

**COURT OF CHANCERY  
OF THE  
STATE OF DELAWARE**

STEPHEN P. LAMB  
VICE CHANCELLOR

New Castle County Court House  
500 N. King Street, Suite 11400  
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Submitted: October 13, 2005  
Decided: October 13, 2005

R. Bruce McNew, Esquire  
Taylor & McNew, LLP  
3711 Kennett Pike, Suite 210  
Greenville DE, 19807

Alfred Ronsdorf  
aronsdorf@yahoo.com

***RE: Randall Jacobson and Technology Development  
Corporation v. Alfred Ronsdorf  
C.A. No. 518-N***

Dear Mr. McNew and Mr. Ronsdorf:

On August 23, 2005, the court resolved an action brought by Randall Jacobson and Technology Development Corporation (USA) Ltd. (“TDC”) against Alfred Ronsdorf by issuing an Opinion granting the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions under Court of Chancery Rule 37(b)(2)(C), and entering summary judgment by default against the defendant.<sup>1</sup> The history of this litigation, and the facts which underlie the dispute, are set forth at length in that Opinion. Unsatisfied with the court’s resolution, the defendant has filed two independent motions seeking relief. First, on September 14, 2005, the defendant filed what he styles a “motion to

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<sup>1</sup>*Jacobson v. Ronsdorf*, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126.

vacate letter opinion.” Second, on October 12, 2005, the defendant filed an amended Rule 60(b) motion for post-trial relief. The court briefly addresses below the defendant’s purported motions.

Neither of the defendant’s motions find any support in the law of Delaware. As to the first, this court’s rules simply do not contemplate a “motion to vacate,” somehow available after the entry of final judgment. The defendant’s motion is no more availing if the court construes it as a motion for reargument under Court of Chancery Rule 59(f).<sup>2</sup> Even if the defendant has timely brought his claim, he has alleged nothing that would invoke the court’s limited discretion to reopen previously litigated cases. Rather, the defendant rehashes old arguments and rewords already tired insinuations against this court and opposing counsel. The defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion is no more apposite, as it specifies none of the particular and limited grounds on which post-trial relief may be based. Neither of the defendant’s motions, therefore, satisfy any possible ground of relief. In short, Ronsdorf has no further recourse before this court.

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<sup>2</sup> A court may grant reargument under Rule 59(f) when it appears that the court “overlooked or misapprehended the factual or the legal principles governing the disposition of the motion.” *VGS, Inc. v. Castiel*, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31. The court may grant relief under Rule 60 on the basis of mistake, new evidence, fraud, a void judgment, and a satisfied or a released judgment. Otherwise, there is no justification for reopening a case. *Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij*, 257 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1969).

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For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motions are DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Stephen P. Lamb  
Vice Chancellor