UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORIGINAL

THE FACEBOOK, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants,

v.

CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as CONNECTU LLC), CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, TYLER WINKLEVOSS, DIVYA NARENDRA, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

Appeal from the United States District Court Northern District of California, Case No. CV 07-01389-JW, The Honorable James Ware

DECLARATION OF THERESA A. SUTTON IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS FACEBOOK, INC. AND MARK ZUCKERBERG'S MOTION TO DISMISS

VOLUME 2 of 2 (EXHIBITS K - U)

I. NEEL CHATTERJEE (STATE BAR NO. 173985)
WARRINGTON S. PARKER, III (STATE BAR NO. 148003)
MONTE COOPER (STATE BAR NO. 196746)
THERESA A. SUTTON (STATE BAR NO. 211857)
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Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg

I, Theresa A. Sutton, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an Associate with the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, counsel for Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg. I am a member of the State Bar of California and the Ninth Circuit. I make this declaration in support of Appellees-Cross-Appellants' Motion to Dismiss. I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the truth of the matters set forth herein.
- 2. Attached hereto as **Exhibit K** is a true and correct copy of the parties' February 23, 2008, Term Sheet and Settlement Agreement. This version has been redacted as indicated on the document.
- 3. Attached hereto as **Exhibit L** is a true and correct copy of the June 25, 2008, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion To Enforce The Settlement Agreement in Case No. CV-07-01389-JW (N. D. Cal.). 24, 2008, Proof of Service in *ConnectU, Inc., et al. v. Facebook, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 07-cv-10593 (DPW)(District of Massachusetts).
- 4. Attached hereto as **Exhibit N** is a true and correct copy of the April 23, 2008, Proof of Service in Case No. CV-07-01389-JW (N. D. Cal.).
- 5. Attached hereto as **Exhibit O** is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the June 2, 2008, Hearing Transcript from ConnectU's Emergency Motion in

ConnectU, Inc., et al. v. Facebook, Inc., et al., Case No. 07-cv-10593 (DPW)

(District of Massachusetts).

- 6. Attached hereto as **Exhibit P** is a true and correct copy of the July 2, 2008, Judgment Enforcing Settlement Agreement.
- 7. Attached hereto as **Exhibit Q** is a true and correct copy of the July 29, 2008, Notice Of Motion And Motion To Intervene By Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss And Divya Narenda.
- 8. Attached hereto as **Exhibit R** is a true and correct copy of the August 8, 2008, Order Denying The ConnectU Founders' Motion To Intervene; Denying ConnectU's Motion To Stay Execution Of Judgment.
- 9. Attached hereto as **Exhibit S** is a true and correct copy of ConnectU's July 30, 2008, Notice of Appeal.
- 10. Attached hereto as **Exhibit T** is a true and correct copy of the August 11, 2008, Notice of Appeal by Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra.
- 11. Attached hereto as **Exhibit U** is a true and correct copy of the Founders' December 19, 2008, [Second] Notice of Appeal.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 18th day of February 2009, at Menlo Park, California.

Theresa A. Sutton

EXHIBIT K

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Term Short & Settlement Agreement

- its related parties, on the other hand and Facebook and
- 2) All parties get mutual releases as broad as possible and all cases are clismissed with prejudice. Each side brans their own attorneys fees and costs.
- 3) All terms of agreement are confidential, no party disperages any other parties and no party will comment further publicly related to facts underlying or related to this dispute. The parties will agree on any public statements. A violation of the publicity and confidentiality provision of this paragraph shall be submitted to a bindly arbitrator who may award injunctive relief and demages up to million. Redacted this Agreement 15 subject to the continuing or formattle the
- 4) The parties stipulate that the Sas Jose Federal count shall have jurisdiction to enforce this agreement
- The parties agree that they resecute more formal documents but there terms are loinding and orney he submitted is to evidence to enforce this agreement.
- 6) Connect U founders represent and warrant (1) They have no further right to assent against Facebook (2) Thy have so turther claims against Facebook of its related parties

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- 7) All connect u stock in exchange for Redacted

shall include a requirement that all rotal related to The

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shares will be noted in accordance with the Board of Director's recommendations and be subject to The Same anti-dilution protections afforded to Series D Proffeel Stock. The true Facebook will determine The form & documentation of The acquisition of connected's shares! Redacted Face book reponeurts that it currently has fully diluted shares outstanding.

focebook, Inc.

MARK Zuckerberg

Connect U, lac.

Casen Winklevoss

Tyle Winklows

Divy Narendra

EXHIBIT L

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

Plaintiffs,

CONFIDENTIAL MOTION TO ENFORCE
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are The Facebook Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, "Facebook"). Plaintiffs bring this action against ConnectU, Inc., Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., Winston Williams, and Wayne Chang (collectively, "Defendants") alleging, *inter alia*, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, *et seq*. In essence, Facebook alleges that ConnectU gained unauthorized access to Facebook's servers and website and took information for its own unlawful use. The parties are engaged in at least two other lawsuits over these matters; in those cases, ConnectU is the Plaintiff and Facebook is the Defendant.

In the course of this lawsuit, the parties engaged in private mediation. On February 22, 2008, as the result of the mediation, the parties signed a written "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement." In the Agreement, the parties agreed to resolve all of their disputes and to dismiss the pending lawsuits. The Agreement provides that they "may execute more formal documents but these terms are binding." After signing the Agreement, the parties attempted to draft formal

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documents but failed to reach a consensus on certain terms. In the Agreement, the parties stipulate that the federal court in San Jose, California has jurisdiction to enforce it. Based on a belief that a court order is necessary to enforce the February 22, 2008 Agreement, Facebook filed the present motion in this Court.1

The question for decision by the Court is whether the February 22, 2008 Agreement contains sufficiently definite and essential terms that it may be enforced. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Agreement is enforceable and orders its enforcement.

II. BACKGROUND

As stated above, this action is one of three separate actions between the parties in various federal courts.² On January 22, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Richard Seeborg ordered the parties to participate in Alternative Dispute Resolution. (Docket Item No. 270.) The parties elected to participate in private mediation.

On February 22, 2008, the parties engaged in mediation before Antonio Piazza. Both sides were represented by counsel. As the result of the mediation, the parties signed a handwritten document entitled, "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement" ("Agreement"). (Second Declaration of Evan A. Parke, Ex. A., hereafter, "Parke Decl.," filed under seal.)

With the precise financial terms redacted, the Agreement provides, as follows:⁴

^{1 (}hereafter, "Motion," Docket Item No. 329, filed under seal.)

² The other actions are ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, Appeal No. 07-1796 (1st Cir.) and ConnectU, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. C 07-10593-DPW (D. Mass.).

³ The Agreement recites that all of its terms are "confidential." At the hearing on the motion, the Court expressed its need to discuss the Agreement in its Order. The Court now determines that it can protect the confidentiality of the Agreement if references to the amount of consideration which the parties agreed to exchange as a part of the settlement are omitted. Moreover, since neither Facebook nor ConnectU are publicly traded companies at this time, the Court finds good cause to keep the transcript of the proceedings under seal as requested by the parties to protect their financial information.

⁴ (Declaration of Theresa A. Sutton in Support of Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion, hereafter, "Sutton Decl.," Ex. A at 1-2, filed under seal.) For authenticity purposes, the Court leaves all typographical errors and strikeouts in the Agreement unchanged.

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Plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement is made on the grounds that the Agreement unambiguously sets forth all material terms of the parties' settlement and Defendants should be ordered to comply with it. (Motion at 6.) Defendants contend that Facebook's motion to enforce the Agreement should be denied because (1) the agreement is missing material terms, (2) the terms which are included were not agreed upon, and (3) Facebook committed fraud in the procurement of the Agreement. (ConnectU's Opposition to Facebook's Confidential Motion at 6, hereafter, "Opposition," filed under seal.) In its reply, Plaintiffs contend that the Agreement was not procured by fraud. (Reply in Support of Confidential Motion at 9, hereafter, "Reply," filed under seal.) The Court considers each issue in turn.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court's Jurisdiction

Before considering the motion to enforce the Agreement, the Court considers its jurisdiction to act on such a motion. The Court also considers issues raised at the hearing, namely, whether Plaintiffs are required to file an action to enforce the Agreement, to which Defendants would be allowed to plead their objections to enforcement as affirmative defenses.

"It is well settled that a district court has the equitable power to enforce summarily an agreement to settle a case pending before it." Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987); Decanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978); TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986); In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994). Once a settlement has been reached in a pending action, any party to the agreement may bring a motion to enforce it. See Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, California law provides:

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.6. In addition to the statutory power to enter a judgment, the court's enforcement powers include the inherent authority to order a party's specific performance of acts

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required by the settlement agreement and to award damages or other sanctions for noncompliance. TNT Mktg., 796 F.2d at 278.

In this case, in addition to its inherent authority and the authority conferred by California law, in Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, the parties explicitly stipulated that the Court has authority to exercise enforcement. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that it has the jurisdiction and authority to enforce the Agreement without requiring additional pleadings.

However, the power to enforce a settlement agreement can only be exercised if the terms have been agreed to by the individuals authorized to make decisions behalf of the parties. See Harrop v. W. Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977). At the hearing, Defendants raised two issues regarding the authority of the Court to enforce the Agreement against the individuals and the corporations.

First, Defendants question whether there is a bases for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over ConnectU's individual shareholders, i.e., the three principals who signed the Agreement.8 The Court finds that by signing the Agreement with explicit statements such as those in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, each of the signatories subjected him or herself to the Court's jurisdiction for the limited purpose of enforcing the Agreement. Second, Defendants question whether ConnectU's individual shareholders received proper notice of the proceedings. The Court finds the three principals of ConnectU have had adequate notice since they are plaintiffs in the Massachusetts action where the parties have vigorously litigated discovery issues relating to the enforcement of this Agreement. (See June 3, 2008, Memorandum and Order, No. 07-10593-DPW, D. Mass.) It is incongruous to argue that these individuals did not receive notice of the motion since Judge

⁸ Defendants first made these contentions in their sur-reply. (Defendants' Sur-Reply in Opposition to Confidential Motion to Enforce, hereafter, "Sur-Reply," Docket Item No. 438.) The Court grants Defendants' motion for leave to file the sur-reply, and considers the contentions raised in the sur-reply.

Woodlocks' June 3, 2008 order in the Massachusetts action specifically addressed the hearing on the motion to enforce the Agreement in this Court. (Id. at 2.)

В. **The Material Terms**

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The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law that apply to the interpretation of contracts, even if the underlying cause of action is federal. United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, challenges to a settlement agreement based on interpretation of ambiguous terms, fraud in the inducement, or indefiniteness of a term all turn on the applicable state law. See White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Doi, 276 F.3d at 1135.

California has a strong policy in favor of enforcing settlement agreements. Osumi v. Sutton, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1355, 1357 (2007). Under California law, a settlement agreement "must be interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting." Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 107 Cal. App. 4th 620, 625 (2003); see Cal. Civ. Code, § 1636. When the agreement is in writing, "the intention . . . is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible." Brinton v. Bankers Pension Serv., Inc., 76 Cal. App. 4th 550, 559 (1999); see Cal. Civ. Code § 1639. "[C]ourts will not set aside contracts for mere subjective misinterpretation." Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1421 (1996). "A settlement agreement, like any other contract, is unenforceable if the parties fail to agree on a material term or if a material term is not reasonably certain." Lindsay v. Lewandowski, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1618, 1622 (2006) (citing Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (1998)).

First, the Agreement clearly states the consideration for the performance required and how it must be paid. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1-2.) In exchange for a specified amount of cash and stock in

⁹ At the hearing, counsel for ConnectU's individual shareholders argued that they are not "plaintiffs" in the Massachusetts action. The Court declines to entertain the notion since counsel admitted that the individual shareholders added themselves as plaintiffs to the amended complaint in

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Facebook, ConnectU founders are required under the Agreement to represent and warrant "they have no further right to assert against Facebook" and "they have no further claims against Facebook and its related parties." (Id.)

Second, the Agreement clearly defines the structure of the transaction. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1-2.) Paragraph 7 recites that all ConnectU stock is to be exchanged for a sum certain amount of cash and a precise number of common shares in Facebook; it is a stock and cash for stock acquisition. Subsequent negotiations might have proposed a different structure for the transaction or other additional terms, but those proposal were, apparently, rejected. (Id., Ex. B.) The Court cannot considered subsequent negotiations as evidence that there was no "meeting of the minds" with the respect to the Agreement. The Court must determine the parties' intent from the four corners of the Agreement, not from the extrinsic evidence. Brinton, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 559; Cal. Civ. Code § 1639.

Third, the principals of each company, who are persons authorized to make decisions for the parties, all signed the handwritten version of the Agreement and none of the signatures are disputed. However, Defendants point out that one stockholder in ConnectU, Howard Winklevoss, was not a party to, and did not sign the Agreement. (Opposition at 10.) Therefore, the issue becomes whether the lack of Howard Winklevoss' signature makes the Agreement unenforceable.

ConnectU is a Connecticut corporation. (Id. at 1.) Under Connecticut law, a share exchange transaction only needs to be approved by majority vote. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-816(a). As of May 23, 2006, Howard Winklevoss owned 1% of the outstanding shares in ConnectU. (Declaration of Neel Chatterjee in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply, Ex. B at 10, filed under seal.) There is no evidence his ownership interest changed as of the date of the Agreement. The shareholders who signed the Agreement own 99% of the outstanding shares. Since a majority of ConnectU's shareholders have agreed to the transaction, the consent of Howard Winklevoss is unnecessary to make the Agreement binding on him. Therefore, the lack of Howard Winklevoss' signature is not an impediment to enforcing the Agreement.

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Defendants contend that the Agreement was only a starting point for negotiating more formal documentation. (Opposition at 7-9.) However, the Agreement itself provides that the parties "may execute more formal documents," but that the Agreement is "binding." (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1, emphasis added.) It is significant that the parties used the word "may" in this instance as opposed to "will," which they had readily used in other contexts. (See e.g., Agreement ¶¶ 1, 3, 7.) On the face of the Agreement, it is clear that, had the parties wished to require more formal documents, they could have indicated they will or shall execute more formal documents. Instead, they elected to use the word, "may," and made clear that the Agreement is binding in and of itself.

In sum, the Court finds that the Agreement reached by the parties does not display on its face a failure to agree or any uncertainty regarding its material terms. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Agreement is enforceable.

C. Whether the Agreement Was Procured by Fraud

Defendants contend that Facebook's motion to enforce the Agreement should be denied because Plaintiffs fraudulently procured the Agreement by misrepresenting Facebook's present value. (Opposition at 14.)

A contract is not enforceable if it was induced by fraud. Jones v. Grieve, 15 Cal. App. 561, 566-67 (1911). To prove fraud in the inducement of a contract, a party must establish the elements of common law fraud. Id. The elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation; (2) scienter; (3) justifiable reliance; and (4) resulting damage. Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd., 155 Cal. App. 4th 798, 806-07 (2007); Wilke v. Coinway, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d 126, 136 (1967) (quoting Cortez v. Weymouth, 235 Cal. App. 2d 140 (1965)). These legal principles apply to a contract to settle a lawsuit. See Merced County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. The State of California, 233 Cal. App. 3d 765, 771 (1991).

Where a party is represented by counsel, or where the alleged misrepresentation was made by an adversary during the course of negotiations, courts have held that reliance is unjustifiable. See Scognamill v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, 2005 WL 2045807 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding as a

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matter of law that reliance on representation of adversary in execution of merger agreement was unjustifiable where parties were represented by counsel during the negotiation process); Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1324 (1986) (holding that the fraud claim failed because plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of the allegedly fraudulent statement, and it was not "reasonable for plaintiff to accept defendant's statements without an independent inquiry or investigation").

1. ConnectU's Proffer Regarding Facebook's Valuation

Defendants contend that they were defrauded during the settlement negotiations because Plaintiffs did not disclose a valuation of Facebook common stock which had been made by the Facebook Board of Directors. (Opposition at 6.)

Apparently, in October 2007, Facebook and Microsoft issued a press release stating Microsoft would "take a \$240 million stake in Facebook's next round of financing at a \$15 billion valuation." (Parke Decl., Ex. J.) Defendants proffer evidence that subsequent to the press release, in the regular course of its operations, Facebook's Board of Directors determined a value of the company's "shares" which was different than the valuation disclosed in the press release. (Declaration of Robert T. Clarkson ¶ 11, filed under seal.)

Defendants do not challenge the accuracy of the press release itself. Thus, there is no claim that the statement in the release was not true when it was made. (Declaration of Ted Wang in Support of Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion ¶ 2, filed under seal.) Plaintiffs do not deny that the Facebook Board of Directors made a subsequent valuation of Facebook shares which was a different value from the value Microsoft attributed to the company. However, Plaintiffs did not make any representations or warranties in the Agreement about the value of Facebook common stock.¹⁰

¹⁰ Defendants provide no authority to support their contention that either Facebook or Zuckerberg had a duty to disclose the Board's valuation to Defendants in the context of the settlement or to correct any subjective valuation which Defendants might have made when determining what demand to make in the mediation. It is clear that generally one has a duty to correct a disclosure which is misleading when made, but usually, there is no duty to a correct statement which is true at the time it is made. See Brody v. Transitional Hospitals Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Intentional

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Morever, it is undisputed that the shares the parties agreed to exchange in the Agreement and the shares involved in the Microsoft's transaction are of different classes. Accordingly, the failure to disclose the difference in the valuations cannot be fraudulent as a matter of law.

Further, the Agreement does not attribute a specific value to the outstanding shares of Facebook's stock; there is no admissible evidence that Plaintiffs made any such representation while negotiating the settlement.11 Rather, the only representation evident from the Agreement is the number of fully diluted shares which Facebook currently has outstanding. (Parke Decl., Ex. A.) Defendants have failed to show that this representation was false or that there were any other misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs upon which Defendants could have justifiably relied.

In sum, the Court finds Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiffs made a misrepresentation during the negotiation. The individual signatories to the Agreement are sophisticated business parties who were represented by reputable counsel at the mediation. Either party could have chosen to condition the financial exchange being negotiated on representations and warranties of the value of the stock involved or to conduct their own due diligence with respect to Facebook's valuation. Neither party chose these courses of conduct. Notably, in his June 3, 2008 order denying ConnectU's motion to compel production of documents, Judge Woodlock stated:

From all that appears, the parties were prepared to settle their disputes then, despite the fact that aspects of discovery in this case—most pertinently for present purposes, document production—had not been completed and unresolved discovery issues remained outstanding.

(See June 3, 2008, Memorandum and Order at 2, No. 07-10593-DPW, D. Mass.) Thus, the parties elected to proceed with their settlement negotiations knowing they lacked potentially relevant

concealment exists only "when a party to a transaction, who is under no duty to speak, nevertheless does speak and suppresses facts which materially qualify the facts stated." Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 1164 (2005).

