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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTHEW C. KILGORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM BRUCE FULLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, successor in interest to Keybank USA, N.A.; KEY EDUCATION RESOURCES, a division of Keybank National Association; GREAT LAKES EDUCATION LOAN SERVICES, INC., a Wisconsin corporation,

Defendants-Appellants,

No. 09-16703

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-02958-TEH

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MATTHEW C. KILGORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM BRUCE FULLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, successor in interest to Keybank USA, N.A.; KEY EDUCATION RESOURCES, a division of Keybank National Association; GREAT LAKES EDUCATION LOAN SERVICES, INC., a Wisconsin corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-15934

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-02958-TEH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

> Argued and Submitted En Banc December 11, 2012—Pasadena, California

> > Filed April 11, 2013

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Harry Pregerson, M. Margaret McKeown, William A. Fletcher, Richard C. Tallman, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr., Mary H. Murguia, Morgan Christen, Paul J. Watford, and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz; Dissent by Judge Pregerson

SUMMARY*

Arbitration

The en banc court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, reversed the denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and remanded with instructions to the district court to compel arbitration.

In an appeal involving a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans and the loan servicer, the en banc court held that the district court should have compelled arbitration under California law. The en banc court held that the arbitration clause was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable under California law. The en banc court held also that this case does not fall under the narrow "public injunction" exception to the Federal Arbitration Act that was

^{*} This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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recognized in *Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers*, 485 F.3d 1066, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2007).

Judge Pregerson dissented. Judge Pregerson would hold that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, and thus unenforceable.

COUNSEL

Andrew A. August and Kevin F. Rooney, Pinnacle Law Group, LLP; James C. Sturdevant (argued) and Whitney Huston, The Sturdevant Law Firm, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Appellants.

W. Scott O'Connell (argued), Courtney Q. Brooks, and Kristen M. Yasenka, Nixon Peabody LLP, Manchester, New Hampshire; Matthew A. Richard, Todd C. Toral, and Stephanie Karnavas, Nixon Peabody LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendants-Appellants/Appellees.

David Horton, Davis, California; Hiro N. Aragaki, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae Law Professors.

Hiro N. Aragaki and David Doeling, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae Arbitration Professors.

Donald M. Falk, Mayer Brown LLP, Palo Alto, California; Andrew J. Pincus (argued), Evan M. Tager, Archis A. Parasharami, and Scott M. Noveck, Mayer Brown LLP; Robin S. Conrad and Kate Comerford Todd, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.

Steve Bullock and Kelley L. Hubbard, Office of the Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana, for Amicus Curiae State of Montana.

Arthur D. Levy; Nancy Barron, Kemnitzer, Barron & Krieg LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae The National Association of Consumer Advocates and The National Consumer Law Center.

Ellen Lake, Oakland, California; Terisa E. Chaw, The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy; Rebecca M. Hamburg, National Employment Lawyers Association; Cliff Palefsky, McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association, The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy, and California Employment Lawyers Association.

Mark A. Chavez, Chavez & Gertler LLP, Mill Valley, California, for Amicus Curiae The National Consumer Law Center, National Association of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen and National Consumers League.

C. Dawn Causey and Gregory F. Taylor, American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, Consumer Bankers Association, and the Clearing House Association, L.L.C.

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OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

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This appeal involves a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans and the loan servicer. The central issue is whether the district court should have compelled arbitration. We hold that this case does not fall under the narrow "public injunction" exception to the Federal Arbitration Act we recognized in *Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers*, 485 F.3d 1066, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2007), and remand with instructions to compel arbitration.

I.

A.

Silver State Helicopters, LLC ("SSH") operated a flight-training school in Oakland, California. SSH referred to KeyBank, N.A. ("KeyBank") as a "preferred lender" in marketing materials and encouraged prospective students to borrow from KeyBank. KeyBank financed virtually all SSH student tuition; Great Lakes Educational Loan Services ("Great Lakes") serviced the loans.

Every SSH student borrowing from KeyBank executed a promissory note ("Note"). The Note contained an arbitration clause, located in a section entitled "ARBITRATION," which provided, in relevant part:

IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM,

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NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM FURTHER, I WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. . . . I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER RIGHTS I WOULD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. . . .

There shall be no authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis. Furthermore, an arbitration can only decide your or my Claim(s) and may not consolidate or join the claims of other persons that may have similar claims.

The Note further provided that "[t]his Arbitration Provision will apply to my Note . . . unless I notify you in writing that I reject the arbitration provisions within 60 days of signing my Note."

¹ The Note contained a choice-of-law clause providing that disputes would be governed by Ohio law and a forum-selection provision requiring disputes to be contested in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, KeyBank's principal place of business.

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B.

Matthew Kilgore and William Fuller ("Plaintiffs") were SSH students, who each borrowed over \$50,000 from KeyBank. The Oakland school failed before they could graduate. After the school's demise, Plaintiffs brought this putative class action suit against KeyBank and Great Lakes (collectively, "Defendants") in California Superior Court, seeking to enjoin Defendants from reporting loan defaults to credit agencies and from enforcing Notes against former students.² The gravamen of the complaint was that Defendants had violated the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–17210, because the Note and SSH's contracts with students failed to include language specified in the Federal Trade Commission's "Holder Rule."

² Plaintiffs amended the complaint in state court to add a third representative plaintiff, Kevin Wilhelmy, and two defendants, Student Loan Xpress and American Education Services. These parties eventually settled and are no longer involved in this litigation.

³ The Federal Trade Commission promulgated the Holder Rule in 1975 in response to concerns that sellers of goods and services were increasingly separating "the consumer's duty to pay from the seller's duty to perform" either by selling loan instruments to a third party after execution or by acting as a conduit between purchasers and third-party lenders. Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,507 (Nov. 18, 1975) (emphasis omitted) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 433). The Rule requires consumer credit contracts to include the following language: "ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a).

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Defendants timely removed the case to the District Court for the Northern District of California,⁴ and filed a motion to compel arbitration. After the district court denied the motion, *Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat'l Ass'n*, No. C 08-2958 TEH, 2009 WL 1975271, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009),⁵ Defendants appealed. We have jurisdiction over Defendants' appeal under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C).

After Defendants filed their notice of appeal, the district court allowed Plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint. The court then granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *Kilgore v. KeyBank*, 712 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947–58 (N.D. Cal.

Plaintiffs do not assert that the Holder Rule gives rise to a private cause of action, but instead seek to vindicate this right through their state law claim. *See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.*, 485 F.2d 986, 988–89 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that private actions to vindicate rights asserted under the Federal Trade Commission Act may not be maintained).

⁴ The notice of removal invoked federal jurisdiction based on a federal question, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1331; complete diversity of citizenship, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); and minimal diversity under the Class Action Fairness Act, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). After removal, Plaintiffs dropped their federal question claims.

⁵ In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the district court applied California law, notwithstanding the Ohio choice-of-law provision in the Note. *Kilgore*, 2009 WL 1975271, at *5–8 (citing *Hoffman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.*, 546 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (applying California conflict-of-law analysis to choice-of-law provision in credit card contract)). We need not consider which law is applicable as the result would be the same in light of our decision that the district court should have compelled arbitration. *See* note 11, *infra*.

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2010).⁶ Plaintiffs appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.⁷

Π.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by dismissing their third amended complaint, and Defendants argue that the district court erred by refusing to compel arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, if Defendants are correct, the district court should never have reached the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. *See* 9 U.S.C. § 3 (requiring stay of civil action during arbitration). Therefore, we begin with whether the district court erred in declining to compel arbitration, a decision we review *de novo*. *Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009).

A.

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") makes an agreement to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA was intended to "overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law," *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985), that resulted in "courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate," *Allied-Bruce*

⁶ The district court held that the various counts in the third amended complaint either failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, *Kilgore*, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 947–53, or were preempted by federal law, *id*. at 953–58.

