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VERTEFEUILLE, J., dissenting. I join part I of Justice Eveleigh’s well reasoned dissent, in which he concludes that he would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, which held that the defendant, Tricia Lynne Cocomo, is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that the defendant had transferred certain real property for less than fair market value as consciousness of guilt. I do not, however, join part II of Justice Eveleigh’s dissent, in which he concludes that he would also affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on the alternate ground that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly admitted the blood alcohol test results into evidence. I disagree with that portion of his dissent because this court generally does not address alternate grounds for affirming a judgment when it is not necessary to do so. See *Bruffman v. Bank of America Corp.*, 297 Conn. 501, 514 n.14, 998 A.2d 1169 (2010).