¹¹ Defendants proffer evidence of statements made during mediation that resulted in the Agreement. Under ADR Local Rule 6-11, "anything that happened or was said, any position taken, and any view of the merits of the case formed by any participant in connection with any mediation ... shall not be ... (2) disclosed to the assigned judge; or (3) used for any purpose, including impeachment, in any pending or future proceeding in this court." Pursuant to this privilege, the Court declines to conduct a hearing or consider evidence regarding the details of the parties negotiations in their mediation

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information. Without a showing by Defendants of a material misrepresentation or omission in the negotiations, the Court finds no basis to decline enforcement.

2. **Securities Fraud**

In their opposition and sur-reply, Defendants contend that the Agreement is not enforceable because Plaintiffs committed securities fraud, making the Agreement voidable. (Opposition at 14; Sur-Reply at 7.)

Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have cited authority that an agreement to exchange shares of closely held corporations pursuant to settlement of litigation between the companies is voidable by showing securities fraud. The cases which Defendants cite in their sur-reply regarding a duty to disclose "material non-public information" all fall within the context of insider trading, which is not an issue in this case. (Sur-Reply at 10.)

On June 24, 2008, the day after the hearing, Defendants requested leave to file additional authority to provide precedent for voiding a purported settlement agreement on the basis of securities fraud.12 While Defendants cite one case where a settlement was found void under § 29 of the Securities Exchange Act, that case involved an agreement which violated the margin requirements of Regulation T because the defendant failed to recover capital after the settlement. Pearlstein v. Scudder and German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1970). Contrary to Pearlstein, the Ninth Circuit has held that a broad release in a signed settlement agreement operates to prevent a party from collaterally attacking the agreement by alleging it violates the securities laws under § 29. Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted:

[w]hen, as here, a release is signed in a commercial context by parties in a roughly equivalent bargaining position and with ready access to counsel, the general rule is that, if 'the language of the release is clear, . . . the intent of the parties [is] indicated by the language employed.'

^{12 (}See Docket Item No. 454.) While Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to respond, the Court finds good cause to grant Defendants leave and considers the authority presented in

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Id. at 1342 (quoting Locafrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing, Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 1977)). Thus, in Petro-Ventures, the Ninth Circuit effectuated the parties' intent to bring about "general peace" by finding that their settlement agreement cannot be voided under § 29. Id.

As in Petro-Ventures, this case involves a settlement agreement reached by the parties, who were represented by counsel, in which they intended to undertake to give mutual releases that were "as broad as possible." (Agreement ¶ 2.) There is no doubt that the language of the release in Paragraph 2 of the Agreement conveys the intent of the parties to release all claims. Thus, the Agreement cannot be collaterally attacked using § 29.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to tender sufficient evidence of fraud in the circumstances proffered to the Court to create a genuine dispute as to whether the Agreement was fraudulently induced.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Parties' Settlement Agreement. The parties are ordered to appear on July 2, 2008 at 10 a.m. to show cause why a judgment should not be entered ordering the parties to take the actions required of them by the Settlement Agreement. On or before June 30, 2008, the parties are directed to submit a proposed form of judgment consistent with this Order.

Dated: June 25, 2008

United States District Judge

∥Case 5:U7-CV-U138C = VV Document 461 Filed 06/25/2. J8 Page 13 of 13 THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 1 Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com D. Michael Underhill MUnderhill@BSFLLP.com 3 David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee @orrick.com 5 Jonathan M. Shaw jshaw@bsfllp.com Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com 6 Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com 7 Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@orrick.com Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman@bsfllp.com 8 Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com 9 Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com Yvonne Penas Greer vgreer@orrick.com 10 United States District Court 11 Dated: June 25, 2008 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk 12 For the Northern District of California 13 /s/ JW Chambers Elizabeth Garcia 14 **Courtroom Deputy** 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28




EXHIBIT M

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CONNECTU, INC., CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, TYLER WINKLEVOSS, AND DIVYA NARENDRA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FACEBOOK, INC., MARK ZUCKERBERG, EDUARDO SAVERIN, DUSTIN MOSKOVITZ, ANDREW MCCOLLUM, and FACEBOOK, LLC,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-10593-DPW

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am more than eighteen years old and not a party to this action. My place of employment and business address is 1000 Marsh Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025.

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Executed on April 24, 2008, at Menlo Park, California. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Abby Ako Nai




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7	I am readily familiar with my firm's practice for collection and processing correspondence				
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11	under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.				
12	2 Jun	M. Mudunian			
13	3	Karen N. Mudurian			
14	4	•			
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Page 3 of /

Document 335

[Case 5:07-cv-013cc-RS

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
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
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


EXHIBIT O

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS													
2	CONNECTU, INC. : DOCKET NUMBER CA0710593													
3	PLAINTIFF :													
4	FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL :													
5	DEFENDANTS : BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS													
6	JUNE 2, 2008													
7	2:30 p.m.													
	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING UNSEALED HEARING ONLY													
8														
9	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK													
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE													
11	APPEARANCES:													
12	ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF:													
13														
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21	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ONE COURTHOUSE WAY													
22	THIRD FLOOR - SUITE 3200													
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25	PROCEEDINGS REPORTED USING MACHINE STENOGRAPHY. TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED EMPLOYING COMPUTER-AIDED TECHNOLOGY.													

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14													
15	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>												
16	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.												
17	This Honorable Court is now in session.												
18	You may be seated.												
19	Calling the case, Civil Action 07-10593,												
20	ConnectU, Inc. versus Facebook, Inc., et al.												
21	THE COURT: Well, at the outset, I do have a motion												
22	to move this case <u>in camera</u> .												
23	My general view is, unless there is some showing of												
24	specific necessity beyond the generalized discussion, then, I												
25	won't do that.												

	ONSEALED REARING											
1	discussion of non-code documents?											
2	Simplistic, that's it.											
3	MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.											
4	If he does get into a document that isn't code, he											
5	can look at it to see if it has what they say is the											
6	syntactical style, that looks like it has code in it, but,											
7	beyond that, he can't review it in detail.											
8	Now, just to be clear, as to these documents that											
9	he identified, even though we disputed the interpretation of a											
10	protocol, we did log them, we provided the log to Mr. Parmet,											
11	and Mr. Parmet was going to be given the opportunity to object											
12	and to take it to court if he felt it was appropriate; so,											
13	notwithstanding the fact that we disagreed with him under the											
14	protocol, and we disagreed with what he did, and we felt he											
15	had violated it, we were still willing to take this to court											
16	to resolve the dispute.											
17	THE COURT: Now, is it your position, then, that											
18	all of this was pre-admitted by the settlement discussions and											
19	the term agreement?											
20	MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.											
21	(Pause.)											
22	THE COURT: What do you want me to do?											
23	MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor, what I'd like you to											
24	do is dismiss this case.											

THE COURT: Well, but that's a matter for

Judge Ware; I mean, the term agreement says that he's the one
who's got the responsibility for this, in reviewing it, and
now, of course, there is a dispute about whether it's actually
been settled.
Now, I don't think I'm going to go beyond what the

Now, I don't think I'm going to go beyond what the term agreement is. That's where the resolution of any disputes regarding this should be; that is, in the San Jose Division of the Northern District.

MR. CHATTERJEE: I agree with you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay; so I'm not in a position to dismiss the case, I don't think, but to await the outcome, now that there's a dispute, before Judge Ware; so what else do you want me to do?

MR. CHATTERJEE: So, Your Honor, the other thing you can do is you can await the outcome of those proceedings in front of Judge Ware.

If Your Honor believes that you have jurisdiction, one thing you could do is refer this matter to Judge Collings, for Mr. Parmet, to talk about <u>in camera</u> what he looked at --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to be doing that.

This is not a, you know, trick question.

It is a question of what it is that I'm really being asked to do and what my authority is to do it.

The only provisional kind of authority I think I

have in this area -- or, at least, the only one that I would

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1	exercise is contempt; that is to say, someone is in
2	violation of a court order and I maintain some sort of
3	authority to deal with that as a contempt.
4	I'm not sure if there's anything else, I mean, you
5	say I could dismiss the case. I suppose it's possible for me
6	to tee it up to dismiss the case by saying that I followed the
7	Massachusetts rules that you've identified, and they're
8	applicable here.
9	I'm loathe to do that when the parties have a
10	mechanism for resolving this locally, which is what they
11	wanted to do, apparently, so it's back again.
12	MR. CHATTERJEE: Okay.
13	Thank you, Your Honor.
14	Going back to your original question: What do we
15	want you to do?
16	If Your Honor is inclined to hold onto this case
17	until the proceedings before Judge Ware are resolved, I would
18	stay this case.
19	Your Honor, the only reason I had suggested
20	Judge Collings handle this is because he handled all the
21	issues leading up to the
22	THE COURT: But he doesn't have contempt power, and
23	that's the reason I took it.

He can do a court recommendation, but, if

MR. CHATTERJEE: Correct, Your Honor.

24

1	MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, I was saying that there												
2	is a parallel to these cases, in that, in each one of those												
3	three cases, there was material information that was withheld												
4	by the opposing party before the parties entered into												
5	settlement negotiations.												
6	There is no reason to believe in any of those cases												
7	that Discovery was complete, but it's not important.												
8	What's important is that there was material												
9	information that was withheld in all three of those cases from												
10	the settling party, and, in all three of those cases,												
11	The Court believed that that was a sufficient basis for your												
12	opening settlement.												
13	Now, we're not asking you to do that, Your Honor.												
14	THE COURT: No, and I don't have the power to do												
15	it. It's up to Judge Ware.												
16	The question is: What do you want me to do?												
17	And I'm back to that question: What do you want me												
18	to do?												
19	MR. HORNICK: The reason why we want Your Honor to												
20	review these documents and not to give them to Judge Ware is												
21	that these documents let me step back for a moment.												

The California case was ordered to mediation on January 22 of this year by Judge Ware. He did not order this

24 case to mediation.

22

23

25

The parties decided to make it a variable

1	discussion, so these documents are not relevant to the											
2	California well, we don't know, but we don't think that											
3	they're relevant to the California case, so, if we make so											
4	the point is that this is the place.											
5	This is the place to address whether these											
6	documents are relevant to the disputes between the parties,											
7	and, therefore, what we ask This Court to do is not to open											
8	the settlement but, simply, to review the documents, determine											
9.	if they should have been produced in Discovery, and, then,											
LO	order that they be produced, if you find that they were											
L1	material or that they were responsive.											
L2	THE COURT: The parties agreed that the in											
L3	Paragraph 4 or, Section 4 of the settlement term sheet											
L 4	and settlement agreement, that the cities and federal court											
L5	shall have jurisdiction to enforce this agreement.											
L6	This is a question over the enforceability of the											
L7	agreement.											
L8	The agreement deals with this case, as well as the											
L9	San Jose case.											
20	That's what the breadth of what you've asked for											
21	is, so											
22	MR. HORNICK: May I respond, Your Honor?											
23	THE COURT: You always do.											
24	MR. HORNICK: I want to make sure that it's okay.											
25	Paragraph 4 doesn't say that the jurisdiction is											

DIANE M. MOLAS, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR USDC - MAD OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

I know

UNSEALED HEARING

	•												
1	exclusive in the California court.												
2	THE COURT: You mean, I have jurisdiction over the												
3	California case, too?												
4	MR. HORNICK: You have jurisdiction over your own												
5	cases, Your Honor.												
6	THE COURT: Well, that doesn't mean that I have												
7	control over the California case, too?												
8	That reading?												
9	Here is a term sheet and settlement agreement.												
10	I mean, let me ask you this: Are you asking me to												
11	deal with the question of whether or not this is an												
12	enforceable agreement?												
13	MR. HORNICK: No, Your Honor.												
14	THE COURT: Okay. I didn't think you would, okay?												
15	So the short of it is that we have a dispute that												
16	will be resolved in California over whether or not there is a												
17	settlement agreement between the parties.												
18	I have a vestigial; like, the vermiform appendix,												
19	which exists solely to get inflamed and cause some upset, of												
20	Discovery dispute in this case, and I keep asking the parties												
21	what you want me to do.												
22	What I understand from Facebook is that their												
23	request is that I instruct Mr. Parmet not to discuss with any												
24	other persons his findings.												

DIANE M. MOLAS, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR USDC - MAD OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

25

I'm not sure what you're asking me to do.

- now that you don't want me to enforce this rule on whether or not this is an enforceable settlement agreement.
- MR. UNDERHILL: May I have a short response,
- 4 Your Honor?
- THE COURT: Well, let me just ask this; I mean, I'm used to tag-team wrestling.
- Are you admitted pro hac vice?
- 8 MR. UNDERHILL: I have applied, Your Honor.
- 9 My application is on file, as of today.
- MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, we neglected to introduce

 Mr. Underhill earlier.
- 12 THE COURT: Well, he introduced himself.
- 13 (Laughter.)
- 14 THE COURT: Mr. Underhill, as a stranger, but as
 15 someone who apparently has some interest in this litigation,
- of course, I'm hear you.
- MR. UNDERHILL: Thank you, Your Honor.
- I appreciate that, and I admittedly have quite a bit of interest in this litigation.
- In response to your question, Your Honor, I would
 like to make sure that The Court understands the nature of the
- 22 proceedings that are before Judge Ware.
- I actually have our briefs without exhibits, that's
- intended to be merciful, if you would like for me to hand up
- 25 | the briefs.

1	The	Cc	urt	ord	dered	tŀ	neir	produ	ıcti	.on,	then,	you're	done;	then
2	we'v	re	got	to	figuı	сe	out	what	we'	re				

THE COURT: Why would I do that, when there is pending in California an issue, as to which both parties have apparently briefed, of whether or not there is a settlement agreement that ends this case, and actually ended this case at the time that the parties called the respective clerks and told them the case was over?

Now, ordinarily, I'd, as a matter of course, to deal with, what I'll call, buyer's remorse, issue a thirty-day order of settlement if there isn't a clear stipulation filed or some other document filed, but, from time to time, I have to deal with buyer's remorse, and I deal with buyer's remorse by determining whether or not there was, in fact, an agreement, and somebody else is going to be making that determination.

If there was an agreement, then, it is a matter against which you argue on a variety of grounds; then, it is a matter of indifference whether or not there were unresolved Discovery matters in This Court.

MR. UNDERHILL: Your Honor, I would agree with you fifty percent.

The fifty percent I agree with is: If it's a binding agreement, then, as well, I agree 100 percent, if it's

a binding agreement, then, yes, this is completely relevant.

1.0

THE COURT: Right.

MR. UNDERHILL: However -- however, Your Honor, if we get those documents and if they're relevant, that's an additional ground that we would apply to The Court for setting aside the settlement agreement, which is, if there was attorney misconduct, they withheld extremely important documents, and, by the way, I'm only assuming that those are the facts, but we're not going to know that those are the facts, unless Your Honor is willing to look at the documents in camera.

I do agree, Your Honor, that this idea of: Oh, you settle cases. There is lots of Discovery out there; it's kind of appealing to go there.

I think the difference here is that there was a specific, heightened identification of a very small universe of documents that, apparently, inferring from the documents, was the smoking gun that was the difference between victory and loss in the case, or, potentially, the difference between victory and loss.

We're never going to know that, unless Your Honor looks at the documents and has some kind of a reaction that we can take to Judge Ware, as to --

THE COURT: Some kind of reaction?

Is that what is called an advisory opinion?

DIANE M. MOLAS, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR USDC - MAD OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 l	MR.	UNDERHILL:	No.
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I'm talking about issuing the documents,

Your Honor, issue an order that they have to produce the

documents.

THE COURT: Right; but they don't have to produce the documents if there is settlement; so the short and sufficient answer, I think, is to say: Judge Ware is entitled to make his determination about the enforceability of this settlement, knowing that there is some sort of dispute about Discovery in Massachusetts, in which you say there is a smoking gun, nobody's indicated there is a smoking gun, but, perhaps reading this in the light most favorable to you, he'll say: Well, until we resolve that, we can't do anything about it, but that's for him to decide, not for me, and not for me to offer my reactions --

MR. UNDERHILL: Right.

THE COURT: -- to documents; so, if you want me to read them and review them?

19 No.

If you want me to have them marked, then, I'll think about that, marked and they're part of the record, and, if Judge Ware thinks that it would be a good idea for somebody in Massachusetts to look at these and decide whether or not there was a failure of some sort of Discovery?

Well, I'm think about that.

DIANE M. MOLAS, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR
USDC - MAD
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

CERTIFICATION

I, DIANE M. MOLAS, a Registered Professional Reporter (RPR), a Certified Shorthand Reporter (CSR) in the State of Delaware, a Certified Court Reporter (CCR) in the State of New Jersey, and a Notary Public in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings reported by me, on June 2, 2008, and that I am neither counsel, nor kin, to any party or participant in said action, nor am I interested in the outcome thereof.

WITNESS my hand, this Sixth Day of June, 2008.

Diane M. Molas, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR
DE Certification Number 208-RPR
NJ Certification Number 30XI00228400

(The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means, unless under the DIRECT CONTROL AND/OR SUPERVISION of the Certifying Court Reporter herself. THE COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION NEVER APPEARS AS A PHOTOCOPIED SIGNATURE.)

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EXHIBIT P

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT ENFORCING SETTLEMENT **AGREEMENT**

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

v.

Defendants.

Pursuant to the Court's June 25, 2008 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (docket item no. 461), the parties appeared before the Court on July 2, 2008 to show cause why a judgment should not be entered. Based on the papers submitted and oral arguments of counsel,

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ENFORCING "THE TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" AS FOLLOWS:

- The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg: (1)
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (a) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, The Facebook, Inc. shall deposit with the Master, the amount of cash and the certificates representing the amount of The Facebook, Inc. common shares stated in Paragraph 7 of the Agreement, endorsed for transfer. The following legend shall appear on certificates of

The Facebook, Inc. common stock issued pursuant to this Judgment:

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THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED. THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, OFFERED FOR SALE, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTRATION STATEMENT IN EFFECT WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITIES UNDER SUCH ACT OR AN OPINION OF COUNSEL REASONABLY SATISFACTORY TO THE ISSUER THAT SUCH REGISTRATION IS NOT REQUIRED, OR UNLESS SOLD PURSUANT TO RULE 144 OF SUCH ACT.

THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE ARE SUBJECT TO AN AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE VOTING OF SUCH SHARES, AS PROVIDED IN THE CERTAIN TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO WHICH SUCH SHARES WERE ORIGINALLY ISSUED. THE HOLDERS OF SUCH SHARES ARE ENTITLED TO THE SAME ANTI-DILUTION RIGHTS AFFORDED THE ISSUER'S SERIES D PREFERRED STOCK, AS PROVIDED IN SUCH TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. A COPY OF SUCH TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ISSUER.

- Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, on or before 12 noon on (b) July 9, 2008, The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg shall submit to the Court for approval a proposed form of release. Upon approval by the Court, the release shall be signed by The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg, and shall have attached to it corporate authority given to the corporate signatory and shall be notarized as to each signatory and shall be immediately deposited with the Master;
- Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (c) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, a legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement. The dismissal shall recite that each party to the respective litigation shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.

The other two cases are ConnectU, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:04-cv-11923-DPW, currently on appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals; and ConnectU, Inc., et al. v. Facebook, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:07-cv-10593-DPW, currently pending in the District of Massachusetts.

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- ConnectU Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Vinklevoss, and Divya Narendra: (2)
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (a) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, ConnectU Inc. shall deposit with the Master all shares of ConnectU Inc., endorsed for transfer. To the extent the parties to the Agreement do not own any shares of ConnectU Inc., to fulfill the obligation of the transfer of "all ConnectU stock," the parties to the Agreement shall take such actions in their respective corporate and individual capacities as are necessary to effect the deposit with the Master of all shares of ConnectU stock;
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, on or before 12 noon on (b) July 9, 2008, ConnectU, Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Vinklevoss and Divya Narendra shall submit to the Court for approval a proposed form of release. Upon approval by the Court, the release shall be signed by these parties and shall have attached to it corporate authority given to the corporate signatory and shall be notarized as to each signatory and shall be immediately deposited with the Master;
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (c) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, a legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement. The dismissal shall recite that each party to the respective litigation shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.
- Upon further order of the Court, the parties shall deposit with the Master such other (3) and further things which will facilitate the orderly exchange of the consideration and shall do the things ordered by the Court to ensure the operational integrity of the business entities that are parties to the Agreement.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Filed 07/02, 308 Page 5 of 5 Document 476 Case 5:07-cv-013c JW THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 2 Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com D. Michael Underhill MUnderhill@BSFLLP.com 3 David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com 4 George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee@orrick.com Jonathan M. Shaw ishaw@bsfllp.com 5 Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com 6 Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@Orrick.com 7 Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman bsfllp.com 8 Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com 9 Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com Yvonne Penas Greer ygreer@orrick.com 10 11 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk **Dated: July 2, 2008** 12 /s/ JW Chambers 13 Elizabeth Garcia **Courtroom Deputy** 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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



EXHIBIT Q

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES WARE AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Please take notice that on August 1, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this matter may be heard, in Courtroom 8 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, located at 280 South First Street, San Jose, California 95113, Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra ("ConnectU Shareholders") will and hereby do move for an order permitting the ConnectU Shareholders to intervene in this case, because their interests and rights are directly affected by the Judgment Enforcing Settlement Agreement ("Judgment") entered by the Court on July 2, 2008, and the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement ("Order") entered by the Court on June 25, 2008.

The ConnectU Shareholders' motion is based on this notice of motion and motion, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, and all pleadings and papers that are of record and are on file in this case. The ConnectU Shareholders file this motion without waiving any rights to appeal or otherwise to set aside the Judgment and reserving all rights with respect thereto.



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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

THE JUDGMENT REQUIRES THE CONNECTU SHAREHOLDERS TO TENDER SHARES AND SUBMIT **DISMISSALS AND RELEASES**

On June 25, 2008, the Court granted the motion of The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg (together, "Facebook") to enforce a purported settlement agreement. Docket No. 461. On July 2, 2008, the Court issued its Judgment requiring "ConnectU Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra" to:

- submit proposed forms of release to the Court by July 9, 2008;
- provide a "legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement" to a special master ("Special Master") by August 4, 2008; and
- deposit the stock required to be exchanged under the provisions of the Term Sheet with the Special Master by August 4, 2008.

Docket No. 476 at 1-4.

II. THE CONNECTU SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO **INTERVENE UNDER RULE 24**

The ConnectU Shareholders should be permitted to intervene in order to protect their interests, including on appeal. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 376 (1987) ("An intervenor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to appeal an adverse final judgment by a trial court."); CFTC v. Topworth Int'l, Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) ("one who is not a party before the district court may not appeal a judgment"). "Rule 24 permits a third party to enter the proceedings in order to protect his own interests."

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liberally, and doubts resolved in favor of the proposed intervenor." *Turn Key Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe*, 164 F.3d 1080, 1081 (8th Cir. 1999).

A. Intervention Is Appropriate Under Rule 24(a)(2)

Intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) is proper where: (1) the motion is timely; (2) the applicant claims a "significantly protectable" interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest is inadequately represented by the parties to the action. *Sierra Club* v. *EPA*, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993).

First, the ConnectU Shareholders' motion is timely because it was filed within the time limit for the parties to the action to appeal. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395 (1977); see also Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463, 465 (9th Cir. 1953) ("Intervention should be allowed even after a final judgment where it is necessary to preserve some right which cannot otherwise be protected."). 1/ Second, the ConnectU Shareholders have protectable interests in their stock and in their individual claims against Facebook. See State ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognized rights that are protectable suffices). Third, the Judgment requires the ConnectU Shareholders to execute releases, submit dismissals, and transfer their stock to the Special Master, which may impair or impede their ability to protect these interests. See id. (where there is a significant protectable interest, there is little difficulty in concluding that disposition of the case may affect it); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, advisory committee note to 1966 amendment ("if an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene").

^{1/} Judgment was entered on July 2, 2008, and the 30-day time period for appeal has not yet run. Fed. R. App. P. 4.

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Fourth, the representation of the Shareholders' interests by ConnectU is inadequate because it is unclear whether ConnectU would be able to appeal if it complies with the Judgment. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Q-Lity Computer, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 365 (N.D. Ca. 2002) ("[t]he burden of showing inadequacy is minimal"). Intervention would ensure that these interests are advanced on appeal. See Mission Hills Condominium Asso. M-1 v. Corley, 570 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ill. 1983) (individual residents permitted to intervene in suit by tenant association to "fill the gap" where tenant association lacked standing). Additionally, ConnectU is ill-positioned to protect the ConnectU Shareholders against contempt charges should they withhold their shares in an effort to clearly preserve their rights to appeal. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983) ("the requirement of inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of its interests 'may be' inadequate and that the burden of making this showing is minimal); Charles Wright, Arthur Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice And Procedure, Vol. 7C, § 1909 at 395 (2007) ("An interest that is not represented is surely not adequately represented and intervention must be allowed."). In this regard ConnectU's interests are narrower than those of its Shareholders and, thus, its representation is inadequate. Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) (because interests were "potentially more narrow" than the movant's, movant satisfied its burden of showing parties representation "may have been inadequate").

Intervention Is Appropriate Under Rule 24(b) B.

The ConnectU Shareholders intend to challenge the enforceability of the Term Sheet on appeal, which constitutes the requisite "defense in common with the main action." Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, "Rule 24(b) intervention is readily permitted when proposed intervenors demonstrate ... that they have real economic stakes in the outcome and

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Document 574

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


EXHIBIT R



Case 5:07-cv-01385 JW Filed 08/08₁ Document 610 ્ર)8 Page 1 of 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SAN JOSE DIVISION 11 The Facebook, Inc., et al., NO. C 07-01389 JW 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING THE CONNECTU 13 DENYING CONNECTU'S MOTION TO ConnectU, Inc., et al., STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 17 Initially, Plaintiffs the Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, "Facebook") brought this action against ConnectU, Inc. ("ConnectU"), Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., Winston 18 19 Williams, and Wayne Chang alleging, inter alia, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair 20 competition, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq. The parties were engaged in at least two 21 other lawsuits over these matters; in those cases, ConnectU and its founders, Cameron Winklevoss, 22 Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra (collectively, the "ConnectU Founders"), were plaintiffs and 23 Facebook was a defendant. Based on a series of events and motions, on July 2, 2008, the Court 24 entered Judgment enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties to all of the actions. 25 (hereafter, "Judgment," Docket Item No. 476.) 26

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Presently before the Court are the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene¹ and ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment.² The Court conducted a hearing on August 6, 2008. Based on the papers submitted to date and oral argument of counsel, the Court DENIES the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene on the ground that they have already been made parties to this action. However, the Court GRANTS them an extension of time in which to file their appeal. Further, the Court DENIES ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

Motion to Intervene A.

The ConnectU Founders move to intervene on the grounds that they have a real economic stake in the outcome of this case and ConnectU will not sufficiently protect their interests. (Intervene Motion at 4, 6.) The Judgment in this case treats the ConnectU Founders as parties; it orders them and the other signatories to take action to comply with the Term Sheet and Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"). Therefore, before reaching the necessity of allowing them to intervene, the Court reviews the ConnectU Founders' status as existing parties to this action and to the other lawsuits covered by the Settlement Agreement.

The Ninth Circuit has held that when a federal court has a basis for jurisdiction over a dispute involving a final settlement agreement, the court may "interpret and apply its own judgment to the future conduct contemplated" by a agreement. See Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1998). The requisite independent basis for jurisdiction may be supplied by a provision in the settlement agreement. Id. at 544. Such a provision, "empowers a district court to protect its judgment" from subsequent attempts to frustrate "the purpose of the settlement agreement and order." Sandpiper Village Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 841

¹ (hereafter, "Intervene Motion," Docket Item No. 574.)

² (hereafter, "Stay Motion," Docket Item No. 578.). Subject to being permitted to intervene,

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(9th Cir. 2005). Under this power, individuals may be bound to take actions as long as they had notice and an ability to contest the judgment or order enforcing the settlement agreement. See id.

On August 8, 2007, the ConnectU Founders and ConnectU, Inc., were named Plaintiffs in a First Amended Complaint in Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-10593-DPW pending in the District of Massachusetts. The Facebook, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg and others were named as Defendants in that action. In this action, Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg have been named as Plaintiffs and ConnenctU, Inc., has been named as a Defendant. Although the ConnectU Founders were named in a Second Amended Complaint in this case, the Court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over them and dismissed them. (See Docket Item Nos. 136, 232.)

On February 22, 2008, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, and the ConnectU Founders individually obligated themselves to perform the terms of the agreement. Among the obligations undertaken by the ConnectU Founders were agreements to dismiss the Massachusetts action and to give mutual releases as broad as possible.³ Notably, the ConnectU Founders expressly stipulated to the jurisdiction of this Court for the limited purpose of enforcement of the agreement. (Id.)

On April 23, 2008, Facebook filed a motion before this Court to enforce the agreement against the parties to the agreement ("Enforcement Motion"), because disputes arose among the parties with respect to execution of the agreement. (Docket Item No. 329.) Rather than file the Enforcement Motion as a new ancillary proceeding, the motion was filed in this action. As noted above, the ConnectU Founders were not existing parties to this action before the Enforcement Motion was filed because they had been dismissed. Nevertheless, the motion sought enforcement against the ConnectU Founders and ConnectU, Inc., because in the agreement, each of the Founders submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court to enforce the agreement. (Enforcement Order at 3; see Declaration of I. Neel Chatterjee, Ex. F, hereafter, "Chatterjee Decl.," Docket Item No. 596.)

³ (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement at 3, "Enforcement Order." Docket Item No. 461

For the Northern District of California

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Notice of the Enforcement Motion was given to counsel for the ConnectU Founders. This was accomplished by filing a notice of the motion in the Massachusetts action in which the ConnectU Founders were parties and by serving that notice on counsel for the ConnectU Founders in the Massachusetts action. (Enforcement Order at 5; Chatterjee Decl., Ex. G.) At a hearing in the Massachusetts action, the parties acknowledged they were aware of the proceedings in this Court. (Id., Chatterjee Decl., Ex. H.)

At the hearing on the Enforcement Motion in this case, the Court raised a question with respect to enforcement against the individuals who, although signatories to the agreement, were not formal parties to the present action. (Transcript of Hearing at 74-75.) Counsel for Facebook took the position that the ConnectU Founders had consented to jurisdiction and that on that basis, the Court could proceed to enter judgment enforcing the agreement against them. (Id.) Counsel for the ConnectU Founders made an appearance at the hearing. Their counsel described the status of the Massachusetts' litigation but otherwise did not object to jurisdiction. (Id.) Thus, like ConnectU, Inc., the ConnectU Founders are parties for purposes of proceedings to enforce the Settlement Agreement.

In its Enforcement Order, the Court ordered the parties to appear for a hearing and to show cause why a judgment should not be entered ordering the signatories to take actions required of them by the Settlement Agreement. (Enforcement Order at 12.) In its Order, the Court specifically cited the ConnectU Founders' consent to jurisdiction and their receipt of notice of the Enforcement Motion as the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to enforce the agreement against them. (Id.) A copy of the Order to Show Cause was served on counsel for all signatories to the agreement, including counsel for the ConnectU Founders.4

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⁴ The service list shows that attorney Scott Mosko of the Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow was served. (Enforcement Order, certificate of service page.) The Finnegan firm previously represented the ConnectU Founders in this action prior to their dismissal; however, the Finnegan firm has represented ConnectU, Inc., since the commencement of this lawsuit and has represented ConnectU, Inc., and the ConnectU Founders since the commencement of the Massachusetts actions

For the Northern District of California

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On July 2, 2008, a show cause hearing was held. Counsel for all signatories to the agreement appeared, including counsel for the ConnectU Founders. (See n.4, supra.) After the hearing, the Court entered Judgment Enforcing the Settlement Agreement against all the signatories to the agreement and appointed a Special Master to perform steps necessary to enforce the agreement. (Judgment at 1-2; Notice of Appointment of a Master; Nomination of Individual to Serve as Master, Docket Item No. 475.) Among others, the Judgment ordered the ConnectU Founders to perform acts necessary to comply with the Judgment with respect to this action and the Massachusetts action. (Judgment at 3.)

In sum, the Court confirms its previous finding that the Motion to Enforce the Term Sheet and Settlement Agreement, although filed under a case number in which the ConnectU Founders were not already parties, was an ancillary proceeding in which Facebook and Zuckerberg were nominal Plainitffs and ConnectU and the ConnectU Founders were nominal Defendants. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[e]nforcement of [a] settlement agreement . . . whether through award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than just a continuation or renewal" of underlying proceedings. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). Although the ConnectU Founders were not made parties by virtue of being served with a summons and complaint, as signatories to the Settlement Agreement they consented to personal jurisdiction being exercised over them by this Court and to proceedings limited to enforcement of the agreement. The ConnectU Founders had fair notice that Facebook sought enforcement of the agreement through a motion, and they had ample opportunity to oppose that motion. Through counsel, the ConnectU Founders participated in and were aware of these proceedings. Thus, the Judgment enforcing the Settlement Agreement is binding on them and they may appeal that Judgment.⁵

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⁵ The Court notes that even a non-party may be permitted to appeal when "(1) the appellant, though not a party, participated in the district court proceedings, and (2) the equities of the case weigh in favor of hearing the appeal." Bank of Am. v. M/V Executive, 797 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to intervene as unnecessary because the ConnectU Founders are already parties to these proceedings to enforce the Settlement Agreement. The unique procedural posture of the case, however, persuades the Court to grant the ConnectU Founders additional time to appeal for good cause shown pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court addresses separately the proposed Complaint in Intervention. With their motion to intervene, the ConnectU Founders have tendered a Complaint in Intervention which essentially seeks to relitigate the issues concerning the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. (See Docket Item No. 577.) The Court addressed these issues at a hearing before granting Facebook's motion to enforce the settlement and entering Judgment. As parties to the case, parties may tender pleadings. However, at this procedural stage, the Court finds that the Complaint in Intervention is improper because intervention is unnecessary. Further, if the Complaint in Intervention is allowed to be filed after Judgment, it would re-open matters covered by the Judgment; this would be improper unless or until the Judgment is set aside and new pleadings are allowed by the Court. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES the ConnectU Founders' Complaint in Intervention.

В. **Motion to Stay**

ConnectU moves to stay enforcement of the Judgment entered by the Court on the grounds that it may be irreparably harmed and the balance of hardships tips in its favor. (Stay Motion at 5, 7.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d), which provides for a stay upon court approval of a supersedeas bond, pertains primarily, if not exclusively, to monetary judgments. See NLRB v. Westphal, 859 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, whether a district court should grant a stay of the enforcement of a non-monetary judgment is governed by Rule 62(c), which provides that "[w]hen an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal." Spieler ex rel. Spieler v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist., 2007 WL

3245286, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

The standard for granting a stay pending appeal under Rule 62(c) is similar to that for a preliminary injunction. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). A party seeking a stay must show "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435. To satisfy steps (1) and (2), a court may accept proof either that the applicant has shown "a strong likelihood of success on the merits [and] . . . a possibility of irreparable injury to the [applicant]," or "that serious legal questions are raised and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Golden Gate Restaurant v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2008). When the district court has already ruled on the legal issue being appealed, the court need not conclude that it is likely to be reversed on appeal in order to grant the stay. Strobel v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 2007 WL 1238709, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2007). However, the court may consider that delay in filing an appeal and seeking a stay vitiates the force of allegations of irreparable harm. Cf. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310, 1313 (1977).

In this case, ConnectU cannot show irreparable harm from execution of the Judgment because the only effect of enforcing the settlement is the transfer of ownership of ConnectU. Barring evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes that Facebook has an equal interest in preserving the value of ConnectU as do ConnectU's current owners. Moreover, ConnectU filed its motion seeking a stay only days before turnover of its stock was ordered to take place. This delay on the part of ConnectU tends to vitiate its contention that it will be irreparably harmed. See Beame, 434 U.S. at 1313.

With respect to the issues of the balance of hardships, ConnectU contends that Facebook may somehow adversely affect its right to appeal. (Stay Motion at 5-6.) However, ConnectU admits that

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For the Northern District of California

it will pursue other litigations with respect to its former counsel related to this case and incur liabilities to its lawyers. Thus, the hardship upon Facebook may be equally as great if the litigation diminishes the value of ConnectU. In essence, the longer the Court delays in enforcing the settlement between the parties, the more likely the value of the consideration subject of the settlement (i.e., the value of the stock of each company) will change. This means that the status quo cannot be preserved with a stay. The Court is concerned that any further delay in enforcing the settlement will create a serious risk of prejudice to Facebook, as well as to ConnectU.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES ConnectU's motion to stay enforcement of the Judgment entered in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene as unnecessary because they have already been made parties to these proceedings by their consent and by service of the Enforcement Motion. The Court STRIKES the ConnectU Founders' Complaint in Intervention. The Court GRANTS the ConnectU Founders additional time in which to file an appeal. Since ConnectU filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 1, 2008, (see Docket Item No. 585), the ConnectU Founders shall have until August 22, 2008 to file their appeal.

The Court DENIES ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. The Judgment requires that on or before August 4, 2008, ConnectU and its Founders to deposit with the Master all shares of ConnectU, Inc., endorsed for transfer, and to submit legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Settlement Agreement. (Judgment at 2.) At the hearing on these motions, it was brought to the Court's attention that while Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg have complied with the Court's Judgment, ConnectU, Inc., and its Founders have failed to do so. Counsel for ConnectU, Inc., and counsel for the ConnectU Founders contend that since the Court had granted a hearing on the Motion to Stay Judgment just two days after the due date, they had a good faith belief that they had a period of reprieve from the Judgment.

Document 610

Page 9 of 10

Filed 08/08, 38

Case 5:07-cv-0138 JW

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 1 2 Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com D. Michael Underhill Munderhill@BSFLLP.com 3 David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee@orrick.com Jonathan M. Shaw jshaw@bsfllp.com Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com Mark A. Weissman <u>mweissman@osheapartners.com</u> 6 Mark Andrew Byrne markbyrne@byrnenixon.com Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com Rachel E. Matteo-Boehm rachel.matteo-boehm@hro.com 8 Roger Rex Myers roger.myers@hro.com Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com 9 Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@Orrick.com Sean F. O'Shea soshea@osheapartners.com 10 Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman@bsfllp.com Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com 11 Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com 12 Yvonne Penas Greer ygreer@orrick.com 13 14 Dated: August 8, 2008 15 16

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers Elizabeth Garcia **Courtroom Deputy**

EXHIBIT S

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1	MARK A. BYRNE (CA SB #116657) markbyrne@byrnenixon.com	FILED
	BYRNE & NIXON LLP 800 West Sixth Street, Suite 430 Los Angeles, California 90017	2008 AUG 11 11:38
	Tel: (213) 620-8003 Fax: (213) 620-8012	RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT NO. DIST. OF CA. S. J.
6 · 7 · 8 ·	SEAN F. O'SHEA (pro hac vice) soshea@osheapartners.com MARK A. WEISSMAN (pro hac vice) mweissman@osheapartners O'SHEA PARTNERS LLP 90 Park Avenue, 20th Floor New York, NY 10016 Tel: (212) 682-4426 Fax: (212) 682-4437	
	Attorneys for Nominal Defendants Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra	
12	UNITED STAT	ES DISTRICT COURT
13		TRICT OF CALIFORNIA
14	SAN JO	SE DIVISION
15		
16	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKERBERG,	Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW
17	Plaintiffs,	NOTICE OF APPEAL BY CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, TYLER
18	ν.	WINKLEVOSS, AND DIVYA NARENDRA
19	CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as	
20	CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS,	
21	and WAYNE CHANG,	
22	Defendants.	
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ORIGINAL

Notice is hereby given that CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, TYLER WINKLEVOSS, and 1 DIVYA NARENDRA, nominal defendants in the above named case, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the final Judgment Enforcing Settlement 3 Agreement (Docket No. 476) entered in this action on July 2, 2008, the Order dated August 8, 2008 Denying the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene and Denying ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment (Docket No. 610), and all related orders including but not limited to the June 25, 2008, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion To Enforce The Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 461); and the June 10, 2008 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motions Posted 8 As Docket Items Nos. 366, 374 and 393 (Docket No. 428). 10 11 August 11, 2008 Respectfully submitted. 12 13 O'SHEA PARA 14 15 16 Sean F. O'Shea 17 90 Park Avenue 18 New York, New York 10016 19 Attorneys for Nominal Defendants Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, 20 and Divya Narendra 21 22 23 24

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EXHIBIT U

1 2 3 4	sholtzman@bsfllp.com BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 1999 Harrison Street, Suite 900 Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (510) 874-1000	77)
. 5	DAVID A. BARRETT (pro hac vice) dbarrett@bsfllp.com	
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9	D. MICHAEL UNDERHILL (pro hac vice) munderhill@bsfllp.com	
10	BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 5301 Wisconsin Avenue NW	
11	Washington, D.C. 20015 Telephone: (202) 237-2727	
12	Facsimile: (202) 237-6131	
13	Attorneys for Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra.	
14	·	
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16	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
17	SAN JC	SE DIVISION
18	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK	Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW
19	ZUCKERBERG,	
20	Plaintiffs,	NOTICE OF APPEAL
21	v.	
22	CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as	
23	CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS,	
24	and WAYNE CHANG,	
25	Defendants.	
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Notice is hereby given that CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, TYLER WINKLEVOSS and DIVYA NARENDRA¹ appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the following orders and judgment and all related orders:

- (a) the December 15, 2008, Order of Dismissal (Docket No. 667), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A;
- (b) the November 21, 2008 Amended Judgment Ordering Specific Performance of Settlement Agreement and Declaratory Judgment of Release (Docket No. 665), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B; and
- (c) the November 3, 2008, Order Directing the Special Master to Deliver the Property Being Held in Trust to the Parties in Accordance with the Terms of their Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 653), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit C.

This notice is in additional to, and related to, their prior notice of appeal filed on August 11, 2008 (Docket No. 611), which is incorporated by reference. In order to preserve all rights to appeal, notice is again provided that CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, TYLER WINKLEVOSS, and DIVYA NARENDRA appeal from the following orders and judgment and all related orders:

(d) the August 8, 2008, Order Denying the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene;

Denying ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment, entered by the district court on August 8, 2008 (Docket No. 610), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D;

To the extent Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss and Divya Narendra and their counsel have any existing rights or obligations with respect to ConnectU, Inc. (all of the stock of ConnectU having been transferred to The Facebook, Inc. on December 15, 2008, as part of the settlement transaction which is at issue on appeal), Notice would hereby be given on ConnectU's behalf. Otherwise, no new notice is provided with respect to ConnectU. See ConnectU's Notice of Appeal (Docket No. 582), attached as Exhibit H, and hereby incorporated by reference. See also ConnectU and Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra's Emergency Motion to Stay and Alternative Petition for Mandamus, filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on November 24, 2008 (Docket No. 43 in Appeal No. 08-16745), also incorporated by reference, providing notice on that date that ConnectU was seeking relief from, among other things, the November 3 Order attached as Exhibit C and November 21 Amended Judgment attached as

the November 3 Order attached as Exhibit C and November 21 Amended Judgment attached as Exhibit B.

- (e) the July 2, 2008, final Judgment Enforcing Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 476), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit E;
- (f) the June 25, 2008, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 461), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit F; and
- (g) the June 10, 2008, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions Posted As Docket Items Nos. 366, 374 and 393 (Docket No. 428), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit G.

1	December 19, 2008	Respectfully submitted,
2		Evan A Parte /KPR
3		Evan A. Parke BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
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5		Attorneys for Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra.
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EXHIBIT A

1	SEAN A. LINCOLN (State Bar No. 136387)	STATES DISTR
2	salincoln@orrick.com I. NEEL CHATTERJEE (State Bar No. 173985	5)
3	nchatterjee@orrick.com MONTE COOPER (State Bar No. 196746)	A ORD
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5	tsutton@orrick.com YVONNE P. GREER (State Bar No. 214072)	[] Quee
6	ygreer@orrick.com ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLI	Z Judge James
7	1000 Marsh Road Menlo Park, CA 94025	
8	Telephone: 650-614-7400 Facsimile: 650-614-7401	DISTRIC
9	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	OISTRIC
10	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKER	RBERG
11	UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT
12	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
13	SAN JOSE DIVISION	
14		•
15	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK	Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW
16	ZUCKERBERG,	PROPERED ORDER OF
17	Plaintiffs,	ØISMISSAL
18	V.	
19	CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC	
20	NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS, and WAYNE	
21	CHANG, Defendants.	
22	Defendants.	
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On July 2, 2008, the Court entered a Judgment Enforcing Settlement Agreement (Docket Item No. 476) and on November 21, 2008, the Court entered an Amended Judgment Ordering Specific Performance of Settlement Agreement and Declaratory Judgment Release (Docket Item No. 665). Pursuant to the Judgment and Amended Judgment, all claims asserted against Defendants ConnectU, Inc., Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., Winston Williams, and Wayne Change, are dismissed with prejudice.

The parties shall bear their own attorney fees and costs. The Clerk shall close this file.

Dated: December 15, 2008

IA**YIZ**S WARE

United States District Judge

OHS West:260417655.2 16069-4 TS2/YG2 [PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL 5:07-CV-01389-JW

EXHIBIT B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

Plaintiffs,

AMENDED JUDGMENT ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF RELEASE

Defendants.

In this ancillary proceeding, having found the "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement" enforceable, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties to the "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement" that "the San Jose Federal Court shall have jurisdiction to enforce this agreement," and having found good cause to vacate the judgment entered on November 3, 2008 and to enter this Amended Judgment:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

The Judgment entered on November 3, 2008 is vacated and this Judgment entered in its place:

Judgment is entered in favor of the Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg and against ConnectU, Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra specifically enforcing the "Term Sheet and Settlement Agreement." The parties to the "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement," having previously made deposits with the Special Master, in specific enforcement of the "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement," on **December 15, 2008**, the Master shall:

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(1)	transfer to the Facebook, Inc. the shares of ConnectU, Inc. being held by the Master
	and

- (2) transfer to Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, as counsel for ConnectU, Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra, in trust for its clients and any lawful claimant, (a) the cash or its equivalent in the form of a bank check or cashiers check and (b) the Facebook, Inc., common shares being held by the Master; and
- (3) file in the appropriate courts, the motions to dismiss being held by the Master.

The "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement" provides: "All parties get mutual releases as broad as possible." The parties having stipulated that this Court shall have jurisdiction to enforce the "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement," the Court declares that as of February 22, 2008, the date of the Settlement Agreement, the Facebook, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg, ConnectU, Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra, and each of them, jointly, severally and mutually released each other as broadly as possible from all claims.

Dated: November 21, 2008

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 1 2 Bruce Eric Van Dalsem brucevandalsem@quinnemanuel.com Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com 3 D. Michael Underhill Munderhill@BSFLLP.com David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com George C. Fisher georgecfisher@gmail.com George C. Fisher georgecfisher@gmail.com George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee orrick.com Jonathan M. Shaw jshaw@bsfllp.com Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com Mark A. Weissman <u>mweissman@osheapartners.com</u> Mark Andrew Byrne markbyrne@byrnenixon.com Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com Rachel E. Matteo-Boehm rachel.matteo-boehm@hro.com Randy Garteiser randygarteiser@quinnemanuel.com Roger Rex Myers roger.myers@hro.com Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@Orrick.com Sean F. O' Shea soshea@osheapartners.com Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman@bsfllp.com Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com Warrington S. Parker wparker@orrick.com Yvonne Penas Greer ygreer@orrick.com Dated: November 21, 2008 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk /s/ JW Chambers Elizabeth Garcia **Courtroom Deputy** 26

EXHIBIT C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

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Plaintiffs, ORDER DIRECTING THE SPECIAL

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

MASTER TO DELIVER THE PROPERTY BEING HELD IN TRUST TO THE PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THEIR SETTLEMENT

Defendants.

AGREEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 2008, the parties to civil cases pending in this Court and the District of Massachusetts signed a "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement." The Agreement provided: "The parties stipulate that the San Jose Federal court shall have jurisdiction to enforce this agreement." On April 23, 2008, The Facebook, Inc., filed a motion with this Court to enforce the Agreement. The motion was docketed in an action pending in this Court. However, it was in legal effect an ancillary proceeding to the pending action.²

On June 25, 2008, over objections by ConnectU and the Founders (collectively, "ConnectU"), the Court granted the motion to enforce the Agreement. (Enforcement Order at 4.)

The Court appointed a Special Master to gather and hold the property and cash which the parties had

¹ (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement at 3, hereafter, "Enforcement Order," Docket Item 461.)

² The ancillary nature of the motion was addressed in the Court's August 8, 2008 Order. (See Order Denying the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene; Denying ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment at 5, hereafter, "Deny Stay Order," Docket Item No. 610.)

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agreed to exchange in the Agreement. (Docket Item No. 475.) On July 2, 2008, the Court issued a Judgment Enforcing Settlement Agreement (hereafter, "July 2 Judgment," Docket Item No. 476), in which the Court ordered the parties to deposit with the Special Master stock, cash and various other documents.

On September 5, 2008, the Special Master issued a report stating that he received the stock. cash and documents. (hereafter, "Special Master's Report," Docket Item No. 630.) Pursuant to the Court's appointment Order, the Special Master also provided the Court with his recommendations of action which the Court should take in the enforcement of the Agreement. (Special Master's Report at 6.) On September 19, 2008, the Court issued an order for the parties to appear on October 28, 2008 and show cause, if any, why the Court should not order the Master to deliver the property being held by him to the parties in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. (Docket Item No. 634.)

At the October 28th hearing, counsel appearing for ConnectU and the Founders advised the Court that on July 30, 2008, ConnectU had noticed an appeal from the July 2 Judgment, and that on August 11, 2008, the Founders had also noticed an appeal from the July 2 Judgment. (See Docket Item Nos. 582, 611, respectively.) Defendants contended that because of their appeals, the Court lacked jurisdiction to order the Master to deliver the things held by him in enforcement of the Agreement.3

Also appearing were counsel for Quinn Emanuel Urguhart Oliver & Hedges, LLP. requesting the Court to honor a lien the firm has asserted on the settlement proceeds. (Docket Item Nos. 337, 644.)

Since Defendants' challenge to the Court's jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the Court proceeds to address this issue first. The Court will also consider Quinn Emanuel's lien on the proceeds.

³ (Defendants' Response to Order to Show Cause on Disbursement of Settlement Consideration, and Renewed Motion to Stay at 1, hereafter, "Defendants' Response," Docket Item No. 637.)

Jurisdiction

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Defendants contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction to take further action because any such action would be taken after an appeal has been filed from the July 2 Judgment, which was final and appealable. (Defendants' Response at 1.)

II. DISCUSSION

As a general matter, "[o]nce a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the matters being appealed." Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). However, there are, several exceptions to the principle of exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Id. An appeal to the Ninth Circuit must be from a final judgment of the district court. 28 U.S.C. §1291. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction to take action if a party files a premature appeal. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1991).

Presuming ConnectU and the Founders have a right to appeal.4 the issue becomes whether the appeals they have filed divest the Court of the power granted in their stipulation to issue an enforcement decision.

This ancillary civil action to enforce the Agreement is tantamount to an action in equity for specific performance. Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989) (A

Although the Agreement in this case affects a pending action, because in the Agreement the parties agreed to dismiss it, these current proceedings are independent of the underlying action. Under the Agreement, no judgment will be entered in the underlying action (or actions) because they will be dismissed. Thus, the appealability of the enforcement order must be judged based its nature as an independent, albeit ancillary proceeding.

⁴ In its June 25, 2008 Order, the Court discussed its general equitable power to enforce an agreement to settle a case pending before it. (Enforcement Order at 4.) However, as a threshold matter, the Court emphasizes that none of the following discussion of jurisdiction should be construed as a finding by this Court that an appeal may be taken from its enforcement decision. The enforcement power of the Court is derived from a stipulation of all the parties to a private mediation. As a component of their private mediation, the parties stipulated that a United States District Court Judge is empowered to enforce their mediated settlement. Thus, this case is distinguishable from one in which the parties to a federal lawsuit reach an out-of-court settlement, request the federal court to adopt the settlement as a judgment in the case, and the federal judge, who has retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, makes a post-judgment order.

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"motion to enforce [a] settlement agreement essentially is an action to specifically enforce a contract."). In a specific performance action, the appealable judgment is the judgment which orders performance of the acts agreed upon, leaving nothing further for the court to do. An order of specific performance is injunctive in nature. It is appealable as a final judgment when it requires conduct that is "specific in terms [and] describe[d] in reasonable detail, and not by reference to [any] other document, the act or acts" to be performed. Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)).

Judgments and orders where "money is directed to be paid into court, or property delivered to a receiver," however, "are interlocutory only and [are] intended to preserve the subject matter in dispute from waste or dilapidation, and to keep it within the control of the court until the rights of the parties concerned can be adjudicated by a final decree." Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1848). A district court's judgment can only be final when "it requires the immediate turnover of property and subjects the party to irreparable harm if the party is forced to wait until the final outcome of the litigation." In re Hawaii Corp., 796 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1986).

The Court finds that although the July 2 Judgment is prefatory to entry of a final adjudication, it is interlocutory in nature. The July 2 Judgment orders the parties to deposit the cash, stock and other documents with a Special Master, subject to further order of the Court; it does not identify specific acts the parties are to perform with respect to one another. See Petrello, 533 F.3d at 115-116. All of the Court's directives are made in reference to the underlying Agreement, which prevents the July 2 Judgment from being considered a final adjudication. See id. Instead, the July 2 Judgment directs the parties to take a number of preparatory actions, which place the Special Master as a temporary intermediary, pending further action of the Court. None of the terms of the July 2 Judgment "require immediate turnover of property" to the parties, nor "subject [either] party to irreparable harm." In re Hawaii Corp., 796 F.2d at 1143. Furthermore, the purpose of the October 28th hearing was to provide the parties with an opportunity to show cause why a final adjudicatory action ordering specific performance should not be entered.

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United States District Court

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the previously filed appeal to the Ninth Circuit from the July 2 Judgment does not deprive it of jurisdiction to enter a final adjudication ordering performance.5

В. Stay of Execution

In the alternative, Defendants renew their motion for a stay of execution pending their appeal. (Defendants' Response at 14.)

As the Court stated on the record, a stay of execution pending appeal from a final judgment ordering specific performance raises issues which are not present in a stay of execution on a money judgment. In cases involving a money judgment, an appellant may obtain a stay by posting a supersedeas bond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). Of course, denial of a stay or failure to post a bond empowers the judgment creditor to execute on the judgment, notwithstanding the appeal. Id.

In a specific performance action, the prosecuting party seeks immediate performance of some act due from the responding party. If the responding party appeals the judgment and moves the Court to stay performance pending appeal, before granting the stay, the Court must consider whether the party in whose favor the judgment has been entered can be provided with security, comparable to that provided by a supersedeas bond. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) provides that while an appeal is pending from an injunction, the Court may "suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party's rights."

Here, the consideration which ConnectU and the Founders seek to withhold pending the appeal are corporate stock, freedom from expensive on-going litigation and peace of mind from a broad mutual release. Security for this consideration must be evaluated in light the rapidly changing United States economy and a highly competitive market for Internet products and services. The Court finds that ConnectU and the Founders have not proposed any security which would protect Facebook from devaluation of that consideration pending appeal.

⁵ Although a matter for the Ninth Circuit to decide, implicit in the Court's findings is that urrent appeals by Defendants are imperfect. However, the Court that upon issuance of a final adjudicatory decision, the pending appeals will be perfected and become effective.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' renewed motion for a stay of execution. However, to afford Defendants a limited right to seek a stay from the Ninth Circuit, the judgment will order transfer on November 24, 2008.

C. Lien on the Settlement Proceeds

At the October 28, 2008 hearing Quinn Emanuel, appeared and requested that any disbursal of the settlement proceeds by made jointly in the name of the Defendants and the law firm. Since Quinn Emanuel is not a party to this case and has otherwise not foreclosed on any lien, the Court declines to grant its request. Instead, the Court will order that the proceeds be delivered in trust to Defendants' counsel. However, nothing in this Order is intended to affect Quinn Emanuel's right to assert its lien on the proceeds in the hands of Defendants or Defendants' counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and pursuant to the stipulation of the parties that this Court enforce the Agreement, the Court will issue a final adjudicatory order. The Court declines to take any action with respect to the lien by Quinn Emanuel.

Dated: November 3, 2008

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 1 2 Bruce Eric Van Dalsem brucevandalsem@quinnemanuel.com Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com D. Michael Underhill Munderhill@BSFLLP.com 3 David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com 4 George C. Fisher georgecfisher@gmail.com 5 George C. Fisher georgecfisher@gmail.com George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee@orrick.com 6 Jonathan M. Shaw jshaw@bsfllp.com Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com 7 Mark A. Weissman mweissman@osheapartners.com Mark Andrew Byrne markbyrne@byrnenixon.com Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com Rachel E. Matteo-Boehm rachel.matteo-boehm@hro.com Randy Garteiser randygarteiser@quinnemanuel.com 10 Roger Rex Myers roger.myers@hro.com Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@Orrick.com 11 Sean F. O' Shea soshea@osheapartners.com Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman@bsfllp.com 12 Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com 13 Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com Warrington S. Parker wparker@orrick.com 14 Yvonne Penas Greer ygreer@orrick.com 15 16 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk Dated: November 3, 2008 17 /s/ JW Chambers By:_ 18 Elizabeth Garcia **Courtroom Deputy** 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

EXHIBIT D

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	A

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

Plaintiffs, v.

ORDER DENYING THE CONNECTU

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

FOUNDERS' MOTION TO INTERVENE; DENYING CONNECTU'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Initially, Plaintiffs the Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, "Facebook") brought this action against ConnectU, Inc. ("ConnectU"), Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., Winston Williams, and Wayne Chang alleging, inter alia, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq. The parties were engaged in at least two other lawsuits over these matters; in those cases, ConnectU and its founders, Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Winklevoss, and Divya Narendra (collectively, the "ConnectU Founders"), were plaintiffs and Facebook was a defendant. Based on a series of events and motions, on July 2, 2008, the Court entered Judgment enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties to all of the actions. (hereafter, "Judgment," Docket Item No. 476.)

For the Northern District of California

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Presently before the Court are the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene¹ and ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment.² The Court conducted a hearing on August 6, 2008. Based on the papers submitted to date and oral argument of counsel, the Court DENIES the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene on the ground that they have already been made parties to this action. However, the Court GRANTS them an extension of time in which to file their appeal. Further, the Court DENIES ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Intervene

The ConnectU Founders move to intervene on the grounds that they have a real economic stake in the outcome of this case and ConnectU will not sufficiently protect their interests. (Intervene Motion at 4, 6.) The Judgment in this case treats the ConnectU Founders as parties; it orders them and the other signatories to take action to comply with the Term Sheet and Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"). Therefore, before reaching the necessity of allowing them to intervene, the Court reviews the ConnectU Founders' status as existing parties to this action and to the other lawsuits covered by the Settlement Agreement.

The Ninth Circuit has held that when a federal court has a basis for jurisdiction over a dispute involving a final settlement agreement, the court may "interpret and apply its own judgment to the future conduct contemplated" by a agreement. See Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1998). The requisite independent basis for jurisdiction may be supplied by a provision in the settlement agreement. Id. at 544. Such a provision, "empowers a district court to protect its judgment" from subsequent attempts to frustrate "the purpose of the settlement agreement and order." Sandpiper Village Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 841

¹ (hereafter, "Intervene Motion," Docket Item No. 574.)

² (hereafter, "Stay Motion," Docket Item No. 578.). Subject to being permitted to intervene, the ConnectU Founders join in the Motion to Stay Enforcement.

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(9th Cir. 2005). Under this power, individuals may be bound to take actions as long as they had notice and an ability to contest the judgment or order enforcing the settlement agreement. See id.

On August 8, 2007, the ConnectU Founders and ConnectU, Inc., were named Plaintiffs in a First Amended Complaint in Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-10593-DPW pending in the District of Massachusetts. The Facebook, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg and others were named as Defendants in that action. In this action, Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg have been named as Plaintiffs and ConnenctU, Inc., has been named as a Defendant. Although the ConnectU Founders were named in a Second Amended Complaint in this case, the Court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over them and dismissed them. (See Docket Item Nos. 136, 232.)

On February 22, 2008, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, and the ConnectU Founders individually obligated themselves to perform the terms of the agreement. Among the obligations undertaken by the ConnectU Founders were agreements to dismiss the Massachusetts action and to give mutual releases as broad as possible.³ Notably, the ConnectU Founders expressly stipulated to the jurisdiction of this Court for the limited purpose of enforcement of the agreement. (Id.)

On April 23, 2008, Facebook filed a motion before this Court to enforce the agreement against the parties to the agreement ("Enforcement Motion"), because disputes arose among the parties with respect to execution of the agreement. (Docket Item No. 329.) Rather than file the Enforcement Motion as a new ancillary proceeding, the motion was filed in this action. As noted above, the ConnectU Founders were not existing parties to this action before the Enforcement Motion was filed because they had been dismissed. Nevertheless, the motion sought enforcement against the ConnectU Founders and ConnectU, Inc., because in the agreement, each of the Founders submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court to enforce the agreement. (Enforcement Order at 3; see Declaration of I. Neel Chatterjee, Ex. F, hereafter, "Chatterjee Decl.," Docket Item No. 596.)

⁽Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement at 3, hereafter, "Enforcement Order," Docket Item No. 461.)

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Notice of the Enforcement Motion was given to counsel for the ConnectU Founders. This was accomplished by filing a notice of the motion in the Massachusetts action in which the ConnectU Founders were parties and by serving that notice on counsel for the ConnectU Founders in the Massachusetts action. (Enforcement Order at 5; Chatterjee Decl., Ex. G.) At a hearing in the Massachusetts action, the parties acknowledged they were aware of the proceedings in this Court. (Id., Chatterjee Decl., Ex. H.)

At the hearing on the Enforcement Motion in this case, the Court raised a question with respect to enforcement against the individuals who, although signatories to the agreement, were not formal parties to the present action. (Transcript of Hearing at 74-75.) Counsel for Facebook took the position that the ConnectU Founders had consented to jurisdiction and that on that basis, the Court could proceed to enter judgment enforcing the agreement against them. (Id.) Counsel for the ConnectU Founders made an appearance at the hearing. Their counsel described the status of the Massachusetts' litigation but otherwise did not object to jurisdiction. (Id.) Thus, like ConnectU, Inc., the ConnectU Founders are parties for purposes of proceedings to enforce the Settlement Agreement.

In its Enforcement Order, the Court ordered the parties to appear for a hearing and to show cause why a judgment should not be entered ordering the signatories to take actions required of them by the Settlement Agreement. (Enforcement Order at 12.) In its Order, the Court specifically cited the ConnectU Founders' consent to jurisdiction and their receipt of notice of the Enforcement Motion as the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to enforce the agreement against them. (Id.) A copy of the Order to Show Cause was served on counsel for all signatories to the agreement, including counsel for the ConnectU Founders.4

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⁴ The service list shows that attorney Scott Mosko of the Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow was served. (Enforcement Order, certificate of service page.) The Finnegan firm previously represented the Connect I Founders in this action prior to their dismissal; however, the Finne firm has represented ConnectU, Inc., since the commencement of this lawsuit and has represented ConnectU, Inc., and the ConnectU Founders since the commencement of the Massachusetts actions.

On July 2, 2008, a show cause hearing was held. Counsel for all signatories to the agreement appeared, including counsel for the ConnectU Founders. (See n.4, supra.) After the hearing, the Court entered Judgment Enforcing the Settlement Agreement against all the signatories to the agreement and appointed a Special Master to perform steps necessary to enforce the agreement. (Judgment at 1-2; Notice of Appointment of a Master; Nomination of Individual to Serve as Master, Docket Item No. 475.) Among others, the Judgment ordered the ConnectU Founders to perform acts necessary to comply with the Judgment with respect to this action and the Massachusetts action. (Judgment at 3.)

In sum, the Court confirms its previous finding that the Motion to Enforce the Term Sheet and Settlement Agreement, although filed under a case number in which the ConnectU Founders were not already parties, was an ancillary proceeding in which Facebook and Zuckerberg were nominal Plainitffs and ConnectU and the ConnectU Founders were nominal Defendants. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[e]nforcement of [a] settlement agreement . . . whether through award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than just a continuation or renewal" of underlying proceedings. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). Although the ConnectU Founders were not made parties by virtue of being served with a summons and complaint, as signatories to the Settlement Agreement they consented to personal jurisdiction being exercised over them by this Court and to proceedings limited to enforcement of the agreement. The ConnectU Founders had fair notice that Facebook sought enforcement of the agreement through a motion, and they had ample opportunity to oppose that motion. Through counsel, the ConnectU Founders participated in and were aware of these proceedings. Thus, the Judgment enforcing the Settlement Agreement is binding on them and they may appeal that Judgment.⁵

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⁵ The Court notes that even a non-party may be permitted to appeal when "(1) the appellant, uch not a party, participated in the district court proceedings, and (2) the equities of the case weigh in favor of hearing the appeal." Bank of Am. v. M/V Executive, 797 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986).

Case 5:07-cv-013

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to intervene as unnecessary because the ConnectU Founders are already parties to these proceedings to enforce the Settlement Agreement. The unique procedural posture of the case, however, persuades the Court to grant the ConnectU Founders additional time to appeal for good cause shown pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court addresses separately the proposed Complaint in Intervention. With their motion to intervene, the ConnectU Founders have tendered a Complaint in Intervention which essentially seeks to relitigate the issues concerning the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. (See Docket Item No. 577.) The Court addressed these issues at a hearing before granting Facebook's motion to enforce the settlement and entering Judgment. As parties to the case, parties may tender pleadings. However, at this procedural stage, the Court finds that the Complaint in Intervention is improper because intervention is unnecessary. Further, if the Complaint in Intervention is allowed to be filed after Judgment, it would re-open matters covered by the Judgment; this would be improper unless or until the Judgment is set aside and new pleadings are allowed by the Court. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES the ConnectU Founders' Complaint in Intervention.

В. Motion to Stay

ConnectU moves to stay enforcement of the Judgment entered by the Court on the grounds that it may be irreparably harmed and the balance of hardships tips in its favor. (Stay Motion at 5, 7.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d), which provides for a stay upon court approval of a supersedeas bond, pertains primarily, if not exclusively, to monetary judgments. See NLRB v. Westphal, 859 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, whether a district court should grant a stay of the enforcement of a non-monetary judgment is governed by Rule 62(c), which provides that "[w]hen an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during

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the pendency of the appeal." Spieler ex rel. Spieler v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist., 2007 WL 3245286, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

The standard for granting a stay pending appeal under Rule 62(c) is similar to that for a preliminary injunction. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). A party seeking a stay must show "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435. To satisfy steps (1) and (2), a court may accept proof either that the applicant has shown "a strong likelihood of success on the merits [and] . . . a possibility of irreparable injury to the [applicant]," or "that serious legal questions are raised and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Golden Gate Restaurant v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2008). When the district court has already ruled on the legal issue being appealed, the court need not conclude that it is likely to be reversed on appeal in order to grant the stay. Strobel v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 2007 WL 1238709, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2007). However, the court may consider that delay in filing an appeal and seeking a stay vitiates the force of allegations of irreparable harm. Cf. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310, 1313 (1977).

In this case, ConnectU cannot show irreparable harm from execution of the Judgment because the only effect of enforcing the settlement is the transfer of ownership of ConnectU. Barring evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes that Facebook has an equal interest in preserving the value of ConnectU as do ConnectU's current owners. Moreover, ConnectU filed its motion seeking a stay only days before turnover of its stock was ordered to take place. This delay on the part of ConnectU tends to vitiate its contention that it will be irreparably harmed. See Beame, 434 U.S. at 1313.

With respect to the issues of the balance of hardships, ConnectU contends that Facebook may somehow adversely affect its right to appeal. (Stay Motion at 5 6.) However, ConnectU admits that

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it will pursue other litigations with respect to its former counsel related to this case and incur liabilities to its lawyers. Thus, the hardship upon Facebook may be equally as great if the litigation diminishes the value of ConnectU. In essence, the longer the Court delays in enforcing the settlement between the parties, the more likely the value of the consideration subject of the settlement (i.e., the value of the stock of each company) will change. This means that the status quo cannot be preserved with a stay. The Court is concerned that any further delay in enforcing the settlement will create a serious risk of prejudice to Facebook, as well as to ConnectU.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES ConnectU's motion to stay enforcement of the Judgment entered in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the ConnectU Founders' Motion to Intervene as unnecessary because they have already been made parties to these proceedings by their consent and by service of the Enforcement Motion. The Court STRIKES the ConnectU Founders' Complaint in Intervention. The Court GRANTS the ConnectU Founders additional time in which to file an appeal. Since ConnectU filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 1, 2008, (see Docket Item No. 585), the ConnectU Founders shall have until August 22, 2008 to file their appeal.

The Court DENIES ConnectU's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. The Judgment requires that on or before August 4, 2008, ConnectU and its Founders to deposit with the Master all shares of ConnectU, Inc., endorsed for transfer, and to submit legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Settlement Agreement. (Judgment at 2.) At the hearing on these motions, it was brought to the Court's attention that while Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg have complied with the Court's Judgment, ConnectU, Inc., and its Founders have failed to do so. Counsel for ConnectU, Inc., and counsel for the ConnectU Founders contend that since the Court had granted a hearing on the Motion to Stay Judgment just two days after the due date, they had a good faith belief that they had a period of reprieve from the Judgment.

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EXHIBIT E

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT ENFORCING SETTLEMENT

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

Pursuant to the Court's June 25, 2008 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (docket item no. 461), the parties appeared before the Court on July 2, 2008 to show cause why a judgment should not be entered. Based on the papers submitted and oral arguments of counsel,

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ENFORCING "THE TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" AS FOLLOWS:

- The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg: (1)
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (a) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, The Facebook, Inc. shall deposit with the Master, the amount of cash and the certificates representing the amount of The Facebook, Inc. common shares stated in Paragraph 7 of the Agreement,

endorsed for transfer. The following legend shall appear on certificates of

The Facebook, Inc. common stock issued pursuant to this Judgment:

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THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED. THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, OFFERED FOR SALE, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTRATION STATEMENT IN EFFECT WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITIES UNDER SUCH ACT OR AN OPINION OF COUNSEL REASONABLY SATISFACTORY TO THE ISSUER THAT SUCH REGISTRATION IS NOT REQUIRED, OR UNLESS SOLD PURSUANT TO RULE 144 OF SUCH ACT.

THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE ARE SUBJECT TO AN AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE VOTING OF SUCH SHARES, AS PROVIDED IN THE CERTAIN TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO WHICH SUCH SHARES WERE ORIGINALLY ISSUED. THE HOLDERS OF SUCH SHARES ARE ENTITLED TO THE SAME ANTI-DILUTION RIGHTS AFFORDED THE ISSUER'S SERIES D PREFERRED STOCK, AS PROVIDED IN SUCH TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. A COPY OF SUCH TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ISSUER.

- Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, on or before 12 noon on (b) July 9, 2008, The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg shall submit to the Court for approval a proposed form of release. Upon approval by the Court, the release shall be signed by The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg, and shall have attached to it corporate authority given to the corporate signatory and shall be notarized as to each signatory and shall be immediately deposited with the Master;
- Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (c) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, a legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement. The dismissal shall recite that each party to the respective litigation shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.

The other two cases are ConnectU, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:04-cv-11923-DPW, currently on appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals; and ConnectU, Inc., et al. v. Facebook, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:07-cv-10593-DPW, currently pending in the District of Massachusetts.

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- ConnectU Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Vinklevoss, and Divya Narendra: (2)
 - (a) Pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, ConnectU Inc. shall deposit with the Master all shares of ConnectU Inc., endorsed for transfer. To the extent the parties to the Agreement do not own any shares of ConnectU Inc., to fulfill the obligation of the transfer of "all ConnectU stock," the parties to the Agreement shall take such actions in their respective corporate and individual capacities as are necessary to effect the deposit with the Master of all shares of ConnectU stock;
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, on or before 12 noon on (b) July 9, 2008, ConnectU, Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Vinklevoss and Divya Narendra shall submit to the Court for approval a proposed form of release. Upon approval by the Court, the release shall be signed by these parties and shall have attached to it corporate authority given to the corporate signatory and shall be notarized as to each signatory and shall be immediately deposited with the Master;
 - Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (c) the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, a legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement. The dismissal shall recite that each party to the respective litigation shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.
- (3) Upon further order of the Court, the parties shall deposit with the Master such other and further things which will facilitate the orderly exchange of the consideration and shall do the things ordered by the Court to ensure the operational integrity of the business entities that are parties to the Agreement.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 1 2 Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com D. Michael Underhill MUnderhill@BSFLLP.com 3 David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee@orrick.com Jonathan M. Shaw jshaw@bsfllp.com Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com 6 Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@Orrick.com Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman@bsfllp.com 8 Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com Yvonne Penas Greer ygreer@orrick.com 10 United States District Court 11 Dated: July 2, 2008 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk For the Northern District of California 12 13 By: /s/ JW Chambers Elizabeth Garcia 14 Courtroom Deputy 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Case 5:07-cv-013

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EXHIBIT F

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Facebook, Inc., et al.,

NO. C 07-01389 JW

Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' CONFIDENTIAL MOTION TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

ConnectU, Inc., et al.,

V.

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are The Facebook Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, "Facebook"). Plaintiffs bring this action against ConnectU, Inc., Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., Winston Williams, and Wayne Chang (collectively, "Defendants") alleging, inter alia, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq. In essence, Facebook alleges that ConnectU gained unauthorized access to Facebook's servers and website and took information for its own unlawful use. The parties are engaged in at least two other lawsuits over these matters; in those cases, ConnectU is the Plaintiff and Facebook is the Defendant.

