

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

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No. 17-30798  
Summary Calendar

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United States Court of Appeals  
Fifth Circuit

**FILED**  
October 17, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce  
Clerk

HERSY JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT; LOUISIANA ATTORNEY  
DISCIPLINARY BOARD; ROBERT S. KENNEDY, Individually and in his  
official capacity as Deputy Disciplinary Counsel; CHARLES B.  
PLATTSMIER, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Disciplinary  
Counsel,

Defendants – Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Louisiana  
No. 5:15-CV-2766

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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:\*

Plaintiff-Appellant Hersy Jones, Jr. appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *See Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex.*, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)

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\* Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

No. 17-30798

(“[The *Rooker-Feldman*] doctrine directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments.”). We find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction to hear Jones’s claims.

Even if some of Jones’s claims can somehow be characterized as a general, facial challenge to the constitutionality of the disciplinary scheme, he should have raised those issues during the state court proceeding. *See Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex.*, 32 F.3d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction does not lie for claims that were not presented first to the state court in the disciplinary proceeding.”).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> We also determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for recusal. *See Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco*, 664 F.3d 71, 80 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We review a denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion.”).