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8
 9 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
 10 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
 11

12 REBECCA SWIFT, individually, on behalf of the
 13 general public, and all others similarly situated,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 ZYNGA GAME NETWORK INC.;
 ADKNOWLEDGE, INC.; D/B/A SUPER
 17 REWARDS; KITN MEDIA USA, INC., D/B/A
 SUPER REWARDS,

18 Defendants.
 19
 20
 21

Case No.: CV 09-5443 EDL

**DEFENDANT ZYNGA INC.'S NOTICE
 OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
 COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
 MOTION TO STAY LITIGATION;
 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
 AUTHORITIES**

Date: June 14, 2011
 Time: 9:00 a.m.
 Judge: Elizabeth D. Laporte
 Ctrm.: E – 15th Floor

Complaint Filed: November 17, 2009

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1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND MOTION TO**
2 **STAY LITIGATION**

3 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

4 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 14, 2011, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
5 matter may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable Elizabeth Laporte, Defendant Zynga Inc.
6 (“Zynga”) will move the Court for an order compelling arbitration of Plaintiff Rebecca Swift’s
7 claims and staying the litigation. This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the
8 supporting Memorandum, the Declaration of Sean Hanley, all pleadings in this action, and the
9 argument of counsel.

10 Dated: May 5, 2011

DUANE MORRIS LLP

11 By:

/s/

12 Richard L. Seabolt
13 Attorneys for Defendant,
14 ZYNGA INC.

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Defendant Zynga Inc. moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Rebecca Swift's claims
4 pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, ___ S.Ct. ___,
5 2011 WL 1561956 (April 27, 2011) ("*AT&T Mobility*"), which was issued last Wednesday, April 27,
6 2011.

7 In *AT&T Mobility*, the Court held that the controlling California law prohibiting enforcement
8 of arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitrations was preempted by the Federal Arbitration
9 Act ("FAA"). In fact, the Court went further, holding that – absent the express consent of the
10 contracting parties to arbitrate on a classwide basis – the FAA requires that arbitrations proceed only
11 on an individual basis. Zynga's relevant Terms of Service ("TOS") agreements provided for
12 arbitration of disputes. Until *AT&T Mobility* was decided, however, Zynga was prohibited by
13 California law from enforcing the right to compel an individual arbitration with the plaintiff,
14 Rebecca Swift, in the present case. Following this change in the law, Zynga now seeks to enforce its
15 contractual right to arbitrate Swift's claims on an individual basis.

16 Zynga is now entitled – and through this motion seeks – to compel arbitration and stay all
17 court proceedings. Zynga has acted promptly to assert its rights under *AT&T Mobility* and the Court
18 should now order that Swift pursue her claim in arbitration.

19 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

20 On November 17, 2009, Rebecca Swift filed an action against Zynga purporting to represent
21 herself and a class of persons similarly situated. The claims related to alleged monetary harm she
22 suffered after allegedly completing third-party advertising offers appearing in the "Offer Wall"
23 sections of Zynga's game pages. FAC, Dkt. 13. Swift alleges that she completed Offer Wall
24 transactions in Zynga's YoVille game in April and June 2009, but did not file her complaint or
25 otherwise notify Zynga of her problems with the advertisers/product service providers until
26 November 2009. *See id.* ¶¶37-40. Swift brought three purported causes of action for (1) violation of
27 the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (2) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
28 ("CLRA"); and, (3) unjust enrichment. *Id.*

1 Two different TOS agreements are relevant here. First, Swift accepted the terms of the
 2 YoVille TOS (the “YoVille TOS”) when she first logged on to play the YoVille game in April
 3 2009.¹ Hanley Decl. ¶¶3-4 & Ex. A. The YoVille TOS governed “the terms and conditions which
 4 apply to the use” of all “product[s] or service[s] offered by Zynga for use, subscription or sale.”
 5 Hanley Decl. Ex. A, p.1. The YoVille TOS contained the following provision requiring disputes to
 6 be arbitrated:

7 . . . You agree that any suit, action or proceeding arising out of or relating to these
 8 Terms of Use or any of the transactions contemplated herein or related to the Service
 9 or any contests or services thereon (including without limitation, statutory, equitable
 10 or tort claims) shall be resolved solely by binding arbitration before a sole arbitrator
 11 under the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”);
 12 provided, however, that notwithstanding the parties’ decision to resolve any and all
 13 disputes arising under these Terms of Use through arbitration, Zynga may bring an
 14 action in any court of applicable jurisdiction to protect its intellectual property rights
 15 or to seek to obtain injunctive relief or other equitable from a court to enforce the
 16 provisions these Terms of Use or to enforce the decision of the arbitrator. The
 17 arbitration will be held in San Francisco, California