In the course of this lawsuit, the parties engaged in private mediation. On February 22, 2008, as the result of the mediation, the parties signed a written "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement." In the Agreement, the parties agreed to resolve all of their disputes and to dismiss the pending lawsuits. The Agreement provides that they "may execute more formal documents but these terms are binding." After signing the Agreement, the parties attempted to draft formal

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documents but failed to reach a consensus on certain terms. In the Agreement, the parties stipulate that the federal court in San Jose, California has jurisdiction to enforce it. Based on a belief that a court order is necessary to enforce the February 22, 2008 Agreement, Facebook filed the present motion in this Court.¹

The question for decision by the Court is whether the February 22, 2008 Agreement contains sufficiently definite and essential terms that it may be enforced. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Agreement is enforceable and orders its enforcement.

II. BACKGROUND

As stated above, this action is one of three separate actions between the parties in various federal courts.² On January 22, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Richard Seeborg ordered the parties to participate in Alternative Dispute Resolution. (Docket Item No. 270.) The parties elected to participate in private mediation.

On February 22, 2008, the parties engaged in mediation before Antonio Piazza. Both sides were represented by counsel. As the result of the mediation, the parties signed a handwritten document entitled, "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement" ("Agreement"). (Second Declaration of Evan A. Parke, Ex. A., hereafter, "Parke Decl.," filed under seal.)

With the precise financial terms redacted,³ the Agreement provides, as follows:⁴

¹ (hereafter, "Motion," Docket Item No. 329, filed under seal.)

² The other actions are <u>ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg</u>, Appeal No. 07-1796 (1st Cir.) and <u>ConnectU, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.</u>, Case No. C 07-10593-DPW (D. Mass.).

³ The Agreement recites that all of its terms are "confidential." At the hearing on the motion, the Court expressed its need to discuss the Agreement in its Order. The Court now determines that it can protect the confidentiality of the Agreement if references to the amount of consideration which the parties agreed to exchange as a part of the settlement are omitted. Moreover, since neither Facebook nor ConnectU are publicly traded companies at this time, the Court finds good cause to keep the transcript of the proceedings under seal as requested by the parties to protect their financial information.

⁴ (Declaration of Theresa A. Sutton in Support of Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion, hereafter, "Sutton Decl.," Ex. A at 1-2, filed under seal.) For authenticity purposes, the Court leaves all typographical errors and strikeouts in the Agreement unchanged.

For the Northern District of California

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The Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement	t

- 1) The following will settle all disputes between ConnectU and its related parties, on the one hand and Facebook and its related parties, on the other hand.
- 2) All parties get mutual releases as broad as possible and all cases are dismissed with prejudice. Each side bears their own attorneys fees and costs.
- 3) All terms of agreement are confidential, no party disparages any other parties and no party will comment further publicly related to facts underlying or related to this dispute. The parties will agree on any public statements. A violation of the publicity and confidentiality provision of this paragraph shall be submitted to a binding arbitrator who may award injunctive relief and damages up to [REDACTED] million.
- This Agreement is subject to the continuing enforcement of the court in San Jose to the current action.5
- The parties stipulate that the San Jose Federal Court shall have jurisdiction to enforce 4) this agreement.
- 5) The parties agree that they may execute more formal documents but these terms are binding and this document may be submitted into evidence to enforce this agreement.
- ConnectU founders represent and warrant (1) They have no further right to assert 6) against Facebook (2) They have no further claims against Facebook & its related parties.
- 7) All ConnectU stock in exchange for [REDACTED] in cash & [REDACTED] common shares in Facebook. The terms of the shares shall include a requirement that all votes related to the shares will be voted in accordance with the Board of Director's recommendations and be subject to the same anti-dilution protections afforded to Series D preferred stock. The form⁶ Facebook will determine the form & documentation of the acquisition of ConnectU's shares [Consistent with a stock and cash for stock acquisition]. Facebook represents that it currently has [REDACTED] fully diluted shares outstanding.

The Agreement was signed by Mark Zuckerberg, individually and on behalf of Facebook, and by Cameron Winklevoss, individually and on behalf of ConnectU. Tyler Winklevoss and Divya Narendra also signed the Agreement. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 2.) These individuals are principals of their respective companies.

⁵ Strikeout in the original. 25

⁶ Strikeout in the original.

⁷ Interlineation in original.

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Plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement is made on the grounds that the Agreement unambiguously sets forth all material terms of the parties' settlement and Defendants should be ordered to comply with it. (Motion at 6.) Defendants contend that Facebook's motion to enforce the Agreement should be denied because (1) the agreement is missing material terms, (2) the terms which are included were not agreed upon, and (3) Facebook committed fraud in the procurement of the Agreement. (ConnectU's Opposition to Facebook's Confidential Motion at 6, hereafter, "Opposition," filed under seal.) In its reply, Plaintiffs contend that the Agreement was not procured by fraud. (Reply in Support of Confidential Motion at 9, hereafter, "Reply," filed under seal.) The Court considers each issue in turn.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court's Jurisdiction

Before considering the motion to enforce the Agreement, the Court considers its jurisdiction to act on such a motion. The Court also considers issues raised at the hearing, namely, whether Plaintiffs are required to file an action to enforce the Agreement, to which Defendants would be allowed to plead their objections to enforcement as affirmative defenses.

"It is well settled that a district court has the equitable power to enforce summarily an agreement to settle a case pending before it." Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987);

Decanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978); TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986); In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994). Once a settlement has been reached in a pending action, any party to the agreement may bring a motion to enforce it. See Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, California law provides:

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.6. In addition to the statutory power to enter a judgment, the court's

enforcement-powers include the inherent authority to order a party's specific performance of acts

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required by the settlement agreement and to award damages or other sanctions for noncompliance. TNT Mktg., 796 F.2d at 278.

In this case, in addition to its inherent authority and the authority conferred by California law, in Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, the parties explicitly stipulated that the Court has authority to exercise enforcement. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that it has the jurisdiction and authority to enforce the Agreement without requiring additional pleadings.

However, the power to enforce a settlement agreement can only be exercised if the terms have been agreed to by the individuals authorized to make decisions behalf of the parties. See Harrop v. W. Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977). At the hearing, Defendants raised two issues regarding the authority of the Court to enforce the Agreement against the individuals and the corporations.

First, Defendants question whether there is a bases for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over ConnectU's individual shareholders, i.e., the three principals who signed the Agreement. The Court finds that by signing the Agreement with explicit statements such as those in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, each of the signatories subjected him or herself to the Court's jurisdiction for the limited purpose of enforcing the Agreement. Second, Defendants question whether ConnectU's individual shareholders received proper notice of the proceedings. The Court finds the three principals of ConnectU have had adequate notice since they are plaintiffs in the Massachusetts action where the parties have vigorously litigated discovery issues relating to the enforcement of this Agreement. (See June 3, 2008, Memorandum and Order, No. 07-10593-DPW, D. Mass.) It is incongruous to argue that these individuals did not receive notice of the motion since Judge

⁸ Defendants first made these contentions in their sur-reply. (Defendants' Sur-Reply in Opposition to Confidential Motion to Enforce, hereafter, "Sur-Reply," Docket Item No. 4 Court grants Defendants' motion for leave to file the sur-reply, and considers the contentions raised in the sur-reply.

Woodlocks' June 3, 2008 order in the Massachusetts action specifically addressed the hearing on the motion to enforce the Agreement in this Court. (Id. at 2.)

В. The Material Terms

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The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law that apply to the interpretation of contracts, even if the underlying cause of action is federal. United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, challenges to a settlement agreement based on interpretation of ambiguous terms, fraud in the inducement, or indefiniteness of a term all turn on the applicable state law. See White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Doi, 276 F.3d at 1135.

California has a strong policy in favor of enforcing settlement agreements. Osumi v. Sutton, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1355, 1357 (2007). Under California law, a settlement agreement "must be interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting." Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 107 Cal. App. 4th 620, 625 (2003); see Cal. Civ. Code, § 1636. When the agreement is in writing, "the intention . . . is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible." Brinton v. Bankers Pension Serv., Inc., 76 Cal. App. 4th 550, 559 (1999); see Cal. Civ. Code § 1639. "[C]ourts will not set aside contracts for mere subjective misinterpretation." Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1421 (1996). "A settlement agreement, like any other contract, is unenforceable if the parties fail to agree on a material term or if a material term is not reasonably certain." Lindsay v. Lewandowski. 139 Cal. App. 4th 1618, 1622 (2006) (citing Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (1998)).

First, the Agreement clearly states the consideration for the performance required and how it must be paid. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1-2.) In exchange for a specified amount of cash and stock in

⁹ At the hearing, counsel for ConnectU's individual shareholders argued that they are not plaintiffs" in the Massachusetts action. The Court declines to entertain the notion admitted that the individual shareholders added themselves as plaintiffs to the amended complaint in that action.

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Facebook, ConnectU founders are required under the Agreement to represent and warrant "they have no further right to assert against Facebook" and "they have no further claims against Facebook and its related parties." (Id.)

Second, the Agreement clearly defines the structure of the transaction. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1-2.) Paragraph 7 recites that all ConnectU stock is to be exchanged for a sum certain amount of cash and a precise number of common shares in Facebook; it is a stock and cash for stock acquisition. Subsequent negotiations might have proposed a different structure for the transaction or other additional terms, but those proposal were, apparently, rejected. (Id., Ex. B.) The Court cannot considered subsequent negotiations as evidence that there was no "meeting of the minds" with the respect to the Agreement. The Court must determine the parties' intent from the four corners of the Agreement, not from the extrinsic evidence. Brinton, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 559; Cal. Civ. Code § 1639.

Third, the principals of each company, who are persons authorized to make decisions for the parties, all signed the handwritten version of the Agreement and none of the signatures are disputed. However, Defendants point out that one stockholder in ConnectU, Howard Winklevoss, was not a party to, and did not sign the Agreement. (Opposition at 10.) Therefore, the issue becomes whether the lack of Howard Winklevoss' signature makes the Agreement unenforceable.

ConnectU is a Connecticut corporation. (Id. at 1.) Under Connecticut law, a share exchange transaction only needs to be approved by majority vote. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-816(a). As of May 23, 2006, Howard Winklevoss owned 1% of the outstanding shares in ConnectU. (Declaration of Neel Chatterjee in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply, Ex. B at 10, filed under seal.) There is no evidence his ownership interest changed as of the date of the Agreement. The shareholders who signed the Agreement own 99% of the outstanding shares. Since a majority of ConnectU's shareholders have agreed to the transaction, the consent of Howard Winklevoss is unnecessary to make the Agreement binding on him. Therefore, the lack of Howard Winklevoss' signature is not an impediment to enforcing the Agreement

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Defendants contend that the Agreement was only a starting point for negotiating more formal documentation. (Opposition at 7-9.) However, the Agreement itself provides that the parties "may execute more formal documents," but that the Agreement is "binding." (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1, emphasis added.) It is significant that the parties used the word "may" in this instance as opposed to "will," which they had readily used in other contexts. (See e.g., Agreement ¶ 1, 3, 7.) On the face of the Agreement, it is clear that, had the parties wished to require more formal documents, they could have indicated they will or shall execute more formal documents. Instead, they elected to use the word, "may," and made clear that the Agreement is binding in and of itself.

In sum, the Court finds that the Agreement reached by the parties does not display on its face a failure to agree or any uncertainty regarding its material terms. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Agreement is enforceable.

C. Whether the Agreement Was Procured by Fraud

Defendants contend that Facebook's motion to enforce the Agreement should be denied because Plaintiffs fraudulently procured the Agreement by misrepresenting Facebook's present value. (Opposition at 14.)

A contract is not enforceable if it was induced by fraud. Jones v. Grieve, 15 Cal. App. 561, 566-67 (1911). To prove fraud in the inducement of a contract, a party must establish the elements of common law fraud. Id. The elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation; (2) scienter; (3) justifiable reliance; and (4) resulting damage. Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd., 155 Cal. App. 4th 798, 806-07 (2007); Wilke v. Coinway, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d 126, 136 (1967) (quoting Cortez v. Weymouth, 235 Cal. App. 2d 140 (1965)). These legal principles apply to a contract to settle a lawsuit. See Merced County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. The State of California, 233 Cal. App. 3d 765, 771 (1991).

Where a party is represented by counsel, or where the alleged misrepresentation was made by an adversary during the course of negotiations, courts have held that reliance is unjustifiable. See Seegnamilly, Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, 2005 WL 2045807 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding as a

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matter of law that reliance on representation of adversary in execution of merger agreement was unjustifiable where parties were represented by counsel during the negotiation process); Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1324 (1986) (holding that the fraud claim failed because plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of the allegedly fraudulent statement, and it was not "reasonable for plaintiff to accept defendant's statements without an independent inquiry or investigation").

ConnectU's Proffer Regarding Facebook's Valuation 1.

Defendants contend that they were defrauded during the settlement negotiations because Plaintiffs did not disclose a valuation of Facebook common stock which had been made by the Facebook Board of Directors. (Opposition at 6.)

Apparently, in October 2007, Facebook and Microsoft issued a press release stating Microsoft would "take a \$240 million stake in Facebook's next round of financing at a \$15 billion valuation." (Parke Decl., Ex. J.) Defendants proffer evidence that subsequent to the press release, in the regular course of its operations, Facebook's Board of Directors determined a value of the company's "shares" which was different than the valuation disclosed in the press release. (Declaration of Robert T. Clarkson ¶ 11, filed under seal.)

Defendants do not challenge the accuracy of the press release itself. Thus, there is no claim that the statement in the release was not true when it was made. (Declaration of Ted Wang in Support of Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion ¶ 2, filed under seal.) Plaintiffs do not deny that the Facebook Board of Directors made a subsequent valuation of Facebook shares which was a different value from the value Microsoft attributed to the company. However, Plaintiffs did not make any representations or warranties in the Agreement about the value of Facebook common stock. 10

Defendants provide no authority to support their contention that either Facebook or Zuckerberg had a duty to disclose the Board's valuation to Defendants in the context of the settlement or to correct any subjective valuation which Defendants might have made when determining what demand to make in the mediation. It is clear that generally one has a duty to correct a disclosure which is misleading when made, but usually, there is no duty to a correct statement which is true at the time it is made. See Brody v. Transitional Hospitals Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Intentional

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Morever, it is undisputed that the shares the parties agreed to exchange in the Agreement and the shares involved in the Microsoft's transaction are of different classes. Accordingly, the failure to disclose the difference in the valuations cannot be fraudulent as a matter of law.

Further, the Agreement does not attribute a specific value to the outstanding shares of Facebook's stock; there is no admissible evidence that Plaintiffs made any such representation while negotiating the settlement. 11 Rather, the only representation evident from the Agreement is the number of fully diluted shares which Facebook currently has outstanding. (Parke Decl., Ex. A.) Defendants have failed to show that this representation was false or that there were any other misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs upon which Defendants could have justifiably relied.

In sum, the Court finds Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiffs made a misrepresentation during the negotiation. The individual signatories to the Agreement are sophisticated business parties who were represented by reputable counsel at the mediation. Either party could have chosen to condition the financial exchange being negotiated on representations and warranties of the value of the stock involved or to conduct their own due diligence with respect to Facebook's valuation. Neither party chose these courses of conduct. Notably, in his June 3, 2008 order denying ConnectU's motion to compel production of documents, Judge Woodlock stated:

From all that appears, the parties were prepared to settle their disputes then, despite the fact that aspects of discovery in this case—most pertinently for present purposes, document production—had not been completed and unresolved discovery issues remained outstanding.

(See June 3, 2008, Memorandum and Order at 2, No. 07-10593-DPW, D. Mass.) Thus, the parties elected to proceed with their settlement negotiations knowing they lacked potentially relevant

concealment exists only "when a party to a transaction, who is under no duty to speak, nevertheless does speak and suppresses facts which materially qualify the facts stated." Persson v. Smart <u>Inventions</u>, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 1164 (2005).

¹¹ Defendants proffer evidence of statements made during mediation that resulted in the Agreement. Under ADR Local Rule 6-11, "anything that happened or was said, any position taken. and any view of the merits of the case formed by any participant in connection with any mediation ... shall not be ... (2) disclosed to the assigned judge; or (3) used for any purpose, including impeachment, in any pending or future proceeding in this court." Pursuant to this privilege, the Court declines to conduct a hearing or consider evidence regarding the details of the parties' negotiations in their mediation.

information. Without a showing by Defendants of a material misrepresentation or omission in the negotiations, the Court finds no basis to decline enforcement.

Page 11 of 13

2. Securities Fraud

In their opposition and sur-reply, Defendants contend that the Agreement is not enforceable because Plaintiffs committed securities fraud, making the Agreement voidable. (Opposition at 14; Sur-Reply at 7.)

Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have cited authority that an agreement to exchange shares of closely held corporations pursuant to settlement of litigation between the companies is voidable by showing securities fraud. The cases which Defendants cite in their sur-reply regarding a duty to disclose "material non-public information" all fall within the context of insider trading, which is not an issue in this case. (Sur-Reply at 10.)

On June 24, 2008, the day after the hearing, Defendants requested leave to file additional authority to provide precedent for voiding a purported settlement agreement on the basis of securities fraud. While Defendants cite one case where a settlement was found void under § 29 of the Securities Exchange Act, that case involved an agreement which violated the margin requirements of Regulation T because the defendant failed to recover capital after the settlement.

Pearlstein v. Scudder and German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1970). Contrary to Pearlstein, the Ninth Circuit has held that a broad release in a signed settlement agreement operates to prevent a party from collaterally attacking the agreement by alleging it violates the securities laws under § 29.

Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted:

[w]hen, as here, a release is signed in a commercial context by parties in a roughly equivalent bargaining position and with ready access to counsel, the general rule is that, if 'the language of the release is clear, . . . the intent of the parties [is] indicated by the language employed.'

¹² (See Docket Item No. 454.) While Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to respond the Court finds good cause to grant Defendants leave and considers the authority presented in Defendants' papers.

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Id. at 1342 (quoting Locafrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing, Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 1977)). Thus, in <u>Petro-Ventures</u>, the Ninth Circuit effectuated the parties' intent to bring about "general peace" by finding that their settlement agreement cannot be voided under § 29. Id.

As in <u>Petro-Ventures</u>, this case involves a settlement agreement reached by the parties, who were represented by counsel, in which they intended to undertake to give mutual releases that were "as broad as possible." (Agreement ¶ 2.) There is no doubt that the language of the release in Paragraph 2 of the Agreement conveys the intent of the parties to release all claims. Thus, the Agreement cannot be collaterally attacked using § 29.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to tender sufficient evidence of fraud in the circumstances proffered to the Court to create a genuine dispute as to whether the Agreement was fraudulently induced.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Parties' Settlement Agreement. The parties are ordered to appear on July 2, 2008 at 10 a.m. to show cause why a judgment should not be entered ordering the parties to take the actions required of them by the Settlement Agreement. On or before June 30, 2008, the parties are directed to submit a proposed form of judgment consistent with this Order.

Dated: June 25, 2008

United States District Judge

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Case 5:07-cv-0138 W Document 461 Filed 06/2F - 38 Page 13 of 13 THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO: 2 Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com D. Michael Underhill MUnderhill@BSFLLP.com 3 David A. Barrett dbarrett@bsfllp.com Evan A. Parke eparke@bsfllp.com George Hopkins Guy hopguy@orrick.com
I. Neel Chatterjee nchatterjee@orrick.com 4 5 Jonathan M. Shaw jshaw@bsfllp.com Kalama M. Lui-Kwan klui-kwan@fenwick.com 6 Monte M.F. Cooper mcooper@orrick.com Scott Richard Mosko scott.mosko@finnegan.com 7 Sean Alan Lincoln slincoln@orrick.com Steven Christopher Holtzman sholtzman@bsfllp.com 8 Theresa Ann Sutton tsutton@orrick.com Tyler Alexander Baker Tbaker@fenwick.com 9 Valerie Margo Wagner valerie.wagner@dechert.com Yvonne Penas Greer ygreer@orrick.com 10 United States District Court 11 Dated: June 25, 2008 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk For the Northern District of California 12 13 By: /s/ JW Chambers Elizabeth Garcia 14 **Courtroom Deputy** 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 27 28

EXHIBIT G

1	SEAN A. LINCOLN (State Bar No. 136387)	CATES DISTRICT	
2	I. NEEL CHATTERJEE (State Bar No. 173985)		
3			
4	mcooper@orrick.com THERESA A. SUTTON (State Bar No. 211857	IT IS SO ORDERED AS MODIFIED	
5	tsutton@orrick.com YVONNE P. GREER (State Bar No. 214072)	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
6	ygreer@orrick.com ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLI	Tomes VI	
7	1000 Marsh Road Menlo Park, CA 94025		
8	Telephone: 650-614-7400 Facsimile: 650-614-7401	ENA DISTRICT OF CV	
9	Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
10	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKER	BERG	
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
12	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
13	SAN JOSE DIVISION		
14			
15	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKERBERG,	Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW	
16	Plaintiffs,	STIPULATION AND [PROPOSES] ORDER ENLARGING TIME TO	
17	V.	FILE A JOINT PROPOSED ORDER RE SEALING; AND	
18	CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as	ORDER GRANTING IN PART	
19 20	CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS, and WAYNE	DENYING IN PART MOTIONS POSTED AS DOCKET ITEM NOS. 366, 374 AND 393	
21	CHANG,		
22	Defendants.		
23			
24	This Stipulation is entered into by and among Plaintiffs Facebook, Inc., and		
25	Mark E. Zuckerberg and Defendant ConnectU, Inc., through its respective attorneys of record.		
26	WHEREAS, on May 27, 2008, the Court issued an order requesting that the parties		
27	submit, by June 9, a Joint Proposed Order regard		
28	the date of the Jointed Proposed Order is filed";	•	
	OHS West:260453060.1 16069-4 YG2/TS2	STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER 5:07-CV-01389-JW	

5:07-CV-01389-JW

16069-4 YG2/TS2

(3) Motion to Seal the Request for Reschedule Hearing on Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks to SEAL the request, DENIED to the extent it seeks to continue the hearing. (Docket Item No. 393.)

There have been voluminous filings in this case in just the last month, which have required extensive judicial resources to manage. The parties are strongly encouraged to work in a collaborative manner to conserve judicial resources.

Dated: June 10, 2008

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JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

EXHIBIT H

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STEVEN C. HOLTZMAN (State Bar No. 144177) sholtzman@bsfllp.com 2 BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 1999 Harrison Street, Suite 900 2008 JUL 30 P ₹ 46 Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (510) 874-1000 4 Facsimile: (510) 874-1460 RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT NO. DIST. OF CA. S.J. 5 D. MICHAEL UNDERHILL (pro hac vice) munderhill@bsfllp.com 6 BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 5301 Wisconsin Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20015 Telephone: (202) 237-2727 Facsimile: (202) 237-6131 Attorneys for Defendant CONNÉCTU, INC. 10 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION 13 14 Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKERBERG, NOTICE OF APPEAL 16 Plaintiffs, BY CONNECTU, INC. 17 ٧. 18 CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS, 20 and WAYNE CHANG, 21 Defendants. 22 23 24 25

- 1		
1	Notice is hereby given that CONNECTU, INC., defendant in the above named case, hereby	
2	appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the final Judgment	
3	Enforcing Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 476) entered in this action on July 2, 2008, and all	
4	related orders including but not limited to the June 25, 2008, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential	
5	Motion To Enforce The Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 461); and the June 10, 2008, Order	
6	Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motions Posted As Docket Items Nos. 366, 374 and 393	
7	(Docket No. 428).	
8		
9	July 30, 2008 Respectfully submitted,	
10		
11	BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP	
12	1 (11 - 1,00	
13	Gan C. Ase /KPP	
14	Steven C. Holtzman	
15	Attorneys for Defendant ConnectU, Inc.	
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28	NOTICE OF APPEAL 5:07-CV-01389-JW	
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A-11 (rev. 7/00) Page 1 of 2

USCA DOCKET # (IF KNOWN)



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CIVIL APPEALS DOCKETING STATEMENT

EASE ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY.

	LEASE ATTACH ADDITIONAL TAGLS IF INDEEDS SET.			
TITLE IN FULL: THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK	DISTRICT: Northern District of California JUDGE: Honorable James Ware			
ZUCKERBERG,	DISTRICT COURT NUMBER: 5:07-cv-01389 JW			
Plaintiffs, vs.	DATE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: 7/30/08	is this a cross-appeal? YES 🗆		
CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS, and WAYNE CHANG,				
Defendants.				
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NATURE OF ACTION AND RESULT BELOW: District Court granted judgment enforcing a purported settlement agreement. Defendants-appellants dispute the enforceability of that purported agreement.				
PRINCIPAL ISSUES PROPOSED TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL: 1) Whether the District Court erred in summarily enforcing a purported settlement agreement without holding an evidentiary hearing notwithstanding disputed issues of fact as to whether the parties agreed to all material terms. 2) Whether the District Court erred in refusing to void a purported settlement agreement under Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78cc(b), because it was procured through securities fraud. Appellants reserve the right to appeal additional issues, including but not limited to evidentiary rulings. PLEASE IDENTIFY ANY OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDING THAT MAY HAVE A BEARING ON THIS CASE (INCLUDE PENDING DISTRICT COURT POSTJUDGMENT MOTIONS): Motion to Stay Judgment in the District Court.				
Possibility of settlement				
☐ Likelihood that intervening precedent will control outcome of appeal				
Likelihood of a motion to expedite or to stay the appeal, or other procedural matters (Specify):				
Motion to Expedite Appeal: Motion to Stay Judgment, if stay is denied by District Court.				
Any other information relevant to the inclusion of this case in the Mediation Program				
Possibility parties would stipulate judges □	Possibility parties would stipulate to binding award by Appellate Commissioner in lieu of submission to judges \Box			
LOWER COURT INFORMATION				

Page 2 of 2

DISTRICT COURT DISPOSITION				
JURISDICTION		TYPE OF JUDGMENT/ORDER APPEALED	RELIEF	
FEDERAL OF STRONG	FINAL DECISION OF DISTRICT COURT	D DEFAULT JUDGMENT	DAMAGES: SOUGHT \$	
QUESTION	☐ INTERLOCUTORY	☐ DISMISSAL/JURISDICTION ☐ DISMISSAL/MERITS	AWARDED \$ INJUNCTIONS:	
OTHER	DECISION APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT	SUMMARY JUDGMENT	☐ PRELIMINARY	
(SPECIFY):	INTERLOCUTORY ORDER CERTIFIED BY	IUDGMENT/COURT DECISION IUDGMENT/JURY VERDICT	✓ PERMANENT ✓ GRANTED	
	DISTRICT JUDGE (SPECIFY):	DECLARATORY JUDGMENT	D DENIED	
·	OTHER (SPECIFY):	UDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OTHER (SPECIFY):	ATTORNEY FEES: SOUGHT \$ AWARDED \$	
			☐ PENDING	
			COSTS: \$	
	CE	RTIFICATION OF COUNSEL		
I CERTIFY THAT: 1. COPIES OF ORDER/JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM ARE ATTACHED. 2. A CURRENT SERVICE LIST OR REPRESENTATION STATEMENT WITH TELEPHONE AND FAX NUMBERS IS ATTACHED (SEE 9TH CIR. RULE 3-2).				
3. A COPY C	APPEALS DOCKETING STATEMENT WAS SERVED IN COMPLIANCE WITH FRAP 25.			
4. I UNDERS	A LUNDER STAND THAT FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE FILING REQUIREMENTS MAY RESULT IN SANCTIONS,			
INCLUDI	NG DISMISSAL OF THIS APPEAL	ha July 3	31, 2008	
Signature		Date		
COUNSEL WHO COMPLETED THIS FORM				
NAME: Evan Parke				
FIRM: Boles, Schiller & Flexner LLP				
ADDRESS: 5301 Wisconsin Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20015				
	E-MAIL: eparke@bsflip.com			
TELEPHONE: (202) 274-6131				
FAX: (202) 23	37-6131		THE NOTICE OF APPEAL *	
*THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT WITH THE NOTICE OF APPEAL * *IF FILED LATE, IT SHOULD BE FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS*				

Case 5:07-cv-013ชษ-JW Document 582-3 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 1 of 23 Filed 06/10/2008 Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Page 1 of 2 Document 428 1 SEAN A. LINCOLN (State Bar No. 136387) salincoln@orrick.com I. NEEL CHATTERJEE (State Bar No. 173985) 2 nchatterjee@orrick.com MONTE COOPER (State Bar No. 196746) IT IS SO ORDER 3 mcooper@orrick.com THERESA A. SUTTON (State Bar No. 211857) 4 tsutton@orrick.com YVONNE P. GREER (State Bar No. 214072) 5 Judge James Ware ygreer@orrick.com ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 6 1000 Marsh Road 7 Menlo Park, CA 94025 650-614-7400 Telephone: 8 Facsimile: 650-614-7401 9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs THE FÁCEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKERBERG 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 SAN JOSE DIVISION 13 14 THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW 15 ZUCKERBERG, STIPULATION AND PROP 16 ORDER ENLARGING TIME TO Plaintiffs, FILE A JOINT PROPOSED ORDER 17 RE SEALING; AND 18 ORDER GRANTING IN PART CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as **DENYING IN PART MOTIONS** CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC 19 NORTHWEST SOFTWARE, INC. POSTED AS DOCKET ITEM NOS. WINSTON WILLIAMS, and WAYNE 20 366, 374 AND 393 CHANG, 21 Defendants. 22 23

This Stipulation is entered into by and among Plaintiffs Facebook, Inc., and

Mark E. Zuckerberg and Defendant ConnectU, Inc., through its respective attorneys of record.

WHEREAS, on May 27, 2008, the Court issued an order requesting that the parties

submit, by June 9, a Joint Proposed Order regarding "all sealing motions that are pending as of

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the date of the Jointed Proposed Order is filed";

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STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER 5:07-CV-01389-JW Case 5:07-cv-013og-JW Document 582-3 Filed 07/50/2008 Page 2 of 23

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1	WHEREAS, Plaintiffs Facebook, Inc. and Mark E. Zuckerberg will be filing their		
2	Reply Memorandum and supporting documents in support of their Confidential Motion (Docket		
3	No. 329) under seal today;		
4	WHEREAS, the parties believe that an extension of time to file the Joint Proposed		
5	Order, until tomorrow, June 10, is necessary in order to include Plaintiffs' June 9 filing;		
6	IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED THAT the parties' Joint Proposed		
7	Order Re: Sealing is due on June 10, 2008.		
8			
9	Dated: June 9, 2008 ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP		
10			
11	/s/		
12	Theresa A. Sutton Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
ı	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK		
13	ZUCKERBERG		
14			
15	Dated: June 9, 2008 BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP		
16			
17	/s/ Evan Parke		
18	Attorneys for Defendant		
19	CONNECTU, INC.		
20	*** ORDER *** For good cause shown, the Court GRANTS the parties' Stipulation regarding the filing of the		
21	Joint Proposed Order Re: Sealing motions. In addition, the Court addresses the following outstanding motions in advance of the June 23, 2008 hearing on Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion:		
22	(1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Rely and Motion to Strike is DENIED.		
23	(Docket Item No. 366). (2) Defendants' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing, and Motion to Expedite Discovery is		
24	DENIED. (Docket Item No. 374.)		
25	(3) Motion to Seal the Request for Reschedule Hearing on Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks to SEAL the request, DENIED to the extent it seeks to continue		
26	the hearing. (Docket Item No. 393.)		
	There have been voluminous filings in this case in just the last month, which have required extensive judicial resources to manage. The parties are strongly encouraged to work in a collaborative		
27	manner to conserve judicial resources.		
28	Dated: June 10, 2008		
	JAMES WARE United States District Judge		

Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Document 582-3 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 3 of 23 Filed 06/25/2008 Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Document 461 Page 1 of 13 1 2 3 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 SAN JOSE DIVISION 10 NO. C 07-01389 JW The Facebook, Inc., et al., 11 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' Plaintiffs, 12 CONFIDENTIAL MOTION TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 13 ConnectU, Inc., et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are The Facebook Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, 17 "Facebook"). Plaintiffs bring this action against ConnectU, Inc., Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., 18 Winston Williams, and Wayne Chang (collectively, "Defendants") alleging, inter alia, 19 misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq. In 20 essence, Facebook alleges that ConnectU gained unauthorized access to Facebook's servers and 21 website and took information for its own unlawful use. The parties are engaged in at least two other 22 lawsuits over these matters; in those cases, ConnectU is the Plaintiff and Facebook is the Defendant. 23 In the course of this lawsuit, the parties engaged in private mediation. On February 22, 24 2008, as the result of the mediation, the parties signed a written "Term Sheet & Settlement 25 Agreement." In the Agreement, the parties agreed to resolve all of their disputes and to dismiss the 26 pending lawsuits. The Agreement provides that they "may execute more formal documents but

these terms are binding." After signing the Agreement, the parties attempted to draft formal

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documents but failed to reach a consensus on certain terms. In the Agreement, the parties stipulate that the federal court in San Jose, California has jurisdiction to enforce it. Based on a belief that a court order is necessary to enforce the February 22, 2008 Agreement, Facebook filed the present motion in this Court.¹

The question for decision by the Court is whether the February 22, 2008 Agreement contains sufficiently definite and essential terms that it may be enforced. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Agreement is enforceable and orders its enforcement.

II. BACKGROUND

As stated above, this action is one of three separate actions between the parties in various federal courts.² On January 22, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Richard Seeborg ordered the parties to participate in Alternative Dispute Resolution. (Docket Item No. 270.) The parties elected to participate in private mediation.

On February 22, 2008, the parties engaged in mediation before Antonio Piazza. Both sides were represented by counsel. As the result of the mediation, the parties signed a handwritten document entitled, "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement" ("Agreement"). (Second Declaration of Evan A. Parke, Ex. A., hereafter, "Parke Decl.," filed under seal.)

With the precise financial terms redacted,3 the Agreement provides, as follows:4

^{1 (}hereafter, "Motion," Docket Item No. 329, filed under seal.)

² The other actions are <u>ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg</u>, Appeal No. 07-1796 (1st Cir.) and <u>ConnectU, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.</u>, Case No. C 07-10593-DPW (D. Mass.).

³ The Agreement recites that all of its terms are "confidential." At the hearing on the motion, the Court expressed its need to discuss the Agreement in its Order. The Court now determines that it can protect the confidentiality of the Agreement if references to the amount of consideration which the parties agreed to exchange as a part of the settlement are omitted. Moreover, since neither Facebook nor ConnectU are publicly traded companies at this time, the Court finds good cause to keep the transcript of the proceedings under seal as requested by the parties to protect their financial information.

⁴ (Declaration of Theresa A. Sutton in Support of Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion, hereafter, "Sutton Decl.," Ex. A at 1-2, filed under seal.) For authenticity purposes, the Court leaves all typographical errors and strikeouts in the Agreement unchanged.

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Plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement is made on the grounds that the Agreement unambiguously sets forth all material terms of the parties' settlement and Defendants should be ordered to comply with it. (Motion at 6.) Defendants contend that Facebook's motion to enforce the Agreement should be denied because (1) the agreement is missing material terms, (2) the terms which are included were not agreed upon, and (3) Facebook committed fraud in the procurement of the Agreement. (ConnectU's Opposition to Facebook's Confidential Motion at 6, hereafter, "Opposition," filed under seal.) In its reply, Plaintiffs contend that the Agreement was not procured by fraud. (Reply in Support of Confidential Motion at 9, hereafter, "Reply," filed under seal.) The Court considers each issue in turn.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court's Jurisdiction

Before considering the motion to enforce the Agreement, the Court considers its jurisdiction to act on such a motion. The Court also considers issues raised at the hearing, namely, whether Plaintiffs are required to file an action to enforce the Agreement, to which Defendants would be allowed to plead their objections to enforcement as affirmative defenses.

"It is well settled that a district court has the equitable power to enforce summarily an agreement to settle a case pending before it." Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987);

Decanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978); TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986); In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994). Once a settlement has been reached in a pending action, any party to the agreement may bring a motion to enforce it. See Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, California law provides:

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.6. In addition to the statutory power to enter a judgment, the court's enforcement powers include the inherent authority to order a party's specific performance of acts

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required by the settlement agreement and to award damages or other sanctions for noncompliance. TNT Mktg., 796 F.2d at 278.

In this case, in addition to its inherent authority and the authority conferred by California law, in Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, the parties explicitly stipulated that the Court has authority to exercise enforcement. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that it has the jurisdiction and authority to enforce the Agreement without requiring additional pleadings.

However, the power to enforce a settlement agreement can only be exercised if the terms have been agreed to by the individuals authorized to make decisions behalf of the parties. See Harrop v. W. Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977). At the hearing, Defendants raised two issues regarding the authority of the Court to enforce the Agreement against the individuals and the corporations.

First, Defendants question whether there is a bases for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over ConnectU's individual shareholders, i.e., the three principals who signed the Agreement.⁸ The Court finds that by signing the Agreement with explicit statements such as those in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, each of the signatories subjected him or herself to the Court's jurisdiction for the limited purpose of enforcing the Agreement. Second, Defendants question whether ConnectU's individual shareholders received proper notice of the proceedings. The Court finds the three principals of ConnectU have had adequate notice since they are plaintiffs in the Massachusetts action where the parties have vigorously litigated discovery issues relating to the enforcement of this Agreement. (See June 3, 2008, Memorandum and Order, No. 07-10593-DPW, D. Mass.) It is incongruous to argue that these individuals did not receive notice of the motion since Judge

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⁸ Defendants first made these contentions in their sur-reply. (Defendants' Sur-Reply in Opposition to Confidential Motion to Enforce, hereafter, "Sur-Reply," Docket Item No. 438.) The Court grants Defendants' motion for leave to file the sur-reply, and considers the contentions raised in the sur-reply.

