
## NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.

See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE



MARY F. D'AMBROSIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY; MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE JOHN REA; ZWILLINGER & GREEK, an Arizona professional corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

MARY F. D'AMBROSIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY; ZWILLINGER & GREEK,

Defendant-Appellees.

) MEMORANDUM DECISION

) 1 CA-CV 10-0562

) 1 CA-CV 10-0706

) (Consolidated)

) DEPARTMENT T

) (Rule 28, Arizona Rules
) of Civil Appellate Procedure)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Cause No. CV2010-004815

The Honorable Robert Carter Olson, Judge

## AFFIRMED

Mary F. D'Ambrosio Pro Se Plaintiff/Appellant Phoenix

Maricopa County Office of General Litigation Services

Phoenix

By Scott H. Zwillinger Sara Witthoft Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Maricopa County

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By Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General
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By Scott H. Zwillinger

Sara Witthoft

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Phoenix

## H A L L, Judge

- ¶1 Mary D'Ambrosio appeals from the superior court's dismissal of her complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.
- In 2007, D'Ambrosio filed a complaint against Maricopa County (the County) in which she claimed to have been beaten by detention officers at the County jail (2007 Case). Zwillinger and Greek represented the County in the 2007 Case, which County Superior Court Judge John Rea subsequently dismissed. The record does not reflect that D'Ambrosio appealed from Judge Rea's dismissal order.
- ¶3 On February 24, 2010, D'Ambrosio filed a complaint against the County, Zwillinger and Greek, and Judge Rea (collectively, Defendants), in which she raised various allegations of fraud, misconduct and "abuses by the judicial"

system" in connection with the 2007 Case's dismissal. The case was assigned to Pinal County Judge Robert Carter Olson. The Defendants successfully moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that D'Ambrosio failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This appeal followed.

- Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint setting forth a claim for relief "shall contain . . . [a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A plaintiff's failure to comport with this requirement entitles the defendant to dismissal of the complaint upon motion. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- Me review de novo a trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Canyon Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. v. SCF Arizona, 225 Ariz. 414, 417,  $\P$  7, 239 P.3d 733, 736 (App. 2010). We assume the complaint's allegations are true and will "uphold dismissal only if the plaintiff [ ] would not be entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof in the statement of the claim." Id. (quoting T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Racing, 223

The complaint also names the City of Phoenix (City) as a defendant, but the record reveals the City was never served, and has never appeared in this case. None of the allegations in the complaint specifically apply to the City.

Ariz. 257, 259, ¶ 8, 222 P.3d 280, 282 (App. 2009) (citation omitted)). "Because Arizona courts evaluate a complaint's well-pled facts, mere conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008).

We have read D'Ambrosio's complaint and conclude it violates Rule 8.<sup>2</sup> The complaint is essentially an inflammatory diatribe against Defendants (and others), and it appears to reflect D'Ambrosio's incorrect belief that she is somehow entitled to a "settlement" from the County in connection with the 2007 Case. The complaint contains improper conclusory assertions about alleged conduct by Defendants, and it otherwise fails to state any cognizable claim. For example, the complaint

The complaint also appears to be collateral attack on the judgment dismissing the 2007 Case. Duncan v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. ex rel. Estate of Pop, 228 Ariz. 3, 7, ¶ 13, 261 P.3d 778, 782 (App. 2011) (noting a collateral attack on a judgment "is an effort to obtain another and independent judgment which will destroy the effect of the former judgment[,]" and unless a judgment is void because the court lacked jurisdiction, the judgment cannot be collaterally attacked even if it is "erroneous or wrong, so that it could be reversed on appeal or set aside on direct attack.") (citations Further, regarding Judge Rea's order of dismissal in 2007, judicial immunity shields him from liability. See Acevedo by Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dept., 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984) (noting "judges of courts of general jurisdiction are not liable in a civil action for damages for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction or are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly").

states: "[counsel for the County] said, 'the County did not want to settle' the case[,]" "FRAUD has occurred[,]" "[T]he court record has been tainted to show that Civil Procedure was followed," "I am appalled to find conflict of interest in the judges protect their employer, the County to continue their paychecks." These and other similar assertions in the complaint are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

¶7 Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's order granting Defendants their respective motions to dismiss. D'Ambrosio's pending motion "to settle the actions" is dismissed as moot.

/s/					
PHILIP	HALL,	Judge			

CONCURRING:

\_/s/\_ MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge

LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP, Judge