13 Hanley Decl. Ex. A, p.17. The YoVille TOS also included language expressly stating that “Zynga
 14 has the right, at any time, to: . . . impose, change or modify the terms and conditions of these Terms of
 15 Use (“Changes”)” and that “[a]ny use of the Service by you after notice of the Changes, constitutes
 16 acceptance by you of any such Changes.” Hanley Decl. Ex. A, p.14. In addition, the YoVille TOS
 17 provides that “any such Changes shall be effective immediately upon notice by posting the Changes
 18 on Zynga’s Service or by any other method of notice Zynga deems appropriate.” *Id.*²

19 Second, Swift agreed to Zynga’s subsequent TOS applicable to all games, which came into
 20 effect on August 1, 2009 and superseded the YoVille TOS (the “Universal TOS”). Hanley Decl. at
 21 ¶6 and Ex. C. The Universal TOS provided that by “using or accessing the Service you agree to be
 22 bound by these Terms.” Hanley Decl. Ex. C, p.1.

23 Paragraph 12 of the Universal TOS provided that either Zynga or its game players could
 24

25 ¹ The YoVille TOS was amended on May 19, 2009. However, the changes are not relevant to this
 26 lawsuit and the arbitration provision was not changed. Hanley Decl. Ex. A, p.14, Ex. B, p.17.
 27 A copy of the YoVille TOS as amended on May 19, 2009, is attached to the Hanley Decl. as Ex. B.
 28 Both YoVille TOSs are referred to as the YoVille TOS in this brief.

² As a result of this language, Zynga believes that the August 1, 2009 Universal TOS governs this
 dispute.

1 require that disputes be arbitrated:

2 Binding Arbitration. If you and Zynga are unable to resolve a Dispute through
3 informal negotiations, either you or Zynga may elect to have the Dispute (except
4 those Disputes expressly excluded below) finally and exclusively resolved by binding
5 arbitration. Any election to arbitrate by one party shall be final and binding on the
6 other. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT ABSENT THIS PROVISION, YOU WOULD
7 HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT AND HAVE A JURY TRIAL. . .

8 Hanley Decl. Ex. C, (Universal TOS ¶12(d)).³ The same paragraph also provided that the FAA
9 would determine the arbitrability of the dispute and that either party could petition a court of law to
10 compel arbitration:

11 The determination of whether a Dispute is subject to arbitration shall be governed by
12 the Federal Arbitration Act and determined by a court rather than an arbitrator . . .
13 Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, you and Zynga may litigate in court
14 to compel arbitration, stay proceedings pending arbitration, or to confirm, modify,
15 vacate or enter judgment on the award entered by the arbitrator.

16 Hanley Decl. Ex. C, (Universal TOS ¶12(d)).

17 The subsequent section of Paragraph 12 of the TOS provided that no actions could be
18 brought on a representative or class-wide basis:

19 You and Zynga agree that any arbitration shall be limited to the Dispute between
20 Zynga and you individually. To the full extent permitted by law, (1) no arbitration
21 shall be joined with any other; (2) there is no right or authority for any Dispute to be
22 arbitrated on a class-action basis or to utilize class action procedures; and (3) there is
23 no right or authority for any Dispute to be brought in a purported representative
24 capacity on behalf of the general public or any other persons.

25 Hanley Decl. Ex. C, (Universal TOS ¶12(e)).

26 During the pendency of this case, controlling California law precluded Zynga from
27 compelling such individual arbitrations under the California Supreme Court decision *Discover Bank*
28 *v. Superior Court*, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (“*Discover Bank*”). However, just last week, on April 27,
2011, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled *Discover Bank* and held that the FAA requires courts to
give full force and effect to parties’ contractual rights, and specifically to enforce bilateral
arbitrations except where the parties explicitly contracted to the contrary. *AT&T Mobility LLC*, ____
S.Ct. ____, 2011 WL 1561956, at *10 (Slip. Op. p.13). Accordingly, Zynga moves the court to
enforce its newly confirmed right to arbitrate Swift’s claims on an individual basis.

