No. 16-56843

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VIDANGEL, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant,

V.

DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.; LUCASFILM LTD. LLC; TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION; AND WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Hon. André Birotte Jr. No. 2:16-cv-04109-AB-PLA

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

VOLUME 3 OF 3

(Pages 573-749)

Brendan S. Maher Daniel L. Geyser Douglas D. Geyser STRIS & MAHER LLP 6688 N. Central Expy., Suite 1650 Dallas, TX 75206 Telephone: (214) 396-6630 Facsimile: (210) 978-5430

December 30, 2016

Peter K. Stris Elizabeth Rogers Brannen Dana Berkowitz Victor O'Connell STRIS & MAHER LLP 725 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1830 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 995-6800 Facsimile: (213) 261-0299 peter.stris@strismaher.com

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant VidAngel, Inc.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7	GLENN D. POMERANTZ (SBN 112503 glenn.pomerantz@mto.com KELLY M. KLAUS (SBN 161091) kelly.klaus@mto.com ROSE LEDA EHLER (SBN 296523) rose.ehler@mto.com ALLYSON R. BENNETT (SBN 302090) allyson.bennett@mto.com MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, Thirty-Fifth Flo Los Angeles, California 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702	·
8	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
9	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
10	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA
11	WESTERN	DIVISION
12	DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC., LUCASFILM LTD. LLC.	Case No. 16-cv-04109-AB (PLAx)
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1

INTRODUCTION

2 VidAngel's overarching defense is that it should be entirely exempt from 3 "liability under any provisions of the Copyright Act" because it filters. Opp. 15. 4 That is absurd. VidAngel's tortured reading of the Family Movie Act ("FMA") 5 contradicts the law's plain language and on-point legislative history, and requires a 6 finding that Congress, in passing a narrow exemption, intended to upend the 7 Copyright Act entirely. If VidAngel were right, then any service could rip, copy 8 and stream content from DVDs and Blu-ray discs ("Discs") with impunity—simply 9 by offering users the option to filter out mere seconds of that content. Relying on its 10 sweeping interpretation of the FMA, VidAngel argues the Court should allow it to continue to rip Discs, and then copy and stream Plaintiffs' works to an active user 11 12 base of nearly [100,000] (and growing).

13 The case for injunctive relief is overwhelming. VidAngel's violations of §§ 106 and 1201 are clear, and its legal defenses are meritless.¹ All of the equitable 14 15 factors weigh decisively for an injunction. Courts consistently hold that unauthorized streaming services like VidAngel cause immediate and irreparable 16 17 harm to copyright owners. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 286 (2d 18 Cir. 2012); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 2014 WL 5393867, at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. 19 Oct. 23, 2014); Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 20 1012-14 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("Zediva"). VidAngel's argument that Plaintiffs waited 21 too long to sue for an injunction contradicts Ninth Circuit authority and the facts. 22 Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2014).

VidAngel's attempt to portray itself as a victim is belied by VidAngel's
strategy of seeking forgiveness instead of permission. VidAngel ripped and
infringed content, in the words of its CEO, Mr. Harmon, to get "a lot bigger" before
trying to "get licensing from Hollywood." Ehler Decl. Ex. DD at 366. In other

 $\begin{array}{c|c} 27 \\ \hline 1 \\ \hline 1 \\ \hline 28 \\ \hline 1 \\ \hline 28 \\ \hline 1 \\ \hline$

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words, VidAngel deliberately violated Plaintiffs' rights to have better leverage in
 negotiating for licenses. Moreover, despite VidAngel's contrary insinuations,
 VidAngel *did not* ask Plaintiffs to discuss a streaming license until *after* this lawsuit.
 And even that request was a transparent attempt to create evidence for opposing this
 motion or supporting VidAngel's baseless antitrust counterclaim. In arguing against
 an injunction, VidAngel asks the Court to reward its deceitful tactics.

7 Contrary to VidAngel's rhetoric, Plaintiffs are not trying to stop lawful 8 filtering. This case simply is not about filtering. Plaintiffs' claims are aimed at 9 VidAngel's unauthorized and illegal ripping, copying and streaming to the public of 10 Plaintiff's copyrighted works. The legitimate streaming services with which VidAngel claims to compete all have licenses from copyright owners for the works 11 they stream. VidAngel does not, and the fact that it offers filtering in connection 12 13 with its streaming service does nothing to excuse the need to obtain such licenses. Notably, VidAngel omits to tell the Court that another filtering service, ClearPlay, 14 15 has continued to operate for more than a decade since the FMA was passed, or that it offers filtering to Google Play users who access authorized streams from Google 16 Play's licensed service.² A company that wants to filter lawfully does not have to 17 violate the DMCA and infringe copyright to do so. 18

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ARGUMENT

20I.THE FMA PROVIDES NO DEFENSE FOR VIOLATING THE DMCA
OR PLAINTIFFS' EXCLUSIVE REPRODUCTION AND PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHTS

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A. VidAngel's Argument Contradicts The FMA's Clear Language

- 23 The FMA does not authorize a party that filters to circumvent access controls,
- 24 to copy movies and TV shows, or to stream them. Rather, the FMA exempts only
- ²⁶²Bennett Decl. Ex. A (ClearPlay users can apply filters to content streamed on computers or on their televisions, using Google's Chromecast, Apple's Air Play or
- an HDMI cable). VidAngel distinguishes ClearPlay in part because it offers only standard definition (SD) and not high definition (HD) resolution, but over [100] of
- ²⁸ VidAngel's users choose SD over HD. See Ehler Decl. Ex. Z at 296.

1 the act of "making imperceptible . . . limited portions of audio or video content."
2 § 110(11).³ VidAngel's argument is impossible to square with the FMA's text.

3 First, the FMA does not address DMCA violations or create an exemption 4 through silence. The FMA is clear that it provides a defense only to § 106 rights, 5 which are different from § 1201 rights. The latter impose a prohibition on circumvention of access control measures. If Congress intended the FMA to excuse 6 7 a DMCA violation, it would have said so. In fact, Congress considered explicitly 8 stating that the FMA would not be a defense to an anti-circumvention claim, but the 9 Register of Copyrights told it that doing so was unnecessary since, as a rule, 10 statutory exceptions to § 106 rights do not apply to § 1201. See Hearing on H.R. 4586, Serial No. 94 at 84, 89 (June 17, 2014) (RJN Ex. E at 236, 241). 11

Second, VidAngel is wrong that the FMA "expressly provides" that VidAngel 12 13 can "transmit" performances of movies as long as "a fixed copy of the altered content is not created."⁴ Opp. 12 (emphasis VidAngel's). The FMA provides an 14 exemption only for the narrow act of "making imperceptible" portions of an 15 audiovisual work during a performance of such work. Nothing in the language 16 17 authorizes the performance itself or the copying of those works. The acts of 18 publicly performing (transmitting) and copying copyrighted works are different (and 19 fundamental) rights of a copyright owner. If Congress had intended to limit the reproduction or public performance rights, it would have said expressly that copying 20

21

³ Congress intended the FMA to resolve disputes in then-pending litigation about 22 whether filtering that did not result in the creation of a fixed copy infringed the exclusive rights to create derivative works and distribute copies. H.R. Rep. 109-23 33(1) at 6-7, 69-72 (Minority Views) (Apr. 12, 2005) (RJN Ex. K at 483-85, 500-24 02). This case, in contrast, does not involve either of those rights. ⁴ VidAngel does not comply with the FMA requirement that no altered copy be 25 fixed. As Plaintiffs demonstrated, and VidAngel does not dispute, altered portions of Plaintiffs' movies are [fixed—i.e., copied—to servers and stored there for up to 26 24 hours]. Schumann Decl. ¶ 11-12; Mot. 22 n.11. VidAngel argues that it does 27 not fix "complete" copies, Opp. 15-16, but the FMA forbids the copying of any 28 "altered version," which does not have to be the entirety of the work.

1 and transmitting works are exempt when done by a service that filters.

2 VidAngel argues that it streams from "authorized copies" because it uses 3 "authorized (not bootlegged) copies of physical discs" from "the legal market." 4 Opp. 13. This is irrelevant because VidAngel has no right to stream Plaintiffs' 5 content at all. In any event, VidAngel's argument is wordplay. The Disc that 6 VidAngel acquires contains an authorized copy. When VidAngel illegally 7 circumvents access-controls and copies content from the Disc to a computer or 8 server, VidAngel creates a new copy. This copying violates the reproduction right. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 9 10 ("the reproduction right is necessarily implicated when a copyrighted work is embodied in a new material object"). And the new copy that VidAngel makes, and 11 "from" which it streams to thousands of users, is not authorized. 12

Third, VidAngel's interpretation of the FMA is foreclosed by the statute's
savings clause, which directs that courts shall not construe the FMA "to imply
further rights under section 106 . . . or to have any effect on defenses or limitations
on rights granted under any other section" of Title 17. § 110 (last sentence).

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B. The FMA's Legislative History Makes Clear That The Statute Does Not Immunize VidAngel's Conduct

18 Recognizing that the FMA's text does not support its argument, VidAngel 19 relies overwhelmingly on selected portions of the FMA's legislative history that 20 speak generally about filtering. (VidAngel cites to the history 39 times, while citing 21 the text just four times.) There is no reason to resort to legislative history when 22 statutory language is unambiguous. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). 23 The FMA is unambiguous: it exempts filtering, but not circumventing, copying or 24 publicly performing. But even if the Court finds the FMA ambiguous, the history 25 proves VidAngel's reading of the FMA is wrong. 26

First, the on-point legislative history could not be more direct in addressing the concrete claims at issue and showing the FMA is not a defense here:

DMCA Violation: The FMA "does not provide any exemption from the anti-1 2 circumvention provisions of section 1201 of title 17." 150 Cong. Rec. S.11852-01 at S11853 (Sen. Hatch) (RJN Ex. G at 269). VidAngel asserts the 3 history "does not evince a clear intent to prohibit VidAngel from decrypting 4 5 DVDs for the purpose of accessing a disk to filter." Opp. 16-17. The history in fact shows VidAngel's defense to the DMCA violation is meritless: "It 6 7 would not be a defense to a claim of violation of section 1201 that the 8 circumvention is for the purpose of engaging in the conduct covered by this 9 new exemption in section 110(11)." 150 Cong. Rec. at S11853 (RJN Ex. G at 10 269).

Public Performance Violation: "[A]n infringing transmission of a performance to a household [is] not rendered non-infringing by section 110(11) by virtue of the fact that limited portions of audio or video content of the motion picture being performed are made imperceptible." *Id*.
Plaintiffs pointed to these and similar quotations from the legislative history. Mot.
14-15, 22. VidAngel ignores them. The legislative history that VidAngel quotes
simply does not address the issues that actually matter in this case.

Second, VidAngel argues that because movie streaming services such as
iTunes, Netflix and Hulu did not exist in 2005, Congress must have intended for the
FMA to allow filtering services to circumvent DVD protections in order to copy
movies to computer servers and make filtered streams to users. Opp. 17. Nothing in
the statute or legislative history supports this position. And the history makes clear
that FMA does not protect a service that circumvents in order to filter.

C. VidAngel's Interpretation Of The FMA Leads To Absurd Results
 "[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be
 avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are
 available." *Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.*, 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). If
 VidAngel were right that the FMA completely exempts a party from liability under

Title 17, see Opp. 12, practically any streaming service could avoid all liability for 1 2 infringement and circumvention merely by following VidAngel's sham "buy-3 sellback" model and allowing its customers to choose to filter out a snippet of content. A service need not even filter "sex, violence, [or] profanity" to qualify for 4 5 the FMA. See Opp. 5. The statute is "content-neutral." H.R. Rep. 109-33(1) at 6 (RJN Ex. K at 483). Thus, under VidAngel's interpretation, a service could filter 6 7 only a movie's credits (as VidAngel did pre-litigation, and says it will do again, 8 Mot. 11), or an even smaller portion of content, and circumvent, copy and stream at 9 will. Congress, in creating a limited exemption for making content imperceptible, 10 did not intend to create such a massive loophole in the law.

- 11 **II.**
- 12

- Al583

VIDANGEL'S NON-FMA DEFENSES ARE MERITLESS

A. VidAngel Has No Defense For Its DMCA Violation

VidAngel admits that it bypasses and removes the technological protection
measures on Plaintiffs' Discs. Opp. 16; Meldal Decl. ¶ 40. VidAngel
euphemistically calls this "re-formatting." Opp. 17. The DMCA calls it
circumvention, and the statute makes it illegal. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (prohibition),
(a)(3)(A) (definition). VidAngel cannot excuse its DMCA violation.

18 First, VidAngel is wrong that the purported purchase of a Disc conveys 19 authority to decrypt the Disc to view it on another platform. Opp. 17. Courts have 20 repeatedly rejected this argument: "[T]he purchase of a DVD does not give the 21 purchaser the authority of the copyright holder to decrypt CSS." 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 22 23 see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). 24 Second, VidAngel is wrong that it has an exemption from the DMCA because VidAngel enables "space shifting." Opp. 17. There is no DMCA exemption for 25 26space shifting—a point that VidAngel itself admits only six pages earlier. Id. at 10-27 11. VidAngel's argument is particularly disingenuous because the Librarian of 28

Congress and the Copyright Office have repeatedly *declined* to adopt the exemption
 VidAngel's seeks. Only last year, the Register again "recommended *against* the
 adoption of a proposed exemption, on the ground *that the law of fair use, as it stands today, does not sanction broad-based space-shifting* or format-shifting." ⁵ 80
 Fed. Reg. 65944-01 at 65960 (Oct. 28, 2015).

6 Third, VidAngel is wrong that a DMCA injunction "essentially" operates as a
7 prior restraint. Opp. 18. The DMCA authorizes, and courts routinely grant,
8 injunctions to halt circumvention violations. § 1203(b)(1); *MDY Indus., LLC v.*9 *Blizzard Entm't, Inc.*, 629 F.3d 928, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2010); *321 Studios*, 307 F.
10 Supp. 2d at 1105. *Overstreet v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners*, 409
11 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005), which VidAngel cites as "*cf*." authority, Opp. 18, has
12 nothing to do with the DMCA or this case.