⁷ We consolidated the two appeals. Order, *Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n*, Nos. 09-16703, 10-15934 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010).

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Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). Recent opinions of the Supreme Court have given broad effect to arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., *Inc. v. Brown*, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding arbitration provision despite state law prohibiting pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal injury and wrongful death claims); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempted a California rule that made class action waivers unconscionable); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (confining FAA exemption for workers engaged in interstate commerce to transportation workers).

The FAA "mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). The basic role for courts under the FAA is to determine "(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

B.

Section 2 of the FAA contains a savings clause, which provides that arbitration agreements are "enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. This savings clause "preserves generally applicable contract defenses." Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. Plaintiffs advance two theories as to why the FAA savings clause defeats the arbitration clause in the Note. We find neither availing.

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Under the FAA savings clause, state law that "arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally" remains applicable to arbitration agreements. *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 685–87 (1996) (quoting *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). "Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2." *Casarotto*, 517 U.S. at 687.

Under California law, a contractual provision is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. *Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.*, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000). "[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa." *Id.*

"Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness or overly harsh effect of the contract term or clause." *Harper v. Ultimo*, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Plaintiffs claimed below that the Note's ban on class arbitration is unconscionable under California law, but that argument is now expressly foreclosed by *Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. Plaintiffs' assertion that students may not

⁸ In holding that California law rendered the class arbitration waiver unconscionable, the district court relied on *Discover Bank v. Superior Court*, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), *abrogated by Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. In addressing the issue, the district court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's later *Concepcion* opinion.

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be able to afford arbitration fees fares no better. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 (2000) ("The 'risk' that [a plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement."). And nothing else in the arbitration clause in the Note suggests substantive unconscionability. Cf. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690–94 (holding unilateral arbitration provision substantively unconscionable); Harper, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 423 (explaining substantive unconscionability of arbitration damages limit).

Nor is the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable. "Procedural unconscionability focuses on the factors of surprise and oppression. . . ." Harper, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 422. The arbitration clause allows students to reject arbitration within sixty days of signing the Note. This provision is more forgiving than the one in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, where we found thirty days a sufficient period in which to consider whether to opt out of arbitration. 283 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor was the arbitration clause buried in fine print in the Note, but was instead in its own section, clearly labeled, in boldface. Cf. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding procedural unconscionability of

⁹ The Note also includes a clause preventing disclosure of any arbitration award. Although we have found confidentiality provisions to be substantively unconscionable when applied to a large class of customers, *Ting v. AT&T*, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003), the small number of putative class members in this case (approximately 120) mitigates such concerns. In any event, the enforceability of the confidentiality clause is a matter distinct from the enforceability of the arbitration clause in general. Plaintiffs are free to argue during arbitration that the confidentiality clause is not enforceable.

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consequential damage provision contained in middle of last page of an agreement in inconspicuous font).

2.

a.

The UCL authorizes broad injunctive relief to protect the public from unfair business practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. The Supreme Court has suggested that claims arising from a statute whose underlying purpose creates an "inherent conflict" with the federal policy favoring arbitration may be exempt from the FAA. ¹⁰ *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Relying on *Gilmer*, the California Supreme Court has found an inherent conflict between the FAA policy favoring arbitration and California statutes authorizing "public" injunctive relief. *Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal.*, 988 P.2d 67, 73, 78 (Cal. 1999).

The *Broughton* plaintiffs "were covered by Medi–Cal, which had negotiated a contract with Cigna . . . for health care coverage." *Id.* at 71. They sued Cigna under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750–85, seeking damages for medical malpractice and injunctive relief against Cigna's allegedly deceptive advertising. *Broughton*, 988 P.2d at 71. The California Supreme Court held the damages claim subject to the arbitration clause in the Cigna policy because "[s]uch an action is primarily for the benefit of a party to the arbitration, even if the action incidentally vindicates important public

¹⁰ The parties dispute whether the "inherent conflict" exemption is limited to federal statutes or applies to both federal and state statutes. For the reasons discussed below, we need not resolve this issue.

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interests." *Id.* at 79. But the Court also found that because the plaintiffs were "functioning as a private attorney general, enjoining future deceptive practices on behalf of the general public," *id.* at 76, their injunction claims were not arbitrable, *id.* at 75–78.

The California Supreme Court expanded upon *Broughton* in *Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.*, 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003). Plaintiff there alleged that PacifiCare had fraudulently induced its customers to enroll in health care programs while at the same time discouraging primary care physicians from providing services to enrollees. *Id.* at 1159. The complaint sought injunctive and monetary relief under the UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, which prohibits unfair business practices, and under section 17500 of the same, which prohibits untrue or misleading statements designed to mislead the public. *Cruz*, 66 P.3d at 1164–65. PacifiCare invoked the arbitration clause in its contract with enrollees. *Id.* at 1160.

As in *Broughton*, the California Supreme Court in *Cruz* held that the plaintiff's claims for monetary relief were subject to arbitration, because any public benefit from such relief would be "incidental to the private benefits obtained from those bringing the restitutionary or damages action." *Id.* at 1166. Extending the reasoning of *Broughton* to claims brought under the UCL and Business and Professions Code, the *Cruz* court found "the request for injunctive relief is clearly for the benefit of health care consumers and the general public" and therefore not subject to arbitration. *Id.* at 1164.

We applied the *Broughton-Cruz* framework in *Davis*, 485 F.3d at 1081–84. There, an employer "adopted and

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distributed to its employees a new Dispute Resolution Program (DRP) that culminated in final and binding arbitration of most employment-related claims by and against its employees." *Id.* at 1070. The DRP prohibited the filing of both judicial and administrative actions. *Id.* at 1081–82. Citing the *Gilmer* dictum, we noted that "employment rights under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] and California's Labor Code" were analogous to substantive "statutory rights established for a public reason." *Id.* at 1082 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because the *Davis* plaintiffs sought to vindicate these statutory rights through public injunctions, we found the DRP unenforceable to the extent that it barred claims for public injunctive relief. *Id.*

b.

Defendants argue that *Davis* was vitiated by *Concepcion*, and the *Broughton-Cruz* rule no longer exempts a public injunction claim from arbitration. We need not reach that broad argument. Even assuming the continued viability of the *Broughton-Cruz* rule, Plaintiffs' claims do not fall within its purview.

Public injunctive relief "is for the benefit of the general public rather than the party bringing the action." *Broughton*, 988 P.2d at 78. A claim for public injunctive relief therefore does not seek "to resolve a private dispute but to remedy a public wrong." *Id.* at 76. Whatever the subjective motivation behind a party's purported public injunction suit, the *Broughton* rule applies only when "the benefits of granting injunctive relief by and large do not accrue to that party, but to the general public in danger of being victimized by the same deceptive practices as the plaintiff suffered." *Id.*

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The claim for injunctive relief here does not fall within the "narrow exception to the rule that the FAA requires state courts to honor arbitration agreements." Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1162. The third amended complaint seeks an injunction prohibiting Defendants from reporting non-payment of a Note by putative class members to credit agencies, from enforcing a Note against any class member, and from disbursing the proceeds of any loans to a seller whose consumer credit contract did not include Holder Rule language. The requested prohibitions against reporting defaults on the Note and seeking enforcement of the Note plainly would benefit only the approximately 120 putative class members. requested injunction against disbursing loans to sellers who do not include Holder Rule language in their contracts, while ostensibly implicating third parties, also falls outside the The third amended complaint Broughton-Cruz rule. expressly notes that KeyBank had completely withdrawn from the private school loan business and does not allege that the bank is engaging in other comparable transactions. The injunctive relief sought thus, for all practical purposes, relates only to past harms suffered by the members of the limited putative class.

The central premise of *Broughton-Cruz* is that "the judicial forum has significant institutional advantages over arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as a consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the public benefit if the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators." *Broughton*, 988 P.2d at 78. That concern is absent here, where Defendants' alleged statutory violations have, by Plaintiffs' own admission, already ceased, where the class affected by the alleged practices is small, and where

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there is no real prospective benefit to the public at large from the relief sought.¹¹

III.

For the reasons above, we **VACATE** the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, **REVERSE** the denial of Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and **REMAND** with instructions to the district court to compel arbitration.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I. Hustled by the school; hustled by the bank.

Silver State Helicopter School did not do a good job training helicopter pilots, placing them in jobs, or managing its own finances. But it did make a convincing sales pitch. Silver State promised its students that they would get the training required to get good paying jobs as commercial helicopter pilots.

At flashy career fairs around California, Silver State worked hard to sign up prospective students for its helicopter pilot training program. Former Silver State student, Mathew Kilgore, declared under penalty of perjury:

¹¹ Because we hold that arbitration is required under California law, we need not address Defendants' contention that Ohio law (which apparently has no *Broughton-Cruz* rule, see Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1170 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)) should apply.

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The seminar was very impressive and glitzy. There were numerous helicopters onsite and the school appeared to be very professional. [Silver State's CEO, Jerry Airola] was very convincing and portrayed Silver State as a top flight school. The presentation made clear that Silver State was very selective about which students would be chosen to attend the school . . . Mr. Airola emphasized that all of the tuition to fund the entire Silver State education could be obtained through Silver State's partner lender, KeyBank. Mr. Airola also emphasized that . . . the loans would only cost the students about [a] hundred dollars a week at 4% interest.

Airola's claims were not true. Silver State accepted almost all applicants who could get their loans approved. Silver State lacked sufficient equipment or instructors to properly train its students. The variable rate interest on the loans would rise far above four percent.1 Matthew Kilgore, William Fuller, and the other 120 putative class members believed what Airola told them and signed up. They took out \$55,950 loans, which KeyBank promptly forked over to Silver State before students took a single class.

But Silver State knew it was headed for a crash landing. By 2008, Silver State had racked up ten million dollars in debt against fifty thousand dollars in assets. Moreover, despite Silver State's alluring promises, there was no significant demand for helicopter pilots with a Silver State

¹ See Appendix at 9.

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degree. And it wasn't just the school that knew it. Defendant KeyBank knew it, too.

KeyBank, an Ohio-based lending giant, participated in the fraud that Silver State perpetrated on unwitting students. From 2003 to 2005 KeyBank financed ninety-five percent of the tuition students paid to Silver State. KeyBank printed up lengthy loan papers that lacked the Federal Trade Commission's Holder Rule Notice. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 The Holder Rule required the loan contracts to notify students that KeyBank was subject to the same claims and defenses as Silver State. Id. The Holder Rule protects borrowers, such as the students, from being legally obligated to pay a creditor like KeyBank "despite breach of warranty, misrepresentation, or even fraud on the part of the seller." 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,507 (Nov. 18, 1975). By omitting that notice from its printed loan contracts, KeyBank may have sought to insulate itself from liability for Silver State's misleading promises. Silver State then presented those faulty loan contracts to prospective students and "pressure[d] the students to sign the [master promissory notes] as soon as possible," according to an affidavit of Silver State's former student finance manager Jody Pidruzny. And sign up they did.

Once a student signed the promissory note, KeyBank immediately transferred the full amount of the loans to Silver State. KeyBank then turned a profit by selling the students' loans on the securities market to investors. Defendant Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. continues to service those loans by collecting payments from students, and notifying credit reporting agencies when students fail to pay.

KeyBank loaned students tuition money to attend Silver State knowing that Silver State was financially volatile. A ID: 8585719

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2004 email between KeyBank Vice Presidents Paul McDermott and Rodney Landrum predicted that Silver State "could be the next 'big one' to go under." Nevertheless, KeyBank made more than ten million dollars in loans to Silver State students over the following two years. In 2008, Silver State filed for bankruptcy and closed its doors. Students could not recoup the amount of their unused tuition because Silver State sought protection under Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.

Kilgore, Fuller, and their classmates were left holding the bag with no degree, no helicopter piloting career, and no opportunity to train. The students' failed attempts to launch flight careers saddled them with huge private loans that are collecting interest and weighing them down.

The private loans students incurred to pay for Silver State helicopter pilot training were not subsidized or insured by the federal government. Private student loans are generally more expensive than federal loans, especially for students with lower credit scores or limited credit histories. Students could borrow larger amounts because there are no loan limits for private loans. Morever, students who hold private loans are not eligible for federal programs that allow them to reduce their monthly payments based on their income, or have their loans forgiven after working for ten years in public service jobs.²

² See Editorial, Student Debt and the Economy, N.Y. Times, March 10, 2013, at SR 10 ("Because private loans offer little flexibility, borrowers in bad straits have few options except default, which makes it difficult for them to get jobs or credit, or even to rent apartments.").

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Unlike federally guaranteed loans, private student loans are not discharged should the school go out of business. The students themselves cannot discharge these loans in bankruptcy proceedings unless they can prove that "excepting such [student] debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

II. Ignored by the courts.

To make matters worse, the majority opinion strips Kilgore, Fuller, and their classmates of the ability to find recourse in state or federal court. The majority holds that we must compel arbitration in the students' case, a holding at odds with the district court's decision. According to the majority, the arbitration clause was not unconscionable. I disagree.

A contract provision is unenforceable under California law if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. *See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc.*, 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). California applies a sliding scale to determine if a contract is unenforceable due to unconscionability. *Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.*, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000). The more substantively unconscionable it must be to be found unconscionable, and vice versa. *Id.* Here, the arbitration clause is highly procedurally *and* substantively unconscionable.

A. Procedurally Unconscionable

If both parties agree to give up the protections of the courts, arbitration can be a just and efficient way to resolve disputes. But Kilgore, Fuller, and their classmates signed

contracts under unconscionable "take it or leave it" conditions. *Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc.*, 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). This means that they did not agree to arbitration. Without such an agreement, it is wholly inappropriate to stop them from having their claims decided by a court.

Under California law: "A contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion, *i.e.*, a standardized contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." *Ting v. AT&T*, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). Procedural unconscionability focuses on the "the factors of surprise and oppression in the contracting process." *Pokorny*, 601 F.3d at 996.

There can be no doubt that the promissory notes were contracts of adhesion, and that surprise and oppression dominated the contracting process. I have attached as an Appendix the dense, small print, and blurry nine-page contract that Silver State thrust on the students at career fairs and open houses. The arbitration clause at issue was buried in the middle of the contract, split over two pages, and surrounded by language that was difficult to read and understand. See Appendix at 3-4; see also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F. 3d 1165, 1171 (2003) ("Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). officials never discussed the loans with students or mentioned the arbitration clause to them. KeyBank left those jobs to Silver State's financial aid staff-employees who, according to the record, did not know that the loans contained Case: 09-16703 04/11/2013 ID: 8585719 DktEntry: 169-1 Page: 24 of 35

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arbitration clauses. Silver State staff pressured students to sign the loans immediately or else risk losing their spots in the school. Pidruzny, the school's Student Finance Manager, explained the strategy in her sworn declaration:

At the direction of my superiors I conveyed KeyBank's and Silver State's directives to expedite the loan application process and pressure the students to sign the [Master Promissory Notes] as soon as possible . . . I did not discuss the terms of the [Master Promissory Notes] with Silver State students. Specifically, I did not discuss the Arbitration Provision with any Silver State Student

In light of these facts, it is unsurprising that students felt pressured to sign the contract without knowing it contained an arbitration clause. Moreover, the sixty day opt-out provision was meaningless because students did not know the arbitration clause existed in the first place. As Kilgore declared, "I did not know that the Promissory Note contained an arbitration provision (nor did I know that I could opt out of the arbitration provision) . . . I believed that the Promissory Note had to be signed immediately and I felt pressured to do so. I believed that if I did not sign the Promissory Note I would lose my spot at Silver State." Surprise? Yes. Oppression? Yes. Procedural unconscionability? Definitely.

B. Substantively Unconscionable

A contract provision is substantively unconscionable if it is "one-sided and will have an overly harsh effect on the disadvantaged party. Thus, mutuality is the paramount consideration when assessing substantive unconscionability."

Pokorny, 601 F.3d at 997 (internal quotations and citations omitted). To make that determination, courts must "look beyond facial neutrality and examine the actual effects of the challenged provision." Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149. KeyBank's contract fails the mutuality test in three respects:

- 1. The confidentiality provision requires both parties to maintain the confidentiality of any claim they arbitrate. While facially neutral, this claim overwhelmingly favors A student who wins in arbitration against KeyBank. KeyBank cannot alert other students or arbitrators to KeyBank's predatory practices that led to the win. But KeyBank is a repeat player in these arbitrations; it knows the outcome of each arbitration and can use that knowledge to its advantage. Id. at 1152 (Defendant "has placed itself in a far superior legal posture by ensuring that none of its potential opponents have access to precedent while, at the same time, defendant accumulates a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its own unilaterally crafted contract.").
- 2. The high cost of arbitration imposes another unequal burden, creating further substantive unconscionability. Filing a civil case in California Superior Court costs less than five hundred dollars. Filing the same claim before an arbitrator, runs more than four thousand dollars. The high cost of arbitration will prevent many students from vindicating their rights, but will not limit KeyBank's ability to defend itself. This asymmetry makes arbitration all the more unconscionable. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151 (finding a feesplitting arbitration clause unconscionable "because it imposes on some consumers costs greater than those a complainant would bear if he or she would file the same complaint in court.").

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3. The arbitration process itself greatly favors banks over consumers. One study found that the National Arbitration Forum, one of the two arbitrators named in the contract, ruled for banks and credit card companies, and against consumers ninety-four percent of the time.³ This further gives KeyBank an unfair advantage in resolving any claims.

KeyBank foisted loans on students who staked their financial well-being on the shaky promises of Silver State Helicopter school. When Silver State went down, so did the students. The students deserve, and I submit the law requires, that their claims be heard and adjudicated by a court. The provision in the promissory note relegating students to arbitration is unconscionable and thus unenforceable. Therefore, I dissent.

³ Public Citizen, *The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensare Consumers* 2 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.

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APPENDIX

REDACTED*

Key Alternative Loan Program

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name; Matt C. Kilgore

Cosigner Name:

Borrower Social Security Number:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

MASTER STUDENT I OAN PROMISSORY NOTE
No white-out or scratch-outs of terms will be accepted on this Promis

A. TDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND TERMS

A. TDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND TERMS

In this Application/Mustre Student Loan Promissory Note, unless otherwise provided, the wenter "1," "we," "our," "ne," "me," "my," and "nuse" mean the personn(s) who signed this Application/Mustre Student Loan Promissory Note and provided in this Student Loan Promissory Note and pay other holder of this Master Student Loan Promissory Note. Terms in initial capital letters in this Note have the definitions set forth in Paragraph D or elsewhere in this Nine, unless otherwise noted.

R. PROMISS TO PAY: CONSOLIDATION; ACCIRECATING BALANCES

This is a consumer credit transaction; I promise to pay to your order or to any accordance of the Note and the Note and that has been added to the principal statuse; interest on such principal statuse, interest on any Capitalized Interest, and offer this Note and that is agreed by my coaigner with respect to any Loan that I obtain subject to the terms of this Note and the Loan Program.

R. PROMISS TO PAY: CONSOLIDATION; ACCIRECATING BALANCES

This is a consumer credit transaction, i promise to pay to your order or to any advantage of the Note and that of the Note and that has been added to the principal student of the Note and that has been added to the principal student of the Note and that has been added to the principal student of the Note and that the Note and that is agreed by my coaigner with respect to any Loan that I obtain subject to the terms of this Note and the Loan Frogram.

R. Conginer to order the Note and that is agreed by my coaigner with respect to any Loan that I obtain subject to the terms of this Note and the Note and that the Loan Frogram of the Note and the Note and the Note and that the Loan Frogram of the Note and the No any other holder of this Master Student Loan Premissory Note. Terms in initial capital Inture in this Note; have the definitions set forth in Paragraph D or elsewhere Interest to the property of the propert

7. Institution - means the educational institution, if any, to writen the processes or my Loast(s) are payable.
8. Interrim Pernod - means the period beginning on the initial Disbursternor Date and ending on the date which is six (6) months after I graduate from, or otherwise cease to be enrolled at least half-time at the Institution identified at the time of my Application or any other eligible Institution.
9. Loan - means all principal sums disbursted during the twelve (12)-month totus of an academic year of the Loan Program (as such year is designated by your under the terms of this Note, plus interest on such principal sums, interest on any Capitalized Interest, and other charges and fees that may become due under the Loan as provided in this Note.

Interest, and other charges and fees that may become due under the Lean seprovided in this Note.

10. Keythnik National Association Loan Program ("Loan Program") - mense the Key Alternative Loam® program.

11. Note - means this Matter Student Loan Promissory Note setting forth the terms applicable to all Loans that I have in effect under the Loan Programs before the date of this Note (that you have agreed in consolidate into this Note) and that I may other inder the Loan Programs on a rate the date of this Note. The arm Note," as used in this Master Student Loan Promissory Note, includes the Applications. Disclosure Statements, and Cosigner Notices of papilotable pelluding to all Loans that I obtain adolpted to the terms of this Note, unless otherwise provided.

12. Repayment Period - means the period beginning on the day after the Internet Period ends and continuing for one handred and Noteny (120) months if the total principal balance of my loans under the Loan Program and my Loans subject to the terms of this Note is less than \$15,000, one hundred and eighty (180) months if the total principal balance of my loans under the Loan Program and my Loans subject to the terms of this Note is equal to or greater than \$15,000 and less than \$60,000, or two lundred and forty (240) months if the total principal balance of my loans under the Joan Program and my Loans subject to the terms of this Note is equal to or greater than \$15,000 and less than \$60,000. The Loans Program and my Loans subject to the terms of this Note is equal to or greater than \$60,000. The Loans under the Joan Program and my Loans subject to the terms of this Note is equal to the Variable Recurse of the Program and the Program and the Loan Program and the Program an

Lam. Hased on your evolution of my redit qualifications, which you may conduct as part of your review of my Application or at any time during the term of any Loan(s) that I obtain subject to the terms of this Note, you have the right not to make a Lam or or a februarrent of an anomatic less than the Amount Requested. I agree to accept an amount less than the Amount Requested and to repay that portion of the Armount Requested that you exhally less it me, plus interest on such principal sums, interest on any Capitalized Interest, and other changes and feet that may become due as provided in this Note.

2. All Applications, Disclosure Statements, and separate Coargoer Notices (if any) relating to any Loan subject to the terms of this Note are incorporated it and made a part of this Note. Interest will be considered to be "written" or in "writing," an act or agreement performed or provided by means of electronic communication will be considered to be "written" or in "writing," as the case can be be. If, under this Note, a document must be "signed," a digital or electronic agreature that complies with applicable feed has vergulements or (in the case of the Loans of the Loans

KAL NOTE CHEYOM KBINA Page 1 of 7

*On every page of the master student loan promissory note, I redacted the signer and co-signer's social security number, and the co-signer's name.