³ The term “Dispute” is defined as “any dispute, controversy or claim related to th[ese] Terms.”
Hanley Decl. Ex. C, (TOS ¶ 12(c)).

1
2

III. DISCUSSION

3

A. Swift Is Contractually Bound To Arbitrate Disputes.

4 In her First Amended Complaint, Swift claims that she played various Zynga games. FAC,
5 Dkt. 13 ¶36. As a Zynga game user who played YoVille, Swift agreed to Zynga's YoVille TOS and
6 then its Universal TOS. Hanley Decl. ¶¶2-6, Exs. A-C. The YoVille TOS applied to all "product[s]
7 or service[s] offered by Zynga for use, subscription or sale." Hanley Decl. Ex. A, p. 1. The
8 Universal TOS applied to users' "use of Zynga.com and/or the games and applications offered by
9 Zynga Game Network, Inc. ("Zynga") and accessed through third party web sites (collectively, the
10 "Service")." Hanley Decl. Ex. C, p.1.

11 Swift alleges that she used Zynga's games through Facebook.com. FAC, Dkt. 13, ¶25. Swift
12 alleges she was harmed after completing various third-party advertising offers in April and June
13 2009, that, she claims, involved a fraudulent scheme between Zynga and various third parties. *Id.* at
14 ¶¶6, 37-40. Irrespective of the merits of those claims, they undoubtedly fall under the TOSs. As
15 detailed in the Statement of Facts, above, each TOS provides that all disputes (defined to encompass
16 all claims relating to the TOS) were subject to binding arbitration. Hanley Decl. Ex. C (Universal
17 TOS ¶12(c), (d)), Ex. A (YoVille TOS).

18

B. The Arbitration Agreement Is Enforceable Under The Federal Arbitration Act.

19 The FAA governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements in contracts involving
20 interstate commerce. 9 U.S.C. §1 *et seq.*; *Preston v. Ferrer*, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008). A
21 transaction occurring over the Internet is by its very nature interstate commerce. *U.S. v. Sutcliffe*,
22 505 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[a]s both the means to engage in commerce and the method by
23 which transactions occur, the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce");
24 *Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.*, 725 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same). Here,
25 Plaintiff Rebecca Swift alleges in the Complaint that she engaged in transactions over the Internet
26 with third parties and that she was harmed as a result of those transactions. *See, e.g.*, FAC ¶¶39-40.
27 Accordingly, the transactions at issue here involve interstate commerce.

28 The FAA establishes a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration when the parties contract for

1 that mode of dispute resolution. *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995);
2 *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1984). Once triggered, the FAA mandates that:

3 A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
4 involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
5 arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
6 whole or any part thereof, . . ., shall be valid, irrevocable, and
7 enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
8 revocation of any contract.

9 9 U.S.C. §2. Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues must be resolved in favor of
10 arbitration. *Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp.*, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
11 (1983). Motions to compel arbitration should be granted in all cases unless the arbitration provision
12 is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. *United Steelworkers of*
13 *America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.*, 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). To that end, courts, “upon
14 being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
15 not an issue, . . . shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
16 the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. §4.

17 Because the dispute involves interstate commerce and is governed by an agreement between
18 the parties containing a now-effective arbitration provision, the FAA controls and requires the
19 present dispute to be ordered to arbitration. Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages must be
20 pursued in arbitration.

21 **C. The Recent *AT&T Mobility* Decision Held That Contracting Parties Are Entitled
22 To Resolve Disputes In Arbitration On An Individual Basis Unless They
23 Specifically Agreed to the Contrary.**

24 Under prior California law, the arbitration clauses contained in the Zynga TOSs were deemed
25 unenforceable. In *Discover Bank*, the California Supreme Court held that arbitration provisions
26 could not require that consumer claims involving small amounts of money to be arbitrated on an
27 individual basis only. 36 Cal. 4th at 162-163. The court held such arbitration provisions would be
28 unconscionable and unenforceable under California law. *Id.* The court further concluded that
California law in this regard was not preempted by the FAA, because the FAA authorized courts to
avoid arbitration agreements on principles of contract law, including unconscionability. *Id.* at 167.
Accordingly, since *Discover Bank*, federal and state courts interpreting that decision consistently

1 have held such arbitration provisions in consumer contracts of adhesion unenforceable under
2 California law. *See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.*, 498 F. 3d 976, 990 (9th
3 Cir. 2007); *Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc.*, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451–1453 (2006); *Oestreicher v.*
4 *Alienware Corp.*, 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067-1069 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

5 Last Wednesday, April 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled *Discover Bank* in *AT&T*
6 *Mobility*. ___ S.Ct. ___, 2011 WL 1561956. In a broad ruling, the Court held that private arbitration
7 agreements must be enforced according to their terms. *Id.*, at *8 (Slip. Op. p.5) (*citing Volt*
8 *Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.*, 489 U.S. 468, 478
9 (1989)). While the FAA, section 2, contained a savings clause that allowed generally applicable
10 contract defenses to be used to invalidate contracts containing arbitration agreement, the FAA
11 nonetheless preempted all “state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
12 FAA’s objectives.” *Id.* at *7 (Slip. Op. p.9). The California Supreme Court’s decision in *Discover*
13 *Bank* “interfere[d] with arbitration” because it allowed courts to disregard the parties’ contractual
14 agreement to arbitrate disputes only on an individual basis. *Id.* at *10 (Slip. Op. p.12). This upset
15 the FAA’s purposes of creating a quick, informal process for resolving disputes. *Id.* at *11 (Slip.
16 Op. pp.14-15). Classwide arbitration would also “greatly increase[] risks to defendants” because the
17 FAA’s intent to create a forum for disputes to be resolved quickly and cost-effectively would be
18 undermined “when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are
19 aggregated and decided at once.” *Id.*, at *12 (Slip. Op. pp.15-16).

20 The Court explained that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation”
21 and the parties’ contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes pursuant to the terms of that agreement
22 took primacy under the FAA. *Id.* at *13 (Slip. Op. p.16). The Court rejected the argument that
23 small-dollar claims might not be effectively recoverable, holding that “[s]tates cannot require a
24 procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.” *Id.* (Slip.
25 Op. p.17). The Court held that, under the FAA, unless the contracting parties *explicitly* agreed to
26 class arbitration, arbitrations could only proceed on an individual basis. *Id.* at *10 (Slip. Op. p.13).
27 The Court discussed how its previous decision in *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*, 130
28 S.Ct. 1758 (2010) held that state public policy could not be used to override the intent of the FAA in

1 understanding the significance of silence in an arbitration provision concerning class issues. *Id.* The
2 Court then held that based on *Stolt-Nielsen* and the situation presented to it in the *AT&T Mobility*
3 case, “[t]he conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by *Discover*
4 *Bank* rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.” *Id.* In other words, class arbitration
5 would only be allowed when the parties specifically consented to it. The Court explained,
6 “Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with the fundamental attributes of
7 arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” *Id.* at *9 (Slip. Op. p.9).

8 Here, there are two TOSs with arbitration provisions. The Universal TOS contains an
9 explicit requirement that claims such as Swift’s be brought on an individual basis. Hanley Decl. Ex.
10 C, (Universal TOS ¶¶ 12(d)-(e)). The YoVille TOS requires arbitration, but is silent on whether that
11 arbitration can proceed on a classwide basis or not. *See* Hanley Decl. Ex. A, p.17. Under *AT&T*
12 *Mobility*, such silence now cannot be read as authorizing a class arbitration. Therefore, because both
13 potentially applicable TOSs now confer the right for Zynga to arbitrate Swift’s claims on an
14 individual basis under *AT&T Mobility*, the Court should compel arbitration of those claims.

15 **D. The Court Should Stay The Action Pending Completion Of The Arbitration.**

16 It is indisputable that when a court determines that a suit or proceeding is referable to
17 arbitration, it must stay any and all of its proceedings. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 of the FAA provides:

18 [I]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
19 any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
20 the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
21 such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
22 application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
23 been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
24 the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

25 9 U.S.C. § 3. Under the FAA, courts “are obligated to grant stays of litigation under Section 3 of the
26 [Federal] Arbitration Act.” *Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., supra*, 460 U.S. at 26; *AT&T Corp. v.*
27 *Innocom Telecom LLC*, 2007 WL 163193 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Laporte, J.) (“Upon request, a federal
28 court must stay an action on issues that by written agreement are subject to arbitration, in order to
allow arbitration of a suit subject to such clause”). Further, a stay under the FAA of the entire
pending action is appropriate so that the arbitration may proceed, even if certain claims are

