EXHIBIT G

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS											
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHOSETTS											
3	CONNECTU, INC. : DOCKET NUMBER CA0710593 PLAINTIFF : :											
4	versus : UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL :											
5	DEFENDANTS : BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS											
6	JUNE 2, 2008											
7	2:30 p.m.											
8	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING											
	UNSEALED HEARING ONLY											
9	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE											
11	<u>APPEARANCES</u> :											
12 13	ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF:											
14	FINNEGAN HENDERSON FARABOW GARRETT & DUNNER LLP											
15	BY: JOHN F. HORNICK, ESQUIRE											
	901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413											
16	TELEPHONE: 202-408-4076 E-MAIL: john.hornick@finnegan.com											
17	FAX: 202-4080-4400											
18												
19	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER											
20	DIANE M. MOLAS, RPR, DE CSR, AND NJ CCR											
21	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS											
22	ONE COURTHOUSE WAY THIRD FLOOR - SUITE 3200											
23	BOSTON, MA 02210 TELEPHONE: (267) 977-2909											
24	E-MAIL: Dmolas1@aol.com											
25	PROCEEDINGS REPORTED USING MACHINE STENOGRAPHY. TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED EMPLOYING COMPUTER-AIDED TECHNOLOGY.											

1	APPEARANCES (CONTIN	UED):
2		AND
3	ву:	TOM JENKINS, ESQUIRE 901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW
4		WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413 TELEPHONE: 202-408-4000
5		FAX: 202-4080-4400
6	BY:	SCOTT R. MOSKO, ESQUIRE
7		3300 HILLVIEW AVENUE PALO ALTO, CA 94304-1203
8		TELEPHONE: 650-849-6600 E-MAIL: scott.mosko@finnegan.com
9		FAX: 650-849-6666
10	BY:	MEREDITH H. SCHOENFELD, ESQUIRE
11		901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413
12		TELEPHONE: 202-408-4393 FAX: 202-4080-4400
13		
14	BY:	DANIEL P. TIGHE, ESQUIRE 176 FEDERAL STREET
15		BOSTON, MA 02110-2214 TELEPHONE: 617-542-9900393
16		E-MAIL: dtighe@gtmllp.com FAX: 617-542-0900
17		AND
18	PRO-HAC-VICE-P	ENDING ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
19	BOIES, SC	HILLER & FLEXNER LLP
20		D. MICHAEL UNDERHILL, ESQUIRE, PRO HAC
21	21	VICE PENDING 5301 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.
22		WASHINGTON, DC 20015 TELEPHONE: 202-237-2727
23		E-MAIL: munderhill@bsfllp.com FAX: 202-237-6131
24		FAX: 202 237 0131
25		

1	APPEARANCES (CONTINU	UED):
2	ATTORNEYS FOR	THE ALL DEFENDANTS, EXCEPT EDUARDO SAVERIN:
3	ORRICK, H	ERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
4	BY:	I. NEEL CHATTERJEE, ESQUIRE
5		1000 MARSH ROAD MENLO PARK, CA 94025-1015
6		TELEPHONE: 650-614-7356 E-MAIL: nchatterjee@orrick.com FAX: 650-614-7401
7		FAX: 050-014-7401
8	BA:	THERESA A. SUTTON, ESQUIRE 1000 MARSH ROAD
9		MENLO PARK, CA 94025-1015 TELEPHONE: 650-614-7356
10		E-MAIL: tsutton@orrick.com FAX: 650-614-7401
11		AND
12	PROSKAUER	ROSE LLP
13	BY:	STEVEN M. BAUER, ESQUIRE
14		ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE BOSTON, MA 02110-2600
15		TELEPHONE: 617-526-9700 E-MAIL: sbauer@proskauer.com
16		FAX: 617-526-9899
17		AND
18	BY:	JEREMY P. OCZEK, ESQUIRE ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE
19		BOSTON, MA 02110-2600 TELEPHONE: 617-526-9651
20		E-MAIL: joczek@proskauer.com FAX: 617-526-9899
21		FAX: 017-520-9899
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):
2	ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT, EDUARDO SAVERIN:
3	HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
4	BY: DANIEL K. HAMPTON, ESQUIRE 10 ST. JAMES AVENUE
5	ELEVENTH FLOOR
6	BOSTON, MA 02116 TELEPHONE: 617-573-5886 E MAIL: den hampten@blaler.gom
7	E-MAIL: dan.hampton@hklaw.com FAX: 617-523-6850
8	AND
9	HELLER EHRMAN LLP
10	BY: ROBERT B. HAWK, ESQUIRE 275 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD
11	MENLO PARK, CA 940252116 TELEPHONE: 650-324-7165
12	E-MAIL: robert.hawk@hellerehrman.com FAX: 650-324-6016
13	FAX: 050-324-0010
14	ATTORNEYS FOR THE WITNESS, JEFFREY PARMET:
15	GESMER UPDEGROVE LLP
16	BY: LEE T. GESMER, ESQUIRE AND JOSEPH LAFERRERA
17	40 BROAD STREET
18	BOSTON, MA 02109 TELEPHONE: 617-350-6800
19	E-MAIL: lee.gesmer@gesmer.com FAX: 617-350-6878
20	AND
21	BY: CHRISTOPHER SHEEHAN, ESQUIRE 40 BROAD STREET
22	BOSTON, MA 02109 TELEPHONE: 617-350-6800
23	FAX: 617-350-6878
24	
25	

1 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: 2 DIANE M. MOLAS, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ONE COURTHOUSE WAY 4 THIRD FLOOR - SUITE 3200 BOSTON, MA 02210 5 TELEPHONE: (267) 977-2909 E-MAIL: Dmolas1@aol.com 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 PROCEEDINGS 15 16 THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. 17 This Honorable Court is now in session. 18 You may be seated. 19 Calling the case, Civil Action 07-10593, 20 ConnectU, Inc. versus Facebook, Inc., et al. 21 THE COURT: Well, at the outset, I do have a motion 22 to move this case in camera. 23 My general view is, unless there is some showing of 24 specific necessity beyond the generalized discussion, then, I 25 won't do that.

1	If the party has a particular issue that believes
2	we're touching on a particular issue, apart from the general
3	topic, then, you can make a motion at that time, and I'll see
4	whether or not it justifies going into, you know, some sort of
5	in camera session, but I don't find, on its face, that, at
6	least, all of the discussion that we have today should be
7	dealt with <u>in camera</u> .
8	Now, I guess I just want to be sure I understand
9	fully, Mr. Hornick.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

At the time of the settlement agreement, or, at least, the term sheet -- we'll call it the term sheet -- was executed, was ConnectU aware that there was some sort of a dispute concerning the products of the Parmet inquiries?

MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, at the time that the term sheet was signed, ConnectU was aware that Mr. Parmet was in some kind of dispute with the Facebook attorneys.

The -- the counsel for ConnectU asked Facebook, on a couple of occasions, to tell what the subject of that dispute was, and they wouldn't tell us, so all we knew was that there was a dispute.

THE COURT: Okay; and, then, aware that there was a dispute, as to which Facebook would not disclose the substance.

> Nevertheless, the term sheet was entered into? MR. HORNICK: I'm not sure the two were necessarily

1	connected, but, yes, the term sheet was signed, and there was											
2	knowledge that there was some kind of a dispute with											
3	Mr. Parmet.											
4	THE COURT: Okay; and, in that connection, there											
5	were a number of unresolved Discovery matters at that point?											
6	MR. HORNICK: Well, it was known that it was											
7	known by ConnectU that Facebook had documents that they had											
8	not yet produced, but the importance of those document, we											
9	didn't know; I mean, Facebook hadn't said we have have any											
10	material documents that we're going to produce. They didn't											
11	say.											
12	THE COURT: Were they under an obligation to tell											
13	you how material they viewed the documents?											
14	MR. HORNICK: I'm sorry?											
15	THE COURT: Were they under an obligation to tell											
16	you how material they viewed the documents?											
17	MR. HORNICK: No, I would say that they were not											
18	under an obligation to tell us, <u>per se</u> , but I believe they											
19	were under an affirmative obligation to produce the documents.											
20	THE COURT: Which was suspended by that settlement											
21	exercise, I take it?											
22	MR. HORNICK: Well, at some point in time it was											
23	suspended, Your Honor, but the defendants knew from Mr. Parmet											
24	that these documents had been identified on December 14.											
25	We said in our brief that it was no later than											

January 7; in fact, it was December 14, so they actually had
five weeks before the mediation even became a possibility,
during which those documents should have been produced, and,
after the remediation became a possibility, there was another
three weeks during which they could have produced them before
mediation was actually scheduled, which was on February 11,
and, then, on February 11, there was another week, or so,
before the mediation actually occurred.

Somewhere in there, there was a decision that parties would hold up. It's in my notes, I can provide it to you, but the point is that there was a period of, somewhere in the neighborhood of, eight weeks, during which the case was business as usual, and, in fact, in mid-February -- I believe it was the day after the parties scheduled the mediation -- the day after the parties scheduled the mediation, Facebook filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the copyright claim, and they, therefore, even as of the day the mediation had been scheduled, believed the case was alive, and, if these documents were, in any way material to that motion, they should have been produced.

THE COURT: And you filed a renewed motion under 56F?

MR. HORNICK: There was a renewed motion under 56F, Your Honor, but it related to the Summary Judgment motion on the contract, which was filed in August of last year.

	ONSEATED HEAKING									
1	Shortly after the motion for Summary Judgment was									
2	filed, the parties did put things on hold.									
3	I'm sorry, shortly after the copyright									
4	Summary Judgment motion was filed in February, the parties put									
5	things on hold, so there wasn't a Rule 56 related to that.									
6	THE COURT: I see.									
7	Now, turning to the order for Discovery on									
8	computer-memory devices, Document Number 103, in this case, is									
9	it your understanding that the matters to which Mr. Parmet									
10	referred are not matters as to which he was properly									
11	positioned to bring them to your attention?									
12	MR. HORNICK: Well, I don't really know for sure,									
13	Your Honor.									
14	I can surmise, from what he said to me, that it									
15	wasn't code, and the subject to protocol is code.									
16	THE COURT: Mm-hmm.									
17	MR. HORNICK: But, other than what we put into our									
18	brief about the subject matter of those documents, I don't									
19	really know what they are.									
20	THE COURT: Well, is there any other mechanism by									
21	which Mr. Parmet would properly have access to these									
22	documents?									
23	Let's assume that we're still in the Discovery									
24	phase of the case, or they're clearly in the Discovery phase									

25

of the case.

