UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LEANTHONY MARCELLE SLIGH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:04-cr-00133-NCT-1)

Submitted: July 6, 2018

Decided: July 25, 2018

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eugene E. Lester III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, P.A., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Leanthony Marcelle Sligh appeals the district court's order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 18 months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Sligh was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a sentence imposed as a result of a supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. *United States v. Padgett*, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). The first step in this analysis is a determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable; in making this determination, we follow the procedural and substantive considerations employed in reviewing original sentences. *United States v. Crudup*, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a district court must consider the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory factors, "the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum." *Id.* at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not proceed to the second prong of the analysis—whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. *Id.* at 438-39.

A district court must adequately explain a revocation sentence, "whether the district court imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence." *United States v. Thompson*, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when

imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed." *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, in conducting the individualized assessment, the district court must consider the defendant's nonfrivolous arguments for a sentence outside of the Guidelines range. *United States v. Slappy*, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the district court sufficiently explained the chosen sentence, rejecting Sligh's arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence, and the sentence is not unreasonable. It follows, therefore, that the sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

We have examined the entire record in accordance with the requirements of *Anders* and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. This court requires that counsel inform Sligh, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Sligh requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Sligh. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED