IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GREG K. TAYLOR, III, ¹	§	
	§	No. 216, 2007
Respondent Below,	§	
Appellant,	§	Court BelowFamily Court of
	§	the State of Delaware in and
V.	§	for Sussex County
	§	-
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES	§	
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF	§	
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN,	§	
YOUTH & THEIR FAMILIES,	§	
	§	
Petitioner Below,	§	File No. CS91-3977
Appellee.	§	

Submitted: July 3, 2007 Decided: July 10, 2007

<u>O R D E R</u>

This 10th day of July 2007, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On April 27, 2007, the appellant filed a *pro se* notice of appeal from an order issued by the Family Court on March 29, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss for the appellant's failure to perfect the appeal. The appellant did not file a response to the motion to dismiss.

(2) By certified letter dated June 15, 2007, the Clerk directed that the appellant file a response to the motion to dismiss. The letter also directed that the appellant explain why the appeal should not be dismissed on the basis that he did

¹The appellant is identified by a pseudonym selected by the Court. Del. Supr. Ct. R. 7(d).

not participate in the Family Court proceedings and thus gave up his right to challenge the March 29, 2007 order.

(3) The Clerk's letter advised the appellant that his response and written explanation were due to be filed on or before July 2, 2007. The letter also advised the appellant that if he did not file his submissions by July 2, 2007, the appeal would be dismissed without further notice.

(4) The appellant has not filed a response to the appellee's motion to dismiss and has not submitted his written explanation as directed by the Clerk. The appellant's failure to file his response and written explanation is deemed to be his consent to the dismissal of this appeal.²

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 30(c) and 3(b)(2), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

<u>/s/Henry duPont Ridgely</u> Justice

²See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 30(c) (2007) (providing that a non-responding party is deemed to have consented to the relief sought by the movant); Del. Supr. Ct. R. 3(b)(2) (providing that an individual Justice may issue an order terminating a case when a party has failed to timely respond to another party's motion to dismiss or to the Court's direction to take action by a fixed date).