[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-11300
Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-61799-FAM

DONNAHUE GEORGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

(November 3, 2020)

Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Donnahue George ("George") appeals the district court's order denying his motion for reconsideration of its prior order affirming the Social Security Administration's ("SSA") denial of his application for Title II disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On appeal, George does not address the order denying his motion for reconsideration. Instead, he only discusses the merits of the district court's underlying order, arguing that (1) substantial evidence does not support the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") finding that he did not have a medically determinable impairment during the relevant insured period, (2) he was entitled to a trial work period before his prior closed period of disability was terminated in 2001, and (3) the Appeals Council improperly denied his request for review of the ALJ's order.

We review the district court's denial of a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. *Drago v. Jenne*, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). "The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59 motion] are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact." *Arthur v. King*, 500 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting *In re Kellogg*, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)). "A Rule 59(e) motion "[cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of the judgment." *Id.* (quoting *Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington*, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)). A party's disagreement with the court's decision, absent a

showing of manifest error, is not sufficient to demonstrate entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e). *See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc.*, 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010).

As an initial matter, George lists only the district court's March 19, 2020, order denying his motion for reconsideration in his Notice of Appeal, notably omitting the district court's underlying order affirming the denial of his DIB application. Therefore, our review is limited to the motion for reconsideration. *See Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc.*, 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) ("The general rule in this circuit is that an appellate court has jurisdiction to review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are specified in an appellant's notice of appeal.").

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying George's motion for reconsideration. George did not raise any newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact in his motion before the district court. Instead, George merely disagreed with the district court's decision and relitigated the same arguments that he previously made in his motion for summary judgment and in his objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation on the motions for summary judgment. Notably, George fails to make any argument to this Court that the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion. Instead, he again relitigates the same issues he presented in his motion

for summary judgment. Because George fails to demonstrate entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e), we affirm. *See Arthur*, 500 F.3d at 1344.

AFFIRMED.