

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1459

REVEREND FRANKLIN C. REAVES; VASTENA REAVES; DONALD N.
REAVES; HENRY O. REAVES,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

MULLINS POLICE DEPARTMENT, City of; MARION COUNTY; W. KENNETH MCDONALD, individually and in his official capacity as Mayor; TERRY B. STRICKLAND, individually and in his official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; JO A. SANDERS, individually and in her official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; JAMES W. ARMSTRONG, individually and in his official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; PATRICIA A. PHILLIPS, individually and in her official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; D. WAYNE COLLINS, individually and in his official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; DANIEL B. SHELLEY, JR., individually and in his official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; GEORGE HARDWICK, individually and in his official capacity as City Administrator for City of Mullins; JOHN Q. ATKINSON, individually and in his official capacity as member of Marion County Council; ELOISE W. ROGERS, individually and in her official capacity as member of Marion County Council; TOM SHAW, individually and in his official capacity as member of Marion County Council; ALLEN FLOYD, individually and in his official capacity as member of Marion County Council; MILTON TROY, individually and in his official capacity as member of Marion County Council; PEARLY BRITT, individually and in his official capacity as member of Marion County Council; ELISTA H. SMITH, individually and in her official capacity as member of Marion County Council; KENT WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as member of Marion County Administrator; K. DONALD FLING, individually and in his official capacity as Marion County Code Enforcement Officer; RUSSELL BASS, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of City of Mullins Police Department; EDWIN ROGERS,

individually and in his official capacity as City of Mullins
Planner,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-1461

REVEREND FRANKLIN C. REAVES, PHd And All Others Similarly
Situated; VASTENA REAVES, And All Others Similarly
Situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

and

DONALD N. REAVES,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERT STETSON, individually and in his official capacity as
Fire Chief and Building Inspector for City of Mullins; DANNY
GARDNER, individually and in his official capacity as Marion
County Employee; DENNIS FLOYD, individually and in his
official capacity as Marion County Employee; DONALD BRYANT,
individually and in his official capacity as Marion County
Employee; MICHAEL CROUCH, individually and in his official
capacity as Marion County Employee; LAYFAYETT REED,
individually and in his official capacity as Marion County
Employee; MULLINS, City of; MARION COUNTY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District
Judge. (4:08-cv-01818-TLW-SVH; 4:09-cv-00816-TLW-SVH)

Submitted: June 30, 2011

Decided: July 5, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Franklin C. Reaves, Vastena Reaves, Donald N. Reaves, and Henry O. Reaves, Appellants Pro Se. Douglas Charles Baxter, RICHARDSON, PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, PA, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; Robert Thomas King, WILLCOX BUYCK & WILLIAMS, PA, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Appellants appeal the district court's order declining to accept the magistrate judge's recommendations that attorney's fees be awarded to Defendants. In their informal brief, Appellants fail to address the district court's ruling on attorney's fees. Therefore, Appellants have forfeited appellate review of that issue. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (limiting review to issues raised in the informal brief); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding failure to raise issue in opening brief constituted abandonment of that issue). Accordingly, we affirm.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* To the extent that Appellants also seek review of the district court's orders accepting the recommendations of the magistrate judge and denying relief on their civil complaints as well as denying their subsequent motions for reconsideration, we conclude that any appeal from these orders is untimely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).