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	I should add that I make no judgment about
2	settlement or not settlement.
3	I'm more concerned with compliance with court
4	orders here than the question of settlement.
5	That's a matter, it seems to me, for Judge Ware to
6	deal with, but let's assume that we're still actively pursuing
7	this issue.
8	Is there any basis on which Mr. Parmet could
9	disclose matters beyond code?
10	MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, when you first asked the
11	question, you asked about access and, now, you're asking about
12	disclosure.
13	I'd like
14	THE COURT: I'd like
15	MR. HORNICK: to answer for both.
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	MR. HORNICK: With respect to access, the answer
18	is: Yes.

Mr. Parmet had the ability and the right to access everything, everything that was on those hard drives, and the reason was the very subject of the September 13 hearing.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

When we came into the September 13 hearing before Judge Collings, the parties had not agreed, at that point, on a couple of remaining issues in the protocol, and one of them was the scope of the search that he could perform.

1	Now, the defendants took the position that he										
2	should only be able to search for code, and I explained to										
3	Judge Collings that you don't know it's code, necessarily,										
4	until you find it, so, therefore, he had to have the ability										
5	to search everything.										
6	He had to have access to everything on those hard										
7	drives, and I think that's clear in the protocol. I think										
8	it's clear in the transcript of the September 13 hearing.										
9	With respect to disclosure, if he were to find										
10	information that was not code, under the protocol,										
11	technically, he was not supposed he could not disclose it										
12	to ConnectU, but he could there were a couple of mechanisms										
13	by which that information could have come out.										
14	One was, in our view, he could have called or										
15	E-mailed Facebook's counsel and ConnectU's counsel and										
16	suggested there be a conference call.										
17	During that conference call, he could have said,										
18	simply: I found information, found documents, that weren't										
19	code; may be relevant.										
20	That's all he had to say.										
21	THE COURT: Where do I find that he's authorized to										
22	do that, though?										
23	MR. HORNICK: In Paragraph 3 of the protocol,										
24	Your Honor, it gives them it simply says that, if there is										

any communication by telephone with ConnectU's counsel,

- UNSEALED HEARING 1 regarding work under the protocol, Facebook's counsel needs to 2 be on the call, so he wasn't prevented from talking to us, 3 talking to ConnectU's counsel. 4 Under the protocol, he was only prevented from 5 talking to ConnectU's counsel without Facebook's counsel also 6 being on the line. 7 I'm just looking at this fairly THE COURT: 8 carefully, I think, and the operative language that I'm 9 concerned about is the language that says that he may not 10 discuss with ConnectU's counsel or with anyone else any 11 information obtained from the Facebook hard drives, except, 12 with respect to program -- produced program code. 13 Wasn't it a condition of his involvement that he 14 was not to discuss with anyone else anything other than 15 produced program code? 16 MR. HORNICK: Yes, Your Honor. 17 Technically, that is correct under the protocol. 18 THE COURT: Okay; so --19 MR. HORNICK: Now, I can't speak for what 20 Mr. Parmet was thinking.
- THE COURT: No, I understand.
- 22 I'm just trying to understand what the provisions
- of the arrangement are.
- 24 (Pause.)
- THE COURT: Okay.

1	MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, we contemplated before
2	the protocol was signed that there could possibly be
3	situations that would arise where you don't know what to do or
4	Mr. Parmet didn't know what to do, and ConnectU, obviously,
5	wanted the situation where Mr. Parmet could approach us about
6	that.
7	Through negotiation, we came to the point where the
8	protocol says that, if there is any communication between
9	Mr. Parmet and ConnectU's counsel, if it's in writing, it has
10	to be approved, first, by defendant's counsel.
11	If it is by telephone, everyone has to be present.
12	THE COURT: No, but the scope of the discussions
13	that he could have were limited to produce program code.
14	MR. HORNICK: Yes, they were.
15	It was impossible at the time to conceive of every
16	possible problem that could have arisen.
17	THE COURT: But that's the one that's in play here.
18	MR. HORNICK: Yes.
19	THE COURT: That's the, apparently, operative
20	position; so is there any other mechanism that you can
21	conceive of that Mr. Parmet would be permitted to disclose to
22	ConnectU's counsel, or anyone else, any information he
23	obtained from the Facebook hard drives?
24	MR. HORNICK: Well, there was a mechanism for
25	disclosing it to The Court, and not to ConnectU's counsel, and

1 | that's Paragraphs 7 through 9 of the protocol.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HORNICK: Under -- the way those work is, essentially, Mr. Parmet provides a report on what he has found, and, then, the Facebook attorneys and Mr. Zuckerberg's attorney, look at that report, and they can identify things that they think don't belong there, because they're privileged, or they're private material, or they're not code, or they're not relevant somewhere, and, then, they send that along with their reasoning to Mr. Parmet, and he reviews that, and, if he agrees with them, then, he takes it off of his list of things that should be provided to ConnectU.

If he doesn't agree with them, then, Facebook is required to submit to The Court, within fifteen days, not only their reasoning for why these things should be removed from the list, but, also, Mr. Parmet's actual reasoning for why they should be included on the list, and, if you read our brief and if you read the defendant's brief, it appears likely, very likely, that that was in play, that that was actually happening, that process was playing itself out.

Now, on March 7, Mr. Parmet would have submitted to Facebook a report in which he would have said: I do not agree with you. These things need to be considered by the judge, essentially.

Now, if they weren't code, then, maybe they

1	sho	ouldn'	t have	e been	in	there	e, but	it	was	а	mechanis	m by	which
2	he	could	have	brough	t ti	he si	ituati	on	to t	he	judge's	attei	ntion.

THE COURT: Well, let's assume it was not code, that it was not what's covered by Paragraph 3.

So, if it's not code, then, he's not authorized to pursue this. If he doesn't, in good faith, believe that it's code, he's not authorized to pursue it.

Is he under these provisions -- is it 7 through 9 -- or -- yes, 7 through 9?

MR. HORNICK: I think there is some ambiguity in Paragraphs 7 and 8 about whether the information that Facebook had the right to exclude from the list had to be privileged and not relevant and not code or whether it could be privileged or not relevant or not code.

I think that there is some room there by which -THE COURT: Well, let's assume that it's not
privileged, it's not irrelevant, but it's, also, not computer
program code.

Your position is: It could be, then, included there?

MR. HORNICK: No, what I'm saying is: There is so much ambiguity in this paragraph, so that, if Facebook were to delete from Mr. Parmet's list information that they believed shouldn't be on the list because it didn't meet all three of those requirements, that they may be wrong in doing that, and,

therefore, Mr. Parmet may have concluded -- and he had counsel advising him, he may have concluded -- that he could --

THE COURT: Well, I guess, at some point, I think we'll hear from Mr. Parmet or his counsel, but I just want to understand what your reading of this provision is, because he -- to some degree, Mr. Parmet is the subcontractor to you, and let's assume a circumstance in which Mr. Parmet discovers something that is not code, and everybody concedes it's not code.

I don't know if that's the case here. It's just simply setting a hypothetical, but whether he assumes it's not code, but, nevertheless, he thinks it's, for whatever reason, important, something he would like to learn about, does he have any authorization under this to initiate that process of back-and-forth?

MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, I'd like to address the issue whether or not it could have been code separately, but, to answer your question specifically, in Paragraph 8, about midway down Page 12 of the protocol, it says that, just to paraphrase, Facebook has to provide notice and objection to the list that Mr. Parmet has provided, quote, along with an explanation of why the Facebook defendants believe the objected-to materials are not computer program code, are not relevant, and/or are privileged or protected, and I think that it's possible to read that and to conclude that they may --

1	Facebook may not have the right to take them off of the
2	list, unless they meet all three of those requirements, so
3	it's possible that
4	THE COURT: How would I read it that way, that
5	and/or means just and?
6	MR. HORNICK: Or that it could mean or.
7	If it means only or as opposed to and, then, it's
8	possible that, if it was
9	THE COURT: Alright. We'll do it a different way.
10	Take the and off and the slash, and that is
11	MR. HORNICK: The point is that it could be
12	relevant.
13	THE COURT: entirely disjunctive?
14	MR. HORNICK: The point is, that, if it were
15	entirely disjunctive, then, it could be relevant information.
16	If it were relevant information, then, it would be
17	relevant to take it off the list, or to argue that it should
18	be taken off the list, but I'd like to address the question of
19	whether
20	THE COURT: Alright; so that, you suggest, is some
21	sort of ambiguity in this language?
22	MR. HORNICK: I believe the ambiguity occurs in
23	another place, Your Honor, which I'll try to find while we're
24	talking, but, as I said, I'd like to address the question of
25	whether these documents that Mr. Parmet found could be code.

Now, I don't know what they are, but reasonable minds might be able to differ about whether they are code, or not, for two reasons.

One is that Mr. Zuckerberg was known -- and the reason I know this is because defendants' counsel told me this during meet-and-confer in Texas, Mr. Zuckerberg was known -- to write code in text files, so it would be a Word document, for example.

He was writing code in a text file, so it might be difficult to determine and to decide, and reasonable minds might differ as to whether that is code or whether that is a document that is not code.

THE COURT: Well, then, we're back to the point of which, if it's code, there was a known dispute about code, and nevertheless, the settlement term agreement was entered into.

