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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DEC 12 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEKLEZGI GEBREZGIABHER,

No. 09-17377

Petitioner - Appellant,

D.C. No. 5:06-cv-07864-RMW

v.

MEMORANDUM*

MIKE C. KREMER,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 3, 2012 San Francisco, California

Before: HAWKINS, TASHIMA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Teklezgi Gebrezgiabher ("Gebrezgiabher") appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his second degree murder conviction. We affirm.

^{*} This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Although the state trial court erred in this case by instructing the jury that voluntary manslaughter requires intent to kill, *see People v. Lasko*, 999 P.2d 666, 670–72 (Cal. 2000) (voluntary manslaughter does not require intent to kill), the question we ask on habeas review is whether that error was constitutional in nature, *Pulido v. Chrones*, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010).¹

Constitutional error requires a showing that the flawed instruction "so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defective instruction "must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole." *Id.* at 72–73 (citation omitted).

Here, in addition to properly instructing the jury on second degree murder, the judge instructed that "[t]o establish that a killing is murder and not manslaughter," the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not done in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel, or in unreasonable self-defense.

Assuming, as we must, that the jury followed the instructions it was given, *Doe* v. *Busby*, 661 F.3d 1001, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A habeas court must presume that

¹ Were we to find constitutional error, we would then determine whether, under *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993), that error was prejudicial. *Pulido*, 629 F.3d at 1012. As we find no constitutional error, we do not reach the question of prejudice.

jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gebrezgiabher did not act in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel, or in unreasonable self-defense. As a result, the jury could not have convicted him of voluntary manslaughter even absent the flawed instruction. The error, therefore, was not constitutional.

AFFIRMED.