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The ''officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ''officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ''officially released'' date.

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NORCOTT, J., concurring. In accordance with my ongoing position in cases regarding the resolution of issues that implicate the death penalty, but do not result directly in its imposition; see *State* v. *Courchesne*, 262 Conn. 537, 583–84, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003) (*Norcott, J.*, concurring); I fully concur and join in the analysis of the majority opinion. Indeed, I particularly agree with the majority's conclusion that ''the jury must be instructed that, in arriving at its judgment that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors by any degree or amount, it must be persuaded that death is the appropriate penalty in the case, and that its level of certitude in arriving at that ultimate weighing judgment must be beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Thus, although ''I [will] continue to dissent from decisions of this court that ultimately conclude that the death penalty can be administered in accordance with the principles of fundamental fairness set forth in our state's constitution''; *State* v. *Breton*, 264 Conn. 327, 447, 824 A.2d 778 (2003) (*Norcott, J.*, dissenting); until this state joins those jurisdictions that have abolished or imposed moratoria upon the imposition of the death penalty; id., 448–49 (*Norcott, J.*, dissenting); I also support procedural safeguards that reflect the nature of this ultimate penalty, the need for reliability and consistency in its imposition, and the nature of the requisite jury verdict. I agree, therefore, with the majority's analysis and will address, together with the other justices of this court, ''the defendant's more general challenges to the imposition of the death penalty after the penalty phase hearing, if and when such challenges are brought.'' *State* v. *Courchesne*, supra, 584 (*Norcott, J.*, concurring).