MR. HORNICK: Well, again, Your Honor, I don't think they are necessarily connected, because, for example, Mr. Parmet is saying that these documents should be included on the list, and Facebook is saying they can't be included on the list because they're not code, and he thinks: Well, they are really, arguably, code, and there is another reason why they could have been, and that's because we believe that the documents that are the subject of Mr. Parmet's documents that he found, we believe that they are Instant Message logs, and they, as I understand it -- and Mr. Parmet would be a better

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	person to ask, but as I understand it, they were rendered
2	as HTML files.
3	THE COURT: What is the basis for saying that they
4	are IM logs?
5	MR. HORNICK: I'm sorry.
6	Exhibit 14 to Mr. Chatterjee's declaration.
7	Do you have it?
8	(Pause.)
9	MR. HORNICK: If you turn to the next-to-the-last
10	page of this exhibit, it's Number 2 at the bottom.
11	This is Exhibit 14 to Mr. Chatterjee's declaration.
12	THE COURT: I have it.
13	MR. HORNICK: And you refer to the E-mail from
14	Mr. Parmet to Mr. Chatterjee, dated, December 14, 2007.
15	The last paragraph says: The logs can be found on
16	Device 371-01 in the Windows Windows partition that we were
17	able to image, and I and, I believe your forensic experts
18	were previously able to image the paths to the and, then,
19	it's blacked out R, and, then, the path is blocked out.
20	Now, the word, "logs," there, I believe it's
21	referring to Instant Messaging logs.
22	The reason that I believe that is because, at the
23	time, right around the same time that this was all happening,
24	a dispute with Mr. Parmet, the defendants did produce some

other Instant Message logs, and this is commonly how they're

-		
	referred	$\pm \circ$
	TCTCTTCG	LU.

Also, 37101, very important number. That's

Mr. Zuckerberg's hard drive.

That is the hard drive that Mr. Zuckerberg used while he was at Harvard. That means that these are logs, some kind of something, that came up on Mr. Zuckerberg's hard drive.

Now, whether it was Instant Message logs or some other kind of log, it was still a computer log, and, for this reason, I think there is an argument, or, at least, reasonable minds might differ, as to whether this was code, or not, and, therefore, Mr. Parmet might have been totally within the protocol to include it, but, if Facebook takes the position that, no, you can't, and it's not code, then, they can make the argument that he's in violation of the protocol.

THE COURT: Okay; so let me just see if I can recapitulate a bit on your theory here.

One is that there could have been code in this disputed material that was going on.

The second is that there is potentially ambiguity to be read into the agreement or the order, I should say, here that would permit Mr. Parmet to raise the question of something that's not code but is arguably relevant.

Is that -- that it?

Now, if the latter, why would there even need to be

- an order; that is to say, Mr. Parmet is exposed to all of this material.
- Presumably, he can, if he's not under some sort of limitation, can disclose that, as well.
- MR. HORNICK: Nothing under this protocol comes to
 ConnectU's attention without Facebook's or The Court's
 permission.
 - THE COURT: Right; and the reason for that is that it's supposed to limit itself to code. That was the whole purpose of this exercise, I assume.
 - MR. HORNICK: But what we don't know, Your Honor, is whether Mr. Parmet believed the information arguably was code.
- 14 THE COURT: Right.

8

9

10

11

12

13

19

20

21

22

23

24

- MR. HORNICK: And, therefore, he was trying to --
- THE COURT: Well, from that perspective, the only basis, I think, fair basis in his authorization to make disclosures is that it is somehow code.
 - The ambiguity, it seems to me, drops out when you look at the purpose and structure of this agreement, which was to limit his exposure or, at least, his ability to pass on his disclosure to other things to be found in the hard drives.
 - MR. HORNICK: Well, Your Honor, I don't really want to box Mr. Parmet in a corner, but I will say this: There was discussion about the purpose of the security provisions in the

protocol at the September 13 hearing, and the purpose of these provisions was not to prevent the production of responsive documents.

It was to prevent ConnectU from coming into possession of private information; such as, E-mails between girl friends, financial information, and privileged information.

THE COURT: No, I understand all of that, and what it did is, it said, I think, that access will be provided, more or less unrestricted access, to review anything on the hard drive, so long as the only disclosure that's made by this subcontractor is of code material.

That was the balance that was struck.

Now, there's an independent obligation, obviously, on the part of Facebook to provide Discovery according to independent Discovery responsibilities; yet, that's a different issue.

The issue here, it seems to me, is -- being a focused issue is -- simply: What is Mr. Parmet authorized to discuss with anybody else; and that, it seems to me, is a question of construction of this order by Judge Collings.

MR. HORNICK: Well, I would argue here, Your Honor, that, if the situation arose in which Mr. Parmet found documents that, even, arguably were not code, documents that were what everyone else would just call documents; such as, a

- letter, an E-mail, something like that, then, I would argue that, under Paragraph 3, he had the right to get all the counsel on the line and simply say: I found some things that were not code, and I don't think that would be a violation of the protocol.
- THE COURT: Well, I don't know how one could discuss something that's not code.
- 8 MR. HORNICK: Well, I'm saying, Your Honor, he has nothing more than that.
- THE COURT: Well, that's the -- amounts to the same thing.
- It's not an extended discussion, but it is a discussion of something that is not code, but I think I understand that argument.
 - MR. HORNICK: There's another possibility,

 Your Honor, and that is that Mr. Parmet was not restricted in
 talking to Facebook and Zuckerberg's attorneys about anything
 that he found.
- THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

15

16

17

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. HORNICK: Which is what he did or what I understand that he did, at least, and, at that point, Facebook, in our view, had an affirmative obligation to produce those documents, and, in fact, they told him, on December 16 and 18, that they were going to produce these documents.

1	Now, it's a separate subject, I think, of what
2	happens after that, whether they get produced, or not, and
3	whether Mr. Parmet is right or wrong in feeling like he has
4	some kind of an obligation to The Court or to ethics or to
5	what's right and wrong, to bring these documents into the
6	open, but he certainly could have discussed them with
7	Facebook, and it is Facebook that has put and
8	Mr. Zuckerberg who have put him in this situation.
9	THE COURT: Well, yes, I think that's right.
10	It's a separate set of issues about what their
11	obligations are in an ongoing process, but is there anything
12	else that you want to focus on?
13	MR. HORNICK: Well, I would like to focus on that
14	obligation, unless Your Honor would like to focus on something
15	else.
16	THE COURT: Well, no, I think I want to hear from
17	Mr. Chatterjee, and I'll see what else I want to do, but are
18	there any other approaches to this that you see with respect
19	to Mr. Parmet's obligations?
20	MR. HORNICK: You're asking if there are other ways
21	that the information could have come out, under the protocol?
22	THE COURT: Yes.
23	Through Mr. Parmet.
24	MR. HORNICK: I believe those are the ways that
25	either well, I suppose another way is Mr. Parmet could have

1	informed	Facebook	that	he	wanted	to	inform	ConnectU	of	the
2	situation	n in writ:	ing.							

They would have had to have approved it, so that they could have vetoed that.

I mentioned the phone call, and I mentioned the Paragraph 7 through 9, and, I mean, entirely independently of the protocol, and -- oh, and I mentioned Mr. Parmet bringing it to Facebook's attention, and, then, I think, totally independently of that, I suppose Mr. Parmet could have come to The Court; I mean, we are in a very strange situation here.

If you look through these -- these E-mails that are the exhibits, Mr. Chatterjee's declaration, E-mails between the Orrick firm and Mr. Parmet, he is an independent expert who does not appear to have counsel, and, yet, they were telling him that they need to meet and confer with him under Local Rules before they file a motion.

Now, they don't know that he has counsel, so how does he know what that means?

I think that they --

THE COURT: I think it's coming out <u>in camera</u>, in my opinion.

He did have counsel at that point, but I think he did have counsel at that point.

MR. HORNICK: I believe he did, but I don't believe, from reviewing these E-mails, which I just saw for

the first time the other day when these were submitted to
The Court, I think, from reviewing those E-mails, it is not
apparent to me that it would have been apparent to anybody
reading them at the Orrick firm that he had counsel, and,
therefore, from their point of view, he's an independent
expert who is not a lawyer and he needs some kind of
protection.

It seems to me, at that point, he could have come to The Court and maybe should have come to The Court, because there wasn't anyone protecting him in Orrick's eyes.

Now, possibly, maybe he could have been between lawyers at that point, too, because, as we explained in our brief, the first lawyer passed away, but the point is -- simply the point is that Mr. Parmet, I think, could have come to The Court in camera and, yet, you wouldn't have learned anything, and the Court could have, then, decided how he should be dealt with, with respect to his relationship with Orrick, and whether these documents needed to be produced by Mr. Zuckerberg and by Facebook.

THE COURT: Alright; so, Mr. Chatterjee, let me understand your position on this.

Let me make an analogy, not a perfect one, by any means, but one of the things that came to my mind is the Doctrine of Plain View, which authorizes those who are constrained by a search warrant to seize materials not covered

1	by the search warrant but that are in plain view and are
2	evidentiary of the some sort of criminal activity, not a
3	perfect analogy on a whole range of issues, but let's put it
4	in the most extreme sense.
5	He encounters some document that discloses, wholly
6	independent of code, the potential for physical harm to some
7	other person, the imminent potential for physical harm to some
8	other person.
9	Is he barred from discussing that, at all?
10	MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor, in your hypothetical,
11	which is not a factual situation here and I can explain
12	that I think the answer to that is: Yes.
13	THE COURT: Alright.
14	Now, he discloses that, how?
15	MR. CHATTERJEE: He
16	THE COURT: You mean, he is barred?
17	MR. CHATTERJEE: He is barred.
18	THE COURT: He can't disclose that.
19	He's like a well, not a psychiatrist, I guess,
20	in California
21	(Laughter.)
22	THE COURT: but like a lawyer or a priest?
23	MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.
24	I mean, there is a court order that restricts what
25	he may or may not talk to.

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	It was one that the Finnegan Henderson firm
2	originally drafted, and, then, we participated in making
3	revisions, and we litigated some of the issues.
4	THE COURT: Now, so the scope of his writ is
5	entirely to disclose nothing but code?
6	MR. CHATTERJEE: That's absolutely correct,
7	Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	Now
10	MR. CHATTERJEE: And, in fact, he's supposed to
11	if he looks at something; such as, the types of documents
12	Mr. Hornick identified, he is to quickly identify whether it
13	has, what's referred to as, the syntactical style in certain
14	languages.
15	These documents; such as, Exhibit E to the Wolfson
16	declaration that was in the 56F, that Mr. Parmet also found,
17	if you look at them, there is nothing that even closely
18	resembles code, nothing.
19	THE COURT: Well, I guess I wasn't forced to or
20	certainly hadn't confronted the question of whether or not
21	he'd exceeded his authority in his Affidavit under the
22	Rule 56F.
23	MR. CHATTERJEE: Oh, no, Your Honor.

I'm sorry, I didn't mean to be confusing.

The Wolfson declaration was a 56F.

24

1	THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
2	MR. CHATTERJEE: That was separately submitted by
3	the Quinn Emanuel firm.
4	They attached to it, as Exhibit E, an
5	Instant Message chat log.
6	That Instant Message chat log was one of the
7	documents that Mr. Parmet found.
8	If you look at that document, there is nothing in
9	there that comes even close to resembling code.
10	THE COURT: Let me step back from that a bit.
11	Is it also a document that you have been disclosed
12	by Facebook?
13	MR. CHATTERJEE: It was a document we produced.
14	We produced this document.
15	THE COURT: Okay; so he made reference to a
16	document that was already disclosed by Facebook?
17	MR. CHATTERJEE: No, Your Honor, he actually had
18	identified it, but we already had it in our production tracks,
19	so it was going out the door, and it was produced.
20	THE COURT: Alright; so, let me understand the
21	status of the particular documents that were in dispute here.
22	Were they in the production track at the time that
23	the dispute arose?
24	MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: That is, things that were going to be

1	disclosed	by	Facebook?
---	-----------	----	-----------

2 MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: But could not be disclosed by

Mr. Parmet; is that it?

MR. CHATTERJEE: Correct.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHATTERJEE: And there was a reason for that, Your Honor, because we had done a very, very broad keyword search of all of our electronic devices, and we were doing document review of those, eliminating the privilege privacy issues, and the like, and we were rolling out the production and sending it, essentially on a monthly basis, as we were getting through the documents, and we kept the Quinn Emanuel firm fully apprised of that.

THE COURT: Well, where were these documents that Mr. Parmet referred to in the disclosure queue?

MR. CHATTERJEE: I think what we had said to the Quinn Emanuel firm -- and I think we put this in our papers -- we had said we were going to be disclosing them in mid-to-late February, and we said we would be done with all the production from the electronic devices that were subject to the protocol.

THE COURT: Now, how do I know that the documents that Mr. Parmet referenced are ones that were going to be disclosed, apart from your representation?

MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor, what I can tell you

1	is,	is	: W∈	know	the	meth	nodology	that	he	use	d to	find	these,
2	and	we	had	done	the	same	methodol	Logy	in	the (devi	ces.	

THE COURT: Well, you say you know the methodology that he used to find these, but his methodology was directed, presumably directed at code, rather than non-code but relevant documents.

MR. CHATTERJEE: It was not, Your Honor; in fact, that was part of our problem.

When we reviewed his logs, which he was obligated to provide us under the protocol, it was very clear that what Mr. Hornick had said in court at the hearing in front of Judge Collings, that there was a computer program that was used to pull out code, but that, in fact, was not what he did.

On many occasions, it appears to be a computer -- a keyword searching.

As a matter of fact, we had a fully-executed expert declaration that had reviewed his logs that basically was saying what it was told -- what we were told -- he was going to do, in fact, was not what he did.

Now, we didn't ultimately file that because of the standstill agreement, the settlement documents which I have here, but I don't know if we need to get into that today.

THE COURT: But back to the question of his obligation.

As you see it, he is simply barred from any

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	discussion of non-code documents?
2	Simplistic, that's it.
3	MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.
4	If he does get into a document that isn't code, he
5	can look at it to see if it has what they say is the
6	syntactical style, that looks like it has code in it, but,
7	beyond that, he can't review it in detail.
8	Now, just to be clear, as to these documents that
9	he identified, even though we disputed the interpretation of a
10	protocol, we did log them, we provided the log to Mr. Parmet,
11	and Mr. Parmet was going to be given the opportunity to object
12	and to take it to court if he felt it was appropriate; so,
13	notwithstanding the fact that we disagreed with him under the
14	protocol, and we disagreed with what he did, and we felt he
15	had violated it, we were still willing to take this to court
16	to resolve the dispute.
17	THE COURT: Now, is it your position, then, that
18	all of this was pre-admitted by the settlement discussions and
19	the term agreement?
20	MR. CHATTERJEE: Yes, Your Honor.
21	(Pause.)
22	THE COURT: What do you want me to do?
23	MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor, what I'd like you to

THE COURT: Well, but that's a matter for

do is dismiss this case.

24

	UNSEALED HEARING									
1	Judge Ware; I mean, the term agreement says that he's the one									
2	who's got the responsibility for this, in reviewing it, and									
3	now, of course, there is a dispute about whether it's actually									
4	been settled.									
5	Now, I don't think I'm going to go beyond what the									
6	term agreement is. That's where the resolution of any									
7	disputes regarding this should be; that is, in the San Jose									
8	Division of the Northern District.									
9	MR. CHATTERJEE: I agree with you, Your Honor.									
10	THE COURT: Okay; so I'm not in a position to									
11	dismiss the case, I don't think, but to await the outcome, now									
12	that there's a dispute, before Judge Ware; so what else do you									
13	want me to do?									
14	MR. CHATTERJEE: So, Your Honor, the other thing									
15	you can do is you can await the outcome of those proceedings									
16	in front of Judge Ware.									
17	If Your Honor believes that you have jurisdiction,									
18	one thing you could do is refer this matter to Judge Collings,									
19	for Mr. Parmet, to talk about <u>in camera</u> what he looked at									
20	THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to be doing that.									
21	This is not a, you know, trick question.									
22	It is a question of what it is that I'm really									
23	being asked to do and what my authority is to do it.									

have in this area -- or, at least, the only one that I would

The only provisional kind of authority I think I

24

	UNSEALED HEARING							
1	exercise is contempt; that is to say, someone is in							
2	violation of a court order and I maintain some sort of							
3	authority to deal with that as a contempt.							
4	I'm not sure if there's anything else, I mean, you							
5	say I could dismiss the case. I suppose it's possible for me							
6	to tee it up to dismiss the case by saying that I followed the							
7	Massachusetts rules that you've identified, and they're							
8	applicable here.							
9	I'm loathe to do that when the parties have a							
10	mechanism for resolving this locally, which is what they							
11	wanted to do, apparently, so it's back again.							
12	MR. CHATTERJEE: Okay.							
13	Thank you, Your Honor.							
14	Going back to your original question: What do we							
15	want you to do?							
16	If Your Honor is inclined to hold onto this case							
17	until the proceedings before Judge Ware are resolved, I would							
18	stay this case.							
19	Your Honor, the only reason I had suggested							
20	Judge Collings handle this is because he handled all the							
21	issues leading up to the							
22	THE COURT: But he doesn't have contempt power, and							

THE COURT: But he doesn't have contempt power, and that's the reason I took it.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Correct, Your Honor.

24

25

He can do a court recommendation, but, if

1	Your	Honor	wants	to	handle	it,	that's	a	perfectly	appropriate
2	thing	a to do).							

I'll tell you, given the confidentiality issues that we've had in this case, there is a lot of concern at Facebook, and, if Your Honor does feel it's appropriate, we would like to be heard on whether there's been a violation of the order, but we would like ConnectU's counsel to be excluded from the proceedings. It's really an issue between us and Mr. Parmet.

THE COURT: It is, if you press it, I suppose, and the question is: Are you pressing it?

Mr. Hornick, it seems to me, unless you want to argue otherwise, did the right thing, which is to bring to my attention -- or, bring to The Court's attention -- the question of some issue arising from the application of this rule, and that's, I think, the appropriate way to deal with it.

I don't think he's asked me to do anything about that, other than to hold a hearing, which I'm doing.

Of course, I'll ask him in a minute what he wants me to do, but I don't hear you asking me to do anything, other than to go encounter with Mr. Parmet and you.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor, what --

24 THE COURT: I guess the answer to the question is:

25 To what end?

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	As interesting as it would be to talk to both of
2	you, on any occasion.
3	MR. CHATTERJEE: Thank you.
4	I think the simple answer here is to deny their
5	motion, deny their motion on the things that they're asking
6	for.
7	I would also like a court order instructing
8	Mr. Parmet not to have further conversations about any of the
9	work he was doing with anyone from ConnectU, and I think; at
10	least, until we resolve the issue before Judge Ware, that
11	should resolve where we are, and we don't need to press
12	anything further at this time.
13	THE COURT: Alright; so you want an order, more
14	specific order, to Mr. Parmet?
15	MR. CHATTERJEE: I think, Your Honor, just having
16	talked through with Your Honor, I think that's probably the
17	most logical way to go at this point.
18	THE COURT: Mr. Hornick, is there anything that you
19	want?
20	MR. HORNICK: Oh, yes, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Well, now, that you can get from me.
22	MR. HORNICK: Well, I don't really know what I can
23	get from you, Your Honor, but I'm willing to ask.
24	I mean, what we'd like, Your Honor, is for you to

interview Mr. Parmet in camera, because I think that there are

1	over	ri	.ding	considerations	here	that	go	beyond	what	happens	to
2	be i	ln	this	protocol.							

I think that, if you talk to Mr. Parmet, you will probably find that he was trying to do the right thing, which may not have been in strict compliance with the protocol, and, if so, then, I think, The Court should consider that and should give some credit for that.

THE COURT: But to what end?

I keep asking the question: To what end, because, ultimately, I don't have this kind of free-floating writ to interview people and chat with them and find out historically interesting information about the conduct of this litigation.

I'm supposed to rule on motions or some sort of action that's presented to me, and, so, I've been told to -- told -- I've been asked to have some sort of conversation with Mr. Parmet in which I direct him not to have any further conversations, pending the outcome before Judge Ware.

Now, is there something specific that you want me to do?

MR. HORNICK: Well, in -- in -- we want you to take these documents from Mr. Parmet.

I understand that he has them with him today. We also asked Facebook to bring them along today.

We would like you to take them <u>in camera</u> and take a look at them, and I think that, if you did that, in the course

1	of	havin	ıg an	inte	ervie	ew wi	th Mi	r. Pa	armet,	it	may	make	it	easier
2	for	the	court	to	see	what	the	rele	evance	is				

THE COURT: Why would -- why would I do that?

Let me place it in a somewhat different context.

Let's assume that the parties entered into an agreement with the understanding that there were unresolved Discovery disputes, but they, nevertheless, entered into the agreement, and, then, there's an agonizing reappraisal of whether it was a good agreement to enter into, and, they're executing the various kinds of initiatives to try to undo it.

