

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND  
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.  
*See* Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

FILED BY CLERK  
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COURT OF APPEALS  
DIVISION TWO

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
STATE OF ARIZONA  
DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,	)	2 CA-CR 2013-0135-PR
	)	DEPARTMENT B
Respondent,	)	
	)	<u>MEMORANDUM DECISION</u>
v.	)	Not for Publication
	)	Rule 111, Rules of
THADDEUS IKOSY'S CRAWFORD,	)	the Supreme Court
	)	
Petitioner.	)	
_____	)	

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COCHISE COUNTY

Cause No. CR200700799

Honorable Wallace R. Hoggatt, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

Thaddeus Ikosy's Crawford

San Luis  
In Propria Persona

V Á S Q U E Z, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Following a jury trial, petitioner Thaddeus Crawford was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to a series of prison terms amounting to life in prison plus 25.5 years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal, *State v. Crawford*, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0188 (memorandum decision filed Mar. 9, 2010), and denied relief on his petition for

review from the court's denial of his first petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P., *State v. Crawford*, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0417-PR (memorandum decision filed Jan. 28, 2013).

¶2 Crawford then filed a pro se “‘Writ of Coram Nobis;’ Writ of Error’s,” which the trial court treated as a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. Crawford now seeks review of the court’s summary dismissal of that petition. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling on post-conviction relief. *State v. Swoopes*, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). We find no such abuse here.

¶3 In his pro se petition for review, Crawford argues that trial counsel was ineffective, the indictment was multiplicitous, and his sentences violated A.R.S. §§ 13-111 and 13-115(B). He also maintains the trial court “failed to distinguish which ineffective assistance of counsel it precluded.”<sup>1</sup> Crawford also argues the court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before dismissing his petition below and asks that he be granted a new trial.

¶4 In a thorough, well-reasoned minute entry order, the trial court identified all of the claims Crawford had raised and resolved them in a manner permitting this court to review and determine the propriety of that order. *See State v. Whipple*, 177 Ariz. 272,

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<sup>1</sup>To the extent Crawford argues the trial court failed to specify which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel it had found precluded as required by Rule 32.6(c), we conclude the court’s ruling did, in fact, identify them, which essentially included all of the claims raised.

274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993). The court correctly concluded the claims raised were precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2. No purpose would be served by reiterating the court's ruling in its entirety. *See Whipple*, 177 Ariz. at 274, 866 P.2d at 1360. Rather, we adopt the court's ruling.

¶5 Because Crawford has not sustained his burden on review of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, we grant the petition for review, but deny relief.

/s/ Garye L. Vásquez  
GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge

CONCURRING:

/s/ Philip G. Espinosa  
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge

/s/ Virginia C. Kelly  
VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge