IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

NORMAN E. MORRISEY,	§
	§ No. 168, 2010
Defendant Below-	§
Appellant,	§
	§ Court Below—Superior Court
v.	§ of the State of Delaware
	§ in and for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE,	§ Cr. ID No. 91006237DI
	§
Plaintiff Below-	§
Appellee.	§

Submitted: July 9, 2010 Decided: August 11, 2010

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices

ORDER

This 11th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

- (1) The defendant-appellant, Norman E. Morrisey, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's March 10, 2010 order adopting the February 24, 2010 report of the Superior Court Commissioner, which recommended that Morrisey's second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be denied.¹ We agree and affirm.
- (2) The record reflects that, in January 1992, Morrisey was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of twelve counts of Unlawful Sexual

1

¹ Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62.

Intercourse in the First Degree, three counts of Robbery in the First Degree, and related crimes. ² He was sentenced to a total of one hundred eighty years of Level V incarceration. This Court affirmed Morrisey's convictions on direct appeal.³ Morrisey filed his first motion for postconviction relief in November 1993. The Superior Court denied the motion and this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely.⁴

- (3) In this appeal, Morrisey claims that he should not have been charged and convicted under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §271(1).⁵ Rather, he claims, his guilt or innocence should have been decided under Section 271(2)(a).⁶ Morrisey argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion for postconviction relief on that ground.
- (4) Before addressing the substantive merits of a claim for postconviction relief, the Superior Court must determine whether the

² At trial, the State proved that, in May and June 1991, Morrisey, holding what appeared to be a handgun, forced two couples to accompany him to isolated locations, undress, and perform numerous sex acts over the course of several hours. He also stole valuables from the victims.

³ *Morrisey v. State*, 620 A.2d 207 (Del. 1993).

⁴ *Morrisey v. State*, Del. Supr., No. 24, 1994, Holland, J. (Mar. 3, 1994).

⁵ Under that section, "[a] person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when . . . [a]cting with the state of mind that is sufficient for commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct constituting the offense"

⁶ Under that section, "[a] person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when . . . [s]olicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it"

defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Rule 61.⁷ Here,

Morrisey's motion is clearly time-barred.⁸ Moreover, his claim that Del.

Code Ann. tit. 11, §271(1) is inapplicable to him was asserted previously in

his direct appeal. In a reported opinion, this Court engaged in an extensive

analysis of the statutory language in determining that the statute was

properly applied to establish Morrisey's guilt. As such, his present claim

also is procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated.⁹ Moreover, Morrisey

has presented no evidence of a miscarriage of justice that would overcome

the time and procedural bars. 10 We conclude, therefore, that there was no

abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in denying Morrisey's

claim.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Randy J. Holland

Justice

⁷ *Younger v. State*, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). ⁸ Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

⁹ Super. Ct. Crim.R. 61(i)(4).

¹⁰ Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).

3