Appendix Page 1

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

Costigner (varine):

on the 20th day of the month preceding the applicable "Change Date" (e.g., December, March, June, and Septembor), subject to the limitations herein. You will use the office month. LISOR published on the 20th day of the preceding month without regard to the two-tary delayed effective date. If the 20th day of the preceding month without regard to the two-tary delayed effective date. If the 20th day of the two-tary leaders four a basiness day, the preceding basiness tay will be used to leteratine the Carriera Index. For purposes of this Paragraph E.3, "basiness day" means any day the banks in New York and London ser open for the transaction of business. You may reach the crounded to 6.69%. (This is an example and may not be reflective of the actual LIBOR), LIBOR is the British Banker's Association average of interbank offered rates for dollar deposits in the London marker based on quotations at 16 major banks. LIBOR is merely a pricing index and is not necessarily the lowest interest rate index used by you or any other lender. If LIBOR is no longer available, you will choose a comparable index.

Capitalization. Al your option, you may add all accrued and unpaid interest to

used by you or any other lender. If LIBOR is no longer available, you will choose a comparable index.

4. Capitalization - Al you option, you may add all accrued and unpaid interest to the principal balance of nny Loan, on the list day of any laterim Period, and on the last day of any period of forbearance. I agree to the addition of secrend and unpaid interest to the principal balance (the "compounding" of interest) as set forth in Paragraph E.1 and this Paragraph E.4.

F. TERMS OF REPAYMENT

1. Interim Period - 1 may, but am not required to, make payments of interest that I do not pay during the Interim Period. You may add accreed unpaid interest that I do not pay during the Interim Period to the principal balance as set forth in Paragraphs E.1 and E.4.

2. Repayment Period - During the Repayment Pariod, I will make consecutive mouthly payments in the indicated amounts by the payment due dates shown in my coupon book until I have paid all of the principal and interest and any other charges that I may owe under the Note.

3. Repayment Terms - I will repay my Loan in consecutive monthly installments of

- roundily payments in the indicated amounts by the payment due dates shown on my coupon book until flavor paid all of the principal and interest and any other charges that I may owe under the Note.

 3. Repayment Terms I will repay my Loan in consecutive monthly installments of principal and interest. If my Variable Rate increases or decreases, so that the coal amount I must pay to you increase or decreases, my monthly payment will stay the same but I will make more or fewer monthly payments than would otherwise be required. My monthly payment amount will not repay my Loan in fall within the maximum permissible Repayment Period. In that case, my monthly payment amount may be increased to the minimum payment that will do so. If this should happen, you will notify one of my new monthly payment amount may be increased to the minimum payment that will do so. If this should happen, you will notify one of my new monthly payment amount any increase my monthly payment amount at any time.

 4. Amounts Owing at the End of the Repayment Period. Since interest accrose daily upon the uspaid principal balance of my Loan, (If make payments after my payment due datest, nay owe additional interest and returned cheek NSF fees. If I have not paid my late charges I will also owe additional amounts for those late charges and returned cheek NSF fees. In such case, you will increase the amount of my last monthly payment amount to the amount necessary to repay my Loan in full.

 5. Application of Phyments—Nowthitstanding any other provision of Pargraph F, if my required payment is may mush is less than \$50,00 at your required payment is my mush in less than \$50,00 at your capital and interest) or the unput date balance, whichever is less.

 G. LATE CHARGES ANINOR RETURNED PAYMENTNINSF PEES.

 1. Late Charges—I agree to pay a late charge if I fail to make any part of an installment payment within fifteen (15) days after it become due. I will pay only one late charge by an installment payment in fifteen (15) days after it become due. I will

- I. FORBEARANCE If I am unable to repay any of my Loans in accordance with the terms established under this Note, i may request that you medify these terms. I understand that such modification would be at your option. I understand that I will remain responsible for all interest securing during any perial of florbearance.
 J. DENAILTI WHOLE LOAN DUB
 Subject to the limitations of applicable law, I will be in default under this Note and you have the right to (i) give me notice that the whole outstanding principal balance, carried interest, and all other amounts payable to you under the terms of this Note, are due and payable at once (subject to any applicable law that may give me a right

Borrower Social Security Number.

Cosigner Social Security Number

- to cure my default) and (ii) cease to make further disbursem

 1. I fail to make any monthly payment to you when due; or

- 3. I breek any of my other promises in this Note; or

2.1 date; or
3. I breek any of my other promises in this Note; or
4. Any bankrupicy proceeding is began by or against me, or I assign any of my assets for the benefits of my residency; or
5. I provide any false written statement in applying for any Loan subject to the terms of this Note or at any time during the term of any such Loan; or
6. I become insolvent, or
7. In your pulgment, there is a significant lessening of my ability to repay any Loan subject to the terms of this Note or No. I am in default on any Loan subject to the terms of the Note I may already have writh you, or on any such Loan I may have with you in the future.

My faiture to receive a diatement or coupon bouk does not relieve me of my responsibility and obligation of making the required payments for any Loan in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Note. If I am in default, I will be required to pay interect on any Loan accurate and the required to pay interect on any Loan securing after default. The interest rate (Variable Rate) after default will be subject to adjustment in the same manner as before default.

(Variable Rates) and before default.

K. COLLECTION COSTS

When and as permitted by applicable law, I agree to pay you reasonable amounts, including reasonable attorney's fees fire any attorney who is not your regularly salaried employee and coart and other collection costs, that you incur in enforcing the terms of this Note if I am in default.

- I will send written notice to you, or any subsequent holder of this Note, within
 ten (10) days after any change in my name, address, telephone number, or Institution
- 1. I will send written notice to you, or any subsequent holder of this Note, within tea (10) days after any change in my name, address, telephone number, or Indistation curolliment status.

 2. Any notice required to be given to me by you will be effective (i) when mailed by first class mail to the latest address you have for use or (ii) if 1 agree to receive notices and other communications electronically, when transmitted by electronic communication to the latest electronic mail address you have for me. Unless required by applicable law, you need not give a separate notice to the costiguer, if they 3. State Law Notices As required by law, I am hereby notified that a negative reddireport reflecting on my credit record ray be submitted to a credit report agency if I fail to diffit the terms of my credit obligations. A married applicant may apply for a separate nectous. I angree that the lender may obtain a consumer report (credit report) about me, for a censumer reporting agency (credit burnary). The properties of the consumer report about me, and if so, the name and address of the consumer reporting agency that improves the credit report, I my Application is approved, subsequent consumer report about me, and if so, the name and address of the consumer reporting agreey that improves the credit for which I have applied. New Yestey Residents? Because cretain privisions of this Note are subject to applicable law, they may be violationally or improved to reinapplicable in some privations. New Yestey. OHIO RESIDENTS: The Obio lower against discrimination require list all credits experting against and married applicable in a consumer reporting against and the credit for which I have applied. New Yestey RESIDENTS: Because certain privisions of this Note are subject to applicable in New Yestey. OHIO RESIDENTS: The Obio lower against discrimination require list all credits reporting against and the reddit worthy customers, and that credit reporting against and the reddit worthy customers, and that credit reporting agai

THE ALTONOMER PREFIXES

For purposes of these "Cosigner Notices" only, the works "you," "your," and "youss" meen the person(s) who signed his Note as a cosigner, and the word "hank" means (Keyllank National Association, Cleveland, Ohio, or its successors and assigns, and any other holder of this Note.

any other notice to this whole.

NOTICE TO COSIGNER: You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you do. If the borrower doesn't pay like debt, you will have to. He sure you can afford to pay if you have to, and that you want to accept this responsibility. You may have to pay up to the full amount of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You may also have to pay tace fees or collection costs, which increase this amount. The bank can collect this debt from you without first stying to collect from the borrower. The bank can use the same collection methods against you that

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

Cosigner Name:

can be used against the berrower, such as suing you, garmshing your wages, rie. If this debt is even in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record. This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.

ILLINOUS AND MICHIGAN RESIDENTS: Notice to Cosigner. You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you do. If the borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have to Re same you can afford to pay if you have it, and that you want to accept this responsibility. You may have to pay up to be full amount of the debt if the borrower doesn to pay. You may also have to pay late feet or collection coxes, which increase this amount. The bank can use the same collection rechest against you that the can be used against the borrower, such as using you, garmising our wayes, etc. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your crealist count. This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.

NEW YORK RESIDENTS: NOTICE: You agree to pay the debt identified below and though you may not personally receive say peoperty, services, or money, if you may not personally receive say peoperty, services, or money, if you may not personally receive say peoperty, services, or money, if we to pay. You should know that the Total of Payments listed below does not include finance charges resulting from delinquency, late charges, repossession or foreclosure costs, court costs or attorney's fees, or other charges, repossession or foreclosure costs, court costs or attorney's fees, or other charges, requires the horsower to pay such costs and charges. This notice is not the note contract, the payment of which you are quarantecing, requires the browwer to pay such costs and charges. This notice is not the note contract, the payment of which you are quarantecing, requires the browwer to pay such costs and charges. This notice is not the payer continue, of worther writing fat the exact terms of your obligation.

INFORMER SEARCH THE ADD AND THE SEARC

of your obligation.

IDENTIFICATION OF DEBT(S) YOU MAY HAVE TO PAY

Name of Debtor; 'The person(s) identified as the borrower and co-borrower at the

DENTIFICATION OF DERT(S) YOU MAY HAVE TO PAY
Name of Poblics: The personfs) identified as the borrower and co-borrower at the
time of Application.
Name of Crebbtr: KeyBank National Association, and its successors or assigns.
Date: The Date of this Note.
Kind of Debt: Education Lean
Total of Payments: The "Lean Amount Requested" identified at the time of
Application plus inserved as set forth in Paragraph E of this Note.
You acknowledge by your signature on this Note that you have been given a
completed corpy of this notice and of each writing that obligates you or the Debtor
on this debt.

completed copy of this notice and of each writing that obrightes you at the Debut this dobb.

VERMONT RESIDENTS: NOTICE TO COSIGNER: YOUR SIGNATURE ON THIS NOTE MEANS THAT YOU ARE EQUALLY LIABLE FOR REPAYMENT OF THIS LOAN. IF THE BORROWER DOES NOT PAY, THE LENDER HAS A LEGAL RIGHTTO COLLECT FROM YOU.

N. COSIGNER OBLIGATIONS

If I signed this Note as a conginer, I hereby unconditionally guarantee payment of the borrower's and/or or-borrower's Lean(s) subject to the terms of link Note when the nant in accordance with the terms of this Note. I waive notice of accoptance rocof, and waive all outerly ship defenses that might be available to me (including, without himitation, contribution, subregulation, and econoration). I agree that the borrower may agree to any forbearance, extension, or other modification of the repayment schedule und that such agreement will be binding on me. Unless required by applicable law, it shall not be necessary for you to resort to or exhaust your remedies against the borrower audior co-borrower before calling on me to make repayment. I acknowledge that I have read, indensuand, and agree to the terms of the original to be browned in Paragraph N and that applies to me and, if I am a California or lower especies, to the iterms of the separate state-specific conjuger notice incorporated in and mode a part of this Note that typelse to me.

O. INFORMATION SHARING
Ditalosure of Account Information: You may share information within the
KeyCarp family of companies as well as with unaffiliated third parties external to
Key as described in your Privacy Policy. We specifically consent to you during
laformation within the KeyCorp family of companies and with reternal
unaffiliated third parties.
NOTE: I/we may elect to opt out of information sharing, or may be automatically
optic-out under our state law, as described in your Pervacy Policy. If like are
opted out, that election will override this consent to share, except for those
instances in which you are otherwise permitted to share by law without our
constent.

P. DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNT INFORMATION TO CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES; INACCURATE INFORMATION

REPORTING AGENCIES; INACCURATE INFORMATION
You are communicated to furnishing complete and accurate information about credit accounts, including any Loan subject to the terms of this Note, to consumer reporting agencies. If the information you report about my of my Loans is insaccurate, I will write to: Great Lakes Higher Education Servicing Corporation, P.O. Rox. 7860, Massion, WI 53707-7860. In my correspondence I should include the following information: my social security number, Loan account number(s), a copy of my credit burses reporting reflecting the insecurate information, and my name, address, city, state and 2m conde.

Borrower Social Security Number:

Cosiener Social Security Number:

Q. ARBITRATION

This Arbitration Provision sets forth the circumstances and procedures under which Claims (as defined below) may be arbitrated instead of highested in court. This Arbitration Provision supersedes and replaces any existing arbitration provision supersedes and replaces any existing arbitration provision.

Q. ARBITRATION
This Arbitration Provision sets forth the circumstances and procedures under which
Claims (as defined below) may be arbitrated instead of inigated in court. This
Arbitration Provision superactes and replaces any cristing arbitration provision
between your and me.

This Arbitration Provision superactes and replaces any existing arbitration provision
between your and me.

This Arbitration Provision superacted and replaces are cristing arbitration provision
to key Education Resource-Arbitration, F.O. Bax 55448, Borton, M. 622/65445. The notice nout include the borrower's name, the names of say controver or coalgare and the Loan unterher(t) and must be algored by the
borrower and the co-barrower or coalgare, if any. The rejection notice should
not Include any other correspondence. Calling the leader to reject the
Arbitration Provision or providing notice by any other manner or format than
as described above will not operate as a rejection of this Arbitration Provision
and consequently this Arbitration Provision will become part of this Note
Rejection of this Arbitration Provision was not serve as rejection of only other
torm or condition of this Potes or Frine Promissory Note (so defined below) with
the leader governing the Loan or loan.

For parposes of this Arbitration Provision was not serve as rejection of many other
torm or condition of this Potes or Frine Promissory Note (so defined below) with
the leader governing the Loan or loan.

For parposes of this Arbitration is creating to the Loan Program
for the Loan of the Arbitration Provision was an expensive provision does

For parposes of this Arbitration Provision was the server or may have

In effect under the Loan Program before the date of this Note (and that is
consolidated or the total outstanding balance of which is aggregated under Paragraph B ("Prior Promissory Note"), and all of their respective paraces,

wholy or mapping womed stabilitions, arbitrating phalmace of which is aggregated under Paragraph B. (Brior Promissory Note, any Pri

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

COSIGNE NAME.

IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM, NETHER YOU NOR I WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM, OR TO ENGAGE IN PRE-ARBITRATION DISCOVERY EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE APPLICABLE ARBITRATION RULES PRUTHER, I WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PETALINION TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. EXCEPT AS SET FORTH BELOW, THE ARBITRATORS DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND BINDING. I UNDERSTAND THAT OF THE RIGHTS THAT I WOULD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. THE FEES CHARGED BY THE ARBITRATION.

FINAL AND BINDING. I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER RIGHTS THAT I WOILD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. THE FEES CHARGED BY THE ARBITRATION AND RESERVE ACCURET. There shall be no sutherity for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis. Furthermore, an arbitration can only decide your or my Claims(a) and may not consolidate or join the claims of other persons that may have smaller claims. There shall be no pre-arbitration discovery escope as provided for in the applicable Arbitration flees. Any arbitration hearing that lattend shall take place in the federal judicial district of my residence. At my written request, you will pay all fees up to \$10,000 classed by the arbitration administrator for any Claims(a) season by me in the arbitration, after I have poid an amount equivalent to the fee, if any, for filing such claims(b) in state or federal court (whichever it less) in the judicial district in which I reside. (If I have already paid a filing fee for asserting the Claim(b) in court, I will not be required to pay that amount again, If If am required to pay any fogs in excess of \$100,000 classes and the arbitration administrator ("additional foot"), you will consider a strength of the additionals feet. The extent that you do not approve my request, the Arbitrator will decide whether you or I will be responsible for paying any such additional fees. If the arbitrator essues an award in your flower, will not be required to the right to the such arbitrator of for which party or ward in the administrator or for which you can responsible. Each party shall bor the expense of the administrator or for which you can responsible. Each party shall bor the expense of the administrator or for which you can responsible. Each party shall bor the expense of the administrator or for which you can responsible. Each party shall bor the expense of the administrator or for which you can responsible. Each party shall bor the expense of the administrator or for which you can responsible. Each party sh

Borrower Social Security Number.

Cosigner Social Security Number:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

Pos purposes of paragraph R.I. "T", "we", and "my" refer only to borrower.

2. Cancellation of Disbussements - If I am not satisfied with the terms of each disbussement: as approved, I may cancel such disbussement to you within thirty (30) days after the Disbussement Date, If the disbussement both you within thirty (30) days after the Disbussement Date, If the disbussement was sent to the foathusion or other third party, I will instruct the Institution or authorized party to return the disbussement proceeds to you within this thirty (30)-days period. I will notify you of this cancellation trustruction. Wy timely cancellation of a disbussement will not terminate my obligations under this Note trafess the cancelled disbussement will not terminate my obligations under this Note trafess the cancelled disbussement will not terminate my obligations under this Note trafess the cancelled disbussement will not terminate my obligations to Minnes - I understand that I must reput this Note though I may be under eighteen (18) years of age when this Note is signed.

4. Parlial Payments, No Winver of Rights - My responsibility for paying my Loan adjects the terms of this Notes or unaffected by the liability of any other person to me or by your failture to notify one that a captured payment has not the own made. Without long my your failture to notify one that a required payment has not been made. Without long any your gring that the hardest of a special handling and son the Criter Lakes Higher Education Corporation, Cash Operations, P.O. Box 2992, Milwankee, Wi S2021-2992, You endy delay, or all at teacher, or ware any of your grind under the capture of your public on any future encasion. You will not be obligated to make my delanted upon mic send may notice, present this Note to me for payment or make my delanted upon mic send may future encasion. You will not be obligated to make my delanted upon mic send may notice, present this Note to me for payment or m

promissory note relating to loans obtained under the Loan Program that I have signed, such new note will supermed and replace this Note.

9. Severability - If any provision of this Note is held involid or unsufforceable, that provision shall be considered omitted from this Note without affecting the validity or enforceability of the remainder of this Note.

10. Joint and Individual Liability - If more than one person signs this Note, 1 agree to be fully responsible for payment of this Note, and you may collect from me without theying to collect from other signers. You can extend or change the terms of payment and release any security without notifying me or releasing me from my responsibility on this Note.

and relaise any security without notifying me or releasing me from my responsibility on this Note.

11. Lean Changes - If the changes un any Loan subject to the terms of this Note exceed the amount permitted to be changed by the law that governs this Note, then such changes will be reduced to such permitted amount and any excess already collected will be applied as partial percayment of principal.

12. I acknowledge that by signing this Note, I am requesting that you will disturce funds on my behalf either directly to the institution or via check made payable to the Institution. I understand and acknowledge that the lender, any subsequent holder or their agents do not in any way endorse, promote or make any representations concerning any finistiation, including but not limited to the Institution hand in the Application. It is my (our) responsibility to determine the quality of the lastitution.

S. MY CERTIFICATION Identified to the linked States of America that Identified to the prelay of prefury under the leave of the United States of America that

S. MY CERTIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the following is true and correct. I certify flust the information contained or included in my Application for my Louis subject to the terms of this Note is true, complicit, and correct to the best of my, knowledge, and belief and is made in good fifth. I, also, certify that all proceeds of any such Loan will be used solely for educational expenses and/or other expenses relaining to the Loan Program. I authorize any Institution that I (or if I am not the student, the student) may aftend to release to the ender, subsequent holder, or their agents, any requested information pretunent to any Loan subject to the terms of this Note (e.g., employment, outfilment status, provident history, current address). I give you permission to request information from and to make whatever inquitted you consider necessary and appropriate (including requesting and obtaining a encourage report from consumer reporting agencies) in

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

Cosigner Name:

Cosigner Name:

Considering granting such Loan or disbursements under such Loan and for the purpose of any updates, renewals, or extensions of such Loan, reviewing to collection of my Loan, or for any other lawful purpose. I also authorize the lender, subsequent halder or their agents to check my credit and employment history and in answer questions about their credit experience with not. I also authorize the lender, subsequent holder, institution, or their agents, to relate discussive a to respond to my (i.e. If an my other lawful), to make inquiries from my (or, if I am and the student), the student's powers in a subsequent helder, string with respect to this Note and related documents. For the purpose of learning my current address and telephone number, I authorize the the purpose of learning my current address and telephone number, I authorize the chief the purpose of learning my current address and telephone number, I authorize to the individuals I have listed on my Application as references. I authorize to the individuals I have listed on my Application as references. I authorize the lender, subsequent holder or their agents to reduce information of the status of my Application or of any such Loan. I may sak you or a subsequent holder of my outhor of the status of my Application or of any outh Loan. I may sak you or a subsequent holder of my outhorize my lender of my other or my loader of my outhorize my lender of my outhorize my lender of my outhorize my lender of my lender of my outhorize my l

Borrower Social Security Number:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

CAUTION - IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I THOROUGHLY READ	THE CONTRACT SHEADE I SIGN IT	
	THE CONTRACT PERSONS I SPECIAL	
NOTICE TO CONSUMER/CUSTOMER:		
(a) I WILL NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT/NOTE BEFORE		VISED).
(b) I WILL NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT NOTE IF IT CO.		
(c) I AM ENTITLED TO AN EXACT COPY OF ANY ACREE	MENY I SEGN.	
(d) I BAVE THE RIGHT AT ANY TIME TO PAY IN ADVANC	CE THE UNPAID BALANCE DUE UNDE	ER THIS AGREEMENT/NOTE WITHOUT PENALTY
(c) I UNDERSTAND THAT THE MASTER STUDENT LOAN	PROMISSORY NOTE COVERNING M	IV LOAN CONTAINS AN ARBITRATION PROVISION
UNDER WHICH CERTAIN DISPUTES (AS DESCRIBED	IN THE ARBITRATION PROVISION) I	BETWEEN ME AND YOU AND/OR CERTAIN OTHER
PARTIES WILL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRA	THOS IS A SCIEND BY ME UD AUT U	OR CENTAIN OTHER PARTIES IF A DISPUTE IS
ARBITRATED, THE PARTIES WILL NOT HAVE THE O	ARON, IF ELEX. LED BY ME OR 100 O	HIDV DESOLVE IT AND OTHER DICHTS MAY BE
	PPDRTUNITY TO BAYE A JODGE OR	JURY RESULVE II AND OTHER MODITS PIRE OF
SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED.	N. W. dans and all Contract New	t
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this N	lote, Notices and an Cosigner Noti	ices.
	11 . 7 -	200//
	VOV. of , or	107
Borowcy's Signature	Nov. 2, 2	Social Security Number
	11 2 200	~ /
	100,000	Y
Corinner v. antire	Date	Social Security Number

Sign and mail Note to: Key Alternative Loan, c/o Great Lakes, P.O. Box 182736, Columbus, OH 43218-2736

YOU MUST RETURN ALL PAGES OF THIS SIGNED PROMISSORY NOTE

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Appendix Page 5

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore
Cosigner Name:

Borrower Social Security Number: Cosigner Social Security Number:

CALIFORNIA RESIDENTS COSIGNER NOTICE

NOTICE TO COSIGNER (Traducción en Inglés Se Requiere Por La Ley)

You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you do. If the borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you have to, and that you want to accept this responsibility.