13 Fourth, VidAngel's expert, Sigurd Meldal argues that CSS, AACS and BD+ are not effective access-control measures because illegal software-such as the 14 15 AnyDVD HD software VidAngel uses—to rip Discs is readily available on the 16 Internet. See Meldal Decl. ¶ 12. Dr. Meldal is not permitted to make legal 17 arguments, Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1996) 18 ("[e]xpert testimony is not proper for issues of law"), and in any event, courts have 19 uniformly rejected this argument, 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 ("this is 20 equivalent to a claim that, since it is easy to find skeleton keys on the black market, 21 a deadbolt is not an effective lock to a door"); Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy 22 Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same). CSS, AACS and

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⁵ VidAngel incorrectly asserts that Don Verrilli told the Supreme Court at the *Grokster* argument that his movie studio *and* record company clients "agreed that space shifting is legal." Opp. 17. He actually said that "[*t*]*he record companies*, my clients, have said, for some time now ... that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your computer, put it onto your iPod." RJN Ex. B at 53 (Tr. of *MGM v. Grokster* Oral Argument at 12). CDs are not protected by technological protection measures; DVDs and Blu-ray discs are, and thus are subject to the protections of the DMCA's anti-circumvention prohibition.

BD+ all effectively control access "in the ordinary course of [their] operation,"
 which is all the DMCA requires. § 1201(a)(3)(B); *Realnetworks*, 641 F. Supp. 2d at
 932 (CSS); *Adv. Access Content Licensing Adm'r, LLC v. Shen*, No. 14-CV-1112
 (VSB), Dkt. No. 87 at 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015) (AACS) (RJN Ex. A at 9-10).

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B. VidAngel Cannot Defend Its Infringement Of The Reproduction Right By Calling Its Copies "Intermediate" And "Personal"

VidAngel does not dispute that it copies Plaintiffs' movies from Discs to computer servers. Ehler Decl. Ex. EE Tr. 58:1-4; Schumann Decl. ¶¶ 40-42. That violates Plaintiffs' reproduction right. *ReDigi*, 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649-50.

9 VidAngel instead tries to defend its copying by calling it "intermediate," a 10 concept that has no application here. Opp. 10. VidAngel uses its unauthorized 11 copies to make unauthorized streams. Schumann Decl. ¶ 40-42; Supp. Schumann 12 Decl. ¶ 21. There is nothing "intermediate" about VidAngel's copies. The cases on 13 which it relies are completely inapposite. Two of them hold that a defendant may 14 have a defense of fair use to an infringement claim when it makes copies of another 15 party's copyrighted computer software for the sole purpose of discovering 16 functional, non-copyrightable elements of that software that are required for the 17 defendant's product to interoperate with that software.⁶ Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. 18 v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 1999); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. 19 Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992). UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 20MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), makes clear that Sony 21 and Sega provide no defense for making permanent copies of works to servers in 22 order to stream performances to customers. See also ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 650 23 (rejecting ReDigi's argument that it simply "migrates a file" when it creates new 24 copies of works upon upload and download). 25

VidAngel also insists it makes "personal copies" and says such copies are

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 ⁶ The third case VidAngel cites—*Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)—has nothing to do with such "intermediate" copying.

1 immune from infringement. No case holds that making "personal copies" of movies 2 is fair use or otherwise lawful. And one of the cases that VidAngel cites holds 3 exactly the opposite: "there is as yet no generally recognized right to make a copy 4 of a protected work, regardless of its format, for personal noncommercial use." 5 United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (cited 6 Opp. 11). And, there is nothing "personal" about the copies VidAngel makes. 7 VidAngel makes four master copies of files (differing in resolution) from a single 8 Disc, and then streams from those master files to thousands of different paying users. Supp. Schumann Decl. ¶¶ 21, 24-28; Ehler Decl. Ex. EE Tr. 90:18-22. 9

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C. *Aereo* Provides No Defense To VidAngel's Infringement Of Plaintiffs' Public Performance Right

VidAngel ignores on-point precedent establishing its infringement of the
public performance right. *See* Mot. 17-18. VidAngel instead misreads *American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014), to argue that VidAngel
makes private performances because its users "purchase[]" Discs. Opp. 11.

VidAngel's Aereo defense fails because it is based on gimmickry—calling 16 what obviously is a rental service a "buy-sellback" service—and Aereo makes it 17 clear that a service like VidAngel cannot use gimmickry to create loopholes in 18 copyright law. The Supreme Court rejected Aereo's arguments that it transmitted 19 "private" performances because it transmitted broadcast programs from separate 20 copies captured from thousands of individual antennae. The Court held that Aereo's 21 "behind-the-scenes" mechanisms made no difference to "Congress' regulatory 22 objectives," "Aereo's commercial objective," or "the viewing experience." See 23 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508-09. 24

The same substance-over-form analysis compels the conclusion that "buysellback" is a sham: the alleged "buyer" does not control the Disc that VidAngel supposedly "sells" him or her; VidAngel does not stream a performance to the user from his or her "copy"; VidAngel actively encourages users to treat the service as a

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rental; and VidAngel's users treat it as a rental, with only [four] of out of more than
[1.5 million] purported "sales" resulting in the transfer of a Disc. Mot. 7-9, 20. Mr.
Harmon himself admitted that "buy-sellback" is just VidAngel's "creative way" to
offer "the value of a Redbox while staying buttoned up legally," and that
["VidAngel is NOT a disc service"—i.e., it does not sell Discs—but instead "is a
streaming service."] Ehler Decl. Ex. DD at 366; *id.* Ex. W at 234. Tellingly,
VidAngel does not respond to *any* of this evidence in its Opposition.

8 VidAngel insists that its service falls within the Court's dicta stating that the 9 analysis of the public performance right might be different with a different type of 10 service, such as one that allows users to "receive performances in their capacities as owners or possessors of the underlying works," analogous to a car owner getting its 11 12 keys back from a valet parker. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. The Court explained that 13 the valet analogy would not apply to a service, like Aereo's, where the users lacked a "relationship to the work[]" prior to dealing with the service. Id. VidAngel 14 15 likewise falls outside the dicta because its users also have no "prior relationship" to the movies before coming to VidAngel's service to stream them. 16

VidAngel also argues that *Aereo* holds it is not infringement if "the user of a
service pays primarily for something other than the transmission of copyrighted
works." Opp. 11. The Supreme Court actually said that it "ha[d] not considered"
that question. *Aereo*, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. And, in any event, VidAngel's users do
not pay "primarily" for something other than streaming Plaintiffs' works. Without
the streamed *content*, VidAngel's service has no value. *See* Ehler Decl. Exs. A, B.⁷

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⁷ VidAngel incorrectly accuses Plaintiffs of trying to force users to "be charged twice"—once for the sale of a Disc, a second time for a stream—in order "to watch a movie once." Opp. 11. Plaintiffs ask for no such thing. VidAngel decided to run its service by buying copies of movies on Discs and then streaming performances from server copies. Reproduction and public performance are two different rights under the Copyright Act, and copyright owners are entitled to compensation for the exercise of each right. (That is why, for example, Netflix pays for the DVDs it uses for its mail-order business, and separately for the right to stream the same movies.)
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D. VidAngel's Unauthorized Conduct Is Not Fair Use

It is settled law, and VidAngel does not dispute, that fair use is not a defense
to a DMCA violation. *See* Mot. 15-16. VidAngel does not meet its burden of
showing the fair use defense likely will excuse VidAngel's copying and streaming
of Plaintiffs' works. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2007); *see MP3.com*, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (service's conduct, not that of its
users, must meet burden for fair use defense). Indeed, VidAngel does not show that
any fair use factor weighs in its favor.

Factor One: VidAngel's use is not transformative. VidAngel argues that,
because its users must select at least one filter, VidAngel's copying and streaming
are transformative. Opp. 19-20. Not so. VidAngel uses Plaintiffs' movies and TV
shows for their intrinsic purpose, just like airlines and networks do when they show
edited versions of Plaintiffs' works. VidAngel's customers recognize they can
watch a full work with minimal filtering. *See* Bennett Decl. Ex. C; *id* at 20 ("Even a
single word is good enough to then watch the movie. Beats Redbox all day.").

Numerous cases (discussed in Plaintiffs' Motion) make it clear that VidAngel
uses Plaintiffs' works for their intrinsic purpose, not for transformative use. Mot.
23-24. VidAngel ignores all of these except for *Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v*. *Soderbergh*, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (D. Colo. 2006), which rejected a filtering
service's fair use defense where "the edits are a small percentage of most of the
films copied and the use is clearly for commercial gain." VidAngel calls *Clean Flicks* "inapposite" because that service had no FMA defense. Opp. 22. That is a

Customers of legitimate streaming services, however, pay one charge to watch the movie through that service. ClearPlay customers who want to use filters on top of an authorized stream pay only once—to Google Play—to watch the movie; they pay ClearPlay separately for filtering. *See* ClearPlay, "Filtering & Streaming Together" *available at* <u>https://try.clearplay.com/streaming-sign-up/</u>. VidAngel is wrong that Congress did not intend for users to pay to filter: ClearPlay, whose service the legislative history expressly cited, charged users for its filtering service, while users paid separately for DVDs they wished to watch. *See* Hearing on H.R. 4586 at 2
(RJN Ex. E at 154).

distinction without a difference. The FMA has no effect on the fair use defense, see 1 2 § 110 (last sentence), and in any event VidAngel has no FMA defense either. Clean 3 Flicks and Plaintiffs' other authority show factor one weighs for Plaintiffs.

Factor Two: Plaintiffs' works are at the core of copyright protection. 4 5 VidAngel's argument that "this factor favors fair use" because Plaintiffs already published their works, Opp. 20, is wrong. The law is clear that motion picture 6 7 content—whether or not published—is "creative in nature and thus fit[s] squarely 8 within the core of copyright protection." Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport 9 Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003).

10 Factor Three: VidAngel copies all, and publicly performs nearly all, of Plaintiffs' works. Even with filters, VidAngel is copying entire works and 11 streaming nearly complete versions—the heart of Plaintiffs' works by any measure. 12 13 Id. at 630. This factor weighs for Plaintiffs.

14 Factor Four: VidAngel directly interferes with the market for Plaintiffs' 15 works. VidAngel argues that it does not harm the market for Plaintiffs' works because "filtered movies are not a substitute" for Plaintiffs' works. Opp. 21. 16 17 VidAngel is wrong because the evidence shows its offerings are substituting for 18 authorized streams of Plaintiffs' works. Ehler Decl. Ex. I; Bennett Decl. Ex. D. 19 VidAngel originally asserted that "[o]ver 92 percent of VidAngel customers would not watch those movies without filtering," Opp. 21, but later filed an errata dropping 20 21 that number to 51%. Dkt. 76. Taking VidAngel at its (unexamined) word on this 22 (VidAngel refused Plaintiffs' repeated requests for the actual survey data), 23 VidAngel admits that nearly half of its customers would watch the exact same movie without filters.⁸ Moreover, these numbers only account for VidAngel. The 24 relevant question on factor four is "whether unrestricted and widespread" streaming 25 26 Even VidAngel's errata is erroneous. The errata states that "[o]ver 51% of its users would not watch unfiltered content under any circumstances." Dkt. 76 at 1, 27 21. In fact, the survey instrument (like VidAngel's Opposition) asked whether the 28 user would have watched the particular movie without filters. Bennett Decl. Ex. E.

by other services mimicking VidAngel would "substantially adverse[ly] impact"
 Plaintiffs' potential market opportunities. *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510
 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). The answer obviously is yes.

VidAngel also is off-base arguing that its unauthorized use "[i]ncreases 4 [Plaintiffs'] [s]ales." Opp. 21. To be clear, VidAngel does not purchase a Disc for 5 6 every individual customer to whom it streams. VidAngel instead purports to have in 7 its vault a Disc for every user who, at a particular moment, has obtained access to 8 the content. Once a user "sells back" their access (i.e., returns the rental), the Disc 9 becomes "available" again in VidAngel's system for a different user. On average, 10 for every [16] users to whom VidAngel streams a new release title, VidAngel buys one Disc containing that title.⁹ Harmon Decl. ¶ 61. This means if VidAngel buys 11 100 Discs of new releases, VidAngel will use those 100 Discs to justify streams of 12 13 the same title to [1,600] different users. Buying one Disc for multiple users helps VidAngel's bottom line, not Plaintiffs'. 14

15 More important, VidAngel's purported "help" to Plaintiffs is entirely irrelevant as a legal matter. Courts have roundly rejected the argument that an 16 17 infringing use is "fair" because the use allegedly generates incremental income for the copyright owner: "Any allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities on 18 19 plaintiffs' prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that 20 directly derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works." A&M 21 Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 22 *MP3.com*, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352); *Clean Flicks*, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (same). 23 VidAngel fails to show it likely will prevail on any fair use factor, much less 24 that its defense likely will succeed. All factors weigh decisively for Plaintiffs. 25 26 Mr. Harmon's declaration provides this ratio only for new releases. Based on the 27 limited discovery thus far, a conservative estimate of the ratio for all VidAngel 28 offerings is, for every Disc, around [19-20 streaming sessions]. Bennett Decl. ¶ 7.

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E.

VidAngel's Antitrust Allegations Provide No Defense

VidAngel asserts that Plaintiffs have conspired to put it out of business. Opp. 18; Harmon Decl. ¶¶ 14-16, 45-60. This is a smokescreen to divert attention from VidAngel's unlawful conduct.¹⁰

First, VidAngel incorrectly asserts that Plaintiffs (and other motion picture
studios) are parties to an agreement with the Directors Guild of America ("DGA")
that prohibits any studio from licensing any service through which users could apply
filters. Opp. 7; Harmon Decl. ¶ 48. The DGA Agreement is publicly available, and
it does not set forth any such prohibition.

Second, VidAngel alleges that Plaintiffs and other "studios" directed Google
and other licensees not to do business with VidAngel. Opp. 7; Harmon Decl. ¶ 49.
Mr. Harmon, however, admitted at his deposition that VidAngel has *no* evidence
that any Plaintiff directed Google or anyone else not to work with VidAngel.
Bennett Decl. M Tr. 273:14-277:11, 301:15-20; *see id.* Ex. J at 51 (Google

15 expressing it might ["go it alone"]).

16 Third, VidAngel argues that Plaintiffs refused when asked to license 17 VidAngel. Opp. 7-8; Harmon Decl. ¶ 59. Notably, Mr. Quinto did not make his 18 license "offer" until after Plaintiffs filed this Motion. Quinto Decl. ¶ 2-4 Ex. A. Mr. Quinto's "offer," moreover, was a transparent attempt to gain litigation 19 20advantage. Mr. Quinto invited all Plaintiffs—who are competitors in licensing their 21 works—collectively "to discuss[] a license." Id. Had Plaintiffs accepted the offer, 22 VidAngel presumably would have used that as evidence of joint licensing to support 23 its antitrust counterclaim. Because Plaintiffs refused to engage in joint licensing 24 discussions, VidAngel has cited this as evidence of a purported group boycott. 25

 $28 \parallel$ counterclaim the day its opposition was due. Dkt. 77.

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 ¹⁰ Plaintiffs will move to dismiss the antitrust counterclaims before the hearing on this Motion. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss VidAngel's original counterclaim. Dkt. 35. VidAngel mooted the first motion to dismiss by amending the

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VidAngel's Catch 22 litigation tactics provide no basis for denying this Motion.¹¹ III. PLAINTIFFS FACE AN IMMINENT AND INCREASING RISK OF IRREPARABLE HARM

VidAngel admits it intends to increase exponentially its unlawful streaming of Plaintiffs' works. VidAngel currently claims to have more than a [half-million] monthly streams spread across nearly [100,000] monthly active users. Ehler Decl. Ex. EE Tr. 190:2-8; *id.* Ex. AA at 317. Absent an injunction, VidAngel will try to grow that user base to [**100**] within a year, and [**100**] in two years. *Id.* Ex. Y at 283. The law is clear that such conduct causes immediate and irreparable harm to copyright owners' exclusive rights to control their works. *ivi*, 691 F.3d at 286; *Aereo*, 2014 WL 5393867, at *7; *Zediva*, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-14.

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A. Plaintiffs Filed Suit And Sought An Injunction When It Was Clear VidAngel Posed A Viable Threat Of Harm

In an effort to avoid an injunction and continue its illegal streaming for profit,
VidAngel argues that Plaintiffs waited too long to sue and so forfeited the right to a
preliminary injunction. Opp. 22-24. If accepted, VidAngel's argument would
require plaintiffs to "rush to court at the first sign of potential infringement, even if
the prospect of harm is remote." *Am. Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo Inc.* ("*Aereo I*"),
2012 WL 3854042, at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 11, 2012). That is why the law is to
the contrary. *Id; Arc of Cal.*, 757 F.3d at 990.

VidAngel argues that because Plaintiffs knew about and investigated
VidAngel's service before filing suit, any harm may be reparable. Opp. 21-22. *Aereo I* expressly rejected the same type of argument. There, as here, plaintiffs
"were aware of [the service's] existence for roughly a full year before seeking [an]
injunction," *Aereo I*, 2012 WL 3854042 at *27. Indeed, Aereo had received

¹¹ VidAngel also relies on confidential agreements of a non-party (Sony Pictures) that VidAngel admits it obtained trolling WikiLeaks for documents stolen during the massive criminal cyber-attack on Sony. Opp. 7; Harmon Decl. ¶¶ 48-50. Plaintiffs will not respond in kind by quoting from stolen documents, but simply note that the materials VidAngel cites do not support its claim.

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substantial press attention and \$4.5 million in funding a year before plaintiffs filed 1 2 suit. Id. at *28. The court held that plaintiffs "did not unduly sleep on their rights" 3 but brought suit once it was clear that Aereo "posed a substantial and imminent threat of irreparable harm." Id. at *27-28. The same is true here. Plaintiffs learned 4 5 of VidAngel when it was in "limited beta" and had fewer than 5,000 users—which would not lead legitimate streaming licensees to "notice (let alone complain)." 6 Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 35-36. Plaintiffs monitored VidAngel and investigated their 7 8 claims. Id. Once VidAngel started marketing itself more aggressively, expanded its content offering, and posed a more significant threat of harm, Plaintiffs filed this 9 action and sought a preliminary injunction.¹² That is not undue delay. Aereo I, 10 2012 WL 3854042 at *27. 11

VidAngel asserts that it detrimentally relied on the lack of a response to Mr. 12 13 Quinto's letters. Opp. 24. Mr. Harmon admitted under oath, however, that if Plaintiffs had sued VidAngel earlier, the company would have behaved just as it has 14 since June 2016. Bennett Decl. Ex. M Tr. 313:5-20. VidAngel was not lulled into 15 complacency but was actively preparing for litigation. It hired (in its own words) 16 17 ["NO CONFLICT"] counsel in fall 2015 so it could present the ["most relevant defense available in the industry"]. Ehler Decl. Ex. Y at 286. As Mr. Harmon 18 19 concedes, if Plaintiffs (or someone else) had objected in response to Mr. Quinto's letters, VidAngel could have instituted a potentially unnecessary declaratory 2021 judgment action. Harmon Decl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs were entitled to wait until the harm 22 ¹² Contrary to VidAngel's claim that Plaintiffs waited a "year-and-a-quarter" to seek a preliminary injunction, Opp. 22, Plaintiffs sought a stipulated preliminary 23 injunction from VidAngel on June 10, 2016. Bennett Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. K at 53-54. VidAngel also asserts that Plaintiffs "seemingly learned of VidAngel in December 24 2014," when, VidAngel says, Plaintiffs "apparently . . . caus[ed] Google to" 25 withdraw support for a *different* VidAngel service. Opp. 23. This is pure conjecture that has no basis in fact. See pp. 14-15 supra. And VidAngel's accusation that 26 Plaintiffs are "hid[ing] evidence" by refusing VidAngel's demand to conduct a company-wide email search is not true. Opp. 23. As Plaintiffs explained (and 27 VidAngel does not dispute) searching the emails of many thousands of employees is 28 infeasible and unnecessary. Marquart Decl. Ex. E.

1 from VidAngel's service was imminent before bringing suit.

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B. Plaintiffs' Harms Are Not Speculative

Mr. Cittadine testified, among other things, that VidAngel's service threatens
to undermine content owners' legitimate digital business and dealings with third
parties. Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 14-34. He specifically explained that as of August 22,
VidAngel was directly interfering with the exclusive window Fox had granted HBO
for *The Martian* and *Brooklyn. Id.* ¶ 32. These and other harms that Mr. Cittadine
describes are fact, not speculation. Opp. 26.

9 That harm continues to grow as VidAngel adds more users and encourages 10 them to stream through VidAngel rather than a licensed service. The evidence since 11 Plaintiffs' filing shows this harm only continues to grow. For example, one 12 VidAngel user posted a review to Facebook on September 7: "Far and away the 13 best video streaming service out there ... Even if you don't want to filter much or anything, take out one swear word or even the credits. You'll live and so will 14 15 Spielberg, Disney, and the others." Bennett Decl. Ex. C at 15. See also id. Ex. D at 28 (Sept. 13: "#CivilWar is already on @VidAngel great job, can't wait to watch it 16 17 tonight. I even use VA when I don't need filtering, cheaper than Amazon."); id. at 18 29 (Sept. 20: "I will never watch a movie at home through another service. Simply 19 amazing in every way."). VidAngel thus undermines Plaintiffs' relationships with 20 authorized streaming services—harm that courts have repeatedly held is irreparable. 21 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ("pressure on [] licensing relationships" is irreparable); 22 23 Zediva, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1013 (same); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X 24 LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2013) (same). 25

VidAngel's growth has exacerbated the harm to Plaintiffs' business and will
continue to do so. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 34. VidAngel continues to add Plaintiffs'
popular titles as they are released to Disc. Bennett Decl. Ex. F (*Captain America:*

Civil War (2016), posted September 13); Ehler Decl. Ex. EE Tr. 36:19-37:5. The 1 2 Opposition says VidAngel projects growth to [by April 2018 3 with an annual revenue of], Harmon Decl. ¶ 63; its internal 4 projections predict even more aggressive growth to [5], Ehler Decl. Ex. Y at 283. C. Money Damages Are Inadequate To Redress Plaintiffs' Harms 6 7 VidAngel is wrong that money damages are adequate to compensate 8 Plaintiffs' harms. Opp. 28-29. First, VidAngel will not be able to pay a final 9 judgment, making an injunction appropriate. *BarryDriller*, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1147; 10 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2007). The statutory damages for each work VidAngel has infringed 11 12 may be as much as 150,000, 504(c); and statutory damages will be as high as 13 \$2,500 for each act of circumvention (i.e., for each of the "thousand[s]" of titles VidAngel has ripped from Discs, Harmon Decl. ¶ 30), § 1203(c)(3). VidAngel 14 15 pleads financial hardship, Harmon Decl. ¶ 63, and will not be able to pay. 16 Second, infringement like VidAngel's directly undermines Plaintiffs' "exclusive right to decide when, where, to whom, and for how much they will" 17 18 license their copyrighted works. Zediva, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Money damages cannot compensate this harm. Citing Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, 19 20 L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2012), VidAngel urges that 21 Plaintiffs' licenses can be used to calculate money damages. Opp. 29. But VidAngel's large-scale infringement "eviscerate[s] Plaintiffs' ability to protect and 22 23 enforce their statutorily-created property rights," which cannot be compensated with 24 payment for lost sales. Grokster, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. Dish also is inapposite because the court there said it was the skipping of commercials rather than the 25 26infringing copying that was the real source of harm. 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. 27 Here, VidAngel's circumvention and copyright infringement, if not enjoined, will 28

1 undermine Plaintiffs' legitimate licensing and goodwill.

Third, the law is clear that harm to goodwill and relationships with consumers
and licensees is non-quantifiable and thus irreparable. *See Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc.*, 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991)
("intangible injuries . . . qualify as irreparable harm").

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D. VidAngel, Not The FMA, Causes Plaintiffs' Harm

7 VidAngel is wrong that Plaintiffs' harm flows from the FMA rather than
8 VidAngel's conduct. Opp. 25-26. This argument rests on VidAngel's FMA
9 defense, and thus collapses along with that defense.

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IV. THE LEGITIMATE HARDSHIPS ALL WEIGH IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR

VidAngel's claimed hardships must be disregarded. First, the fact that
VidAngel will have to stop violating Plaintiffs' rights, Opp. 29, is not hardship as a
matter of law. Mot. 31-32 (citing cases).

Second, VidAngel is wrong that its status as a start-up entitles it to an
exemption from the law of injunctive relief. Opp. 29. Courts regularly enjoin
infringing startups. *BarryDriller*, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (enjoining "start-up" in
part *because* it would not be able to satisfy damages); *FilmOn X*, 966 F. Supp. 2d at
50; *Zediva*, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15.

Third, VidAngel's appeal to equity ignores the fact that its revenues are 20 primarily enriching VidAngel's owners. In just the first five months of 2016, 21 VidAngel spent [\$2.2 million] on sales and marketing—where the main services are 22 provided by [Harmon Brothers LLC], which is owned by Neal Harmon and his 23 brothers (who also are VidAngel's principals). Ehler Decl. Ex. AA at 319; *id.* Ex. Z 24 at 306 ([showing Harmon Brothers' role in marketing]); Bennett Decl. Ex. M Tr. 25 19:7-20:19, *id*. Ex. G. VidAngel's owners have no right to profit from illegal 26 activity. 27

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V.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST STRONGLY FAVORS AN INJUNCTION

2 The public interest is served by upholding Plaintiffs' rights. Mot. 32-33 3 (citing cases). VidAngel cites cases involving individuals' interest in not being 4 *involuntarily* subjected to speech or conduct they do not want to hear. Opp. 31-32. 5 These cases are inapposite because enjoining VidAngel will not force anyone to see 6 or hear anything. VidAngel's multiple declarations from individuals who say the 7 "public" wants to be able to view filtered content does not change any of this. There 8 are other market alternatives for filtering that do not depend on circumvention or 9 copyright infringement. Bennett Decl. Ex. A, B; see also Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 10 2d at 1240 (finding similar declarations "inconsequential to copyright law and [] addressed in the wrong forum," in part because the court's role was not "to 11 determine the social value of copyrighted works"). 12

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VI. MINIMAL SECURITY SHOULD BE REQUIRED

VidAngel's request for a \$50 million bond is excessive and unsupported. In 14 15 analogous cases, the required security has been well below \$1 million. See, e.g., BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (rejecting request for \$15 million bond in 16 17 favor of \$250,000); Zediva, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (\$50,000); FilmOn X, 966 F. 18 Supp. 2d at 50 (\$150,000). VidAngel also argues that a massive bond is necessary 19 so its lawyers will have the incentive to continue litigating its antitrust counterclaim. 20 VidAngel provides no legal or factual support for this perplexing argument. 21 **CONCLUSION** Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their motion. 22

23 DATED: October 3, 2016

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

By: /s/ Kelly M. Klaus

KELLY M. KLAUS Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on October 3, 2016, I authorized the electronic filing of
3	the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will
4	send e-mail notification of such filing to all registered parties. I certify under
5	penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing
6	is true and correct.
7	
8	DATED: October 3, 2016 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
9	
10	By: /s/ Kelly M. Klaus
11	Kelly M. Klaus
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- A	-21- 598 - REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
	16-CV-04109-AB (PLAX)

FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT TO ORDER OF THE COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 (Dkt. 75)

EXHIBIT B

Highly Confidential - Pursuant to Protective Order of Tedd Cittadine-Rule (30)(b)(6) Page 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.;) LUCASFILM LTD. LLC;) TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM) CORPORATION; AND WARNER) BROS. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,) Plaintiffs,) Case No. CV16-04109 vs. VIDANGEL, INC., Defendant. AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION. (COMPLETE CAPTION ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE.) CONFIDENTIAL (PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER, THE FOLLOWING TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN DESIGNATED "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL") Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF TEDD CITTADINE Tuesday, August 9, 2016 at 9:19 a.m.

