crotch-grabbing incident, both brothers decided they had had enough and resolved to quit their jobs before the end of the summer. They did not disclose any of these events to their parents, although they did reveal their desire to resign. Their parents suggested that if they did not like their jobs, they should at least give their employer two weeks' notice; hence, the following day, they told Goodwin they would be leaving in a fortnight. The Does did not disclose their actual reason for quitting; instead, fearing reprisals and further taunting if that reason were known, H. and J. concocted a story that they had gotten into some sort of trouble at home and that their father was sending them away to Oklahoma as punishment. But the Does confided in friend and fellow city employee Bonnie Boeving that they really were leaving because of the constant taunting to which they had been subjected on the job; and prior to their intended date of departure, the Does' co-workers learned through the grapevine that the Does were not bound for Oklahoma. Having discovered the deception, their co-workers subjected the Does to even more abuse, culminating in a firecracker being thrown near H., where it exploded. With two days left in their final two weeks of employment, H. and J. immediately left work and never returned.

After filing charges with the EEOC and receiving their right-to-sue letters, the Does filed suit against Belleville claiming that they had been sexually harassed and ultimately (based on the firecracker incident) discharged constructively in retaliation for protesting their mistreatment to Boeving, in violation of Title VII. They further alleged that the harassment amounted to intentional sex discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all of the plaintiffs' claims. In the court's view, the plaintiffs had not come forward with evidence supporting the notion that they were discriminated against on the basis of their sex:

The plaintiffs worked in an all male environment. Both Plaintiffs are white, heterosexual males. The employees responsible for the comments and actions are also white heterosexual males. The comments made and the actions taken did not serve to discriminate against the Plaintiffs because they were male, but rather, these actions and comments implied that the Plaintiffs were homosexual. Title VII does not afford protection [from] this type of conduct.

Order at 3-4; see Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.1984) ("Congress manifested an intention to exclude homosexuals from Title VII coverage."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 2023, 85 L.Ed.2d 304 (1985). Moreover, the court noted, the evidence suggested that neither plaintiff had construed the actions of his co-workers as sexual harassment, for when asked at their depositions whether their co-workers had "made a sexual advance" toward either of them, "asked for sexual favors," asked to "have sex" with them, or had physical contact with them "of a sexual nature," both J. and H. had responded "no." E.g., H. Dep. 29; J. Dep. 40; see Order at 4-5. Because the evidence was thus insufficient to establish sexual harassment cognizable under Title VII, the court reasoned, there could be no viable claim for retaliation, nor could there be a Fourteenth Amendment claim that the plaintiffs were deprived of equal protection. Order at 5-6.

This case was decided below on summary judgment, which is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review the district court's decision de novo, of course (e.g., Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 107 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.1997)), construing the evidence and any inferences that reasonably may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the parties opposing summary judgment, in this case J. and H. Doe (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). If, upon review of the record, we find that a reasonable factfinder might find in favor of the Does, then we must reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir.1996).

We conclude that H. Doe is entitled to a trial on his Title VII and Fourteenth Amendment claims of sexual harassment. On any given work day, H. was faced with the prospect of having his gender questioned ("Are you a boy or a girl?"), having a co-worker, Jeff Dawe, repeat his threat to assault H. sexually ("I'm going to take you out in the woods and give it to you up your ass"), often with the encouragement of others (who urged Dawe to "get a piece of that young ass" and asked if H. was "tight or loose" and "would he scream or what?"), and, ultimately, having his testicles grabbed in a proclaimed effort to determine once and for all whether he was male or female ("Well, I guess he's a guy."). If H. were a woman, no court would have any difficulty construing such abusive conduct as sexual harassment. And if the harassment were triggered by that woman's decision to wear overalls and a flannel shirt to work, for example--something her harassers might perceive to be masculine just as they apparently perceived H.'s decision to wear an earring to be feminine--the court would have all the confirmation that it needed that the harassment indeed amounted to discrimination on the basis of sex.² The fact that H. is male changes the analysis not at all, as we explain below. We believe, then, that there is more than enough evidence that would permit the factfinder to conclude that his workplace was made hostile because of his sex.

Our focus throughout this opinion largely will be on H., rather than J. Doe. The harassment to which the parties have devoted most of their attention is the conduct targeted specifically at him, and we believe it is that harassment that most vividly illustrates why same-sex harassment is actionable as sex discrimination. Like his brother, J. was the object of considerable harassment himself. The sexual nature of this harassment is less evident from the record before us than the harassment that H. Doe endured. Yet, the parties and the district court alike have addressed the Does' claims collectively, and the city in particular has made no meaningful effort to distinguish J. Doe's claims from his brother's. J. Doe is therefore entitled to a trial on his statutory and constitutional claims of sex discrimination as well.

We affirm the entry of summary judgment on the Does' Title VII retaliation claim, however. The evidence does not suggest that the brothers' coworkers drove them from their jobs because they had complained of their mistreatment to another city employee.

Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 1986, the Supreme Court held for the first time that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). The Court embraced the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's position that "sexual harassment," described as " '[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature' " (id. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2404, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)), constitutes a form of sex discrimination (id. at 66-67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405). It also rejected the notion that such harassment must be linked to an economic quid pro quo in order to be actionable. Id. at 64-65, 106 S.Ct. at 2404-05. So long as the harassment complained of is sufficiently severe or pervasive " 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment,' " it affects a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment and thus runs afoul of the statute. Id. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982)). Harassment based on race, religion, and national origin had been recognized as the basis for Title VII "hostile environment" claims, the Court noted; so too should harassment based on sex. Id. at 66, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. " 'Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.' " Id. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902). More recently, in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Meritor and clarified that a plaintiff need not prove a psychological injury in order to recover for sexual harassment in the workplace; "[s]o long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious." Id. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371 (citation omitted).

Given that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII as a form of sex discrimination, courts typically speak of the threshold question presented by a sexual harassment claim as being whether the plaintiff was harassed "because of" her sex. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371 ("Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality" is offended when "the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion or national origin") (emphasis supplied); Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir.1996); Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir.1994); Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111, 114 S.Ct. 1054, 127 L.Ed.2d 375 (1994); Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 758, 107 L.Ed.2d 774 (1990); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir.1985). We frame the question in this manner because "Title VII is not directed against unpleasantness per se but only ... against discrimination in the conditions of employment"; thus it is not any and all harassment that is actionable under Title VII, but (for our purposes here) only harassment that is in some way linked to the plaintiff's sex. Carr, 32 F.3d at 1009.

The requirement of a nexus between the harassment and the plaintiff's gender gives rise to two questions that we confront here. First, as a matter of law, can a man ever establish that he was harassed "because of" his sex in violation of Title VII, when the harassment he complains of was inflicted by another man? The district court, citing the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir.1994), suggested not (Order at 4), and Belleville likewise relies on Garcia to argue that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII as a matter of law. Second, if sexual harassment of a male by another male is actionable under Title VII, must the plaintiff offer proof, beyond the explicitly sexual nature of the harassment, that his gender motivated the harasser and that a similarly situated female worker would not have been harassed? In particular, must the plaintiff prove that his harasser was sexually oriented toward the same gender?

A. Does Title VII reach same-sex harassment?

Of course, "[t]he lion's share of sexual harassment situations features the man as the harasser and the woman as the harassee." Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir.1995); see also Martha Chamallas, Essay, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 38 n. 3 (1993) (discussing EEOC statistics); Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is It Sex Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36 SANTA CLARA L.REV. 1147, 1148 (1996) (same). But Title VII on its face draws no distinction between men and women, either as plaintiffs or harassers, and the EEOC describes sexual harassment in gender-neutral terms.³ The Supreme Court, in interpreting the statute, has never indicated that women alone may bring sexual harassment claims or that men may do so only when they are harassed by women. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. We ourselves have noted (albeit in dicta) that although "[s]exual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, ... we do not mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases." Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1995); see also McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir.1996) ("a difference in sex is not a necessary condition of sexual activity and hence (most courts think) of sexual harassment").⁴ Accord Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n. 55 (D.C.Cir.1977); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1981); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n. 4 (3d Cir.1977); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142-43 (4th Cir.1996); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 447-48 (6th Cir.1997); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 n. 4, 1377, 1379 (8th Cir.1996); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082, 115 S.Ct. 733, 130 L.Ed.2d 636 (1995); Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir.1997); see also Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir.1993) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) ("harassment is harassment regardless of whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192-93 (1st Cir.1990) (assuming without discussion that male on male harassment is actionable under Title VII); Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1028-31 (10th Cir.1993) (same).

A minority of courts nonetheless have concluded that a man harassed by another man has no claim under Title VII, regardless of the scenario. The only appellate court to so hold is the Fifth Circuit. Garcia v. Elf Atochem, N.A., supra, 28 F.3d at 451-52, followed as binding precedent by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.1996), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2430, 138 L.Ed.2d 192 (1997). Garcia, unfortunately, is rather cryptic about the reasons for its holding. Quoting from a prior, unpublished order of the Fifth Circuit, the court merely proclaims: " 'Harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination.' " 28 F.3d at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533, 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. Dec.6, 1993) (unpublished), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925, 115 S.Ct. 311, 130 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994)). The court did, however, cite with approval Judge Williams' opinion in Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F.Supp. 1452 (N.D.Ill.1988), which is the leading case in this school of thought.

The plaintiff in Goluszek was an unmarried male worker who came from an "unsophisticated background," had led an "isolated existence" with "little or no sexual experience," and "blushe[d] easily." His male co-workers urged him incessantly in graphic terms to get married or allow himself to be "fixed up" with women so that he might have sex, showed him pictures of nude women, accused him of being gay or bisexual, and poked him in the buttocks with a stick. The evidence suggested that although his employer took seriously allegations that a female employee had been harassed, its response to Goluszek's complaints was lackadaisical and ineffective. Nonetheless, the court concluded that "the defendant's conduct was not the type of conduct Congress intended to sanction when it enacted Title VII." Id. at 1456.

The discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L.REV . 1449, 1451-52 (1984). Title VII does not make all forms of harassment actionable, nor does it even make all forms of verbal harassment with sexual overtones actionable. The "sexual harassment" that is actionable under Title VII "is the exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person." Id. at 1451. Actionable sexual harassment fosters a sense of degradation in the victim by attacking their [sic] sexuality. Id. at 1455. In effect, the offender is saying by words or actions that the victim is inferior because of the victim's sex. Cf. Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir.1986) ("Such severe harassment becomes discriminatory because it deprives the victim (usually female) of the right to participate in the workplace on equal footing with others similarly situated.").

697 F.Supp. at 1456. Goluszek, the court pointed out, "was a male in a male-dominated environment," and the harassment of which he complained was perpetrated by other men. Id. Consequently, the notion that he might have worked in an environment that treated men as inferior was simply implausible. Id. "In fact, Goluszek may have been harassed 'because' he is a male, but that harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the workplace." Id. Although the facts before the court in Goluszek described only one form of male on male harassment (see Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377, 1378-79, describing the range), other courts (including the Fifth Circuit in Garcia) have either approved or relied upon Goluszek's rationale in finding all manifestations of male on male sexual harassment--including a gay supervisor's harassment of a male subordinate--not to be actionable under Title VII. See, e.g., Torres v. National Precision Blanking, Div. of Nat'l Mat'l L.P., 943 F.Supp. 952 (N.D.Ill.1996), and Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F.Supp. 730 (N.D.Ill.1996) (Norgle, J.); Larry v. North Mississippi Med. Ctr., 940 F.Supp. 960, 962-64 (N.D.Miss.1996); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F.Supp. 489, 492-94 (W.D.Wash.1995); Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F.Supp. 1076, 1082 (S.D.Tex.1995), aff'd. without published op., 85 F.3d 624 (5th Cir.1996); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F.Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D.Tex.1995); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1625, 1995 WL 386793, * 2-* 3 (S.D.Ohio Dec.21, 1994), aff'd. on other grounds, 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 170, 136 L.Ed.2d 112 (1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F.Supp. 790, 796 (N.D.Ind.1994) (Sharp, C.J.), modified on reconsideration, 887 F.Supp. 1178, 1180-81 (N.D.Ind.1995);⁵ see also Dillon v. Frank, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90, 1990 WL 358586, * 5-6 (E.D.Mich.1990), aff'd. in an unpublished op., 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir.1992) (text in Westlaw); Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1995 WL 683772, * 4 (N.D.Ill. Nov.16, 1995) (Kocoras, J.), aff'd. on other grounds, 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir.1996). Belleville relies on this line of authority in defending the judgment below.

Although we agree with Goluszek that the historic imbalance of power between men and women in the workplace offers a very compelling reason why the sexual harassment of a woman by a male superior or co-worker should be understood as sex discrimination,⁶ we cannot agree that Title VII excludes from its purview men who are sexually harassed by other men. The language of Title VII, as we have already noted, does not purport to limit who may bring suit based on the sex of either the harasser or the person harassed.

As for congressional intent, the legislative history suggests that legislators had very little preconceived notion of what types of sex discrimination they were dealing with when they enacted Title VII. We noted in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, supra, that sex was added to the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination by a congressional opponent at the last moment in the hopes that it would dissuade his colleagues from approving the bill; it did not. 742 F.2d at 1085; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64, 106 S.Ct. at 2404; Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII's Ban on Discrimination "Because Of" Sex, 27 CUMB. L.REV. 231, 268-69 (1996-97). Against this backdrop, we were confident that Congress had nothing more than the traditional notion of "sex" in mind when it voted to outlaw sex discrimination, and that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and transsexualism, for example, did not fall within the purview of Title VII. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-86. But to attribute to Congress an intent solely to strike at sexual harassment reflecting the historic exploitation of women by their male co-workers reads far too much into a legislative history that amounts to little more than a last-ditch effort to scuttle the entire statute. Moreover, the degree to which Congress was concerned with the barriers to equality that women encounter in the workplace "does not create 'a negative inference' limiting the scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment." Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 2629, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983).⁷

It is, ultimately, the plain, unambiguous language of the statute upon which we must focus. E.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1169, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) ("If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Time Warner Cable v. Doyle, 66 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir.1995) ("the plain language of the statute is the most reliable indicator of congressional intent"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 974, 133 L.Ed.2d 894 (1996). There is no ambiguity here. As we noted at the outset of this discussion, the words of Title VII suggest that anyone discriminated against "because of" such individual's sex may bring suit, regardless of his gender or that of his harasser. The facial breadth of the statute has led our colleagues in the Fourth, the Sixth, the Eighth, and the Eleventh Circuits, and in district courts within and without this Circuit to conclude that same-sex harassment claims are viable under Title VII. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., supra, 99 F.3d at 141-43; Yeary v. Goodwill Indus. Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d at 447-48; Quick v. Donaldson Co., supra, 90 F.3d at 1376-80;⁸ Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., supra, 112 F.3d at 1506; Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 697, 701-05 (E.D.Wis.1996) (Stadtmueller, C.J.); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D.Wis.1996) (Warren, J.); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 44,265, 1996 WL 515175, * 2-* 3 (N.D.Ill. Sep.6, 1996) (Conlon, J.); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F.Supp. 781 (C.D.Ill.1996) (Mills, J.) (assuming without deciding); Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., 1996 WL 89148 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 27, 1996) (Shadur, J.); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, 1996 WL 5322, at * 5-7 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 3, 1996) (Leinenweber, J.); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 43,620, 1995 WL 420040, * 2-3 (S.D.Ill. Mar. 29, 1995) (Gilbert, C.J.); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F.Supp. 805, 806-07 (N.D.Ind.1995) (Sharp, C.J.); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, Div. of Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 887 F.Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D.Ill.1995) (Mihm, C.J.); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F.Supp. 307, 310 (N.D.Ill.1981) (Shadur, J.); Barlow v. Northwestern Mem. Hosp., 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 43,831, 1980 WL 128728, * 1 (N.D.Ill. July 14, 1980) (Marovitz, J.); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 1990 WL 165611, * 7 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. Oct.16, 1990) (Bobrick, M.J.); see also, e.g., Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F.Supp. 962, 967-69 (D.N.J.1997); McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966 F.Supp. 1209, 1217-18 (M.D.Ga.1997); Wiley v. Burger King, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 44,379, 1996 WL 648455 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 7, 1996); Wehrle v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F.Supp. 234, 236 (W.D.Ok.1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F.Supp 357, 360-61 (D.Colo.1996); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F.Supp. 1495, 1502-03 (E.D.Va.1996); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 44,153, 1996 WL 368316, * 2-3 (E.D.Pa. June 21, 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F.Supp. 269, 272-73 (D.Utah 1996); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F.Supp. 393, 400-03 (D.Minn.1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F.Supp. 1, 7-10 (D.D.C.1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 43,784, 1995 WL 640502, * 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995), interlocutory appeal certified, 69 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 1995 WL 710205 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1995); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F.Supp. 161, 166-68 (E.D.Pa.1995); Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 905 F.Supp. 1368, 1378-80 (C.D.Cal.1995), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.Supp. 283, 286-88 (D.D.C.1995); Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F.Supp. 60, 62-62 (D.P.R.1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F.Supp. 1100, 1102-04 (M.D.Tenn.1995); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F.Supp. 1545, 1549-51 (M.D.Ala.1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F.Supp. 537, 541, 542 (M.D.Ala.1983), aff'd. without published op., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir.1984). Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit discrimination against members of any statutorily protected group, " 'minority or majority.' " McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971)) (emphasis in McDonald ). Put another way, Title VII "protect[s] persons, not classes," as we noted recently. Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir.1996) (per curiam); see also Newport News, 462 U.S. at 682, 103 S.Ct. at 2630 ("Male as well as female employees are protected against discrimination [under Title VII]").⁹ Cf. Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 424 Mass. 285, 676 N.E.2d 45, 47-48 (1997) (interpreting Massachusetts statute proscribing sexual harassment to reach same-sex harassment perpetrated by heterosexual person); Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 300 N.J.Super. 202, 692 A.2d 131 (N.J.Super.L.1996) (finding New Jersey anti-discrimination statute to reach same-sex harassment perpetrated on male perceived to be a virgin and effeminate); Cummings v. Koehnen, 556 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn.App.1996), review granted (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997) (finding sexual harassment actionable under Minnesota Human Rights Act regardless of gender or sexual orientation of either victim or harasser), affirmed, 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn.1997).

We therefore reject the narrow construction of Title VII advanced by Goluszek, Garcia, and their progeny. Unless we read into the statute limitations that have no foundation in the broad, gender-neutral language that Congress employed, it is evident that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under Title VII, no matter what her gender or that of her harasser.

B. What evidence is required to show that same-sex harassment has occurred "because of" the plaintiff's sex?

Title VII bars an employer from discriminating against an employee because of her sex (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)), and thus, as we noted above, courts typically require a plaintiff complaining of sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, to demonstrate that the discrimination occurred "because of" her gender. E.g., Pasqua, 101 F.3d at 517. This requirement has not detained courts long in cases of opposite-sex harassment; it is generally taken as a given that when a female employee is harassed in explicitly sexual ways by a male worker or workers, she has been discriminated against "because of" her sex. E.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, supra, 755 F.2d at 604. But courts by and large have been unwilling to make the same assumption when a man harasses another man in the workplace, however rife the harassment may be with sexual innuendo, sexual contact, and other conduct of an explicitly sexual nature. E.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 & n. 5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 72, 136 L.Ed.2d 32 (1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.) (opinion of Niemeyer, J.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 70, 136 L.Ed.2d 30 (1996). They have looked instead for proof, above and beyond the sexual content of the harassment itself, that the plaintiff was singled out for harassment because of his gender. Id.

One may reasonably infer from the evidence before us that H. Doe was harassed "because of" his gender. If that cannot be inferred from the sexual character of the harassment itself, it can be inferred from the harassers' evident belief that in wearing an earring, H. Doe did not conform to male standards. Thus the repeated inquiries as to whether he was "a guy or a girl," for example. The fact that none of the harassers is gay does not defeat the claim of sexual harassment, as the district court believed. Although we have no quarrel with the notion that same-sex, sexual harassment perpetrated by a gay or lesbian individual amounts to sex discrimination, we do not agree that same-sex, sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only when the harasser is sexually oriented toward members of his or her own gender. We have never made the viability of sexual harassment claims dependent upon the sexual orientation of the harasser, and we are convinced that it would be both unwise and improper to begin doing so. Fears that if such a requirement is not imposed, commonplace "horseplay" will give rise to sexual harassment claims are, we believe, unfounded. Sexual harassment law already provides the means for distinguishing between isolated instances of non-severe harassment and the truly hostile working environment.

