NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION I

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

No. CA07-313

	Opinion Delivered October 24, 2007
KRISTY BEVERLIN & BILLY BEVERLIN APPELLANTS V.	APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [JV-06-271]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, and MINOR CHILDREN APPELLEES	HONORABLE VICKI S. COOK, JUDGE AFFIRMED

DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge

In a previous unpublished opinion, we consolidated two cases involving appellants', Kristy and Billy Beverlin's, child, W.B. One of the cases involved W.B.'s adjudication as dependent-neglected, and the other case involved the termination of appellants' parental rights to W.B. *Beverlin v. Arkansas Dep't of Health & Human Servs.*, CA06-1026 and CA07-39 (May 30, 2007). In the instant appeal, appellants challenge the trial court's termination of their parental rights with respect to their other two children, I.B. and L.B. At the December 18, 2006 termination hearing concerning I.B. and L.B., DHS introduced as an exhibit the transcript of the September 27, 2006 termination hearing concerning W.B. Although appellants did not abstract that testimony, DHS did, supplementing appellants' abstract and providing us with relevant portions of the testimony from that earlier hearing. We affirm the termination of appellants' parental rights with respect to I.B. and L.B.

I.B. and L.B. were removed from appellants' home in April 2006 pursuant to an order for emergency custody because Kristy was arrested for outstanding traffic warrants; because Billy was not responsive, having been diagnosed with bipolar/schizophrenia; and because the "environmental neglect [at the house] was beyond the safety of the children." A probable-cause hearing was held on April 20, 2006, and a dependency-neglect adjudication hearing was held on May 11, 2006. In its adjudication order, the trial court found that the children were dependent-neglected. Appellants did not challenge the dependency-neglect finding with respect to I.B. and L.B. We will discuss any additional necessary facts as they pertain to the points raised by appellants in the instant appeal.

Appellants' first two points of appeal are based upon the position that if the termination of their parental rights concerning W.B. were to be overturned by this court, then the terminations of their parental rights concerning I.B. and L.B. would have to be reversed as well. We dispose of these two points by noting that they are now moot because we affirmed the termination of appellants' parental rights to W.B. in the previously referenced May 30, 2007 opinion.

For their third point of appeal, appellants' argument consists of two sentences: "The record does not contain any such orders [to attend domestic-abuse classes and spousal-abuse classes]. No such requirement is contained in any case plan entered into evidence." DHS and the children's ad litem attorney both acknowledge that the record does not establish that the trial court ordered attendance at either of these classes. However, that fact does not

provide a basis for reversing the trial court because there was clear and convincing evidence of appellants' failure to comply with other portions of the case plan, *e.g.*, their failure to pay court-ordered child support and their failure to maintain stable employment and stable living arrangements.

For their fourth point of appeal, appellants contend that the trial court lacked statutory authority to conduct a termination hearing because the petition for termination was not filed within thirty days of the permanency planning order as set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-338(f). DHS and the ad litem attorney do not dispute the fact that the permanency planning hearing was held on September 27, 2006, and that the petition for termination of parental rights was filed on November 6, 2006, which was more than thirty days later. They maintain, however, and we agree, that that fact does not provide a basis for reversal in this case.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-338 provides in pertinent part:

> (f) If the court determines that the permanency goal is termination of parental rights, the department shall file the petition to terminate parental rights within thirty (30) days from the date of the permanency planning hearing that establishes termination of parental rights as the permanency goal.

This statute sets forth no explanation of what the consequences are if the designated time limit is not satisfied. Moreover, appellants cite no additional statutory authority or case law to support their position that the late filing deprived the trial court of its authority to conduct a termination hearing. Neither do appellants develop any convincing argument that the trial court was deprived of its authority by the late filing. Finally, appellants do not

demonstrate that the late filing prejudices them in any manner. Our supreme court has explained that the appellate courts of this state will not consider an argument on appeal that has no citation to authority or convincing legal argument. *See, e.g., Baker v. Norris*, ____ Ark. ____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (April 12, 2007). Nor will we research or develop an argument for an appellant. *Id.*

For their fifth point of appeal, appellants "reallege and incorporate by reference all points for reversal contained in their pending appeal of the termination regarding W.B.," noting that "such points include" the following:

a) The trial court lacks jurisdiction to terminate while the adjudication order is being appealed.

b) "Other facts or issues" should be dismissed as grounds for termination.

c) The evidence does not support a finding of a "meaningful effort to rehabilitate."

d) The evidence does not support a finding that "the conditions that caused removal ... have not been remedied."

e) The evidence does not support a finding of continued environmental neglect.

f) The evidence does not support a finding that further contact with the parents will be harmful.

g) The evidence does not support a finding that there was drug paraphernalia in the home.

Under this point, with no argument or discussion, appellants do nothing more than recite the points from the earlier appeal, which involved the termination of their parental rights to W.B., not to I.B. and L.B. They provide us with no citation to legal authority or with convincing legal argument that they may present points of appeal to us in this manner by

merely referencing points that they had raised in an earlier appeal that only concerned W.B. Consequently, we do not address this multi-faceted point of appeal. *Baker v. Norris, supra.*

As their sixth point of appeal, appellants contend that "[b]y failing to offer testimony regarding the most recent 82 days, the appellees fail to offer 'clear and convincing evidence.'" The focus of their argument under this point is the eighty-two-day period between the termination of their parental rights to W.B. and the termination of their parental rights to I.B. and L.B. We find no merit in their argument. It is undisputed that appellants' parental rights had been previously, involuntarily terminated as to W.B., a sibling of I.B. and L.B. A previous, involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to a sibling constitutes "aggravated circumstances." Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(*a*)(4) (Supp. 2005). Under such circumstances, reunification efforts with respect to other siblings are not required. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(*b*) (Supp. 2005). In addition, DHS introduced the transcript of the termination hearing for W.B., which developed at length the problems concerning appellants' parenting and the conditions in the home; and the DHS adoption specialist testified that it was her opinion that I.B. and L.B. were adoptable and that the most appropriate permanency plan for them was to be adopted. Thus, in addition to the undisputed fact that appellants' parental rights had been previously terminated with respect to W.B., evidence was also presented that it was in the children's best interest for appellants' parental rights to be terminated with respect to I.B. and L.B. also, and the trial court determined that it was in the children's best interest to do so.

For their final point of appeal, appellants contend that "[t]he trial court's failure to make certain findings is relevant 'new evidence' sufficient to reconsider the previous termination of W.B." Here, appellants again fail to provide us with convincing legal authority and argument as to how we can reconsider the termination concerning W.B. in this appeal concerning I.B. and L.B. We know of no basis for doing so, and, accordingly, we find no basis for reversal under this point of appeal.

Affirmed.

VAUGHT and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree.