

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7280

WILLIAM T. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ROCK HILL MUNICIPAL COURT; JUDGE LONG; JUDGE MODLZ; UNKNOWN
ROCK HILL MUNICIPAL COURT DEFENDANTS, May be amended,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (0:12-cv-01909-JFA)

Submitted: December 27, 2013

Decided: January 16, 2014

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William T. Coleman, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William Coleman appeals the district court's order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against the Rock Hill Municipal Court and Judge Modlz for the reasons stated by the district court. See Coleman v. Rock Hill Mun. Court, No. 0:12-cv-01909-JFA (D.S.C. July 29, 2013).

However, we agree with Coleman that the favorable termination rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar his pro se § 1983 action against Judge Long. See 512 U.S. 477, 487 & n.7 ("[I]f the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit."). We nevertheless affirm the district court's judgment on this claim on alternative grounds. See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e are entitled to affirm the court's judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds are apparent from the record."). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Judge Long is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity because his actions were well within the scope of his jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1987).

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before this Court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED