

**UNPUBLISHED**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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**No. 17-7224**

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SUNDARI KARMA PRASAD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK; CAROLYN D. NELSON; VIVIENE B. CHEEK;  
JONATHAN D. HEADLEE; HAMILTON L. HENDRIX; DAVID ARNOLD  
CARPENTER; JANE JUSTICE; S. MASSEY-TAYLOR, Commonwealth  
Hampton Attorney,

Defendants - Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at  
Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:17-cv-00076-MHL-RCY)

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Submitted: December 21, 2017

Decided: December 28, 2017

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Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit  
Judge.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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Sundari K. Prasad, Appellant Pro Se.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Sundari Karma Prasad seeks to appeal the district court's order dismissing without prejudice her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action for failure to comply with the magistrate judge's order to submit a second particularized complaint. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.*, 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). Because the deficiencies identified by the district court may be remedied by supplementing the complaint as directed, we conclude that the order Prasad seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. *Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc.*, 807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015); *Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392*, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*

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\* We do not remand this matter to the district court, though, because the court previously afforded Prasad the chance to further particularize and amend her complaint, and she failed to do so. *Cf. Goode*, 807 F.3d at 629-30.