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		Page 83
1	A. Uh-huh.	
2	MR. KLAUS: And just and so just	
3	just for my purposes, Mr. Marquart, when you're	
4	using "filtering" in this depos deposition,	
5	unless you say otherwise, that's going to mean	
6	"making imperceptible limited portions of audio or	
7	video content of a motion picture"?	
8	MR. MARQUART: Yes.	
9	And I specifically mean to include the	
10	examples that the witness gave, which would be	
11	bleeping he mentioned to filter out or make	
12	imperceptible audio and removing and cutting,	
13	which would be to skip the video.	
14	MR. KLAUS: Removing, cutting, skipping	
15	video?	
16	MR. MARQUART: Yes.	
17	MR. KLAUS: Okay.	
18	MR. MARQUART: Those were examples of	
19	filtering that I also mean to include.	
20	BY MR. MARQUART:	
21	Q. Have you has Fox ever authorized one	
22	of its clients to provide filtering of authorized	
23	copies of VOD titles?	
24	MR. KLAUS: So the and just to be	
25	clear, is it a speaking at a general level	

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     without going into any specific agreement, but I
 1
 2
     think the question is: Are you aware of an
     agreement that specifically authorizes filtering as
 3
 4
     Mr. Marguart has described it?
               THE DEPONENT: Let me think about that.
 5
 6
               Theoretically, it's possible if we agreed
 7
     with a client about it.
               I can't think of a specific agreement
 8
     offhand.
               I don't have the agreements with me.
 9
               That comes to mind is something where the
10
     client and -- and Fox have mutually decided to
11
     authorize it.
12
     BY MR. MARQUART:
13
               Okay. So you can't -- you can't, sitting
14
          Q.
     here today, remember any instance in which it has
15
     been done?
16
               Has been agreed upon. I can't -- I can't
17
          Α.
     think of a specific example. Again, I don't know
18
     all of the -- I don't have the agreements in front
19
20
     of me, but I can't think of a specific
     circumstance.
21
               Okay. And said, "Theoretically, it's
22
          Ο.
     possible." Just clarify that for me.
23
               What do you mean?
24
               So if -- if Fox and the client were to
25
          Α.
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Page 96 Α. -- more specifically. 1 Let's talk about those. Ο. 2 Α. Okay. 3 ο. What's digital sell-through? 4 5 Α. Digital sell-through is a right that we grant our clients to offer consumers the ability to 6 access content for a very long period of time, 7 whether it's by download or whether it's by stream, 8 to a number of authorized devices. 9 Okay. And the second category you 10 Q. mentioned -- I believe you called -- what was your 11 12 word? Video-on-demand, or --Α. 13 Q. Yes. 14 Α. -- you can refer to it as "digital 15 rental" --16 17 Q. Okay. -- in more of a generic sense. Α. 18 Okay. What does that entail? Q, 19 It's a -- a -- a limited time frame where Α. 20 21 a consumer can download and watch a piece of content, whether that's television or -- or film. 22 Q, Okay. 23 More prevalent in the -- the film 24 Α. business than in the television business. 25

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Page 97 Does your business have anything to do Ο. 1 with physical disc sales? 2 MR. KLAUS: "Your business" meaning --3 MR. MARQUART: Sorry. 4 MR. KLAUS: -- what he's involved in 5 or --6 7 BY MR. MARQUART: ο. Does the business that you're involved in 8 have anything to do with physical disc sales? 9 A very -- very minor aspect of it does. Α. 10 Are you where familiar with the Ο. 11 technology called "ultraviolet"? 12 13 Α. I am. Q. What is that technology? 14 Ultraviolet is a -- is a consortium of 15 Α. companies -- technology companies, content 16 providers, as well as retailers or our -- our 17 clients, that are working together to create better 18 19 utility for digital content. It involves the interoperability of 20 rights from one retailer to another, meaning you 21 buy a piece of content at Apple, and if you're an 22 Amazon user, that piece of content would be 23 available in your Amazon ecosystem as well as your 24 Apple ecosystem, so it makes the content more 25

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Page 98 usable, as well as a standard set of -- of rights 1 and utility that a customer can get. 2 So whether they buy from Apple or Amazon 3 or another party, you know, they're guaranteed a --4 5 a certain amount -- or baseline of utility with that movie. б Okay. And how does that -- how does that Ο. 7 technology relate to the actual purchase -- the 8 retail purchase of physical discs? 9 MR. KLAUS: Object to the form of the 10 question. 11 THE DEPONENT: I would say that it 12 doesn't specifically relate to the purchase of 13 physical discs. 14 A number of studios, including Fox, have 15 attached what we call an eCopy or eCopy rights to a 16 physical disc --17 BY MR. MARQUART: 18 ο. Yeah. 19 Α. -- where we have voluntarily granted with 20 21 some our digital retailers the right for the consumer that buys a physical disc to get a digital 22 or electronic copy of that movie. 23 And there -- they would be able to watch 24 that copy at a retailer of their choice, and that 25

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Page 99 would be a retailer that Fox has authorized to 1 offer that. 2 Q. And -- and when that's offered, that's 3 offered for free? 4 MR. KLAUS: Object to the form of the 5 question. 6 THE DEPONENT: That is currently offered 7 for no additional cost --8 BY MR. MARQUART: 9 Q. Okay. 10 Α. -- to the DVD --11 No additional cost --Ο. 12 -- or the Blu-ray. Α. 13 -- other than the cost of the DVD or Q. 14 Blu-ray? 15 That's correct. 16 Α. Okay. And are -- does that cover all of Q. 17 Fox's new-release titles for major theatrical 18 motion pictures? 19 Α. I believe that -- that covers most --20 most, if not all. 21 22 Q. Okay. A very large percent. 23 Α. And what about Fox's television 24 Ο. programs? 25

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		Page	100
1	A. A much more limited selection of tel		
2	television programs would be available for an		
3	electronic copy. And a much smaller percentage of		
4	that very, very small number would be		
5	ultraviolet enabled.		
6	Q. Okay. So and is ultraviolet becoming		
7	more or less popular, in your estimation?		
8	A. That's a good question.		
9	I am not an an expert on ultraviolet.		
10	I can only tell you that, in my opinion,		
11	ultraviolet has not changed, you know, noticeably		
12	in the last, I would say, two years.		
13	We have the same number of retailers that		
14	have participated in ultraviolet. And our our		
15	strategy as well from like our as well as		
16	what I can tell from our competitors has not		
17	materially changed of putting eCopies on discs,		
18	some of which are ultraviolet enabled.		
19	Q. Okay. Does does Fox allow a member of		
20	the public who has purchased a digital copy, to		
21	filter content of that copy to themselves for		
22	private home viewing?		
23	MR. KLAUS: Object to the form of the		
24	question.		
25	THE DEPONENT: Who has purchased the		

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Page 101 how was the purchase made in this case? 1 BY MR. MARQUART: 2 Ο. Let us use the example of an ultraviolet 3 purchase. 4 5 Α. Okay. An individual has bought a disc at an 6 Ο. authorized retailer. 7 Α. Okay. 8 Ο. That purchase allows them, for free, to 9 access a digital copy. 10 Α. Yes. 11 Does Fox allow that user to view their Q. 12 digital copy in a filtered format to their 13 specifications? 14 MR. KLAUS: Object to the form of the 15 16 question. If you know, you can answer the question. 17 THE DEPONENT: Yes. 18 To my knowledge, it does not allow them 19 to -- to filter the -- the movie that they've 20 21 purchased physically and then redeem the digital copy of that. 22 BY MR. MARQUART: 23 Does -- to your knowledge, does any other 24 Q. Plaintiff allow that? 25

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Page 102 MR. KLAUS: If you know. 1 2 THE DEPONENT: Not -- not to my knowledge, but -- but I don't know for -- for 3 sure. 4 BY MR. MARQUART: 5 Ο. And I know the answer to this. 6 But, to your knowledge, does Fox allow 7 any third party to assist that user in filtering 8 out content from their streamed copy? 9 10 MR. KLAUS: Object to the form of the question, outside the scope, calls for a legal 11 conclusion. 12 13 If you know of any third-party agreements that specifically authorize that, you can say "Yes" 14 or "No." 15 16 THE DEPONENT: NO. BY MR. MAROUART: 17 Okay. Based on your counsel's Ο. 18 clarification, I have another question. 19 Does -- do you believe that Fox has to 20 21 authorize the filtering of that digital copy before it may legally be filtered by the user? 22 MR. KLAUS: Object to the form of the 23 question, calls for a legal conclusion. 24 It's outside the scope of the deposition topics. 25

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Page 227 If it were illegal, I would object to --1 2 to that behavior, yes. 3 BY MR. MAROUART: The -- the second example you mentioned Q. 4 on Harm Number 2 --5 Α. Uh-huh. 6 -- control of revenue and license 7 0. agreements was -- the second specific example you 8 gave, was that existing VOD users might complain to 9 10 you. Do you recall that? 11 Existing VOD users being existing VOD 12 Α. 13 clients? Yeah. Sorry. 14 Ο. 15 Α. Yeah. Let me specify that. 16 Q. Α. Yeah. 17 So your existing VOD clients might come 18 Q. to you and complain about the unauthorized 19 distributors' activities and say that it's harming 20 their business? 21 Yes, they do complain. Α. 22 Do you have any evidence of actual 23 Ο. 24 complaints to you or to anyone at Fox about VidAngel? 25


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
Page 228 Again, I have not received specific Α. 1 complaints about VidAngel, or rarely receive 2 specific complaints about individual pirate or 3 illegal or unauthorized service from clients. Very 4 5 rarely. 6 But very frequently, we receive 7 push-back. Whether we're trying to negotiate 8 economic terms or counter-protection terms or consumer-use cases that unauthorized or pirate 9 10 services don't have to play by the same rules, or the rules do not apply to them. 11 I get frequent push-back about that from 12 a -- from a generic sense about unauthorized 13 services, not specific to a single or -- or 14 multiple authorized services. 15 16 Ο. Okay. But so no one -- no one specifically mentioned VidAngel in that context in 17 any of your negotiations; correct? 18 Α. That's correct. 19 And you don't normally receive specific 20 0. 21 complaints? They're normally generic? 22 Α. Regarding specific unauthorized services, that's --23 24 Ο. If you --Α. -- that's correct. 25

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I, Dr. Sigurd Meldal, declare:

I submit this declaration in support of defendant and counterclaimant 1. VidAngel, Inc.'s ("VidAngel's") Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 4 Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and, if called and sworn as a witness, I could and would testify competently hereto. 6

7 2. I have been retained by VidAngel as an expert in this case. I am a 8 professor of computer engineering, software engineering and computer science at 9 San Jose State University and a computer scientist for Quandary Peak Research and 10 I have served as a consulting Professor in the Electrical Engineering Department at Stanford University.

3. I have received several honors and awards over the course of my career, including the Fulbright-Hayes Fellowship, the Carl-Erik Fröberg Award, a Certificate of Recognition from the California State Assembly, and a Certificate of Special Recognition from the U.S. House of Representatives.

Professional Honors and Experience

17 I have served on many professional committees and organizations. For 4. 18 example, I serve as a Commissioner of the national Engineering Accreditation 19 Commission of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET.) 20 (The Engineering Accreditation Commission of ABET defines the standards for 21 engineering education and determines whether programs are up to those standards or 22 not.) I am also a member of the Fulbright Association, and a Senior Member of the 23 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and of the Association for 24 Computing Machinery (ACM). 25

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I have more than 30 years of experience working on security and 1 5. 2 networked systems, starting with contributions to the surveillance systems for the 3 nuclear arms treaties of the '80s and including the creation of degree curricula in 4 security and privacy. I was the founding director of the Silicon Valley Big Data and 5 Cybersecurity Center as well as a member of the Strategic Task Force on 6 Cybersecurity for the State of California. I am also Co-Director of the NSF Science 7 and Technology Center for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies (the "NSF 8 TRUST Center") at the University of California, Berkeley.

I have previously testified in a number of cases concerning intellectual 6. property that relates to mobile devices, networked systems and services-oriented architectures, including in particular smartphones, wireless communication and telephony, network-based data systems, location-oriented web services and mobile device positioning systems as well as streaming video content across the internet. My Curriculum Vitae is attached as Exhibit A.

Documents and Things Reviewed

The opinions expressed in this declaration are based on my professional 7. experience as well as my use and review of VidAngel's service and the following documents:

(i) VidAngel's Answer and Counter Complaint (Dkt. 11);

The deposition testimony of Todd Cittadine and Neal Harmon; (ii)

(iii) Deposition exhibit 15 (a description of VidAngel's filtering technology), deposition exhibit 16 (a description of VidAngel's process for preparing discs for streaming), deposition exhibit 17 (VidAngel's instructions for adding new movie and television show titles to its inventory), and deposition exhibit 19 (VidAngel's encoding and segmenting checklist);

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(vi) The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Unredacted) (Dkt. 27), declarations of Todd Cittadine (Unredacted) (Dkt. 28) and Robert
Schumann (Unredacted) (Dkt. 29) in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction;

(v) The Digital Entertainment Group's DEG Year-End 2006 Home Entertainment Sales Update;

(vi) The standard terms of service for VOD Google Play, Amazon Video,Vudu, iTunes Store, and Youtube;

(vii) ClearPlay, Inc.'s website available at https://www.clearplay.com.

DVD and Blu-ray Discs Dominated the Home Entertainment Market in 2005

8. In the mid to late 1990s, digital versatile discs ("DVDs") began to replace VHS tapes as the primary media onto which motion pictures were recorded for sale in the home entertainment market. By 2005, the home entertainment market was dominated by DVDs. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a Digital Entertainment Group report dated January 8, 2007, stating that in 2005, approximately 94% of digital home entertainment was consumed using discs. By 2006, this percentage increased to well over 99%. But as I will explain later, the home entertainment market is now moving rapidly away from physical discs, to services that stream a title directly to a user's television or other device.

Discs Were Encrypted by the Late 1990s

9. Encryption of DVDs also dates back to the 1990's, and was the subject of an appellate opinion in 2001. *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley*, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). In 2005, DVDs and Blu-ray discs bore security features, commonly known as "encryption," that encoded the content in such a way that the disc's contents could not be accessed, copied or modified without a decryption key. A disc cannot be used without first decrypting it. Common forms of encryption included Content Scramble System ("CSS") for DVDs and Advanced Access

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DECLARATION OF SIGURD MELDAL

Content System ("AACS") for Blu-ray discs. I have read the Declaration of Robert
Schumann in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Schumann
Dec.") and, for the purposes of my opinion expressed in this declaration, agree with
his descriptions of how CSS, AACS and BD+ each function (but disagree with his
assessment of their effectiveness, as noted below). (Schumann Dec. ¶¶ 20-34.)
CSS, AACS, and to a lesser extent BD+, remain the most common forms of
encryption for DVDs and Blu-ray discs today. (Schumann Dec. ¶¶ 20, 27.)

10. By definition, it is impossible to access, view, copy or alter in any way a motion picture contained on an encrypted digital disc without first unlocking the encryption. In 2005, all household DVD players were equipped with digital keys that unlocked the encryption on the digital disc prior to sending the video to the user's television.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act

11. The DMCA addresses, to some extent, the forms of encryption
described above and in Mr. Schumann's Declaration. It provides that "a
technological measure [i.e., encryption] 'effectively controls access to a work' if the
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner,
to gain access to the work."

20 In the case of the encryption commonly used to access motion pictures 12. on Blu-rays and DVDs, it is undisputed that software capable of removing these 21 22 measures is ubiquitous and easily accessible, despite the fact that much of that 23 software is no longer readily sold in the United States. In light of the ease with 24 which one may currently decrypt a DVD or Blu-ray disc using readily available 25 software, DVD and Blu-ray encryption does not "effectively control access to a 26 work," because these measures may be easily removed in the ordinary course of 27 their operation to gain access to the work. Accordingly, Robert Schumann's opinion 28

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1	expressed throughout Paragraphs 20-34 (under the headings, "CSS Is An Effective		
2	ccess-Control System for DVDs," and "AACS and BD+ Are Effective Access-		
3	Control Systems for Blu-ray Discs") that CSS, AACS and BD+ are effective access-		
4	control systems is incorrect.		
5	The 2005 Family Movie Act Authorized Third Parties (Such as VidAngel) to Filter Motion Pictures in Either of Two Ways		
6	Motion Pictures in Either of Two Ways		
7	13. I understand that The Family Home Movie Act of 2005 ("FMA")		
8	ovides the legal context for the expert opinions expressed herein. The FMA		
9	pecifically provides that "it is not a violation of copyright" to:		
10	[make] imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member of a private		
11	household, of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that household for		
12	private home viewing, from an authorized copy of the motion picture, orcreat[e] or provi[de]a computer program or other technology		
13	orcreat[e] or provi[de]a computer program or other technology that enables such making imperceptible and that is designed and marketed to be used, at the direction of a member of a private household, for such making imperceptible, if no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer		
14	altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer		
15	program or other technology.		
16	17 U.S.C. § 110(11). As used in the FMA, "motion picture" is defined to include		
17	television programs. The "making imperceptible limited portions of audio or		
18	ideo content of a motion picture" referenced in the FMA is commonly referred to		
19	as "filtering."		
20	14. The plain language of the FMA quoted above expressly authorizes and		
21	exempts from copyright infringement two distinct methods for filtering motion		
22	pictures. The first – and today far more important method – is the "transmission" or		
23	streaming method. The word "transmission" has broad meaning in the context of		
24	the Copyright Act. "To 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by		
25	any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from		
26	which they are sent." 17 U.S.C. § 101. In turn, "device," "machine," and "process"		
27	are defined to include "one now known or later developed." Id. Accordingly, the		
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- A	619 - 6 DECLARATION OF SIGURD MELDAL		
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FMA expressly authorized future processes for privately transmitting filtered 1 2 versions of motion pictures to members of households at their direction. In the 3 transmission method, a third party, at the direction of a member of the household, 4 makes imperceptible limited portions of an authorized copy of a motion picture's 5 audio or video content in a "transmission" to that household. This first method is the more important today because it works across every type of device and mobile 6 7 platform for viewing content. This is also the method that VidAngel employs, as 8 described in more detail below.

9 15. The FMA also exempts any computer program or other technology that 10 filters an authorized copy of a motion picture "during a performance in" a private 11 household 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). In 2005, when the FMA was being created, this was 12 the only type of filtering service that existed. It was provided by a company called 13 ClearPlay, which sold specialized hardware to be installed in the user's home. The 14 ClearPlay hardware unlocked encryption through the use of a built-in DVD/Blu-ray 15 disc drive equipped with a CSS "key" that unlocked the DVD's CSS encryption. See 16 https://www.clearplay.com/p-450-clearplay-blu-ray-player-cp1126.aspx, a true and 17 correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit C. All DVD player manufacturers 18 obtained CSS keys through licenses from the DVD Copy Control Association 19 ("DVD CCA") so that every home DVD player could unlock CSS encryption. Once 20 the home DVD player unlocked the CSS encryption, the ClearPlay set top box provided the filtering. Because no fixed copy of the altered work was ever created 21 22 by the ClearPlay box, its service was expressly authorized by the FMA. The 23 ClearPlay set top box recently retailed for \$249.99 and required an additional \$7.99 24 per month subscription to ClearPlay for the filters. The ClearPlay method did not 25 allow a user to access filtered content on modern mobile devices. See 26 https://www.clearplay.com/t-streaming support.aspx, a true and correct copy of 27 which is attached as Exhibit D (noting the ClearPlay Streaming Player works only 28

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on a Mac or PC computer using a Chrome browser, and only when the computer is 2 attached to the TV via HDMI cable or the "tab-cast" feature of the Chromecast in 3 order to work).

16. The FMA expressly does not require that the household or the technology provider operating at the direction of the household obtain the consent of the copyright holder prior to filtering a work, provided that no fixed copy of the altered work is created. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). This lack of a consent requirement for filtering is essential to any functioning market for filtering motion pictures because the major studios that own those works and the directors that create them were vehemently opposed to the enactment of the FMA and to companies that provided filtering technology. In fact, I have reviewed the deposition testimony of Tedd Cittadine, who testified that no studio to his knowledge has ever privately licensed any third party to filter any of its works. Deposition Transcript of Tedd Cittadine attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Jaime W. Marquart filed concurrently herewith ("Marquart Dec.") at Tr. 83:21-84:21.

16 Digitally encoded motion pictures to be distributed commercially are 17. 17 usually encrypted. The content of the movie is transformed from its viewable format 18 into a representation where the content is no longer distinguishable from random 19 data - encrypted data. Without a subsequent decryption, the content information is not accessible - it cannot be viewed or manipulated in any meaningful way. Thus 20 21 before the movie content can be displayed to a viewer, the encrypted data has to be 22 decrypted, or unlocked, reversing the encryption process to yield the original 23 information content.

24 18. Since the encrypted representation of the content is indistinguishable 25 from random data, the movie content cannot be analyzed for objectionable content 26 subject to filtering, nor can such filtering be applied without the content first 27 becoming viewable again. It is thus impossible to view or filter for viewing a

motion picture stored in a digitally encrypted format without first unlocking the encryption. This is true in the case of DVD viewing, where a key contained within a 3 DVD player unlocks the encryption, and it also true in the case of streaming, where 4 a viewing application provided by the streaming service unlocks the encryption. The reason for this is that, by definition, encryption prevents accessing, copying or 6 altering the content of the original files.

19. In drafting the FMA, Congress obviously considered known technologies. When Congress enacted the FMA, encrypted physical discs were the dominant technology in the market. To transmit a filtered version of a motion picture stored on any physical disc sold in the home entertainment market, one must first unlock the encryption of the content and make an intermediate version. The reason for this is that a filter has to modify the movie content to be delivered to the viewer, a process that requires the substitution of original content with the filtered (e.g., muted audio or hidden video) content based on information regarding the time points where the filter is to be invoked, and how. Such manipulation of the original content cannot occur without that content being available, i.e., the encrypted data has to be decrypted before any filtering can occur.

18 20. It is inherent in the decryption process that a local version of the 19 unlocked content be created - be it in memory or other storage.

20 21. Having made the movie content ready for a filtered transmission, 21 further transient versions are created. It is common to create different versions of the 22 content adapted to various presentation formats (e.g., for standard and high 23 definition resolutions) and for different transmission bandwidth environments (e.g., 24 slower vs. faster connections between the servers and the consumer). Finally, for 25 broadly distributed content, when a customer requests a particular movie (as filtered 26 by filtering technologies such as VidAngel's), the streaming media is usually moved 27 from the central servers to so-called "edge servers" to place the multimedia data 28

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repository closer to the consumer to avoid the massive network traffic congestion 1 2 that would result if all multimedia were transmitted from a single hub. (This is 3 commonly referred to as a "pull cache" technology.)

4 22. The strategy of creating temporary versions of data such as movie content to enable streaming transmissions is referred to as "caching," and is a standard practice in the computer and networking professions generally, and with respect to streaming media content in particular.

8 As is common industry practice for delivering of commercial digital 23. 9 content, VidAngel's technology ensures the integrity and the protection of such 10 content against illegal access by encrypting the content prior to its delivery across 11 the Internet to the customer (see below for details).

Technological Measures Implemented by VOD Providers Impede Filtering

Today, physical discs are rapidly being replaced by Video on Demand 14 24. 15 ("VOD") distribution. None of the VOD services described in Plaintiffs' Complaint 16 – Netflix, Hulu, iTunes, Google Play, Amazon Video and VUDU – existed in April 17 2005, when the FMA was enacted. To deliver VOD content to a consumer, standard 18 VOD files are transmitted from the VOD provider's server to a user's television, 19 computer or mobile device in an encrypted format. The most popular VOD providers all use a combination of legal and technological means to prevent 20 21 filtering. First, all the most popular VOD providers provide their own studio-22 approved form of encryption for the motion picture files they stream to their users. 23 See, e.g., Marquart Dec. Ex A at Tr. 80:13 – 81:16. Second, their VOD distribution 24 systems are "closed systems." In closed systems, the files are encrypted prior to 25 transmission to the user's device and then may be opened and viewed only by using 26 a proprietary software application loaded on the user's device. The use of a closed 27 system is intended to prevent any third party (or the user) from accessing or altering 28

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any VOD file transmitted to it. In closed systems, access to the VOD provider's proprietary software is necessary to alter the file, and no user or third party may 3 access, alter or add to that software. Id.

25. I have read the declaration and deposition transcript of Plaintiffs' witness, Tedd Cittadine, who testified that the market for VOD titles is divided into two general types of transactions, rental (usually for a small period of time, such as 24-48 hours) and what the VOD providers characterize as "sell-through." This comports with my understanding of the market for VOD titles. In general, "sellthrough" is meant to mimic in some, but not other, respects the purchase of a physical disc, and VOD providers generally refer to a sell-through transaction as a "Purchase." The price for a purchase of a VOD title is commensurate with the price for purchasing a physical disc at retail, though it is usually reduced by a small amount (as much as \$5.00 for a new release), which reflects costs saved by not having to manufacture, package, store, distribute and ship discs. A "sell-through" transaction differs from a traditional purchase of a physical disc, however, in that it is merely a license to view the VOD title within the VOD provider's viewing software subject to a long list of restrictions contained in terms of service agreements that must be accepted to complete the "purchase." The same is true of "renting" a VOD title, with the additional term that a customer's window to watch the title expires within a short time.

21 Third, their terms of service agreements prohibit filtering. I have 26. 22 reviewed the standard terms of use for the four VOD providers mentioned in 23 Plaintiffs' Complaint as marketing major motion pictures on a rental and "sell-24 through" basis: Vudu, Google Play, iTunes, and Amazon Instant Video. Two other 25 services mentioned in Plaintiffs' Complaint - Netflix and Hulu - provide VOD titles 26 on a subscription basis. However, I understand that Plaintiffs in this case have 27 compared VidAngel's service to the non-subscription-based VOD providers. True 28

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and correct copies of the terms of service agreements for the four non-subscriptionbased services are attached collectively as Exhibit E. Each of them provides that
the user may not modify any digital content purchased through the provider's
system. Because these terms of service expressly prohibit modification of
audiovisual content in the ways necessary to filter (through automatic skipping and
muting), a user may not filter VOD content without violating the VOD provider's
terms of service.

8 27. Fourth, in addition to VOD terms of service, which prohibit filtering, several technological issues make it impractical to apply filters accurately to a VOD 9 title after it is opened within the VOD provider's proprietary software on a user's 10 11 device. Due to varying transfer rates and other technical functionalities unique to 12 each VOD provider's viewing application software, as well as operational 13 differences unique to each user's device, it has not been possible for a third party to 14 create software compatible across multiple devices and applications to filter titles 15 after they have been opened in a particular VOD provider's viewing application. 16 More importantly, such software cannot be written for even a simple application. 17 Closed systems contain security features that prevent the creation of filtering 18 software compatible with that system absent assistance from the VOD provider. To 19 develop filtering software that functions within a VOD provider's closed system, a 20 developer typically must have the consent and participation of the VOD provider to access its software for the purpose of developing software compatible with it. I 21 22 have been informed, and have confirmed in part through my review of Mr. 23 Cittadine's deposition transcript, that no VOD provider and no Plaintiff has ever 24 consented to allow a third party to create software compatible with a VOD 25 provider's closed system to allow users to apply customized filters to titles viewed 26 within the provider's closed system. 27

DECLARATION OF SIGURD MELDAL

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Google's Purported YouTube Player "Exception" Demonstrates That Plaintiffs Have Made It Infeasible to Provide Filtered VOD Content to Consumers

One exception to the closed VOD delivery systems architecture and 28. terms of service described above is the YouTube Embeddable Player and its application programing interface ("API"). The YouTube Embeddable Player API also did not exist in April 2005, when the FMA was enacted. An API is a set of function and interface definitions, the protocols for their use, and associated programming tools that affords software developers controlled access to the API owner's software. An API permits the development of other software programs that can interact with the API owner's software. The additional software is often referred to as a "plug-in" to the API owner's software. In theory, the YouTube Embeddable Player API allows a software developer to create a plug-in for the YouTube Embeddable Player capable of allowing automatic skipping and muting of undesired content in an encrypted motion picture file after the file is opened for viewing by the YouTube Embeddable Player in a user's Google Chrome browser. To my knowledge, no other VOD provider's player contains an API that would allow for the creation of a plug-in capable of allowing automatic skipping and muting of undesired content in an encrypted motion picture file after the file is opened for viewing by the VOD provider's player.

29. Paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the YouTube API allows a third party – such as VidAngel – to filter VOD titles purchased from Google. This is inaccurate in a number of ways. To begin, YouTube's terms of service – attached as Exhibit F – expressly prohibit a user (or anyone directed by the user) from "alter[ing] or modify[ing] any part of" a motion picture viewed on the YouTube Embeddable Player. The user also "agree[s] not to access Content through any technology or means other than the video playback pages of the Service itself, the Embeddable Player, or other explicitly authorized means YouTube may designate." The YouTube Paid Service Terms of Service – a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit G – further prohibits copying the Paid Services or
the sublicensing them to any third party. These terms of service also do not allow a
user to "circumvent, reverse-engineer, modify, disable, or otherwise tamper with
any security technology that YouTube uses to protect the Paid Service or encourage
or help anyone else to do so." All these restrictions expressly make it a violation of
YouTube's Terms of Service to engage in any of the activities necessary to filter a
motion picture through YouTube's Embeddable Player.

30. In addition, the YouTube API Services Terms of Service for developers writing software plug-ins that interact with the API – a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit H – also prohibit any technology capable of filtering motion pictures viewed through the YouTube Player API. They provide that developers may not "separate, isolate, or modify the audio or video components of any YouTube audiovisual content made available through the YouTube API." Thus, any third party that attempts to provide a filtering plug-in for a YouTube Embeddable Player does so in violation of YouTube's terms of use. I have also read Exhibit A to the Declaration of Neal Harmon, which is a notification from YouTube informing VidAngel that its filtering plug-in for the YouTube Embeddable Player violates the YouTube API Services Terms of Service.

19 31. There are also several technological limits to creating a plug-in compatible with the YouTube Embeddable Player API capable of accurately and 20 21 seamlessly filtering motion pictures purchased lawfully for viewing on the YouTube 22 Embeddable Player. To begin with, the Embeddable Player plug-in works only with 23 standard-definition content, not with the popular high-definition format typical of 24 DVDs or Blu-ray discs. More importantly, because the plug-in is not officially 25 supported by Google, changes to YouTube can cause the filters to fail. When that 26 happens, filtering is ineffective and users will see content that they did not want to 27 see until the plug-in is updated. Finally, slower computers cannot process both the 28

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BAKER MARQUART LLP 2029 CENTURY PARK EAST, 16TH FLOOR Los Angeles, CA 90067 Iel: (424) 652-7800 • Fax: (424) 652-7850 video and the filter at the same time, resulting in missed filters. The end result is
that – without Google's technical support and cooperation – no method of using a
YouTube Embeddable Player plug-in provides a consistent filtering experience for
the majority of users and no method would provide a high-definition filtering
experience for any user. In addition, this method does not work on modern mobile
devices.¹

32. Furthermore, these approaches to enabling a filtering functionality for the customer suffer from reductions in the quality of the viewer experience such as lower resolution, delays or stops, stuttering, and other impediments to smooth viewing. Consequently, the commercial quality a viewer would expect when enjoying the filtered content would be significantly jeopardized and diminished.

VidAngel Transmits Filtered Versions of Plaintiffs' Motion Pictures to Owners of Authorized Copies of the Motion Pictures Pursuant to the FMA

14 33. VidAngel is an online video filtering service that operates under the
15 "transmission" filtering method authorized by the FMA. Its service allows
16 customers to stream filtered feature films and television shows via the Internet to a
17 wide range of devices, including desktop computers, laptops, iPads, smart phones,
18 and televisions (through devices like Roku, Google Chromecast, or Apple TV).

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20 ¹ I am also aware of certain "digital rights locker services," such as UltraViolet 21 and Disney Movies Anywhere and disc-to-digital services such as VUDU and Flixter, that claim to allow consumers to convert previously purchased DVDs or 22 Blu-ray discs into high quality digital files. See 37 CFR Part 201 (Exemption 23 to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies). These services merely provide the same digital right to a 24 user that he or she would obtain if purchasing a "sell-through" license from a VOD 25 provider for the disc the customer owns. The user then must follow the same terms of service attendant to that VOD license, which prevent any third-party filtering in 26 the same way that other VOD services prevent filtering. Marguart Dec. Ex. B at Tr. 27 96:11-102:4. 28

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VidAngel users can select from more than 80 unique filters when viewing a film or 1 2 television show. The filters have the effect of skipping audiovisual content or 3 muting audio content in categories created by VidAngel and selected by the user. 4 Example categories include sexual activity, nudity, drug use, obscenity, vulgarity, 5 the "F" word, blasphemy and violence. All users must select at least one filter, and 6 each user has the option to select as many other filters as apply to that content, thus 7 permitting users in most instances to select many thousands of different 8 combinations of filters, thus making a customer's viewing experience individualized 9 and unique.

VidAngel's Filtering Technology

VidAngel follows the first, "transmission," method contemplated by 34. the FMA, requiring the purchase of an authorized copy of a physical disc, a filtered version of which is then streamed to the user without making a fixed copy of the filtered work. VidAngel delivers filtered content to users by streaming it over the Internet using a video content delivery protocol called HTTP Live Streaming² ("HLS"). HLS divides the audiovisual content into short segments that are frequently less than 4 seconds and never more than 10 seconds that are delivered separately to a user's device when viewed. The user's device downloads each segment individually. At the beginning of an HLS streaming session, the user's device downloads an index file which provides the device with a list of segment files that the device can then request and play to display the content.³

22 VidAngel's filtering technology divides each feature film or television 35. 23 show into hundreds or sometimes thousands of small segments (ranging from 2

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² R. Pantos, W. May, "HTTP Live Streaming," Internet Engineering Task Force, Apr. 4, 2016 (retrieved from https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pantos-http-live-26 streaming-19, Sept. 3, 2016) 3 Id.

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tenths of a second to 10 seconds in length), for which each segment is identified and 1 2 "tagged" as associating with one or more available categories of filterable content. 3 When a user selects a filter category and streams a feature film or television show, 4 all segments that are tagged for that filter are omitted from the stream.

36. If the filter concerns audiovisual content, the user's device will not download the segments that have been tagged for that filter. If the filter affects only the audio, the user's device downloads a version of the segment with the voice soundtrack muted while other soundtracks continue to play, but leaves the video portion unchanged.

10 37. Based on my review of the documents that VidAngel has provided to me, it is my understanding that VidAngel's system is designed and operates as 12 follows:

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(i) VidAngel lawfully purchases DVDs and Blu-ray discs;

VidAngel places a DVD or Blu-ray disc into the optical drive of a (ii) computer. VidAngel then uses a commercially available software program such as AnyDVD HD to automatically allow read-access for the purpose of mounting the DVD or Blu-ray files for uploading onto a computer, in the process necessarily removing restrictions on DVD or Blu-ray content access;

19 VidAngel uses a software program to extract the subtitle/caption data (iii) 20 files and then creates temporary ("locally cached") Matroska files (erroneously referred to by Plaintiffs' expert, Robert Schumann, as "Mastroska" files) of the 21 22 feature films. Matroska files are multimedia files that can hold an unlimited number 23 of video, audio, picture, or subtitle tracks in one file;

24 VidAngel uploads the subtitle/caption data files and Matroska files (iv) (collectively known as the "pre-filter files" or "PF" files) onto a secure folder on a 25 26 third-party Internet service provider's cloud storage service ("PCSS") and uploads 27 the subtitle/caption into a separate PCSS folder ("PCSS cache" of these intermediate 28

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(v) VidAngel destroys the locally cached Matroska file;

(vi) VidAngel boots an encoding and segmenting server ("ESS") to run two scripts, including an encoding script and a segmenting script, as follows:

a. The encoding script temporarily copies the PF files from the PCSS cache to the ESS, uses ffmpeg to prepare the PF files for tagging and filtering, creates a single mp4 file (640 kilobytes per second bitrate) for tagging (when that is not performed beforehand on YouTube or when corrections need to be made to the tags), copies the mp4 file from the ESS to a secure PCSS location, creates four Transport Stream files ("TS files") at 640, 1200, 2040 and 4080 bitrates for filtering, copies the TS files to a secure location on the PCSS, and deletes all copies and files on the ESS. This script is run once for each title's Matroska file.

13 The segmenting script temporarily copies the TS files from the PCSS to b. 14 the ESS, segments the TS files for adaptive bitrate streaming (as per the HLS 15 specification) based on both 9-10 second intervals and the locations of each tag for 16 the title (which could be as short as 2 tenths of a second), creates thumbnail files for 17 player scrubbing preview for each non-filterable segment, saves a comma-separated 18 values (CSV) file containing the results of the segmenting process for each segment, 19 uploads the CSV file for use by the filtering system, encrypts the segments of each bitrate with a new and unique encryption key, copies the unencrypted segments 20 from the ESS to a secure location on the PCSS, copies the encrypted segments from 21 22 the ESS onto a publicly accessible location on the PCSS (the "TS cache"), copies 23 the encryption keys from the ESS to a secure location on the PCSS, deletes older 24 revision files on the PCSS, and deletes all copies and files on the ESS; 25

(vii) VidAngel lawfully purchases additional DVDs and Blu-ray discs;(viii) VidAngel enters the information concerning the additional discs into an

27 || inventory system;

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- (ix) VidAngel applies bar codes to the disc packages;
- (x) VidAngel sells specific discs to specific customers;
- (xi) VidAngel requires each customer to select one or more filters; and

(xii) VidAngel streams encrypted content from the discs to each purchaser while applying the filters chosen by that customer.

(xiii) At the customer's device VidAngel software assembles the segments in sequence, and for each segment decrypts the content, displays it and then discards the segment.

VidAngel's Technology Prevents File Sharing and Does Not Create Any Watchable Copy of Plaintiffs' Works

38. Based on my understanding of VidAngel's system, at no point during this process does VidAngel create a fixed copy of the altered (filtered) movie or television show viewed by any user. In fact, VidAngel's service does not even make a "copy" of the original motion picture in any traditional sense. Rather, the feature film or television show is altered (filtered) as it is divided into hundreds or thousands of small segments and streamed to the user's device using the HLS protocol. A user can view the contents of each segment only after it has been streamed in sequence, decrypted with the correct keys (keys which, themselves, are protected and accessible only by a user who has legally purchased a disc from VidAngel), and rendered with a VidAngel media player. After each unencrypted segment is viewed, it is removed from the device's memory by the player and, for all intents and purposes, is gone.

39. I have read the description of VidAngel's service in the Declaration of
Robert Schumann (Paragraphs 7 to 19 and 35 to 42), and the service, as he describes
it, also creates no fixed copy of the altered movie or television show.

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3 40. The FMA provides that it is not a violation of copyright to "transmit" a 4 filtered motion picture to a consumer who lawfully purchased a copy of the 5 unfiltered work. To *transmit* a filtered version of a movie or television show from a 6 DVD or Blu-ray disc to a household, VidAngel must first unlock the encryption on 7 the DVD or Blu-ray disc. Only after the encryption is unlocked can VidAngel tag 8 audiovisual and audio segments of the movie or television show for filtering. This 9 process of unlocking the encryption contained on the disc is the functional 10 equivalent of what occurs every time a person places the disc in a player to view the 11 contents of the disc.

The Purported Legal Violations Plaintiffs Complain of Are Necessary to Provide any Filtering/Streaming Service Authorized by the FMA

12 41. As is common practice for Internet content delivery services (and 13 multimedia services in particular), VidAngel employs multiple delivery servers for 14 caching purposes to ensure that its users receive a seamless stream and avoid 15 creating network traffic congestion. VidAngel streams filtered content to users from 16 one of eight or more servers located in different parts of the United States. The 17 content is streamed to the user from whichever server is closest. The closer the user 18 is to the server, the faster the content reaches the user's device, reducing the need 19 for buffering. Without the use of distributed servers, a viewer would see and hear a 20 motion picture briefly before it froze while the next segment of the motion picture 21 loaded, thereby diminishing the presentation quality of the media content. Rather 22 than see continuous motion, the viewer would experience a maddening start, stop, 23 start, stop viewing of the motion picture.

24 42. Each VidAngel user experiences an individualized stream based on the 25 filters he or she selects. A user can choose from many thousands of different 26 combinations of filters for any movie or television show, creating a private viewing 27 experience. For two people to watch all of the exact same segments of a filtered

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motion picture streamed through VidAngel's process, they would have to choose the
same combination of filter settings and receive each of the segments from the same
server.

43. Decrypting and streaming a filtered version of a motion picture contained on a DVD or Blu-ray disc that the user has lawfully purchased is the only method a third party such as VidAngel can employ to *transmit* a filtered version of a motion picture to a household absent an express VOD license from the copyright owner. It is my understanding that the studios refuse to license VOD rights to VidAngel (or any other service that filters content). Moreover, the closed systems of the VOD providers prevent the creation of technology that could permit filtering without their consent and participation. Thus, VidAngel's method is the only known method a third party could use to transmit filtered content to a household without first obtaining the copyright holder's consent.

44. Importantly, VidAngel's methodology ensures that any decrypted file can be accessed *only by* the legal purchaser of the disc containing the file, and that no filtered version could ever be conveyed to a member of the public by any means.
VidAngel's decryption technology thus does not and cannot harm the market for the work, nor does VidAngel's decryption process result in injury to copyright owners.