The divergent answers courts have given to the question of when same-sex harassment constitutes sex discrimination necessitates that we spend some time addressing each of these points below. But we do not wish the length of our analysis to detract from what we believe to be the straightforward nature of this case. As we observed at the outset, if H. were a woman, there would be no agonizing over whether the harassment the plaintiffs have described could be understood as sex discrimination. The happenstance that he is instead male should not make for an entirely different analysis, particularly for purposes of a statute that forbids sex discrimination.

The need for proof that the plaintiff was targeted for harassment because of his gender is evident in cases where the harassment is not explicitly sexual (the type of harassment the EEOC cites in its guideline (see n. 3, supra)), but is gender-based nevertheless. Harassment can obviously take many forms, and although mere profanity, "shoptalk," and other manifestations of "general unpleasantness" in the workplace typically will not by themselves support a Title VII claim (Carr, 32 F.3d at 1009, 1010), harassment lacking in sexual overtones may nonetheless support a claim for sex discrimination when it is visited upon workers of one gender but not the other. This is typically referred to as "gender harassment." See 3 Lex K. Larson, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 46.01 (2d ed.1995). Thus, "any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII" (McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C.Cir.1985) (emphasis supplied); see also Carson, 82 F.3d at 158-59); and hostile environment claims are "in no way limited ... to intimidation or ridicule of an explicitly sexual nature" (Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir.1990)). See also Carr, 32 F.3d at 1010; Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir.1993); Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.1987); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir.1985); Curde v. Xytel Corp., 912 F.Supp. 335, 340 (N.D.Ill.1995). A woman employed in a male-dominated workplace with an antipathy toward female workers might find her tools constantly missing, her locker broken into, and her work sabotaged, for example, as part of a campaign of harassment motivated by her gender yet devoid of sexual innuendo and contact. In such a case, the plaintiff necessarily must show differential treatment of men and women, or an animus to her own gender, in view of the fact that the harassment itself does not suggest a nexus to the plaintiff's gender. See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447, 449 (3d Cir.1994); Vore v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir.1994); Cline v. General Elec. Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 748 F.Supp. 650, 654-55 (N.D.Ill.1990); Carrie N. Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based Harassment of Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271, 316-17 (1994).

It is not clear why such proof is needed when the harassment has explicit sexual overtones, however. Arguably, the content of that harassment in and of itself demonstrates the nexus to the plaintiff's gender that Title VII requires. Thus, the Third Circuit has remarked that "[t]he intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course." Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n. 3; see also Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir.1994) (opinion of Reinhardt, J.) ("[S]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex. What else could it be based on?") (emphasis in original); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n. 5 (5th Cir.1986) ("Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 952, 93 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1987) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, supra, 682 F.2d at 905 n. 11); Jones v. Aspin, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. para. 43,005, 1994 WL 88988, at * 1 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 1, 1994); Frey v. Pennsylvania Airlines, 859 F.Supp. 137, 144 (M.D.Pa.1992); Cline, 748 F.Supp. at 654. And as the district court observed in Cline:

Sexual harassment cases differ because the discriminatory nature of the charged conduct speaks for itself. The main issue in sexual harassment cases is not whether the employer harassed the employee on the basis of her gender, but whether the claimed harassment affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff's employment, as Title VII uses those words.

Id.; accord Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir.1983) ("In cases involving claims of sexual harassment, ... the sexual advance or insult almost always will represent 'an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy.' Therefore, once the plaintiff in such a case proves that harassment took place, the most difficult legal question typically will concern the responsibility of the employer for the harassment.") (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, supra, 641 F.2d at 945); see also Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir.1996) (reasonable jury could find that intent to discriminate is implicit in use of racial code words) (citing, inter alia, Futrell v. J.I. Case, 38 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir.1994) (age bias could be inferred from remarks that company needed "sharp young people" and that plaintiff was not a "forward enough thinker")); Vore, 32 F.3d at 1164 (racially hostile remarks, graffiti, and other conduct are indicative of "obvious" animus). This view is consistent with the EEOC's guideline, which does not focus on whether the harasser singled out the victim on the basis of her gender, but instead provides simply that "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute[s] sexual harassment when ... such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (quoted in full at n. 3, supra).

The harassment of which H. Doe complains, although certainly disagreeable, does not fall into the category of "general unpleasantness" or generic "shoptalk." It was targeted specifically at H. and it was explicitly sexual--it both revolved around his gender and specifically alluded to sexual conduct. From his first day at work, H. was repeatedly referred to as a "bitch" (sometimes as Dawe's "bitch")¹⁰ and asked whether he was "a boy or a girl"; was threatened with a trip "out to the woods" where Dawe would "get him up the ass"; and, last but not least, he was backed up to a wall and his testicles grabbed so that Dawe might "finally find out if [H. is] a girl or a guy." In view of the overt references to H.'s gender and the repeated allusions to sexual assault, it would appear unnecessary to require any further proof that H.'s gender had something to do with this harassment; the acts speak for themselves in that regard.¹¹

But some cases can be read to suggest that even the explicitly sexual nature of the harassment is not enough to establish that the harassment was discriminatory for purposes of Title VII. Sexual harassment traditionally has been explained as sex discrimination by pointing out that the harassed plaintiff is subjected to treatment that members of the other gender are not. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (" 'Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.' ") (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902) (emphasis supplied); Harris, 510 U.S. at 25, 114 S.Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Div. of Texas-American Petrochemicals, Inc., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.1986) ("to prove a claim of abusive work environment premised on sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she would not have been the object of harassment but for her sex"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1983, 95 L.Ed.2d 823 (1987); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 ("In proving a claim for a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment ..., the plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment"); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n. 7 ("the question is one of but-for causation: would the complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different gender"); Blozis, 896 F.Supp. at 806-07. The familiar notion is thus that a woman sexually harassed by a man may claim discrimination under Title VII because the harasser is, presumably, heterosexual and would not have bothered her if she were a man. See, e.g., Horn, 755 F.2d at 604 ("But for Horn's womanhood, [her supervisor] would not have demanded sex as a condition of employment."). In the same way, a gay man who sexually harasses a male co-worker "discriminates" because he presumably has no interest in treating a female coworker in the same way. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 & n. 55; Peric, 1996 WL 515175, at * 3; Raney, 892 F.Supp. at 288; Nogueras, 890 F.Supp. at 63; Walden Book Co., 885 F.Supp. at 1103-04; Prescott, 878 F.Supp. at 1550-51; Joyner, 597 F.Supp. at 542; Wright, 511 F.Supp. at 309-10.

