\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

The "officially released" date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the <u>Connecticut Law Journal</u> or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the "officially released" date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the "officially released" date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

\_\_\_\_\_\_

## RONALD LABOW v. MYRNA LABOW (AC 19762)

Schaller, Mihalakos and Hennessy, Js.

Submitted on briefs March 2—officially released August 21, 2001

Counsel

*Myrna LaBow*, pro se, the appellant (defendant), filed a brief.

Daniel D. Portanova and Gwen E. Murray filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Myrna LaBow, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in her favor on her counterclaim to an action commenced by the plaintiff, Ronald LaBow. On appeal, the defendant challenges the court's conclusion that she proved only one of her five causes of action. She also challenges the court's determination of damages. In her brief to this court, she raises no fewer than fifty-one claims, challenging the court's assessment of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case stems from a 1982 action commenced by the

plaintiff as a collateral attack against a 1978 dissolution judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. Since that dissolution judgment, the parties have engaged in extensive, hostile litigation in the trial and appellate courts of our state and New York for more than twenty years. In 1993, following a brief respite, the torrent of litigation continued, resulting in the judgment on the counterclaim from which this appeal is taken.

This appeal is best categorized as a futile effort to retry this case in this court. No good purpose would be served by discussing seriatim its numerous claims. The defendant 's myriad claims constitute a rambling, convoluted, hodgepodge of grievances. "[A]ppellate pursuit of so large a number of issues forecloses the opportunity for a fully reasoned discussion of pivotal substantive concerns [by the appellant]. A shotgun approach does a disservice both to this court and to the party on whose behalf it is presented." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 21, 717 A.2d 77 (1998). Naturally, an appellate court "is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one [issue] . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 117 n.3, 622 A.2d 519 (1993).

After thoroughly examining each of the defendant 's claims, we conclude that they consist merely of abstract assertions unaccompanied by reasoned legal analysis. Therefore, her claims are deemed abandoned, and further review is denied. See *Velazquezv. Marine Midland Automotive Financial Corp.*, 24 Conn. App. 455, 460 n.2, 590 A.2d 116 (1991).

The judgment is affirmed.