Isn't the first step to say: If, on the basis of this settlement; at least, as contended by Facebook, the parties entered into it with the knowledge of unresolved matters, then, the first thing for Judge Ware to do is to decide whether or not to permit some further more open Discovery?

I'm not -- I don't find compelling the kind of Whitman Sampler of three or four cases regarding settlement representations.

There were no settlement representations; at least, as I can see it, in the settlement sheet.

Parties chose to do what they did on the basis of imperfect knowledge about what the outcome of the case would be.

Uncertainty isn't one of the greatest drivers of

1 settlement, of course, and, so, it seems to me the first thing 2 to do is simply say Judge Ware can decide this case on the basis of what he has there. 3 4 Why should I look at these documents? 5 If he wants me to look at the documents, I'll look at them, or if he wants to look at the documents. 6 7 MR. UNDERHILL: Your Honor, I'm Mike Underhill, and I am lead counsel in the California case with ConnectU. 8 9 May I respond to that question? THE COURT: Sure. 10 11 MR. UNDERHILL: I appreciate it. 12 First of all, Judge Ware doesn't have any of these 13 issues in front of him. He's not really become aware of these 14 issues. THE COURT: And whose fault is that? 15 16 MR. UNDERHILL: Well, it's just happening now, Your Honor. It's not anybody's fault. 17 THE COURT: And, so, if you want to raise this with 18 19 him --20 MR. UNDERHILL: Right. 21 THE COURT: -- then, you can. 22 MR. UNDERHILL: Right; but here's the issue, 23 Your Honor: Judge Ware, presumably, is not going to have any

interest in diving into the protocol, which is a Massachusetts

order, in trying to get to the bottom of whether --

24

1	THE COURT: Do you want me to rule on the protocol,
2	whether or not Mr. Parmet was authorized to disclose anything
3	other than the code?
4	MR. UNDERHILL: No, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: I mean, I'll rule on that.
6	MR. UNDERHILL: I'm not looking at that issue,
7	Your Honor.
8	What I am looking at, however, is, we believe,
9	under the facts as we know them now, is very, very serious
10	attorney misconduct in this case and a violation of
11	This Court's orders by Facebook's attorneys, and that is an
12	issue
13	THE COURT: Let me see.
1 /	What does in a mean?
14	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
15	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents
15	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents
15 16	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents that should have been disclosed; that is, they had an
15 16 17	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents that should have been disclosed; that is, they had an obligation to disclose the documents and they didn't disclose
15 16 17 18	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents that should have been disclosed; that is, they had an obligation to disclose the documents and they didn't disclose them?
15 16 17 18	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents that should have been disclosed; that is, they had an obligation to disclose the documents and they didn't disclose them? MR. UNDERHILL: That is, in fact, the case,
15 16 17 18 19 20	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents that should have been disclosed; that is, they had an obligation to disclose the documents and they didn't disclose them? MR. UNDERHILL: That is, in fact, the case, Your Honor.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Does it mean that they willfully withheld documents that should have been disclosed; that is, they had an obligation to disclose the documents and they didn't disclose them? MR. UNDERHILL: That is, in fact, the case, Your Honor. THE COURT: Now, how do I deal with that when it is

MR. UNDERHILL: Well, we believe that they were,

1	Your	Honor,	and	Ι	think	that	it	is	something	Your	Honor	should
2	rule	upon.										

THE COURT: How is that?

MR. UNDERHILL: Your Honor, they were getting E-mails from Parmet on December 14, where he was laying out, with great specificity, apparently, what he felt was the smoking gun.

8 THE COURT: And what is the mechanism for dealing 9 with that?

MR. UNDERHILL: The mechanism for dealing with that at that time from Orrick is to produce the documents.

You cannot sit on smoking guns when they're, I believe, inferring from the documents a relatively small quantity of documents.

Your Honor could certainly find out today, because I understand they are in the courtroom, but you cannot rely on the refusal to produce a small number of smoking-gun documents on the theory that: Oh, we've got lots of documents, and we're going to do it in the ordinary course of time.

THE COURT: Why isn't the answer to this to say to someone who enters into an agreement or appears to: You knew you didn't have everything. You didn't ask for representation that there were no smoking guns.

You didn't enter into an agreement to say: Are there any other documents that you have not produced that

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	would bear on the question?
2	None of that was done.
3	Parties knew that there was incompleteness to the
4	Discovery process at that point. It had not come to rest its
5	final conclusion.
6	Now, those who would want to unravel an agreement,
7	certainly would want to pull at whatever strings they can pull
8	at, but the first order of business is to say: Why is it that
9	we should unravel this if there was an agreement between the
10	parties, on those premises?
11	MR. UNDERHILL: Right.
12	THE COURT: Including you're making the
13	argument you're making the argument to Judge Ware: We had
14	no idea there was something out there, and, in fact, nobody
15	will even let us look at it.
16	MR. UNDERHILL: I think there is a compelling
17	answer to your question, Your Honor.
18	I think it is in the documents that counsel has
19	filed with their opposition.
20	There is an E-mail in early February. There is an
21	E-mail by Mr. Wolfson at the Quinn Emanuel firm.
22	THE COURT: Can you
23	MR. HORNICK: Let me have that?
24	MR. UNDERHILL: Sure.

THE COURT: Just bring me to the document.

MR. HORNICK: Well, I'm going to refer you to a document that I think is more compelling than the one that Mr. Underhill was referring to.

This is Exhibit 7 of --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: The penultimately compelling document?

MR. HORNICK: That remains to be seen, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Compelling document?

MR. HORNICK: That would be Exhibit 7 to Mr. Chatterjee's declaration, in which is a January 23, 2008 E-mail from Miss Sutton of the Orrick firm, representing Facebook, and Mr. Zuckerberg to Mr. Wolfson, who was with Quinn Emanuel firm representing ConnectU, and, in the last paragraph on the first page of this E-mail, it says: With regard to Facebook defendants' production, we intend to produce by mid-February all responsive documents, paren, with the exception of code, closed paren, retrieved from the hard drives that are currently subject to the protocol, so, in this E-mail, January 23, which was the day after the California court issued the order, that the case, that case, by the way, only the California case, had to be mediated within 90 days, the day after they promised that they're going to produce these documents by mid-February.

At that point in time, they had no idea when the mediation would be scheduled.

As it turned out, the mediation was scheduled on

1	February	11	for	February	22,	but	nobody	knew	that	at	the	time
---	----------	----	-----	----------	-----	-----	--------	------	------	----	-----	------

I'd also like to refer The Court to Exhibit 14 to this declaration, Chatterjee declaration, and that is a December 15 E-mail from Miss Sutton to Mr. Parmet.

This is the day after Mr. Parmet brings these documents to Facebook's attention, and, recall, we looked at that document, which was the previous document, Exhibit 14, and, in that document, all he did was tell him that they found some things.

He didn't say: Are you going to produce them; when will you produce them; you need to produce them.

All he did was tell them about them, and, the next day, in the fourth paragraph, in the middle, they say, quote: We will review these documents consistent with the massive document review we already have underway, and we'll produce it, if appropriate; and, then, the next day, Exhibit 16 -- sorry. It was three days later, December 18.

This is Exhibit 16 to the Chatterjee declaration, and, if you look at the one that came from that, before that, from Mr. Parmet, he wasn't saying: When are you going to produce these documents; you need to produce them.

He wasn't insisting, but, nevertheless, on

December 18, they wrote to him again, and, at the bottom of

the first page of this E-mail, the penultimate paragraph, they

say, quote: We will also review the documents you have

- UNSEALED HEARING 1 identified in violation of the protocol, to the extent we have 2 not done so already, and will produce them if responsive, not 3 privileged or otherwise objectionable. We will tell 4 ConnectU's counsel when production is complete. 5 Now, this was only three days, four days after 6 Mr. Parmet told them about the documents. They told him, 7 unsolicited, that they would produce them, twice. 8 THE COURT: Well, see, the problem with that -- and it really goes back, I guess, to Exhibit 7, which is: You 9 10 knew, at the time that you entered into the agreement, the 11 settlement term agreement, that it wasn't complete. 12 MR. HORNICK: Well, Your Honor, that happens in 13 many cases, but not in all cases is there an affirmative 14 obligation to produce. 15 Now, Your Honor referred to a case --16 THE COURT: Wait. 17 The affirmative obligation to produce. 18 Now, what does that mean? 19 MR. HORNICK: Yes. 20 THE COURT: You mean, in Discovery? 21 MR. HORNICK: Yes.
 - THE COURT: And Discovery here is ongoing and incomplete, so what you would like me to do is rear back and say: This disclosure should have been made on "X" date, before the settlement term agreement?

22

23

24

1	MR. HORNICK: That's right, Your Honor, and the
2	reason is
3	THE COURT: Where will I find that in the
4	Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or anywhere else?
5	MR. HORNICK: Well, Rule 26 says, for example, that
6	there must be a timely supplementation if you find out that
7	your production is incomplete.
8	Now, since Rule 34 only gives you 30 days to
9	produce documents in the first place, I would argue that, if
10	you come into knowledge that your production is incomplete
11	timely, there's a good argument to be made that timely means
12	around thirty days, no more than thirty days.
13	Now, this was not a case, Your Honor, where
14	THE COURT: Why didn't you come to court and ask
15	for that, then, because you had more than thirty days after
16	your request?
17	MR. HORNICK: But, Your Honor, we had three motions
18	to compel pending over a period of two years.
19	THE COURT: Right; so you didn't bring that one.
20	The short of it is that at least, the argument,
21	I think, can fairly be made that you knew it was
22	incomplete, you knew there was a dispute, and, yet, you
23	entered into the settlement term agreement.
24	Now, somebody may say: Well, there is still some
25	sort of obligation to provide exculpatory evidence before the

- 1 negotiations take place; and, maybe, that's true somewhere.
- 2 I'm not aware of it.

MR. HORNICK: Well, Your Honor, we cited to you the Spaulding case, and I believe you indicated a moment ago that you weren't impressed with that case, but I think that case is directly relevant.

It did involve a minor who --

THE COURT: I mean, that's like saying: It did involve a minor; which is to say it was fundamentally different.

MR. HORNICK: No.

THE COURT: I have to actually have hearings on whenever a minor comes in here, and I have to make an independent determination.

I don't make any determination, nor do I think

Judge Ware is going to, about whether or not this was a good agreement or bad agreement; so people with lots of money who have engaged in some discussion and they clearly settled the matter, that's the issue, so Spaulding doesn't really --

MR. HORNICK: There is a reason, Your Honor, why Spaulding does apply, and that is because in that case the plaintiff failed to seek the information in Discovery, and, therefore, The Court said the defendant has no obligation to disclose this information and that the reason that the obligation arose was because, when the settlement was

- submitted to The Court for The Court's approval, that is when the fraud on The Court occurred.
- However, if, as in this case, the plaintiff had sought Discovery, then, the defendant would have had an obligation to disclose that information, and they didn't do

6 so.

- 7 THE COURT: It doesn't follow.
- 8 MR. HORNICK: There's also another case,
- 9 Your Honor, and that is the <u>KATH v. Western Media</u> case, which we can hand up.
- This is from the Supreme Court of Wyoming, and, in this case --
- THE COURT: Why don't you pass it up, sir.
- MR. HORNICK: Approach?
- 15 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
- 16 (Handed to the Deputy Clerk.)
- MR. HORNICK: In this case, the appellants were
- 18 represented by an attorney with a strange name, which is
- 19 escaping me at the moment, and it was Panell (phonetic),
- 20 Planell (phonetic) -- Planell (phonetic),
- 21 Mr. Planell (phonetic), he was an attorney, he represented the
- 22 appellants, and he testified in a deposition, prior to
- 23 settlement, that he represented all of the appellants equally,
- 24 and the appellants had sought Discovery of him, and not just
- 25 the deposition, but they also had sought Discovery of his

- litigation file, and he produced it, but he failed to produce a letter from that file, and that letter admitted, clearly, that he did not represent all the defendants equally.
- 4 The case settled.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

20

21

22

23

24

25

5 After the case settled, Mr. Planell (phonetic) 6 disclosed this letter.

In this particular case, the trial court affirmed the settlement. There was a Motion to Enforce the Settlement, trial court affirmed it, went up on appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court said: No, that Mr. Planell (phonetic) had an affirmative duty to produce this document.

They said that he had -- that the appellee's attorney had an ethical duty to disclose the letter before settlement.

 $\label{eq:thm:case_cited} That \ case \ cited \ another \ case, \ called, \ \underline{Virzi \ versus}$ Grand Trunk.

THE COURT: Virzi, V-I-R-Z-I.

18 MR. HORNICK: 571 F.Supp. 507, Eastern District of 19 Michigan.

Now, in that case, the plaintiff's attorney, the plaintiff died, and the plaintiff's attorney failed to tell the other side that the plaintiff had died, and, then, the plaintiff's attorney went into settlement talks with the defendant and they settled, and, then, after they settled, the plaintiff's attorney disclosed that the plaintiff had died,

- 1 and the defendant said: The only reason that I settled this 2 case was because I thought the plaintiff would make an 3 excellent witness at trial; so, in that case, the 4 Eastern District of Michigan overturned the settlement, 5 because this information should have been disclosed before the 6 settlement, and it said, quote, there is an absolute duty of 7 candor and fairness on the part of counsel to both The Court 8 and opposing counsel, end quote.
 - Quote: Zealous representation of interest,
 however, does not justify a withholding of essential
 information, such as the death of a client, unquote; when the
 settlement of the case is based largely upon the defense
 attorney's assessment of the impact the plaintiff would make
 on the jury, unquote.

So, in these two cases and the <u>Spaulding</u> case, which I urge Your Honor to read cover to cover, because these three cases support --

THE COURT: I have.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. HORNICK: -- the situation here.

THE COURT: They don't.

The short answer is: They don't.

We're dealing with the question of The Court's responsibility to act more or less independently on behalf of minors in Spaulding.

Here, in Kath, K-A-T-H, the Wyoming case, we're

dealing with a question of whether or not a particular
attorney actually represented the parties involved, and, in
the third case, we're dealing with the question of whether or
not there is even a party to represent, <u>Virzi</u> , and the
attorneys' abilities to represent that party.

MR. HORNICK: With all due respect, Your Honor -THE COURT: With all due respect, I'll finish my
statement, and, then, you'll have an opportunity to respond.

MR. HORNICK: Sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The short of it is that none of those cases deal with arm's-length negotiations between parties who are aware that they have not resolved their Discovery disputes fully. That's what this case is, entirely different from the protection that The Court provides to shareholders, and children, and dead people or the successors of dead people, so the short of it is: I don't find any of these cases evenly scratching through the digest to find glittering generalities; like, duty of candor, and fairness with respect to The Court, to decide this case.

Of course, it's a duty case. No one will deny it, and, of course, there is an obligation to comply with

The Court orders, but here, these parties, between these parties, it seems to me, there is an entirely different set of factors and circumstances.

But you were saying?

1	MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, I was saying that there
2	is a parallel to these cases, in that, in each one of those
3	three cases, there was material information that was withheld
4	by the opposing party before the parties entered into
5	settlement negotiations.
6	There is no reason to believe in any of those cases
7	that Discovery was complete, but it's not important.
8	What's important is that there was material
9	information that was withheld in all three of those cases from
10	the settling party, and, in all three of those cases,
11	The Court believed that that was a sufficient basis for your
12	opening settlement.
13	Now, we're not asking you to do that, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: No, and I don't have the power to do
15	it. It's up to Judge Ware.
16	The question is: What do you want me to do?
17	And I'm back to that question: What do you want me
18	to do?
19	MR. HORNICK: The reason why we want Your Honor to
20	review these documents and not to give them to Judge Ware is
21	that these documents let me step back for a moment.
22	The California case was ordered to mediation on
23	January 22 of this year by Judge Ware. He did not order this
24	case to mediation.

The parties decided to make it a variable

1	discussion, so these documents are not relevant to the
2	California well, we don't know, but we don't think that
3	they're relevant to the California case, so, if we make so
4	the point is that this is the place.
5	This is the place to address whether these

documents are relevant to the disputes between the parties, and, therefore, what we ask This Court to do is not to open the settlement but, simply, to review the documents, determine if they should have been produced in Discovery, and, then, order that they be produced, if you find that they were material or that they were responsive.

THE COURT: The parties agreed that the -- in

Paragraph 4 -- or, Section 4 of the settlement -- term sheet

and settlement agreement, that the cities and federal court

shall have jurisdiction to enforce this agreement.

This is a question over the enforceability of the agreement.

The agreement deals with this case, as well as the San Jose case.

That's what the breadth of what you've asked for is, so --

MR. HORNICK: May I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You always do.

MR. HORNICK: I want to make sure that it's okay.

Paragraph 4 doesn't say that the jurisdiction is

UNSEALED HEARING exclusive in the California court. 1 2 THE COURT: You mean, I have jurisdiction over the 3 California case, too? 4 MR. HORNICK: You have jurisdiction over your own 5 cases, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Well, that doesn't mean that I have 7 control over the California case, too? 8 That reading? 9 Here is a term sheet and settlement agreement. 10 I mean, let me ask you this: Are you asking me to 11 deal with the question of whether or not this is an 12 enforceable agreement? 13 MR. HORNICK: No, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. I didn't think you would, okay? So the short of it is that we have a dispute that 15

So the short of it is that we have a dispute that will be resolved in California over whether or not there is a settlement agreement between the parties.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I have a vestigial; like, the vermiform appendix, which exists solely to get inflamed and cause some upset, of Discovery dispute in this case, and I keep asking the parties what you want me to do.

What I understand from Facebook is that their request is that I instruct Mr. Parmet not to discuss with any other persons his findings.

I'm not sure what you're asking me to do. I know

- now that you don't want me to enforce this rule on whether or not this is an enforceable settlement agreement.
- MR. UNDERHILL: May I have a short response,
- 4 Your Honor?
- 5 THE COURT: Well, let me just ask this; I mean, I'm 6 used to tag-team wrestling.
- 7 Are you admitted pro hac vice?
- 8 MR. UNDERHILL: I have applied, Your Honor.
- 9 My application is on file, as of today.
- MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, we neglected to introduce
- 11 Mr. Underhill earlier.
- 12 THE COURT: Well, he introduced himself.
- 13 (Laughter.)
- THE COURT: Mr. Underhill, as a stranger, but as
- 15 someone who apparently has some interest in this litigation,
- of course, I'm hear you.
- 17 MR. UNDERHILL: Thank you, Your Honor.
- I appreciate that, and I admittedly have quite a
- 19 | bit of interest in this litigation.
- In response to your question, Your Honor, I would
- 21 like to make sure that The Court understands the nature of the
- 22 proceedings that are before Judge Ware.
- I actually have our briefs without exhibits, that's
- 24 | intended to be merciful, if you would like for me to hand up
- 25 the briefs.

1	The argument in California is that the term sheet
2	is not an enforceable agreement because it's missing material
3	terms, and I'm happy to go into as much detail as you want,
4	but, probably, you don't want to hear it.
5	THE COURT: I'd have to be somewhat innocent, if I
6	didn't figure out what it was that you were arguing about in
7	California. That's fairly obvious.
8	MR. UNDERHILL: Yes.
9	THE COURT: The issue is what I'm supposed to do
10	here
11	MR. UNDERHILL: Yes.
12	THE COURT: apart from providing a forum for the
13	opportunity to try to pull at the threads of a fabric that was
14	fabricated in California.
15	MR. UNDERHILL: Your Honor, I'm going to get right
16	to it.
17	The second argument in California is a fraud
18	argument, regarding the valuation of the stocks.
19	Again, I don't think those are issues with which
20	This Court has familiarity.
21	The issue that we're here on today, is on an issue
22	that is very much within the familiarity of This Court.
23	The idea, Your Honor, is this: If these documents
24	were withheld and if they are material, This Court is, by far,

the much better viewer to understand what would be the

1	relevance of the claims that were being pressed in This Court.
2	With respect to the jurisdictional issues,
3	Your Honor, the forum selection clause only has effect if that
4	agreement is binding. If it's not binding, the forum
5	selection clause doesn't have effect
6	THE COURT: And who makes that
7	MR. UNDERHILL: immediately.
8	THE COURT: Who makes that determination?
9	It's the chicken-and-egg problem.
10	MR. UNDERHILL: It is, indeed, and that's why we
11	did not contest it in front of Judge Ware, but the other side
12	filed a motion in the courts in California.
13	We didn't oppose it. We didn't understand: This
14	is the situation. It's got to start somewhere.
15	With respect to this issue, Your Honor, and as far
16	as the relief we are asking, I would respectfully disagree
17	that it has anything to do with enforcing the settlement
18	agreement or not enforcing the settlement agreement. That's
19	not what we're asking for.
20	THE COURT: But what what
21	MR. UNDERHILL: That's not, at all.
22	THE COURT: What, precisely, are you asking?
23	MR. UNDERHILL: We're asking for in camera review.
24	If The Court agrees that these documents are
25	material to the claims in the Massachusetts tapes, that

1	The	Со	urt	ord	lered	the	ir	produ	uction	, th	en,	you'	re	done;	then,
2	we'ı	<i>r</i> e	qot	to	fiqui	re o	ut	what	we're						

THE COURT: Why would I do that, when there is pending in California an issue, as to which both parties have apparently briefed, of whether or not there is a settlement agreement that ends this case, and actually ended this case at the time that the parties called the respective clerks and told them the case was over?

