UN	HITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
	FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
	August Term, 2009
(Argued: July 14	, 2010 Decided: September 16, 2010)
	Docket No. 09-4564-cv
	X
INDIA STEAMSHIP C	COMPANY LIMITED,
Pla	intiff-Appellant,
- v	
KOBIL PETROLEUM I	LIMITED,
Def	<u>endants-Appellees</u> .
	x
Before:	JACOBS, <u>Chief Judge</u> , WESLEY and CHIN, <u>Circuit Judges</u> .
Plaintiff ap	peals from an October 20, 2009 order of the
United States Dis	strict Court for the Southern District of
New York (Berman,	$\underline{J.}$), vacating a Supplemental Rule for
Admiralty or Mari	time Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions B
attachment in lig	tht of Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi
Overseas Pte Ltd.	_, 585 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED .
	JEREMY J.O. HARWOOD, of counsel,

1 Blank Rome LLP, New York, NY, 2 for Plaintiff-Appellant. 3 4 FRANCIS H. McNAMARA, of counsel, 5 Cardillo & Corbett, New York, 6 NY, for Defendants-Appellees. 7 8 PER CURIAM:

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In anticipation of arbitration, plaintiff India Steamship Company Limited ("ISC") attached \$1,653,168 belonging to defendant Kobil Petroleum Limited ("Kobil"), pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions ("Rule B"), as the funds passed briefly through New York en route from one foreign Kobil account to another. Kobil entered a general appearance, and the attached funds were transferred by consent order to the Southern District Clerk. Following this Court's decision in Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2009), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Berman, J.) ordered the funds released to Kobil. appeals the release order. We affirm, holding that neither Kobil's general appearance nor its consent to the funds' transfer waived objection to the attachment.

ISC also argues that <u>Jaldhi</u> does not apply because the intercepted electronic funds transfers ("EFTs") passed

3 between accounts held by the same party. That argument is

4 foreclosed by <u>Scanscot Shipping Servs. GmbH v. Metales</u>

5 <u>Tracomex LTDA</u>, No. 09-5280-cv, 2010 WL 3169304, at *2 (2d

6 Cir. Aug. 12, 2010) (per curiam). <u>See Allied Maritime, Inc.</u>

7 <u>v. Descatrade SA</u>, No. 09-5329-cv, 2010 WL 3447882, at *3 (2d

8 Cir. Sept. 3, 2010).

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losses, estimated at \$1,653,168.

In 2005, the motor tanker Ratna Shalini was damaged
while in port in Mombasa. The tanker had been leased by
ISC, an Indian corporation, to Kobil, a Kenyan corporation;
and ISC initiated arbitration in London to recover its

As security against an arbitration judgment, ISC obtained an order from the district court on February 8, 2008, attaching Kobil's property in the Southern District of New York pursuant to Rule B. ISC thereafter attached \$1,653,168 in the hands of New York intermediary banks while the funds were in transit between Kobil accounts pursuant to

1 an electronic funds transfer. 1 Kobil entered a general

2 appearance, and consented to the funds' transfer to an

interest-bearing account in the Southern District's

4 registry.

Following this Court's decision in <u>Jaldhi</u>, the district court on October 20, 2009 ordered the attached funds released. This appeal timely followed.

II

ISC argues that Kobil waived objection to the attachment [1] by entering a general appearance and, alternatively, [2] by consenting to the funds' transfer.

Neither argument is persuasive.

Kobil concedes that its general appearance conferred on the district court jurisdiction that is general and <u>in</u>

<u>personam</u>. Kobil therefore waived objection to jurisdiction over its person, asserted broadly. But the appearance did not waive Kobil's objection to the attachment order or render the order valid. This is so even though attachment provided the basis for jurisdiction over Kobil at the

 $^{^{1}}$ For an explanation of electronic funds transfers, see generally <u>Jaldhi</u>, 585 F.3d at 60 n.1.

outset. Jurisdiction over a person is conceptually distinct 1 from jurisdiction over the person's property--though (as in 2 the case of quasi in rem jurisdiction) the issues sometimes 3 overlap. To attach property, a court will have jurisdiction 4 5 over the property in question and the remedial authority to order attachment, regardless of the court's jurisdiction in 6 7 personam over the property owner. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1963) 8 9 (observing that statutorily authorized tax lien can be enforced only against property within the jurisdiction of 10 the court), aff'd per curiam on reh'g in banc, 325 F.2d 1020 11 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 378 (1965); 12 13 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 8 & cmt.a ("[Attachment jurisdiction] is based on the fact that the property is 14 within the territorial limits of the state in which the 15 16 court is located."). The validity of an attachment order therefore is not settled by a court's attainment of in 17 18 personam jurisdiction over the property owner. Consent to 19 one does not imply or effect consent to the other. 20 Kobil consented to the funds' transfer to the Southern 21 District registry so that the funds would accrue interest 22 during the pendency of this action. Its consent did not

- 1 purport to waive objection to the attachment, nor should it
- 2 effect forfeiture of objection by operation of law. Cf.
- 3 <u>Cricket S.S. Co. v. Parry</u>, 263 F. 523 (2d Cir. 1920)
- 4 (holding that a defendant who "releas[es] his property from
- 5 an illegal attachment [by posting a bond] does not waive a
- 6 good objection to jurisdiction over his person, if it be
- 7 reserved"). A party need not choose between challenging an
- 8 attachment and protecting the value of the attached assets.
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- 10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
- 11 court's October 20, 2009 release order.