19 45. Tedd Cittadine declares that the following four harms he claims will 20 befall Plaintiffs if VidAngel's service is not enjoined: (1) the service harms the 21 studios' "basic right to control how, when and through which channels our content 22 is disseminated for viewing by consumers"; (2) the service causes "harm to the 23 online distribution of our content and to our relationships with authorized 24 distributors"; (3) the service causes "harm to our ability to secure and protect content in an online environment"; and (4) the service causes "harm to the overall 25 26 development of the on-demand streaming market by the provision of user-viewing 27 experiences without our rigorous quality controls." To begin with, I have reviewed 28


DECLARATION OF SIGURD MELDAL

Mr. Cittadine's declaration and his deposition transcript and have found no direct evidence that VidAngel has actually caused any of these injuries; rather, Mr. Cittadine has merely testified that VidAngel "threatens" serious harm to the studios. More importantly, any service that transmits a filtered version of Plaintiffs' motion pictures pursuant to the FMA would "harm" the studios in each of these ways. By definition, filtering does not allow Plaintiffs to control the manner in which a user filters their works, and the FMA states that filtering shall occur without the studios' consent. This necessarily means that viewing experiences will occur outside of the studios' control.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 11, 2016, at Wilmington, Delaware.

Dr. Sigurd Meldal

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VIDANGEL, INC., 1 Defendant. 2 3 VIDANGEL, INC., 4 Counterclaimant, 5 vs. 6 DISNEY ENTERPRISES. INC.: 7 CENTURY FOX FILM 8 CORPORATION: AND BROS. ENTERTAINMENT, INC., 9 Counterclaim Defendants. 10 11 12 I, Neal Harmon, declare: 1. 16 17 18 19 2.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN PPOSITION TO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION

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I am a founder and the Chief Executive Officer of defendant and counterclaimant VidAngel, Inc. ("VidAngel"). I submit this declaration in support of VidAngel's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto.

Why My Family Wanted to Watch Filtered Content

Throughout my life, I have been a consumer of family-friendly movies and television programs. I was raised in rural Idaho. We did not watch movies with sex or nude scenes or with excessive violence and profanity in our home. For much of my childhood, this meant that my family did not have access to many mainstream movies and television shows, as they often included content at odds with my family's beliefs and values. At times, we felt left out of popular American culture, as we were unable to watch the most popular movies and shows. Even entertainment offerings with messages and themes compatible with my family's values and beliefs still included some scenes with content we found objectionable.

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DECLARATION OF NEAL HARMON

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Figure 1 - I was the third of 9 children and our family enjoyed movie experiences together. Here we are with our parents, spouses and young children. We had movie night out on the lawn for our family reunion using VidAngel. We decided not to watch certain offerings we were interested in, because we could never know when a particular scene in a broad family comedy might include material that made us uncomfortable. For this reason, my family was very excited about the CleanFlicks service that debuted in 2000.

3. CleanFlicks was a business that produced edited versions of films to remove content that was inappropriate for children or that other viewers might find offensive. CleanFlicks removed sexual content, profanity and some references to violence from movies, either by muting audio or cutting entire portions of the track. 17 My family and I used the CleanFlicks service to watch the same movies the rest of 18 the country found enjoyable and moving, without compromising our values. To our 19 regret, a group of Hollywood directors engaged in litigation with CleanFlicks for 20 copyright infringement and in 2006 a federal district court found that CleanFlicks' 21 filtered movies infringed their copyrights. CleanFlicks' service was held to infringe 22 because, contrary to the requirements of the Family Movie Act ("FMA"), 23 CleanFlicks did not allow each consumer to decide what to mute or delete. It also 24 created fixed copies of filtered works. When CleanFlicks and similar services were 25 put out of business, my family lost a major source of family-friendly content. 26 4. The FMA was enacted in 2005, in response to a lawsuit against a 27 number of different filtering companies, including ClearPlay. The FMA promised a

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clearly legal way to filter out content from popular films and television shows that
 families like mine found objectionable.

5. In 2012, Google announced the debut of Google Play. Google Play is a digital distribution service operated and developed by Google. Among other things, Google Play serves as a digital media store, offering music, magazines, books, movies and television programs. It is similar to services such as Apple iTunes, VUDU and Amazon Video. Google Play allows users to download media to various digital devices, including phones and Google TV. When Google debuted Google Play, I had already been experimenting with the YouTube JavaScript application programming interface ("API"). It allowed me to write program codes that permitted automatic skipping and muting of movies and television shows purchased through Google Play and watched on a YouTube Player in a Google Chrome web browser.

14 6. Around the time Google Play debuted, I realized that the way users 15 consume movies and other visual narratives was undergoing a profound shift away from traditional physical embodiments like DVDs and Blu-ray discs to digital 16 17 streaming. The popularity of smart phones and tablets along with the development 18 of internet infrastructure and other technologies offered users the potential to stream movies and television shows to many types of devices whenever a user desired. 19 20Remembering my family's struggle to find appropriate film and television content, I 21 realized there was a tremendous opportunity to serve the vast market of households 22 with religious, moral and other objections to the adult content of most mainstream 23 studio offerings in the context of this massive shift to streaming distribution.

7. Sometime in 2012, my brothers and I asked ourselves, "Why isn't there
a content filtering service for streaming?" Using my coding knowledge, I coded a
filtering tool for the movie "Cinderella Man" on the YouTube Player in the Google
Chrome browser. (YouTube is owned by Google.) The tool filtered the film for

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1 swearing and a couple of especially gruesome punches. While it would play only the 2 standard definition ("SD") version of the movie on a computer, the tool succeeded in removing the objectionable content. "Cool," we said, "it seems to work for SD 3 content on the Chrome browser." At the time, though, we realized that high 4 5 definition ("HD") content would become the industry standard for digital movie 6 distribution. Realizing this, my brothers and I started to look for ways to create a 7 filtering tool that would work on HD content streams.

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The Development That Led Us to Found VidAngel

9 8. In 2013, Google announced that it would conduct a private beta test of 10 the Chromecast streaming device. Chromecast is a line of digital media players developed by Google. The players are physically small dongles and play video 12 content on high-definition televisions by streaming it directly to a television set via 13 Wi-Fi from the Internet or a local network. Users select the media to play using 14 mobile and web apps that work with the Google Chromecast technology. The first-15 generation Chromecast was a video-streaming device that was made available for 16 purchase in July 2013. When Chromecast was announced, there was no company providing a content filtering service pursuant to the FMA that worked with HD 18 video streams. My brothers and I saw a market opportunity to provide families with 19 such a tool.

"The Chromecast is how we get filtered HD content on the television," 209. 21 my brothers and I said to each other. "It's time to build this." To confirm our 22 intuitions concerning the potential market for such a service, we conducted research 23 and found that about half of American parents would use a filtering service. 24 Although we created VidAngel because we wanted it for our own children, we knew 25 many other families would want to use it as well. We then set about creating the 26 technology, business plan and infrastructure necessary for a filtering service. After 27 many months of hard work, we launched a private beta VidAngel filtering service 28

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capable of filtering HD content through Chromecast. It was and is my
 understanding that our beta service fully complied with the provisions of the FMA.
 We simply provided users with a tool they could use to filter digital content streams
 from Google Play using the Chromecast's technology.

The Studios' First Attempt to Block VidAngel

10. In January 2014, we raised \$600,000 to launch VidAngel.com. After the private beta launch, we reached out to Google to ask whether we could purchase Chromecast devices at wholesale and then sell them to families who wanted to use VidAngel's filtering service. Google responded that it would consider a bulk purchase agreement only after VidAngel successfully launched a public beta of its Softward Development Kit (SDK) on February 3, 2014. The day of Google's Chromecast API launch, even though we were attending a conference in California, we were so excited to launch that we did not sleep the entire night trying to get the system to work and be the first out the door on the list of Chromecast applications. It never worked.



Figure 2 - I took this photo of my brothers Daniel and Jordan in our Redwood City, CA hotel on Tuesday, Feb 4, 2014 at 8:05am after working through the night trying to understand why our programs no longer worked

11. We discovered that Google removed the technology from their SDK that made the filtering service possible on native Chromecast. Google did not notify us or publicly announce the removal of its technology. Based on conversations I later had with a Google representative, I am informed and believe that Google removed this technology at the request of the movie studios, which claimed that Google would be in violation of its agreement with them if it enabled VidAngel's filtering.

12. Also, on December 5, 2013, VidAngel received a notification from
YouTube that VidAngel's YouTube Player API programming violated the
developers' API Terms of Service for YouTube. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and
correct copy of that notification. Again based on later conversations with a Google
representative, I am informed and believe that YouTube sent this notification
because the studios told Google that it would be in violation of its agreement with

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them if it enabled VidAngel's filtering. As explained in more detail in Paragraphs
 48-50 below, I later obtained a copy of Google Play's VOD Distribution Agreement
 with Sony, which confirmed this belief.

4 13. That the technology enabling filtering had been quietly removed gave 5 me pause about moving forward with the VidAngel service. Even though I 6 understood that our service was legal under the FMA, I was aware of the studios' 7 historical hostility to filtering. In light of that hostility, I was concerned that the 8 studios might again try to shut down our service despite the clear protections of the 9 FMA. VidAngel was a startup company without the deep pockets and litigation 10 budgets of the major studios, and I feared that the studios would wage a legal 11 campaign that would bankrupt VidAngel's business – before VidAngel could 12 prevail in court under the FMA.

VidAngel's Attempt to Partner with Google Play and the Studios' Interference with Those Efforts

14. Because we had already raised money, we decided to test different models and ultimately opted for seeing how many customers we could acquire if we gave the filtering away for free -- even if users could watch only on the YouTube Player in the Chrome browser on their computer, and only in SD format.

19 15. While VidAngel was working with counsel to develop a filtering 20technology compliant with the law, someone from a different division of Google 21 reached out to partner with VidAngel to provide a filtering feature for all of Google 22 Play. VidAngel was thrilled to pursue this option, realizing that with Google's 23 resources and reach in digital markets, VidAngel would finally be able to serve the 24 vast market of Americans desiring an effective digital streaming filtering tool. The 25 partnership did not materialize because Google's distribution contracts required 26 them to seek permission from the studios to develop a filtering tool. I was advised 27 by Google that the studios refused Google's requests to develop such a tool with 28

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16. After the studios rejected Google's requests to allow the use of a filtering tool, VidAngel realized that a small startup could not possibly negotiate a filtering license with the studios. With the help of legal counsel, VidAngel then decided to pursue the launch of its current filtering system.

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VidAngel's Current Streaming Technology

17. By mid-2014, it was clear that the VidAngel service, as it was then structured, using the YouTube Player API, could never achieve commercial success. It required users first to create an account on VidAngel and then with Google Play. Users would use their Google Play accounts to rent content viewable on YouTube, but then had to return to the VidAngel site to select the filtering they desired. After those steps, users could watch only an SD version of the content and only on their computer. This multi-step process confused and frustrated customers. In addition, the filters often did not work properly because computer processors struggled with YouTube's API. Further, the service was not then adapted to modern industry standards for digital content streaming – users demanded HD content and needed to be able to watch the content on their mobile devices and high-definition set-top boxes. By mid-2014, people simply did not watch SD movies exclusively on their desktops computers and no major distributor of digital content limited their distribution in this way.

18. In June 2014, the Supreme Court published its decision in American
Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, 573 U.S. ____, 134 S. Ct. 2498. In that decision,
the Court noted: "an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their
capacities as owners or possessors does not perform to 'the public.'" This language
prompted me to seek legal advice concerning ways to provide a lawful filtering
service to the owners of movies under the FMA.

19. I am familiar with some of the litigation involving filtering technology

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3 Soderbergh, No. Civ. A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421 (D. Colo. 2005). 4 The Court found that the FMA protected ClearPlay's service from the studios' 5 infringement claims: "the effect of the Family Movie Act is that Congress made a 6 policy decision that those who provide the technology to enable viewers to edit 7 films for their private viewing should not be liable to the copyright owners for infringing their copyright" I am also aware that the FMA protects a technology 8 9 that filters content "transmitted to [the] household for private home viewing." 10 Today, VidAngel follows the FMA and transmits filtered content to users' homes 11 without making a "fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture." 12 VidAngel specifically designed its current technology to comply with the FMA and 13 the relevant Court decisions interpreting the FMA and copyright law. 14 20. 15

Under the current service, customers buy an authorized DVD or Bluray disc from VidAngel (which buys it at retail after the studios release it) and then choose various filters provided by VidAngel to apply to the movie. VidAngel then streams the filtered movie to the user's home. VidAngel allows users to sell back their disc to VidAngel if they choose not to own the movie permanently.

and the FMA. I know that in 2005, a federal court in Colorado dismissed a

copyright infringement claim against ClearPlay based on the FMA. Huntsman v.

19 21. In early 2015, VidAngel began privately testing the new service with 20 customers. Over the course of a few months, the service improved substantially and 21 we were able to expand it to the Google Play app store and Chromecast.

VidAngel Announces Its New Service to the Studios

23 22. By July of 2015, VidAngel felt confident enough in its service to seek 24 feedback from the major movie studios. To that end, with the help of counsel, 25 VidAngel sent a letter on July 23, 2015, to the major studios and television networks 26 (including all plaintiffs herein) explaining its service and technology. A true and 27 correct copy of that July 23, 2015 letter as sent to Disney is attached as Exhibit B. 28

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for the customer and stores it in a physical vault;" (2) it "streams" the contents of the 3 4 disc to the customer in a filtered format chosen by the customer; and (3) it then "re-5 purchase[s] the disc at a discount from the sale price. . .based on the length of time 6 the customer has owned the disc." VidAngel explained that it had grown from 43 to 7 4848 users in just under six months (a 10,000% growth rate) and now wished to buy 8 directly from the studios "to scale its business." The letter invited the studios to 9 access the service and concluded: 10 If you have any questions concerning VidAngel's technology or business model, please feel free to ask. If you disagree with VidAngel's belief that its technology fully complies with the Copyright Act or otherwise does not adequately protect the rights of copyright owners, please let us know. VidAngel wants to take the concerns of content owners into consideration and address them to the cutent it con 11 12 13 14 15

content owners into consideration and address them to the extent it can. Unbeknownst to VidAngel at the time, Disney almost immediately accessed its service. Attached as Exhibit C is true and correct copy of a printout from a 16 VidAngel user account showing that, on August 6, 2015, a Disney employee signed 17 up for a VidAngel account using a non-descript Gmail account and provided 18 payment information for a Director of Antipiracy Operations at Disney. Even 19 though they were obviously investigating VidAngel, Plaintiffs did not respond to 20VidAngel's letter, so it sent a second letter on August 21, 2015. A true and correct 21 copy of the August 21, 2015 letter is attached as Exhibit D. VidAngel had over 750 22 titles available for the new filtering service when it sent its letters to Disney. Prior 23 to filing suit on June 9, 2016, none of the plaintiffs, nor any of the dozen other 24 entities to which VidAngel wrote, ever expressed to VidAngel that they believed its 25 services infringed their copyrights and none ever sent a cease and desist letter to 26 VidAngel. 27 23. I understand that two of the plaintiffs confirmed receipt of VidAngel's 28

VidAngel's letter explained that VidAngel operates under the FMA's filtering

exemption, and works as follows: (1) VidAngel "purchases the DVD or Blu-ray disc

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1 letters and called or emailed VidAngel's counsel. Warner Bros. Entertainment 2 Inc.'s parent, Time Warner, Inc., emailed VidAngel in October. VidAngel promptly 3 returned the email and even scheduled a call to answer his questions. Time Warner 4 later cancelled the call and never rescheduled it. Fox called VidAngel's counsel in 5 September 2015 and left a message, but in my understanding did not return phone 6 calls placed to it in September and October by VidAngel's counsel. Thereafter, 7 VidAngel heard nothing from Plaintiffs, through counsel or otherwise, until this 8 lawsuit was filed.

