

1 **WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD**

2 **STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

3 **Case No. WCK 13904**

4 **CHARLES FORD,**

5 *Applicant,*

6 **vs.**

7 **LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY,**

8 *Defendant.*

**OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDERATION (EN BANC)**

9
10 Applicant employee seeks reconsideration of the Board's En
11 Banc decision filed January 27, 1997, in which the Board majority
12 held that the workers' compensation referee's imposition of a 10%
13 penalty on defendant employer was proper, but that an employee's
14 attorney's fees may only be assessed against an employer pursuant
15 to Labor Code section 4064 where the employer has filed the
16 initial application contesting the opinion of the qualified
17 medical evaluator selected by the employee from a three-member
18 panel. In this case the initial application for adjudication of
claim was filed by the employee.

19 In his petition, applicant contends that where the defendant
20 refuses to comply with express Labor Code procedures and forces an
21 unrepresented worker to file an application, the defendant must be
22 held liable under section 4064 for the attorney's fees incurred by
23 the worker for consequent legal representation. In this
24 connection, applicant asserts that the majority decision allows
25 the defendant to benefit from its wrongdoing because the 10%
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1 penalty assessed against defendant is less than the attorney's
2 fees allowed to applicant's attorney.

3 To accomplish what applicant considers to be a more
4 equitable result, he would have the Board rewrite section 4064.
5 Under the plain, unambiguous wording of the statute, an employer
6 is liable for an employee's attorney's fees "if an employer files
7 an application." If the employer is not the one who files an
8 application, there is no authority for imposing liability on the
9 employer under that section. However, applicant contends that
10 the Board has a duty "to interpret the statutes (sic), often
11 qualifying them contrary to express language found in them, as a
12 check and balance against the legislative branch who can make
13 errors and contradict the intent of their legislation." In his
14 amended petition, applicant asserts that the Board majority
15 "would allow the defective Code Section to stand until the
16 legislature corrects it, but that is the opposite of the process:
17 it is up to the WCAB to correct the Code Section through
18 interpretation, and then it goes back to the legislature for
19 revised drafting, etc."

18 We agree that it is the duty of the Appeals Board to
19 interpret statutes in such a way as to give true meaning to the
20 legislation. We do not, however, agree we have broad authority
21 to correct "defective" legislation. In any event, in this case,
22 the majority interpretation is giving full effect to the statute
23 and there is nothing which causes us to believe that the law is
24 defective. Because a statute does not extend its benefits to all
25 possible related circumstances does not render the law defective.

1 This code section provides additional benefits to an injured
2 worker under certain conditions. If the Legislature wishes to
3 extend the benefits to apply to other conditions or
4 circumstances, it may do so. It is not the duty or function of
5 the Appeals Board to do so.

6 In his petition, applicant argues that because the amount of
7 the 10% penalty imposed on defendant in this case is less than the
8 attorney's fees allowed, defendant has "saved \$633.00 on its
9 wrong-doing." However, even if defendant, a non-profit
10 institution, made a deliberate choice to incur a penalty rather
11 than provide benefits or file an application (a supposition that
12 is not apparent from the record), it is not the duty of the Board
13 to insure that the sanction imposed is in the highest possible
14 amount. A penalty is a penalty, and defendant has ended up having
15 to pay out more than its original liability. If the Legislature
16 concludes that the 10% penalty under section 5814 is insufficient
17 to deter unreasonable delay, it has the authority to change the
18 law. It is not the function of the Board to improvise a new
19 statutory interpretation to accomplish that purpose.

20 In his petition, applicant asserts that "a literal reading
21 [of section 4064] contravenes the legislative intent of the reform
22 act." He contends that the Board has "the obligation to apply a
23 judicial interpretation of an imperfect statutory language," and
24 he exhorts us "to 'do the right thing' and assess the cost of the
25 attorney's fees against the defendant for their wrongful action."
26 However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the
Board's role is more circumscribed. (See, e.g., Ruiz v.

1 Industrial Acc. Com. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 409, 413-414, 20
2 Cal.Comp.Cases 265, 267-268; Kaiser Founda-tion Hospitals
3 Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. [Keifer] (1974) 13 Cal.3d 20, 39
4 Cal.Comp.Cases 857; and Nickelsberg v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
5 (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 302, 56 Cal.Comp.Cases 476, 487.) Absent
6 specific statutory authority, the Board may not assess applicant's
7 attorney's fees as an additional liability of defendant.

8 In the Board's earlier En Banc decision in this case, Ford v.
9 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 153, we set
10 forth at length the basis for our holding that section 4064 does
11 not apply under the facts existing in this case. We continue to
12 believe that that analysis is correct and that it would be
13 improper for the Board to interpret section 4064 contrary to its
14 express language.

15 For the foregoing reasons,

16 IT IS ORDERED THAT applicant's petition for reconsideration
17 be, and it is hereby, DENIED.

18 WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

19 /s/ Arlene N. Heath _____

20 /s/ Jane Wiegand _____

21 /s/ R. N. Ruggles _____

22 /s/ Diana Marshall _____

23 We dissent. (See dissenting
24 opinion)

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/s/ Colleen S. Casey

/s/ Richard P. Gannon

DATED AND FILED IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
APRIL 22, 1998

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DISSENTING OPINION

In our dissent to the Board's earlier En Banc decision in this case, we analyzed the legislative history and purpose of Labor Code section 4064, as well as the prior Board decisions which awarded attorney's fees under that section when the application for adjudication of claim was considered to have been "constructively" filed on the employer's behalf. In that connection, we noted Civil Code section 3529, which states that an act which ought to have been done is regarded as having been done in favor of him to whom performance is due. We also stated that "if the employer follows the procedure mandated by sections 4061 and 4063, there is no need to refer [in section 4064] to applications filed by the employee," and that "in interpreting and applying section 4064, this Board, like the Legislature, must proceed as if the employer has followed the law." We also discussed why the existence of additional remedies for employer misconduct, which have significant limitations, should not preclude an assessment of attorney's fees against defendant under the facts presented in this case. For all of those reasons, we

1 would grant applicant's petition for reconsideration and reinstate
2 the award of attorney's fees made by the workers' compensation
3 referee.

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5 /s/ Colleen S. Casey

6 /s/ Richard P. Gannon

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