Yet, we must question whether it is appropriate to view sexual harassment as actionable sex discrimination only when the plaintiff is able to show that she was harassed because she was a woman rather than a man, or vice versa. Proof that the harasser was motivated to target (or in practice did target) one gender and not the other may be necessary where the harassment is not on its face sexual, as we have discussed, but such proof would seem unnecessary when the harassment itself is imbued with sexual overtones. Recall that the premise of the hostile environment claim (which is what the Does are asserting) is that the conditions of the plaintiff's work environment have been altered in a way that made the environment hostile to him or her as a man or woman. E.g., Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371 (Title VII is violated when "the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin") (emphasis supplied); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454-55 (7th Cir.1994) ("the test under Title VII is ... whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered") (citations omitted); see Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay? The False Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REV . 201, 232-33 (1996), Regina L. Stone-Harris, Comment, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment--The Next Step in the Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 269, 295-97 (1996); Deering, supra, 27 CUMB. L.REV . at 289-90. Thus, so long as the environment itself is hostile to the plaintiff because of her sex, why the harassment was perpetrated (sexual interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) is beside the point. If H. and J. were twin brother and sister, for example, it would not be permissible for their co-workers to pervasively refer to J. as "the chick," to grab her breasts, and to threaten to undress and assault her ostensibly to tell the two of them apart. Whatever the reason she were harassed in this way, the work environment would be rendered hostile to J. as a woman. For it is one thing to berate a female worker as "worthless"; although derogatory, the term on its face is gender neutral, and a hostile environment claim founded upon that type of generic harassment typically would require proof that women were belittled while men were not. But, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, it is quite another "to call her 'a worthless broad,' " Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., supra, 25 F.3d at 1464, to berate her with terms like "bitch" and "cunt." See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L.REV . 1, 90-92 (1995).

When the harasser sets out to harass a female employee using names, threats, and physical contact that are unmistakably gender-based, he ensures that the work environment becomes hostile to her as a woman--in other words, that the workplace is hostile to her "because of" her sex. Regardless of why the harasser has targeted the woman, her gender has become inextricably intertwined with the harassment. Likewise, when a woman's breasts are grabbed or when her buttocks are pinched, the harassment necessarily is linked to her gender. See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 861 n. 15 (3d Cir.1990) (" '[w]omen's sexuality largely defines women as women in this society, so violations of it are abuses of women as women' ") (quoting Catherine A. MacKinnon, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979)). It would not seem to matter that the harasser might simultaneously be harassing a male co-worker with comparable epithets and comparable physical molestation. When a male employee's testicles are grabbed, his torment might be comparable, but the point is that he experiences that harassment as a man, not just as a worker, and she as a woman. In each case, the victim's gender not only supplies the lexicon of the harassment, it affects how he or she will experience that harassment; and in anything short of a truly unisex society, men's and women's experiences will be different.¹² In that sense, each arguably is the victim of sex discrimination. See Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464 ("Even if [the harasser] used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally degrading manner against male employees, he cannot thereby 'cure' his conduct toward women.... [A]lthough words from a man to a man are differently received than words from a man to a woman, we do not rule out the possibility that both men and women working at Showboat have viable claims ... for sexual harassment.") (emphasis in original); see also Miller v. Vesta, supra, 946 F.Supp. at 706.

Looked at in another light, the explicitly sexual harassment of a female worker amounts to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII not simply because her harasser might be heterosexual, and thus would not be sexually interested in a man, and not simply because a man might not encounter comparable harassment in the workplace, but because her employment is now conditioned upon her willingness to endure harassment that is inseparable from her gender. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, supra, 682 F.2d at 902); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., supra, 904 F.2d at 859-60. When she is taunted day after day in sexual terms, told she will be taken into a back room for sexual purposes, and has her breasts grabbed to determine whether she is "a boy or a girl," she is no longer an employee but a sexual object, judged not by how well she does her job but by how she measures against the sexual standards of her co-workers. Id. at 861 n. 15. From her point of view, and from the perspective of any reasonable person, the harasser's motives are immaterial. Perhaps the harasser is sexually attracted to her, perhaps he just wants her job and figures that harassing her sexually would be the most effective way of driving her from it; either way, the environment is hostile, and the hostility is inescapably and irrevocably linked to her gender.

The same is true of racial harassment, for example. If an African American is repeatedly subjected to racial slurs and talk of lynching by his co-workers, we typically do not ask, "But was he singled out because of his race?" See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.1991); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir.1986). Perhaps intuitively, we understand that the harassment, perpetrated through the vehicle of race, is discriminatory and injurious in and of itself, even if his harassers wanted to make his life miserable for reasons altogether unrelated to the color of his skin. See Frantz Fanon, The Fact of Blackness in THE ANATOMY OF RACISM 108-11 (David Theo Goldberg, ed., 1990); see also, e.g., Daniels, 937 F.2d at 1273 & n. 3, 1274 & n. 4; Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464; Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., supra, 85 F.3d at 1083.¹³ With that understanding in mind, it is not difficult to imagine an abusive supervisor simultaneously harassing several subordinates of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, but in each instance choosing an epithet, symbol, or gesture that he surely knows will have a uniquely hurtful and intimidating impact upon its intended target. Perhaps he paints a swastika on the locker of a Jewish employee, while he threatens a worker of Japanese ancestry with internment. The discrimination in that scenario lies not in the selection of victims (which might be random) but in the decision to perpetrate the harassment through words and conduct charged with unmistakable racial, religious, and ethnic overtones, creating a work environment that is uniquely hostile to each victim because of his particular race, religion, or ethnicity. See Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser As a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383, 413-14 (1996).

Just so here. We doubt that it would have mattered for H. Doe to know, when his testicles were in Dawe's grasp, that Dawe was heterosexual or (as his deposition reveals) that he lived with a woman (Dawe Dep. 51-52), and thus that he may not have been sexually interested in H. The experience was still humiliating in a deeply personal way, as only sexual acts can be. See Katz v. Dole, supra, 709 F.2d at 254; Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1140, 103 L.Ed.2d 201 (1989); Catherine A. MacKinnon, ONLY WORDS 60 (1993). It may not have been an "overt sexual advance" in the sense that it reflected a desire to have sex with H. See post at 598-599. But aside from being unwelcome, it was a grave intrusion upon H.'s sexual privacy and, given the remarks that accompanied the assault, an explicit comment upon his gender. Frankly, we find it hard to think of a situation in which someone intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons entirely unrelated to that person's gender. But the overall context of the harassment alleged in this case--the name-calling, the references to sexual assault, and the intrusive, intimate touching, all of which expressly invoked H.'s gender--certainly makes it reasonable to infer that the workplace was made hostile to him because of his gender. And to the extent that their mind-set is pertinent, we also think that one can reasonably infer that Dawe and his cohorts chose to harass H. in the way that they did with just this likelihood in mind--that is, that their intent was to humiliate him as a man.

We view with considerable skepticism, therefore, the notion that same-sex harassment that is overtly sexual and sex-based is only sex discrimination when the plaintiff can produce proof that the harasser chose him specifically because he is male. Again, we have difficulty imagining when harassment of this kind would not be, in some measure, "because of" the harassee's sex--when one's genitals are grabbed, when one is denigrated in gender-specific language, and when one is threatened with sexual assault, it would seem to us impossible to de-link the harassment from the gender of the individual harassed. We need not so decide, however, because there is more linking the harassment to the plaintiff's gender here.

Assuming arguendo that proof other than the explicit sexual character of the harassment is indeed necessary to establish that same-sex harassment qualifies as sex discrimination, the fact that H. Doe apparently was singled out for this abuse because the way in which he projected the sexual aspect of his personality (and by that we mean his gender) did not conform to his coworkers' view of appropriate masculine behavior supplies that proof here. The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), makes clear that Title VII does not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles. Price Waterhouse was a case in which the parties were at odds over whether Ann Hopkins was denied a partnership in an accounting firm based on an illegitimate criterion--sex--or a legitimate one-interpersonal skills. Hopkins pointed to the firm's reliance upon gender stereotypes as evidence that sex was the motivating factor in the decision: her reviews asserted that she was "macho," "over-compensated for being a woman," needed "a course at charm school," and was "a lady using foul language" (id. at 235, 109 S.Ct. at 1782); moreover, when a partner explained the adverse vote to Hopkins, he advised her that she ought to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" in order to brighten her prospects for making partner in the future (id. at 235, 109 S.Ct. at 1782). Six members of the Court agreed that this evidence bespoke gender discrimination and as such was sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant to show that it would have denied Hopkins the promotion even had it not relied on sex in determining her suitability for admission to the partnership.¹⁴ In no uncertain terms, the plurality firmly rejected Price Waterhouse's suggestion that such stereotyping was irrelevant to Hopkins' Title VII claim:

[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for " '[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.' " Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1375, n. 13, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (C.A.7 1971).

490 U.S. at 251, 109 S.Ct. at 1791. (Neither Justice White, nor Justice O'Connor, each of whom concurred in the judgment, had any quarrel with that proposition.)

Just as the accounting firm's reliance upon gender stereotypes informed the Court's decision in Price Waterhouse that Ann Hopkins had presented sufficient proof that she was denied a partnership because of her sex and not some other factor, evidence that the same stereotypes animated H. Doe's co-workers suggests that the harassment they perpetrated on him was "because of" his sex. A woman who is harassed in the workplace with the degree of severity or pervasiveness that our cases require¹⁵ because her personality, her figure, her clothing, her hairstyle, or her decision not to wear jewelry or cosmetics is perceived as unacceptably "masculine" is harassed "because of" her sex even if the harassment itself is not explicitly sexual. See supra at 575-576. In the same way, a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed "because of" his sex. Read favorably to the plaintiffs, the testimony here suggests that H. Doe was harassed (in an explicitly sexual fashion, we reiterate) in whole or in part because he wore an earring, a fact that evidently suggested to his co-workers that he was a "girl" or, in their more vulgar view, a "bitch." Cf. post at 598 (reasoning that discharge of male receptionist by male supervisor who believes it more appropriate for women to greet customers amounts to sex discrimination); Hines v. Caston School Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (school board's ban on male students wearing earrings defended as a policy that "creates discipline, a sense of pride, and positive attitudes among students because it discourages rebellion against local community standards of dress, under which earrings are considered female attire"). Just as in Price Waterhouse, then, gender stereotyping establishes the link to the plaintiff's sex that Title VII requires. The contexts of the two cases are admittedly different, but the differences are immaterial. The question in both cases is whether a particular action (in Price Waterhouse, the exclusion from partnership, here, the harassment by co-workers) can be attributed to sex; reliance upon stereotypical notions about how men and women should appear and behave (in Price Waterhouse, by the partners, here, by H. Doe's tormentors) reasonably suggests that the answer to that question is yes. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D.Fla.1991). One need only consider for a moment whether H.'s gender would have been questioned for wearing an earring (see post at 601, 607) if he were a woman rather than a man. It seems an obvious inference to us that it would not. Cf. Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, supra n. 2, 845 F.2d at 902 (female employee's decision to wear pants prompted male co-workers to remark "[w]e're going to take your pants off and put a skirt on you," and "we're going to take your clothes off to see if you are real").¹⁶ (Of course, this is ultimately for the factfinder to resolve; we are merely considering what inferences one may reasonably draw from the evidence before us.)

The city maintains that this case cannot be fit within the Price Waterhouse framework because "[t]he type of stereotyping actionable under Price Waterhouse is that of traditionally perceived personality traits, not personal appearance or physical traits." Belleville Br. at 8. That is simply wrong. Price Waterhouse itself recognizes that gender discrimination may manifest itself in the employer's stereotypical notions as to how an employee of a given gender should dress and present herself. Ann Hopkins was, after all, told that she might improve her chances for partnership if she would only "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 490 U.S. at 235, 109 S.Ct. at 1782. The plurality found such remarks to be highly probative of actionable sex stereotyping (id. at 251, 109 S.Ct. at 1791), noting that "it [does not] require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed 'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism" (id. at 256, 109 S.Ct. at 1793); see also id. at 272, 109 S.Ct. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring). We ourselves recognized ten years in advance of Price Waterhouse that workplace dress codes founded on cultural stereotypes are not permissible under Title VII. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.1979) (invalidating rule requiring female but not male employees to wear bank-approved uniforms), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 1316, 63 L.Ed.2d 762 (1980).

It is true, as Belleville reminds us, that courts have afforded employers a certain amount of latitude to adopt employee grooming standards that are not entirely gender neutral. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir.1979) (discharge of male nursery school teacher because he was perceived as effeminate for wearing earring beyond purview of Title VII)¹⁷; cf. Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921, 111 S.Ct. 297, 112 L.Ed.2d 251 (1990) (rejecting due process and First Amendment claims of male police officers disciplined for wearing earrings while off duty). But these cases are entirely inapposite here. H. Doe is not suing Belleville in order to challenge a workplace rule that forbade him from wearing an earring. The city had no such rule.¹⁸ H. instead points to the earring, and his co-workers' apparent belief that an earring is a feminine accoutrement not suitable for male adornment, as evidence that his gender had something to do with the harassment heaped upon him. To the extent that proof of such a nexus is required in a case like this one, we see nothing wrong with H.'s theory.

The district court seemed to think that because there was no proof that the Does' harassers are gay, the Does could not, as a matter of law, show that they were harassed "because of" their sex. Order at 3-4. It is not alone in that view; a number of courts have suggested that such proof is virtually the sine qua non of a same-sex harassment claim under Title VII. E.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 72 F.3d at 1195 & n. 5; Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 77 F.3d at 752; Ward v. Ridley School Dist., 940 F.Supp. 810, 812-13 (E.D.Pa.1996); see also Shermer, 937 F.Supp. at 784.¹⁹

a.

The Fourth Circuit's recent opinions are illustrative of the emphasis on sexual orientation. Although that court has recognized the viability of same-sex harassment claims, it has suggested that the homosexuality of the plaintiff and/or his harassers is an "essential" element of the claim that must be pleaded and proved. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, supra, 72 F.3d at 1195 & n. 5. Mark McWilliams worked as an automotive mechanic for a county transportation agency. A learning disability had arrested his cognitive and emotional development, and perhaps that is what made him the target of a group of male co-workers known colloquially as the "lube boys." These men repeatedly teased and questioned McWilliams about his sex life, exposed themselves to him, and touched him in sexually suggestive ways. One co-worker made a habit of following McWilliams into the bathroom where, with a hand on the unzipped fly of his pants, he would invite McWilliams into a stall. He also repeatedly asked if he could masturbate McWilliams and on one occasion, while McWilliams was working under the dashboard of a bus, he actually did so, rubbing McWilliams' penis until it became erect. In one of several instances in which McWilliams was blindfolded, his hands were cuffed, and he was forced to his knees, this same co-worker put his finger in McWilliams' mouth and simulated an act of oral sex. In another instance, McWilliams was held down while one co-worker exposed himself and another placed a broom handle between McWilliams' buttocks. On yet another occasion, a condom was placed in McWilliams' food. Ultimately, McWilliams filed suit under Title VII, but the Fourth Circuit held in a divided opinion that the district court had properly entered summary judgment against him on this claim, because "McWilliams and all his alleged harassers were indisputably males, and no claim is made that any was homosexual." Id. at 1195. The majority explained:

We believe this result compelled by a commonsense reading of the critical causation language of the statute: "because of the [claimant's] sex." As a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in common understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male conduct alleged here (nor comparable female-on-female conduct) is considered to be "because of the [target's] 'sex.' " Perhaps "because of" the victim's known or believed prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to sexually-focussed speech or conduct. Perhaps "because of" the perpetrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecurity. Certainly, "because of" their vulgarity and insensitivity and meanness of spirit. But not specifically "because of" the victim's sex.

Id. at 1195-96 (emphasis in original). Judge Michaels, who dissented, wrote that he was inclined to hold "that Title VII is implicated whenever a person physically abuses a co-worker for sexual satisfaction or propositions or pressures a coworker out of sexual interest or desire." Id. at 1198. In his view, it was unnecessary for McWilliams to allege or prove that his harassers were homosexual. "The acts of assault and harassment are sufficiently direct and suggestive by themselves to raise the question whether they were done 'because of [McWilliams'] ... sex.' " Id. at 1199. The majority explicitly rejected this suggestion, however:

The dissent expresses concern, because of proof (and privacy?) problems about requiring such allegation and proof, but we believe it critical and eminently fair to require it if homosexuality is to be the critical fact making same-sex harassment claims cognizable under Title VII. The (ordinarily different) sexes of the relevant actors always has been an essential element of either form of Title VII sexual harassment claims. If such claims were to reach past different-sex to same-sex situations where the homosexuality of one or the other or both of the actors is involved, that added fact would seem equally essential to the statement and proof of such a claim.

Id. at 1195 n. 5.

More recently, in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., supra, Judge Niemeyer, a member of the majority in McWilliams, expounded further on why he believed proof of the harasser's sexual orientation is pertinent in a case alleging same-sex harassment. "When someone sexually harasses an individual of the opposite gender," he explained, "a presumption arises that the harassment is 'because of' the victim's gender."

This presumption is grounded on the reality that sexual conduct directed by a man, for example, toward a woman is usually undertaken because the target is female and the same conduct would not have been directed toward another male. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 (plaintiff "became the target of her superior's sexual desires because she was a woman.... [N]o male employee was susceptible to such an approach"). But when the harasser and the victim are of the same gender, the presumption is just the opposite because such sexually suggestive conduct is usually motivated by entirely different reasons.

Thus, when a male employee seeks to prove that he has been sexually harassed by a person of the same sex, he carries the burden of proving that the harassment was directed against him "because of" his sex. The principal way in which this burden may be met is with proof that the harasser acted out of sexual attraction to the employee. In McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n. 5, we noted that a male employee who undertakes to prove sexual harassment directed at him by another male may use evidence of the harasser's homosexuality to demonstrate that the action was directed at him because he is a man. But we cautioned that proof of such homosexuality must include more than "merely suggestive" conduct. Id.

77 F.3d at 752 (opinion of Niemeyer, J.).²⁰

Finally, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., supra, the court addressed the threshold question it had skirted in McWilliams and Hopkins--whether same-sex harassment is, in fact, actionable under Title VII. (The court had assumed that it was in McWilliams, and Judge Niemeyer so argued in Hopkins.) Noting that the language of the statute did not rule out same-sex claims, the court concluded that "a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates against an employee of the same sex or permits such discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the same sex." 99 F.3d at 143. The harassment in Wrightson included sexual advances, physical contact, and graphic, sexual remarks; but in addition to the nature of the harassment itself, the plaintiff had alleged that his harassers, who included his male supervisor and certain of his male co-workers, all were homosexual. In view of that allegation, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of same-sex harassment was viable under Title VII as a claim of sex discrimination. Id. at 143; see also Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., supra, 107 F.3d at 447-48; Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., supra, 112 F.3d at 1505, 1506-07.

b.

The notion that the harasser's sexual orientation is pertinent stems from the assumption that sexual harassment is a function of the harasser's sexual attraction to the harassee. E.g., Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (Niemeyer, J.); Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 926 F.Supp. 1044, 1049-50 (N.D.Ala.1996). Thus, the heterosexual man who sexually harasses a woman discriminates within the meaning of Title VII because (assuming he is a zero on the Kinsey scale²¹), he is sexually uninterested in men and so would have no reason to harass a man sexually. To the extent that sexual desire is to some degree the explanation for sexual harassment, we agree that same-sex harassment perpetrated by a gay or lesbian individual is the functional equivalent of opposite-sex harassment perpetrated by a heterosexual individual. In that sense, we have no difficulty agreeing with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Wrightson, the Sixth Circuit's in Yeary, and the Eleventh Circuit's in Fredette that an employee who has been subject to sexual overtures and other harassment by a gay coworker of the same gender has a clear-cut claim of sex discrimination under Title VII. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d at 260. But for a number of reasons, we do not agree that the viability of a same-sex harassment claim should be made to depend on the sexual orientation of the harasser.

c.

The Supreme Court's recent decision in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996), and our own subsequent decision in Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 82 F.3d 157, demonstrate that it is ill-advised to make categorical assumptions about which factual scenarios bespeak discrimination and which do not. In O'Connor, the Court considered whether a plaintiff attempting to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination under the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), had to show that upon his discharge, he was replaced by someone outside the class of persons forty years of age and older protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In a unanimous opinion, the Court concluded that he did not. "The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is ... irrelevant," the Court observed, "so long as he has lost out because of his age." --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1310 (emphasis in original). In the effort to distinguish viable from unviable claims of discrimination, the Court admonished, lower courts must take care not to make arbitrary factors part of the prima facie case, for what the prima facie case requires is evidence adequate to create an inference of discrimination. Id. Mandating proof that a discharged worker was replaced by someone outside of the protected class failed that requirement, because it would recognize a claim of discrimination when a forty year-old was replaced by a thirty-nine year-old (where the inference of age discrimination is weak or non-existent) but not when a fifty-six year-old is replaced by a forty year-old (where the inference of age discrimination is much stronger). Id. Taking our cue from O'Connor, we held in Carson that simply because a white woman had been discharged by a white supervisor and replaced by another white individual did not bar her from making a case of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.