You may have to pay up to the full amount of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You may also have to pay late fees or collection costs, which increase this amount.

The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, such as suing you, garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record.

This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.

AVISO PARA EL FIADOR (Spanish Translation Required By Law)

Se le está pidiendo que garantice esta deuda. Piénselo con cuidado antes de ponerse de acuerdo. Si la persona que ha pedido este préstamo no paga la deuda, usted tendrá que pagarla. Esté seguro de que usted podrá pagar si sea obligado a pagarla y de que usted desea aceptar la responsabilidad.

Si la persona que ha pedido el préstamo no paga la deuda, es posible que usted tenga que pagar la suma total de la deuda, mas los cargos por tardarse en el pago o el costo de cobranza, lo cual aumenta el total de esta suma.

El acreedor (financiero) puede cobrarle a usted sin, primeramente, tratar de cobrarle al deudor. Los mismos metodos de cobranza que pueden usarse contra el deudor, podran usarse contra usted, tales como presentar una demanda en corte, quitar parte de su sueldo, etc. Si alguna vez no se cumpla con la obligación de pagar esta deuda, se puede incluir esa información en la historia de credito de usted.

Este aviso no es el contrato mismo en que se le echa a usted la responsabilidad de la deuda.

(Cosigner Signature)

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Applicant's Name: (First & Last	Matt Kilgare
(Phys To Qualify as a Personal Reference the	ur, all must have COMPLETE Addresses, with City, State and <u>Zip Code</u> . ical address only, P.O. Box NOT acceptable.) e persons listed must have known the applicant for at least one (1) year d cannot reside at the same address.
Name;	Address:
1 V 2 V 2 V 2 V 2 V 2 V 2 V 2 V 2 V 2 V	Streel:
Home Phone#	City:StateZip Code
Name:	Address:
	Street:
Home Phone#	City:StateZip Code
Name:	Address:
	Streel:
Home Phone #	City:StateCode
Name:	Address:
	Street:
Home Phone #	City:StateZip Code f
	,
If you have any personal accomplis	thments, special skills or training that you Would like us to know prior view please list on a separate sheet of paper.
to an inter	
to an inter	3.
to an inter	3. contact information of the references.

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REDACTED

Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Key Alternative Loan

MATT C KILGORE

Creditor: KeyBank National Association Please direct all questions or correspondence to: Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. 2401 International Lane Madison, WI 53704-3192 (800) 236-4300

SILVER STATE HELICOPTERS LLC

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE The cost of your credit as a yearly rate.	CHARGE	Amount Financed The amount of credit provided to you or on your behalf.	Total of Payments The amount you will have paid after you have made all payments as scheduled.
5.16% c	\$44,098.80	\$55,950.00	\$100,048.80 e

Your payment schedule will be:

Number of Payments	Amount of Payments	Payments are Due Monthly Commencing
240 ^e	\$416.87 e	05/01/2007 ^c

Variable Rate: The Variable Rate on this loan may increase or decrease and is equal to the "Current Index", plus a margin as defined below. The "Current Index" is the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") published in the "Money Rates" section of The Wall Street Journal on the 20th day of the month preceding the applicable "Change Date" (e.g., December, March, June and September). During the Interim Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3.30% per annum. During the Repayment Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3.30% per annum. The Variable Rate will change quarterly on the first day of each January, April, July and October (the "Change Date"). Under no circumstances will the Variable Rate exceed the maximum rate allowable under applicable law. Increases in the Variable Rate may result in an increase in the number of payments while decreases in the Variable Rate may result in a decrease in the number of payments while decreases in the Variable Rate may result in a decrease in the interest rate may result in a payment will not repay the loan in full within the maximum permissible Repayment Period, an increase in the interest rate may result in higher payments. For example, if your repayment amount is \$62,700 for 240 months with a monthly payment of \$564.13 and an initial interest rate of 9.00% and on the first Change Date the interest rate increases to 9.50% immediately after your first monthly payment, your repayment period would increase by 34 months. The repayment term is the aggregate of the outstanding principal balance of all your loans in the program as outlined in your Promissory Note. The most current Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure will provide the repayment term.

Late Charge: If a payment is more than 15 days late, you may be charged the lesser of \$5 or 5% of the unpaid amount of the payment.

<u>Prepayment:</u> If you pay off your loan early, you will not be entitled to a refund of any part of the Loan Fee. If you pay off your loan early, you will not have to pay a penalty.

See your appropriate contract documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, prepayment penalties and any required repayment in full before the scheduled date. All numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosure are estimates based on your 10/01/2006 anticipated graduation date.

(e) means an estimate

Itemization of the Amount Financed of: \$55,950.00
Loan Amount given to you directly: N/A
Amount paid to others on your behalf: \$55,950.00
Total Loan Fee: \$0.00

Schedule of Advances of Amount Financed

Scheduled Date of Advances	Amount of Advances	Loan Fee
11/15/2004	\$16,000.00	\$0.00
01/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
04/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
07/05/2005	\$13,212.00	\$0.00

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REDACTED

Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure - Revised Disclosure Key Alternative Loan

07/01/2005 MATT C KILGORE

Creditor: KeyBank National Association Please direct all questions or correspondence to: Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. 2401 International Lane Madison, WI 53704-3192 (800) 236-4300

SILVER STATE HELICOPTERS LLC

RATE	FINANCE CHARGE The dollar amount the credit will cost you.	Amount Financed The amount of credit provided to you or on your behalf.	Total of Payments The amount you will have paid after you have made all payments as scheduled.
6.62% ^e	\$60,157.20 ^e	\$55,950.00	\$116,107.20 ^e

Your payment schedule will be:

Number of Payments	Amount of Payments	Payments are Due Monthly Commencing
240°	\$483.78 ^c	05/01/2007 [©]

Variable Rate: The Variable Rate on this loan may increase or decrease and is equal to the "Current Index", plus a margin as defined below. The "Current Index" is the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") published in the "Money Rates" section of The Wall Street Journal on the 20th day of the month preceding the applicable "Change Date" (e.g., December, March, June and September), During the Interim Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3,30% per annum. During the Repayment Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3,30% per annum. The Variable Rate will change quarterly on the first day of each January, April, July and October (the "Change Date"). Under no circumstances will the Variable Rate exceed the maximum rate allowable under applicable law. Increases in the Variable Rate may result in an increase in the number of payments while decreases in the Variable Rate may result in a decrease in the number of payments. In cases where the monthly payment will not repay the loan in full within the maximum permissible Repayment Period, an increase in the interest rate may result in higher payments. For example, if your repayment amount is \$62,700 for 240 months with a monthly payment of \$564.13 and an initial interest rate of 9.00% and on the first Change Date the interest rate increases to 9.50% immediately after your first monthly payment, your repayment period would increase by 34 months. The repayment term is the aggregate of the outstanding principal balance of all your loans in the program as outlined in your Promissory Note. The most current Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure will provide the repayment term.

Late Charge: If a payment is more than 15 days late, you may be charged the lesser of \$5 or 5% of the unpaid amount of the payment.

<u>Prepayment:</u> If you pay off your loan early, you will not be entitled to a refund of any part of the Loan Fee. If you pay off your loan early, you will not have to pay a penalty.

See your appropriate contract documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, prepayment penalties and any required repayment in full before the scheduled date. All numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosure are estimates based on your 10/01/2006 anticipated graduation date.

(e) means an estimate

Itemization of the Amount Financed of:	\$55,950.00
Loan Amount given to you directly:	\$13,212.00
Amount paid to others on your behalf:	\$42,738.00
Total Loan Fee:	\$0.00

Schedule of Advances of Amount Financed

Scheduled Date of Advances	Amount of Advances	Loan Fee
11/15/2004	\$16,000.00	\$0.00
01/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
04/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
07/05/2005	\$13,212.00	\$0.00

35-70 (05/05