Now, ordinarily, I'd, as a matter of course, to deal with, what I'll call, buyer's remorse, issue a thirty-day order of settlement if there isn't a clear stipulation filed or some other document filed, but, from time to time, I have to deal with buyer's remorse, and I deal with buyer's remorse by determining whether or not there was, in fact, an agreement, and somebody else is going to be making that determination.

If there was an agreement, then, it is a matter against which you argue on a variety of grounds; then, it is a matter of indifference whether or not there were unresolved Discovery matters in This Court.

MR. UNDERHILL: Your Honor, I would agree with you fifty percent.

The fifty percent I agree with is: If it's a binding agreement, then, as well, I agree 100 percent, if it's a binding agreement, then, yes, this is completely relevant.

1	However
2	THE COURT: Right.
3	MR. UNDERHILL: However however, Your Honor, if
4	we get those documents and if they're relevant, that's an
5	additional ground that we would apply to The Court for setting
6	aside the settlement agreement, which is, if there was
7	attorney misconduct, they withheld extremely important
8	documents, and, by the way, I'm only assuming that those are
9	the facts, but we're not going to know that those are the
10	facts, unless Your Honor is willing to look at the documents
11	<u>in camera</u> .
12	I do agree, Your Honor, that this idea of: Oh, you
13	settle cases. There is lots of Discovery out there; it's kind
14	of appealing to go there.
15	I think the difference here is that there was a
16	specific, heightened identification of a very small universe
17	of documents that, apparently, inferring from the documents,
18	was the smoking gun that was the difference between victory
19	and loss in the case, or, potentially, the difference between
20	victory and loss.
21	We're never going to know that, unless Your Honor
22	looks at the documents and has some kind of a reaction that we
23	can take to Judge Ware, as to
24	THE COURT: Some kind of reaction?

Is that what is called an advisory opinion?

1	MR	UNDERHILL:	NΟ
	I*II\ •	OMDRIVITADD •	TAO.

2 I'm talking about issuing the documents,
3 Your Honor, issue an order that they have to produce the

4 documents.

THE COURT: Right; but they don't have to produce the documents if there is settlement; so the short and sufficient answer, I think, is to say: Judge Ware is entitled to make his determination about the enforceability of this settlement, knowing that there is some sort of dispute about Discovery in Massachusetts, in which you say there is a smoking gun, nobody's indicated there is a smoking gun, but, perhaps reading this in the light most favorable to you, he'll say: Well, until we resolve that, we can't do anything about it, but that's for him to decide, not for me, and not for me to offer my reactions --

MR. UNDERHILL: Right.

THE COURT: -- to documents; so, if you want me to read them and review them?

19 No.

If you want me to have them marked, then, I'll think about that, marked and they're part of the record, and, if Judge Ware thinks that it would be a good idea for somebody in Massachusetts to look at these and decide whether or not there was a failure of some sort of Discovery?

Well, I'm think about that.

1	MR.	UNDERHILL:	Okay,	Your	Honor.	
---	-----	------------	-------	------	--------	--

Obviously, that is our fall-back position, that they be marked.

And one last comment, Your Honor, and I understand.

I understand that, when a judge rules, a judge rules.

I would --

THE COURT: Do you -- do you really?

MR. UNDERHILL: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Do you really?

MR. UNDERHILL: I know it in my heart and not in my head, or <u>vice versa</u>, I guess.

(Laughter.)

MR. UNDERHILL: What the witness is going to point out, I would assume, is: If we are forced into a settlement, which we don't think we will, particularly on the arguments we've already put before Judge Ware, but, if we were, the next step is going to be a fraud claim, and it's going to be a new lawsuit, and we're going to be back in court, and we will get the documents in non-party Discovery, and we're going to have a whole lawsuit over --

THE COURT: Maybe you are. Maybe some judge is going to look at this and say: Somebody can't claim fraud when they managed to settle the case when there were things outstanding and they knew were outstanding, so that's, frankly, a matter of indifference to me.

The question is step by step; so, you know, you raised the question of fraud.

You won't be the first person to say it, you won't be the first person to be disappointed when the acts of your parties, your client, have undermined it, but I'm not making a determination about that, and, if somebody wants to come back, they can come back.

MR. UNDERHILL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Alright.

Mr. Chatterjee?

MR. CHATTERJEE: Your Honor, I just wanted to address one point that Your Honor raised associated with the marking of documents.

Many of these documents have a lot of very deeply personal information, similar to some of the things that showed up when we had our the hearing at the 02138 hearing.

There's a lot of client sensitivity about putting these into a court file anywhere, even if it's sealed.

What I would suggest, Your Honor, is, for example, if you do want to mark them, that we put them in the hands of Mr. Bauer, he's an Officer of This Court, he has an office here, and is subject to The Court's jurisdiction, and he holds onto them should the matter be reopened, and the reason for that is just because of the client sensitivities around a lot of confidential information.

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	THE COURT: Yes.
2	It's a lot of hypersensitivity on the part of the
3	clients, but is there any objection to that, as an
4	alternative, if Mr. Bauer becomes the escrow agent?
5	MR. HORNICK: Yes, there is, Your Honor, because, I
6	think, there's two reasons: One is that this whole
7	confidentiality thing has gotten way out of hand, in this
8	case.
9	THE COURT: Well
10	MR. HORNICK: The plaintiffs marked documents as
11	confidential, just
12	THE COURT: Alright; so you object to it.
13	I understand.
14	MR. HORNICK: And I
15	THE COURT: Just a moment.
16	MR. HORNICK: Okay.
17	THE COURT: If someone objects to it, that's the
18	end of it.
19	It will be held here.
20	The Court of Appeals had an unhappy experience
21	earlier with sealed documents. We'll see if we can do better
22	than that, so I'll put them in a safe in my office.
23	I've not decided that they're particularly
24	confidential, at all, but just to satisfy everyone, and I'll
25	await further direction.

MR. HORNICK: May I ask The Court's permission to submit these documents to the California court?

They're under seal in This Court.

THE COURT: Only if Judge Ware asks me for them.

You can ask him to ask me, if you think that he'll find that compelling. I'm not sure I would in his position, but they're here, and the way I'm perceiving this now -- and I think the next stage is that I have to go into in camera proceedings with simply Facebook's attorneys and Mr. Parmet's attorneys, just to clarify matters a bit, but the way I see it is -- I will preserve the basis for this issue.

You can argue the issue to Judge Ware. I've made no ruling, with respect to whether or not they're relevant, or not, because I'm not even going to look at them, because I don't think, at this stage, it is necessary for me to look at them, particularly when there is outstanding the question of whether or not there is an enforcement agreement that would obviate that altogether.

MR. HORNICK: Well, Your Honor, these -- the subject of whether there is a settlement, it seems to me, is, obviously, before Judge Ware, but there is still the question of whether the two cases that are in This Court are alive, and there is nothing, at all, to indicate that they're not, and, in fact, all of the communications that have been given to This Court about whether those two cases are alive --

THE COURT: I'll tell you, my view is, if
Judge Ware says that this is an enforceable agreement; that
is, the term sheet and settlement agreement's enforceable,
these cases were dead on the day that this agreement was
entered into or the day after.
If it's not, then, you're right, they're over, a

If it's not, then, you're right, they're over, and that's the whole gist of the question, but it seems to me an undue waste of judicial resources, and the parties have their own and have been making their own choices about the expenditure of theirs, to litigate this in a parallel fashion, particularly when nobody's asking me to enforce this agreement.

I will take my direction from Judge Ware and his resolution.

If this isn't an enforceable agreement, then, the case is still on -- cases are still on.

MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, the way that you've phrased that point several times today makes me wonder whether This Court would entertain a motion to open the settlement, based upon misconduct of the plaintiffs or their counsel in failing to produce documents that they should have produced before; in other words, you've asked me and I'm asking you --

THE COURT: Not, until after Judge Ware -- I'd ask -- not until Judge Ware rules on this.

I've asked you in a large fashion, whether you want

me to rule on the question of the enforceability of the settlement agreement.

I'll tell you that I would do it more or less in the same fashion and proceed in more or less the same fashion Judge Ware is doing it, but I don't even think I have the authority to do that.

He has the authority -- first, he has the first cut at this. Parties wanted him to have jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.

It's kind of a fine nuance to say that that's not an exclusive choice of jurisdiction, although I frankly find that meretricious, but the way in which I think this has to be dealt with is to say: Judge Ware's going to decide it on the basis of the parties' submissions, and he'll decide whether or not it's necessary to -- in order to rule on it, to -- have further proceedings in This Court, and I stand ready to do whatever is necessary, or he can decide that it's not an enforceable agreement, and, then, we're off to the races again.

MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, the reason that we were asking you to review these documents is because, if Judge Ware does find that it's an enforceable agreement, then, the logical, one of the logical, places to file a new lawsuit and to reopen this matter, under Rule 60 or based upon fraud on the court or based upon fraud on the parties, would be right

	UNSEALED HEARING
1	here, because this is the court that knows about these issues.
2	THE COURT: Well, you know, always be careful what
3	you ask for.
4	(Laughter.)
5	THE COURT: So but we do that step by step.
6	We don't have a 60B motion, until we have a final
7	judgment.
8	We don't have a final judgment yet, because it is
9	tied up in this issue of the enforceability of this agreement,
10	as to which a variety of issues have been raised here, but I
11	will be bound by whatever Judge Ware decides, concerning
12	enforceability of this agreement, and I'll deal with whatever
13	follow-on that leads to, either that he finds it to be an
14	enforceable agreement or he doesn't.
15	MR. HORNICK: Well, Your Honor, the risk is that we
16	will ask Judge Ware to order the production of these
17	documents, and he'll say: They're not relevant to the case
18	that's before him.
19	THE COURT: Well, you know, you'll just have to
20	MR. HORNICK: And that they belong here.
21	THE COURT: Right.
22	Okay; so, then, we'll go step by step.
23	I suspect he won't do that. That's my general
24	view.

My general view is: He'll look at all the facts

- and circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement,

 including an allegation that there was incomplete disclosure

 that contained a smoking -- a series of smoking -- guns, and

 that was not completed at the time that the parties entered

 into this agreement and make whatever judgments he wants about
- 7 MR. UNDERHILL: Your Honor, I have a technical question, with respect to the technical order here?
- 9 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

that, but that's up to him.

- MR. UNDERHILL: I'm assuming that we're not going
 to have any issues dealing with anything with Judge Ware on
 the issues in front of This Court, and, by that, I mean,
 providing the pleadings in This Court, Mr. Chatterjee's
 affidavit, those sort of things, to the California court.
- 15 THE COURT: Is there any problem with that,
- Mr. Chatterjee?

- 17 MR. CHATTERJEE: No.
- 18 THE COURT: It seems to me that those can properly
 19 be placed before Judge Ware.
- 20 MR. CHATTERJEE: Yeah, I think you're right.
- Your Honor, we're not going to have an issue with that.
- 23 THE COURT: Okay.
- MR. CHATTERJEE: We've been doing that throughout
- 25 this case.

THE COURT: Alright; so there is nothing having to do with protective orders in this case that prevent the submission of these documents to Judge Ware, nor the transcript of this hearing.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Obviously, Your Honor, that is subject to the protective order provisions and all the things you have to do in California to put things under seal.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. UNDERHILL: Thank you, Your Honor, and thank you for your courtesy in this position.

THE COURT: Alright.

So what I think I want to do at this stage is: I do want to hear from Mr. Parmet and his counsel, and I do want to -- I think, my present inclination, and I will tell counsel if that's what happened, is to -- take the documents that he has that he says are relevant, keep them under seal, and we'll keep them under seal in This Court, but, because this deals with the question of whether or not a mechanism for Discovery that was designed to limit disclosure only to that degree necessary is involved, I'm going to close the courtroom, and take this in camera, so I'd ask everyone who is not, either in a representative capacity for Facebook or for Mr. Parmet to leave the courtroom.

MR. HORNICK: Your Honor, would you like ConnectU's counsel to wait?

1	THE COURT: I think so; I mean, I don't want to
2	interfere with your schedules, or anything.
3	MR. HORNICK: We're prepared.
4	THE COURT: I'll dictate whatever I do.
5	My intention is to reconvene The Court after this
6	hearing and simply report what I've done.
7	MR. HORNICK: We'll we'll be we're prepared
8	to wait, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Okay; so we'll take, maybe, a
10	five-minute break, at this point.
11	Is that sufficient for you?
12	THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
13	THE COURT: And, then, we'll hear from the Facebook
14	and Mr. Parmet's counsel.
15	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
16	(The judge exited the courtroom.)
17	(The parties were sequestered, subject to
18	The Court's order.)
19	(A short recess was taken.)
20	(A SEALED, <u>in camera</u> hearing was held.)
21	(The proceedings were continued onto the next
22	page.)
23	
24	
2.5	

1	(All parties returned to the courtroom.)
2	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
3	This Honorable Court is back in session.
4	You may be seated.
5	THE COURT: Well, having completed in camera
6	hearing with Mr. Parmet and his counsel and counsel for
7	Facebook, I think I should report what I've chosen to do here,
8	which I indicated ahead of time.
9	At the outset, however, let me just say that it
10	seems to me that it is appropriate to keep the transcript of
11	the <u>in camera</u> proceeding <u>in camera</u> , because, necessarily,
12	there was a discussion, to some degree, of the substance of
13	the at least, Mr. Parmet's view of the substance of the
14	documents that he believes are at issue here.
15	By keeping it in camera, I do not mean to suggest
16	that it's not available to Judge Ware, if he chooses to review
17	it; otherwise, the transcript of the proceedings is open, as
18	is customary in This Court.
19	Mr. Parmet has passed up to me, now, incorporated
20	in this single, three-ring binder, a collection of documents
21	that are at issue in the dispute between parties and have been
22	the focus of the dispute between the parties, and I intend to
23	have them docketed as a sealed exhibit.
24	(A sealed exhibit will be docketed.)
25	THE COURT: I will keep them in the safe, in the

control of the court, pending resolution of other matters by the parties, and, more particularly, by Judge Ware.

During the course of the proceeding, I found that Mr. Parmet did not engage in any knowing violation of the provisions of the order for Discovery of computer-memory devices that was entered by Judge Collings on September 13, 2007.

I did, however, indicate -- and I'll make explicit -- that my view is even to have discussed the existence of documents that he reviewed that did not involve, what we call, code is a transgression of the order.

The order, I think, is quite explicit on the issue of what kind of disclosure to others Mr. Parmet could make; more specifically, in Section 3, on Page 7, the order directs that Parmet and Associates may not discuss with ConnectU's counsel or with anyone else any information obtained from the Facebook hard drives, except, with respect to the produced program code, and, in the course of my discussions with Mr. Parmet, I emphasized, again, to him the view that I have, that that means he may not have any discussions, direct or indirect, with ConnectU's counsel or with anyone else -- obviously, with the exception of The Court, direction from me or from Judge Ware, for example -- of any information obtained from the Facebook hard drives, except with respect to the produced program code, and I'm satisfied that Mr. Parmet is

fully familiar and fully prepared to comply with this provision.

My own role in this, I think, is to do no more than simply preserve evidence which may or may not become relevant in the decision-making process, with respect to settlement, which is now ongoing before Judge Ware in California.

This seems to me the orderly way to proceed, and my expectation, as I expressed to counsel, is that, if being aware of the universe of potential disputes between the parties, Judge Ware, nevertheless, chooses to enforce the settlement term agreement, that will be the end of the two cases pending before me.

Whether there's follow-on litigation or some other initiatives that are undertaken is far too speculative for me to address at this point.

If he finds that the settlement agreement expressed in the settlement term sheet is not enforceable, then, we will re-ignite this case -- or, these cases, I should say -- and continue the litigation to some other resolution, but the short of it is that the core of the case is, I think, and the core of the question of whether or not the case is continued is before Judge Ware, and, until he's made those determinations, I do nothing, other than to ensure that there is available such evidence as may become relevant at some point in the process.

1	Is there anything further from counsel?
2	MR. HORNICK: Just one question, Your Honor.
3	I do have occasion to deal with Mr. Parmet
4	THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
5	MR. HORNICK: in other cases, and, also, there
6	may even be situations in this case, and I just want to go on
7	the record, that there are no surprises, and I understand that
8	the order is limited to anything under protocol.
9	THE COURT: It is.
10	MR. HORNICK: Yes.
11	THE COURT: I mean, the order is as the order
12	states.
13	With respect to his exposure to any materials in
14	this case through the hard drives, he is bound not to discuss
15	it with you, except as it is code.
16	Now, I say one other thing, based on all that I
17	know, which in this and in other ways is sometimes less than I
18	think I know, it seems to me that counsel have and
19	Mr. Parmet have proceeded properly.
20	I said so in open court, with respect to
21	Mr. Hornick bringing it to my attention, and I said so in
22	in camera proceedings with Mr. Parmet.
23	There are sometimes these very difficult issues
24	that the parties have to struggle with, and I made the
25	analogy, I think in open court, but, also with Mr. Parmet,

1	that the priest or the attorney who has disclosed to him
2	information which he is obligated not to disclose to others,
3	that frequently creates tension.
4	I'm not suggesting that's what's involved here,
5	because I don't know, not having reviewed it, it rises or
6	falls to that level, but, when there are these competing
7	considerations, it creates tensions for the parties.
8	They did, I think, what is proper to do in this
9	setting, and I hope I've clarified; at least, provisionally,
10	while we await the resolution from Judge Ware, what their
11	respective responsibilities are.
12	If there's nothing further, then, we'll be in
13	recess.
14	Thank you.
15	MR. HORNICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
16	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
17	(The proceedings were concluded.)
18	
19	(Court was adjourned.)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

						96
1						
2		PAGE	DIRECT	CROSS	חשם	
3	UNSEALED HEARING	<u>PAGE</u> 5	DIRECT	CROSS	KED	
4	UNSEALED REARING	5				
5	SEALED HEARING	71				
6	Jeffrey Parmet By The Court		72			
7	By Mr. Chatterjee By The Court		7 &	78	84	
8					04	
9	UNSEALED HEARING	91				
10						
11						
12						
13			-			
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						

		97
1	I N D E X (CONTINUED)	
2	(CONTINUED)	
3	EXHIBITS	
4	DOCKETED	
5	(A sealed exhibit) 91	
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

CERTIFICATION

I, DIANE M. MOLAS, a Registered Professional Reporter (RPR), a Certified Shorthand Reporter (CSR) in the State of Delaware, a Certified Court Reporter (CCR) in the State of New Jersey, and a Notary Public in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings reported by me, on June 2, 2008, and that I am neither counsel, nor kin, to any party or participant in said action, nor am I interested in the outcome thereof.

/s/Diane M. Molas

Diane M. Molas, RPR, DE CSR, and NJ CCR
DE Certification Number 208-RPR
NJ Certification Number 30XI00228400
7/23/09

(The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means, unless under the DIRECT CONTROL AND/OR SUPERVISION of the Certifying Court Reporter herself. THE COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION NEVER APPEARS AS A PHOTOCOPIED SIGNATURE.)

- - -