An employee may be able to show that his race or another characteristic the law places off limits tipped the scales against him, without regard to demographic characteristics of his replacement.... The question instead is whether the plaintiff has established a logical reason to believe that the decision rests on a legally forbidden ground. That one's replacement is of another race, sex, or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition.

82 F.3d at 158-59.

The case before us, obviously, is not a discharge case that the plaintiff has pursued within the framework of McDonnell Douglas and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), but at bottom the question confronting us here is the same question raised in O'Connor and Carson: does the evidence before us permit the inference that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination? O'Connor and Carson make clear that we must not permit the viability of a discrimination claim to turn on arbitrary factors that do not capture the universe of actionable discrimination. We are convinced that the sexual orientation of the person who sexually harasses his co-worker is just such an arbitrary factor.

d.

The focus on the sexual orientation of the harasser betrays a fundamental misconception that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter of sexual desire run amok--in other words, that the harasser is attracted to the victim and simply cannot restrain himself. Certainly we agree that sexual harassment can spring from the harasser's attraction to the victim. See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1506; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 447-48; Nichols v. Frank, supra, 42 F.3d at 510 (opinion of Reinhardt, J.). But no case that we are aware of holds that the harasser must have been sexually interested in the victim in order for a claim of sexual harassment to be viable. Take Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., supra, 28 F.3d 1446, for example. There the male harasser was prone to describe female colleagues in terms like "broad" and "flat chested cunt." He also routinely made sexually charged remarks to and about the plaintiff, suggesting, for example, that Dey had not returned from a vacation to Phoenix with a tan because she spent the week on her back in bed and remarking to someone on the phone that "there is a girl in my office going down on me" as Dey leaned down to place some documents on the floor. On one occasion, while he and Dey were alone in an elevator, he unzipped, and then zipped, his slacks. We found the pattern of such incidents to be strong enough evidence of sexual harassment to require a trial without proof that the harasser was actually attracted to the plaintiff, or even that he was heterosexual. Indeed, we deemed the evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment despite the fact that Dey had never been touched in a sexually suggestive manner (as H. Doe was), and despite the fact that it was never intimated to Dey that sex was a quid pro quo for continued employment or promotion within the company. See id. at 1450. It was enough that the verbal harassment and the zipper incident were "overtly sexual" and for the most part targeted specifically at Dey (id. at 1456), that the abuse "upset and embarrassed her, and made her feel uncomfortable," (id. at 1454), and that a reasonable person in Dey's position would likewise have perceived the work environment as "hostile and abusive" (id. at 1456). The same was true in Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., supra, 32 F.3d 1007, where the plaintiff was the target of a series of sexual pranks, where she was routinely denominated by her male co-workers as "whore," "cunt," and "split tail," and where the men made a habit of exposing themselves to her. And again in Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d 230 (7th Cir.1994), where the plaintiff was repeatedly referred to as "bitch," where her buttocks were slapped, where her tormentor placed his boot in her crotch and wiggled it, and where he pulled on the elastic band of her slacks and peered at her underwear, we did not think it important whether or not the harasser sexually desired the plaintiff or what his sexual orientation was. It was enough that she and any other reasonable woman would have found the harassment degrading and abusive. In these cases, as in any case of sexual harassment, the pervasive sexual content of the harassment has been all the proof needed to establish that the plaintiff has been sexually harassed and thus discriminated against because of her sex.²²

The Eighth Circuit made just this point recently in Quick. In that case the male employees of a muffler production plant had repeatedly "bagged" the plaintiff (grabbed his testicles, or otherwise assaulted his groin) and subjected him to verbal abuse which, incidentally, included the types of homophobic epithets that H. Doe's co-workers favored (more on that below). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on his Title VII claim, reasoning in part that the abuse, although it involved the plaintiff's genitals, was not genuinely sexual in nature: " 'Bagging' did not happen because male DCI coworkers were demanding sexual favors, were expressing sexual interest, or making sexual comments regarding Quick's gender." Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F.Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.Iowa.1995). The court of appeals rejected this rationale:

A worker "need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or harassed by sexual innuendo" in order to have been sexually harassed.... Intimidation and hostility may occur without explicit sexual advances or acts of an explicitly sexual nature. Moreover, physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse may amount to sexual harassment. The bagging was aimed at Quick's sexual organs, his testicles were squeezed so hard on one occasion that he almost passed out from the pain, he was punched in the neck, and he was verbally taunted with names such as "queer" and "pocket lizard licker." Whether or not these actions, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, constituted prohibited sexual harassment remains a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

90 F.3d at 1379 (citations omitted). The district court spoke to the same point recently in Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc.:Title VII does not require that sexual harassment be motivated by attraction, only that it be "because of sex"; indeed, harassment, like other forms of victimization, is often motivated by issues of power and control on the part of the harasser, issues not necessarily related to sexual preference.

919 F.Supp. 351, 355 (D.Nev.1996); accord Miller, 946 F.Supp. at 705; Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., supra, 932 F.Supp. at 273-74 & n. 8; see also Deering, supra, 27 CUMB. L.REV . at 289-90; Papish, supra, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REV . at 229.

e.

The focus on sexual orientation thus signals a departure from opposite-sex harassment cases, which have never made the plaintiff's right to relief dependent on proof that the harasser is heterosexual. Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Hopkins, which we quoted from above, offers an explanation for the dichotomy. Again, his point is that "[w]hen someone sexually harasses an individual of the opposite gender, a presumption arises that the harassment is 'because of' the victim's gender." 77 F.3d at 752. That presumption makes it unnecessary for the plaintiff in such a case to offer any proof that her harasser was heterosexual. "But," Judge Niemeyer reasons, "when the harasser and the victim are the same gender, the presumption is just the opposite...." Id.; see also Quick, 90 F.3d at 1381 (Nangle, J., dissenting); Martin, 926 F.Supp. at 1049-50. See post at 601, 606. Thus the requirement that the victim of same-sex harassment offer proof of his harasser's sexual orientation, whereas the victim of opposite-sex harassment is burdened with no such requirement.

It may well be true that we have always assumed, in the familiar case of opposite-sex harassment, that the harasser was heterosexual and that his sexual orientation toward the opposite sex in some measure contributed to the harassment. But to imbue that assumption with the legal weight of a presumption strikes us as a dramatic step in the evolution of sexual harassment law with troubling implications for claims of opposite-sex harassment and same-sex harassment alike.

Let us assume, for example, that we do (or will from now on) formally presume that when a woman complains of explicit sexual harassment by a man, her harasser was heterosexual and for that reason the harassment occurred "because of" her gender. Is that presumption rebuttable? In other words, could her employer avoid liability by proving that the harasser is gay? Or, to take a more plausible scenario, might the employer rebut the presumption by showing that the harasser was motivated to torment the plaintiff not by her gender but out of revenge, for example, because she won a promotion that he had sought? See Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 998 (10th Cir.1996) (harassment of female plaintiff began with dispute over apportionment of sales commissions). Or, to borrow a page from McWilliams, what if the plaintiff's male co-workers harassed her not out of sexual desire, but because of her "known or believed prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to sexuall