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Woodlocks' June 3, 2008 order in the Massachusetts action specifically addressed the hearing on the motion to enforce the Agreement in this Court. (Id. at 2.)

B. The Material Terms

The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law that apply to the interpretation of contracts, even if the underlying cause of action is federal. <u>United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp.</u>, 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, challenges to a settlement agreement based on interpretation of ambiguous terms, fraud in the inducement, or indefiniteness of a term all turn on the applicable state law. <u>See White Farm Equip.</u> Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., <u>Doi</u>, 276 F.3d at 1135.

California has a strong policy in favor of enforcing settlement agreements. Osumi v. Sutton, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1355, 1357 (2007). Under California law, a settlement agreement "must be interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting." Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 107 Cal. App. 4th 620, 625 (2003); see Cal. Civ. Code, § 1636. When the agreement is in writing, "the intention . . . is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible." Brinton v. Bankers Pension Serv., Inc., 76 Cal. App. 4th 550, 559 (1999); see Cal. Civ. Code § 1639. "[C]ourts will not set aside contracts for mere subjective misinterpretation." Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1421 (1996). "A settlement agreement, like any other contract, is unenforceable if the parties fail to agree on a material term or if a material term is not reasonably certain." Lindsay v. Lewandowski, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1618, 1622 (2006) (citing Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (1998)).

First, the Agreement clearly states the consideration for the performance required and how it must be paid. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1-2.) In exchange for a specified amount of cash and stock in

⁹ At the hearing, counsel for ConnectU's individual shareholders argued that they are not "plaintiffs" in the Massachusetts action. The Court declines to entertain the notion since counsel admitted that the individual shareholders added themselves as plaintiffs to the amended complaint in that action.

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Facebook, ConnectU founders are required under the Agreement to represent and warrant "they have no further right to assert against Facebook" and "they have no further claims against Facebook and its related parties." (<u>Id.</u>)

Second, the Agreement clearly defines the structure of the transaction. (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1-2.) Paragraph 7 recites that all ConnectU stock is to be exchanged for a sum certain amount of cash and a precise number of common shares in Facebook; it is a stock and cash for stock acquisition. Subsequent negotiations might have proposed a different structure for the transaction or other additional terms, but those proposal were, apparently, rejected. (Id., Ex. B.) The Court cannot considered subsequent negotiations as evidence that there was no "meeting of the minds" with the respect to the Agreement. The Court must determine the parties' intent from the four corners of the Agreement, not from the extrinsic evidence. Brinton, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 559; Cal. Civ. Code § 1639.

Third, the principals of each company, who are persons authorized to make decisions for the parties, all signed the handwritten version of the Agreement and none of the signatures are disputed. However, Defendants point out that one stockholder in ConnectU, Howard Winklevoss, was not a party to, and did not sign the Agreement. (Opposition at 10.) Therefore, the issue becomes whether the lack of Howard Winklevoss' signature makes the Agreement unenforceable.

ConnectU is a Connecticut corporation. (Id. at 1.) Under Connecticut law, a share exchange transaction only needs to be approved by majority vote. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-816(a). As of May 23, 2006, Howard Winklevoss owned 1% of the outstanding shares in ConnectU. (Declaration of Neel Chatterjee in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply, Ex. B at 10, filed under seal.) There is no evidence his ownership interest changed as of the date of the Agreement. The shareholders who signed the Agreement own 99% of the outstanding shares. Since a majority of ConnectU's shareholders have agreed to the transaction, the consent of Howard Winklevoss is unnecessary to make the Agreement binding on him. Therefore, the lack of Howard Winklevoss' signature is not an impediment to enforcing the Agreement.

Defendants contend that the Agreement was only a starting point for negotiating more formal documentation. (Opposition at 7-9.) However, the Agreement itself provides that the parties "may execute more formal documents," but that the Agreement is "binding." (Sutton Decl., Ex. A at 1, emphasis added.) It is significant that the parties used the word "may" in this instance as opposed to "will," which they had readily used in other contexts. (See e.g., Agreement ¶ 1, 3, 7.) On the face of the Agreement, it is clear that, had the parties wished to require more formal documents, they could have indicated they will or shall execute more formal documents. Instead, they elected to use the word, "may," and made clear that the Agreement is binding in and of itself.

In sum, the Court finds that the Agreement reached by the parties does not display on its face a failure to agree or any uncertainty regarding its material terms. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Agreement is enforceable.

C. Whether the Agreement Was Procured by Fraud

Defendants contend that Facebook's motion to enforce the Agreement should be denied because Plaintiffs fraudulently procured the Agreement by misrepresenting Facebook's present value. (Opposition at 14.)

A contract is not enforceable if it was induced by fraud. <u>Jones v. Grieve</u>, 15 Cal. App. 561, 566-67 (1911). To prove fraud in the inducement of a contract, a party must establish the elements of common law fraud. <u>Id.</u> The elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation; (2) scienter; (3) justifiable reliance; and (4) resulting damage. <u>Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises</u>, <u>Ltd.</u>, 155 Cal. App. 4th 798, 806-07 (2007); <u>Wilke v. Coinway</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, 257 Cal. App. 2d 126, 136 (1967) (quoting <u>Cortez v. Weymouth</u>, 235 Cal. App. 2d 140 (1965)). These legal principles apply to a contract to settle a lawsuit. <u>See Merced County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. The State of California</u>, 233 Cal. App. 3d 765, 771 (1991).

Where a party is represented by counsel, or where the alleged misrepresentation was made by an adversary during the course of negotiations, courts have held that reliance is unjustifiable. See Scognamill v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, 2005 WL 2045807 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding as a

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matter of law that reliance on representation of adversary in execution of merger agreement was unjustifiable where parties were represented by counsel during the negotiation process); Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1324 (1986) (holding that the fraud claim failed because plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of the allegedly fraudulent statement, and it was not "reasonable for plaintiff to accept defendant's statements without an independent inquiry or investigation").

1. ConnectU's Proffer Regarding Facebook's Valuation

Defendants contend that they were defrauded during the settlement negotiations because Plaintiffs did not disclose a valuation of Facebook common stock which had been made by the Facebook Board of Directors. (Opposition at 6.)

Apparently, in October 2007, Facebook and Microsoft issued a press release stating Microsoft would "take a \$240 million stake in Facebook's next round of financing at a \$15 billion valuation." (Parke Decl., Ex. J.) Defendants proffer evidence that subsequent to the press release, in the regular course of its operations, Facebook's Board of Directors determined a value of the company's "shares" which was different than the valuation disclosed in the press release. (Declaration of Robert T. Clarkson ¶ 11, filed under seal.)

Defendants do not challenge the accuracy of the press release itself. Thus, there is no claim that the statement in the release was not true when it was made. (Declaration of Ted Wang in Support of Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion ¶ 2, filed under seal.) Plaintiffs do not deny that the Facebook Board of Directors made a subsequent valuation of Facebook shares which was a different value from the value Microsoft attributed to the company. However, Plaintiffs did not make any representations or warranties in the Agreement about the value of Facebook common stock.¹⁰

Defendants provide no authority to support their contention that either Facebook or Zuckerberg had a duty to disclose the Board's valuation to Defendants in the context of the settlement or to correct any subjective valuation which Defendants might have made when determining what demand to make in the mediation. It is clear that generally one has a duty to correct a disclosure which is misleading when made, but usually, there is no duty to a correct statement which is true at the time it is made. See Brody v. Transitional Hospitals Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Intentional

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Morever, it is undisputed that the shares the parties agreed to exchange in the Agreement and the shares involved in the Microsoft's transaction are of different classes. Accordingly, the failure to disclose the difference in the valuations cannot be fraudulent as a matter of law.

Further, the Agreement does not attribute a specific value to the outstanding shares of Facebook's stock; there is no admissible evidence that Plaintiffs made any such representation while negotiating the settlement.11 Rather, the only representation evident from the Agreement is the number of fully diluted shares which Facebook currently has outstanding. (Parke Decl., Ex. A.) Defendants have failed to show that this representation was false or that there were any other misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs upon which Defendants could have justifiably relied.

In sum, the Court finds Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiffs made a misrepresentation during the negotiation. The individual signatories to the Agreement are sophisticated business parties who were represented by reputable counsel at the mediation. Either party could have chosen to condition the financial exchange being negotiated on representations and warranties of the value of the stock involved or to conduct their own due diligence with respect to Facebook's valuation. Neither party chose these courses of conduct. Notably, in his June 3, 2008 order denying ConnectU's motion to compel production of documents, Judge Woodlock stated:

From all that appears, the parties were prepared to settle their disputes then, despite the fact that aspects of discovery in this case—most pertinently for present purposes, document production—had not been completed and unresolved discovery issues remained outstanding.

(See June 3, 2008, Memorandum and Order at 2, No. 07-10593-DPW, D. Mass.) Thus, the parties elected to proceed with their settlement negotiations knowing they lacked potentially relevant

concealment exists only "when a party to a transaction, who is under no duty to speak, nevertheless does speak and suppresses facts which materially qualify the facts stated." <u>Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc.</u>, 125 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 1164 (2005).

¹¹ Defendants proffer evidence of statements made during mediation that resulted in the Agreement. Under ADR Local Rule 6-11, "anything that happened or was said, any position taken, and any view of the merits of the case formed by any participant in connection with any mediation ... shall not be ... (2) disclosed to the assigned judge; or (3) used for any purpose, including impeachment, in any pending or future proceeding in this court." Pursuant to this privilege, the Court declines to conduct a hearing or consider evidence regarding the details of the parties' negotiations in their mediation.

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Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Document 582-3 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 13 of 23 Filed 06/25/2008 Page 11 of 13 Document 461 Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW information. Without a showing by Defendants of a material misrepresentation or omission in the 1 negotiations, the Court finds no basis to decline enforcement. 2 2. Securities Fraud 3 In their opposition and sur-reply, Defendants contend that the Agreement is not enforceable 4 because Plaintiffs committed securities fraud, making the Agreement voidable. (Opposition at 14; 5 Sur-Reply at 7.) 6 Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have cited authority that an agreement to exchange shares 7 of closely held corporations pursuant to settlement of litigation between the companies is voidable 8 by showing securities fraud. The cases which Defendants cite in their sur-reply regarding a duty to 9 disclose "material non-public information" all fall within the context of insider trading, which is not 10 an issue in this case. (Sur-Reply at 10.) 11 On June 24, 2008, the day after the hearing, Defendants requested leave to file additional 12 authority to provide precedent for voiding a purported settlement agreement on the basis of 13 securities fraud.12 While Defendants cite one case where a settlement was found void under § 29 of 14 the Securities Exchange Act, that case involved an agreement which violated the margin 15 requirements of Regulation T because the defendant failed to recover capital after the settlement. 16 Pearlstein v. Scudder and German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1970). Contrary to Pearlstein, 17 the Ninth Circuit has held that a broad release in a signed settlement agreement operates to prevent a 18 party from collaterally attacking the agreement by alleging it violates the securities laws under § 29. 19 Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 20 21 noted: [w]hen, as here, a release is signed in a commercial context by parties in a roughly 22

[w]hen, as here, a release is signed in a commercial context by parties in a roughly equivalent bargaining position and with ready access to counsel, the general rule is that, if 'the language of the release is clear, . . . the intent of the parties [is] indicated by the language employed.'

¹² (See Docket Item No. 454.) While Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to respond, the Court finds good cause to grant Defendants leave and considers the authority presented in Defendants' papers.

Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Document 582-3 Filed 07/3v/2008 Page 14 of 23 Filed 06/25/2008 Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Document 461 Page 12 of 13 Id. at 1342 (quoting Locafrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing, Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 1 (2d Cir. 1977)). Thus, in Petro-Ventures, the Ninth Circuit effectuated the parties' intent to bring 2 about "general peace" by finding that their settlement agreement cannot be voided under § 29. Id. 3 As in Petro-Ventures, this case involves a settlement agreement reached by the parties, who 4 were represented by counsel, in which they intended to undertake to give mutual releases that were 5 "as broad as possible." (Agreement ¶ 2.) There is no doubt that the language of the release in 6 Paragraph 2 of the Agreement conveys the intent of the parties to release all claims. Thus, the 7 8 Agreement cannot be collaterally attacked using § 29. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to tender sufficient evidence of 9 fraud in the circumstances proffered to the Court to create a genuine dispute as to whether the 10 Agreement was fraudulently induced. 11 V. CONCLUSION 12 The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Parties' Settlement Agreement. The 13 parties are ordered to appear on July 2, 2008 at 10 a.m. to show cause why a judgment should not 14 be entered ordering the parties to take the actions required of them by the Settlement Agreement. 15 On or before June 30, 2008, the parties are directed to submit a proposed form of judgment 16 17 consistent with this Order. 18 Dated: June 25, 2008 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW

Filed 07/02/2008 Case 5:07-cv-01389-JW Page 1 of 5 Document 476 1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 SAN JOSE DIVISION 9 NO. C 07-01389 JW The Facebook, Inc., et al., 10 JUDGMENT ENFORCING SETTLEMENT Plaintiffs, 11 AGREEMENT ٧. 12 ConnectU, Inc., et al., 13 Defendants. 14 Pursuant to the Court's June 25, 2008 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Confidential Motion to 15 Enforce the Settlement Agreement (docket item no. 461), the parties appeared before the Court on 16 July 2, 2008 to show cause why a judgment should not be entered. Based on the papers submitted 17 and oral arguments of counsel, 18 JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ENFORCING "THE TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT 19 AGREEMENT" AS FOLLOWS: 20 The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg: (1) 21 Pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by (a) 22 the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, The Facebook, Inc. shall deposit with 23 the Master, the amount of cash and the certificates representing the amount of 24 The Facebook, Inc. common shares stated in Paragraph 7 of the Agreement, 25 endorsed for transfer. The following legend shall appear on certificates of 26 The Facebook, Inc. common stock issued pursuant to this Judgment: 27 28

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THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE ARE SUBJECT TO AN AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE VOTING OF SUCH SHARES, AS PROVIDED IN THE CERTAIN TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO WHICH SUCH SHARES WERE ORIGINALLY ISSUED. THE HOLDERS OF SUCH SHARES ARE ENTITLED TO THE SAME ANTI-DILUTION RIGHTS AFFORDED THE ISSUER'S SERIES D PREFERRED STOCK, AS PROVIDED IN SUCH TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. A COPY OF SUCH TERM SHEET & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ISSUER.

- (b) Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, on or before 12 noon on July 9, 2008, The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg shall submit to the Court for approval a proposed form of release. Upon approval by the Court, the release shall be signed by The Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg, and shall have attached to it corporate authority given to the corporate signatory and shall be notarized as to each signatory and shall be immediately deposited with the Master;
- (c) Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, on or before **August 4, 2008**, a legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement.¹ The dismissal shall recite that each party to the respective litigation shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.

¹ The other two cases are <u>ConnectU, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., et al.</u>, Case No. 1:04-cv-11923-DPW, currently on appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals; and <u>ConnectU, Inc., et al. v. Facebook, Inc., et al.</u>, Case No. 1:07-cv-10593-DPW, currently pending in the District of Massachusetts.

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- (2) ConnectU Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Vinklevoss, and Divya Narendra:
 - (a) Pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, ConnectU Inc. shall deposit with the Master all shares of ConnectU Inc., endorsed for transfer. To the extent the parties to the Agreement do not own any shares of ConnectU Inc., to fulfill the obligation of the transfer of "all ConnectU stock," the parties to the Agreement shall take such actions in their respective corporate and individual capacities as are necessary to effect the deposit with the Master of all shares of ConnectU stock;
 - (b) Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, on or before 12 noon on July 9, 2008, ConnectU, Inc., Cameron Winklevoss, Tyler Vinklevoss and Divya Narendra shall submit to the Court for approval a proposed form of release. Upon approval by the Court, the release shall be signed by these parties and shall have attached to it corporate authority given to the corporate signatory and shall be notarized as to each signatory and shall be immediately deposited with the Master;
 - (c) Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Agreement, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, on or before August 4, 2008, a legally sufficient dismissal with prejudice of all cases by and between the parties pending as of the date of the Agreement. The dismissal shall recite that each party to the respective litigation shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.
- (3) Upon further order of the Court, the parties shall deposit with the Master such other and further things which will facilitate the orderly exchange of the consideration and shall do the things ordered by the Court to ensure the operational integrity of the business entities that are parties to the Agreement.

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11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
12	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
13	SAN JOSE DIVISION		
14	THE EACEDOON INC. and MARK	Case No. 5:07-CV-01389-JW	
15	THE FACEBOOK, INC. and MARK ZUCKERBERG,	Case 140. 5.07** CV-01505-5 W	
16	Plaintiffs,	REPRESENTATION STATEMENT OF CONNECTU, INC. PURSUANT TO	
17	v.	NINTH CIRCUIT RULE 3-2	
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19	CONNECTU, INC. (formerly known as CONNECTU, LLC), PACIFIC NORTHWEST		
20	SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON WILLIAMS, and WAYNE CHANG,		
21			
22	Defendants.		
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1	ConnectU, Inc. files this Representation Statement in accordance with Ninth Circuit Rule 3-		
2	2. The parties to the suit and their respective counsel, including their contact information, are as		
3	follows:		
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5	Parties:	Party:	
6	The Facebook, Inc. (plaintiff)	ConnectU, Inc. (formerly known as	
7	Mark Zuckerberg (plaintiff)	ConnectU, LLC) (defendant)	
8	Counsel:	Counsel:	
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2	Parties:	Parties:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Pacific Northwest Software, Inc. (defendant) Wayne Chang (defendant) Winston Williams (defendant) Counsel: Scott R. Mosko (SBN106070) FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, L.L.P. Stanford Research Park 3300 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, California 94304 Telephone: (650) 849-6600 Facsimile: (650) 849-6666	Cameron Winklevoss (proposed intervenor) Tyler Winklevoss (proposed intervenor) Divya Narendra (proposed intervenor) Counsel: Mark A. Byrne (SBN116657) BYRNE & NIXON LLP 800 West Sixth Street, Suite 430 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 620-8003 Fascimile: (213) 620-8013 Sean F. O'Shea (pro hac vice) O'SHEA PARTNERS LLP 90 Park Avenue, 20th Floor
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15 16	July 30, 2008	Respectfully submitted,
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22		Attorneys for Defendant ConnectU, Inc.
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REPRESENTATION STATEMENT

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