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VidAngel Wanted the Studios' Feedback for Many Reasons

10 24. The letters were an important part of VidAngel's strategy of developing 11 new technology. Although VidAngel believed its new filtering system complied 12 with the FMA, as a practical matter we understood that any legal challenge from the 13 studios would have significant financial consequences for VidAngel even if its 14 technology were ultimately vindicated by the Courts. It was important to assess the 15 studios' attitude toward VidAngel's new streaming system early on, to provide 16 VidAngel's investors (and potential investors) with accurate information about the 17 studios' position with respect to VidAngel's technology. For that reason, the letters 18 requested feedback from the studios and invited them to examine VidAngel's 19 technology and ask any questions they might have about it. Because the letters 20invited a response from the studios and clearly described VidAngel's technology, 21 VidAngel assumed that, to the extent the studios had a problem with VidAngel's 22 technology, they would inform VidAngel if any of them disagreed that VidAngel's 23 service complied with the FMA. Further, as VidAngel's model involved purchasing 24 DVDs from the studios and was serving a market of customers that would never 25 watch un-filtered studio content, VidAngel was creating new revenue for the 26 studios. VidAngel believed then (and continues to believe) that there are very good 27 business reasons for the studios to support VidAngel's model. Since VidAngel's 28

BAKER MARQUART LLP 2029 CENTURY PARK EAST, 16TH FLOOR Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel: (424) 652-7800 • Fax: (424) 652-7850 service contributes to the studios' bottom line, it was another reason to view the
 studios' silence in response to VidAngel's letters as tacit approval of its service.
 Had any studio expressed a complaint to VidAngel in response to the letters,
 VidAngel would have discussed and considered any proposal to resolve it. In
 particular, VidAngel could have adapted its technology in some way or, to the
 extent the studios expressed an opinion that VidAngel's technology was infringing,
 VidAngel could have filed a declaratory relief suit concerning its technology.

8 25. Having received no feedback or objections to our technology from the
9 studios after sending two very direct letters, VidAngel opened its services to the
10 public in August 2015.

26. The version of the system that was publicly launched in August 2015 solved the problems of the 2014 design: it simplified the user-interface, required users to register only once with VidAngel, allowed users to watch HD content on their favorite mobile devices and set-top boxes, and improved the filters so that they were more seamless. By bringing VidAngel's technology up to and beyond industry standards and offering the features users expect of any content streaming service, VidAngel found a large market for filtered movie and television content. As a result, its customer base began to shoot up almost immediately.

19 27. In fact, today, VidAngel's apps are rated higher by users than the
20 leading studio distribution platforms. For example, the VidAngel rating on Google
21 Play is 4.8 stars whereas Netflix is 4.4 stars, Hulu is 4.1 stars, and Disney Movies
22 Anywhere is 3.9 stars. For all ratings on the Apple App Store, VidAngel has 5 stars,
23 Netflix has 3.5 stars, Hulu has 2 stars, and Disney Movies Anywhere has 3.5 stars.
24 On Roku, VidAngel has 4.5 stars, Netflix has 3 stars, Hulu has 3.5 stars and Disney
25 Movies Anywhere has 3.5 stars.

26 28. By the end of 2015, VidAngel's monthly disc sales had grown to over
27 100,000. In January 2016, USA Today published an article about VidAngel's

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services and the ability to stream filtered versions of Star Wars prequels for a net
cost (after buy and sellback) of as little as \$1. A true and correct copy of this USA
Today article is attached as Exhibit E. On January 12, a Disney employee -- using
the secret VidAngel account created with payment information from Disney's
Director of Antipiracy Operations -- logged on to VidAngel account and purchased
Frozen and a Star Wars prequel. (See Exhibit F hereto.) This same employee
purchased and sold back 17 total titles over the next four months.

8 29. On March 3, 2016, Disney announced that it would release Star Wars: 9 The Force Awakens on DVD on April 5. The film would be available for digital 10 "purchase" (but not a shorter rental period) on April 1. I am aware that Plaintiffs 11 have used Star Wars: The Force Awakens to show that VidAngel purportedly makes 12 titles available before they become available in other digital markets. This is untrue. 13 In fact, the film was available for digital download purchase four days before 14 VidAngel could buy DVDs. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of an 15 article regarding Disney's announcement. While the film was not made available 16 for shorter-term rentals when VidAngel began to make the filtered film available, 17 this is irrelevant because VidAngel does not rent titles. In any event, Star Wars: 18 The Force Awakens is the only major title released in this way, and it was clearly 19 done so at a time when the plaintiffs were planning litigation against VidAngel. Despite VidAngel's growing popularity, the imminent release of Star Wars: The 2021 Force Awakens, and the fact that Plaintiffs had been discussing VidAngel with one 22 another and outside counsel for over seven months, Plaintiffs did not send VidAngel 23 a cease and desist letter or seek an injunction. Instead, on April 5, Plaintiffs 24 purchased, streamed and sold back the film. (See Exhibit C.)

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VidAngel Invested Millions in Reliance Upon the Studios' Silence

30. During the ten and a half months from VidAngel's first letter to the
filing of Plaintiffs' suit, VidAngel openly streamed filtered versions of every one of

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1 Plaintiffs' most popular titles as soon as they were available on DVD. During this 2 time, VidAngel continued to purchase DVDs. In total, VidAngel has spent over 3 \$1.2 million purchasing discs at retail. VidAngel has also spent millions of dollars 4 in funding since it wrote to Plaintiffs in July 2015. Attached as Exhibit G is a true 5 and correct copy of an article from October 2015 announcing that VidAngel had 6 raised \$2.5 million in additional funding. VidAngel invested most of that funding to 7 develop its current model prior to Plaintiffs filing suit. Prior to the filing of this 8 lawsuit, VidAngel also had applications approved on every major mobile 9 application store and set-top box (e.g., Roku, Apple App Store, Apple TV, Amazon 10 Fire TV, Android TV and Kindle Fire). Monumental efforts went into each one of 11 these apps. In fact, VidAngel hired scores of tech, support and content employees. 12 VidAngel also hired scores of contractors to support the employees. Also, VidAngel 13 updated all the streaming technology to play more smoothly and built a multi-14 thousand title content library. After several months passed without objection from 15 the studios, VidAngel concluded that the studios did not object to its service. In response to media inquiries about the legality of its service, I cited VidAngel's 16 17 letters and the studios' lack of objection as a basis for VidAngel believing its service 18 did not infringe. Attached as Exhibit H are news articles containing my quotes 19 about the studios having no objection to VidAngel's service. Today, over 500,000 20 families have used VidAngel's filtering service.

21 31. In fact, it was not until VidAngel announced its intention to seek 22 significant financing that Disney finally decided to sue. On May 24, 2016, a couple 23 of weeks before the suit, VidAngel informed its better customers (including Disney, 24 which has purchased 17 titles with its secret VidAngel account) of its intent to raise 25 additional funds through Regulation A+ financing. Then, and only then, did Disney 26 finally decide to sue. I believe this litigation was intentionally timed to cut off 27 VidAngel's access to cash flow at a critical stage in its development and prevent our 28

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1 modern filtering service from growing.

VidAngel Is a Filtering Company

32. Because VidAngel has catered only to people who want to filter the motion pictures they watch in their homes, we did not immediately recognize that others might try to abuse VidAngel's service or exploit loopholes in our service to watch motion pictures without filtering. At the very early stages of our service, our system allowed one to stream a movie even if no filter was selected. At that time, we trusted that our audience was using our service for filtering.

33. In December 2015, we created a #StopJarJar marketing campaign to coincide with Star Wars 7 movie launch, giving away a free \$20 Star Wars movie.
We discovered that the campaign was attracting users who were watching Star Wars without filters. We therefore halted the campaign and began requiring filters to watch movies on VidAngel.

34. Later on, we discovered that other customers were setting a single global filter (e.g., Jar Jar Binks) and then watching movies on the Roku that didn't have any tags for the selected filter, resulting in a few unfiltered streams. As soon as we discovered potential loophole, we altered the system again so that it ensured that a filter was set on each streamed movie. It has upset a few customers, but it has allowed us to stay focused on our original target market of FMA-compliant filtering.

2035. When the studios sued us, they complained that the opening and 21 closing credits were another loophole of sorts. Because we had always tried to 22 prevent improper use of VidAngel, we immediately removed the opening and 23 closing credits tags altogether. VidAngel received a few complaints from those who 24 were abusing the system, but it also got complaints from those who used those 25 filters for legitimate purposes. One reason these filters were created was that credits 26 are often more than mere lists of the people who did certain tasks in creating the 27 film. Some movies save the most offensive content for the credits. The titles and 28

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1 credits feature allowed users to avoid such content. We are now updating our apps 2 to allow our customers to use the opening and closing credits filters provided that 3 they also pick at least one additional filter.

36. All of the above steps to remove potential loopholes and focus VidAngel's viewing experience on filtering have been a part of our evolution, as we become known to a larger audience of people. VidAngel is committed to ensuring that people come to VidAngel to view filtered versions of motion pictures.

37. Despite there being a few times where the system has been abused, our data shows that 95.93 percent of VidAngel's purchases came from users who voluntarily chose more than one filter. VidAngel also ran these numbers for July 2016, and found that more recently 96.93 percent of VidAngel's purchases came from users who voluntarily chose more than one filter. This indicates that our users are overwhelmingly using VidAngel for filtering, and that the number of users choosing multiple filters is increasing.

38. The studios claim that VidAngel is threatening the "legitimate streaming market" because VidAngel's sellback model allows a net cost of \$1, but the data prove otherwise. Because almost 96% of VidAngel's purchasers have selected multiple filters over VidAngel's entire history, this means the version of the 19 film or television show VidAngel streams to them is of a different character than the 20 version available through other VOD providers like Google Play, Amazon Video, 21 VUDU and iTunes. VidAngel has had a long history of ensuring that it is reaching 22 its target filtering market.

23 39. VidAngel has additional data showing that most of its users would not 24 have watched the movie they chose to see absent filtering:

25 SURVEY QUESTION: Would you have watched "[title]" without a filter? 26 Out of 180,227 movies watched, 92,225 users said they would not have 27 watched the movie at all without filters (as of 8/26/2016). These answers come from 28

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1 the account holders (usually parents). The numbers do not fully account for 2 hundreds of comments like these: 3 I would let my 13+ year old children watch without the filter. My younger kids had to wait until Vidangel provided it. 4 My kids love this movie especially at Halloween but I hate it because it 5 needed to be edited. Thank you for editing it and putting it on your site. 6 The filter was great with younger kids watching (13 yr old in my case) 7 The filter was for the kids. 8 I wouldn't have let me kids watch without the filters. My husband and I love the movie "Apollo 13" but we have never watched it with our kids (youngest is age 7.) We muted the language that we feel is inappropriate for our own household and were able to watch it with our children. They loved it :) 9 10 11 I would have watched it without a filter with my older kids, but not the 12 youngers. Tel: (424) 652-7800 • Fax: (424) 652-7850 2029 CENTURY PARK EAST, 16TH FLOOR 13 40. This means that, while over half of all movies would not have been LOS ANGELES, CA 90067 14 watched by the account holders without filters at all, far more users would not have 15 watched the movie with their family without filters. This filtered-only viewership is 16 entirely additive to the studios' market, and the purchases of those films and shows 17 would not have occurred without VidAngel. 18 VidAngel's Marketing Is About Filtering 19 41. VidAngel is constantly testing advertising messages and the studios 20have cherry picked a few that never even got traction. While the studios say 21 VidAngel has an "unfair advantage" using its net cost with sellback and filters as a 22 marketing hook, what they fail to acknowledge is that VidAngel is not a direct 23 competitor to their distribution partners because those partners do not offer filtering. 24 42. VidAngel learned in its early market testing that the market for filtered 25 content was far larger if customers did not have to pay an additional fee for filtering.

26 It seemed that customers felt they should be able to watch the movie however they 27 wanted after they had purchased the movie. As a company strategy, VidAngel

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wanted to reach broadest filtering audience possible and adjusted its marketing messages accordingly. 43. Historically, those who would like to enjoy filtered content had to pay a

premium price for the ability to do so (even purchase expensive hardware and a subscription in addition to the cost of the movie). VidAngel's messaging helps those who think that filtering is more expensive and more difficult to realize that the opposite is true. An analogy explains why VidAngel's marketing references other VOD services. People may believe that flying in an airplane is dangerous. Airlines may highlight that the chances of dying in a car are higher than the chances of dying 10 in an airplane to dispel that myth and attract people to purchasing plane tickets. Plane tickets do not directly compete with car sales, but the comparison is useful to customers.

44. The number of users voluntarily choosing more than one filter (over 96 percent in July) are evidence that the studios have mistakenly concluded that VidAngel's marketing highlighting net cost gives VidAngel an "unfair advantage," when the approach is ultimately attracting a filtering audience rather than competing with all the many distributors who do not offer filtering.

The Studios Are Being Disingenuous Concerning the Lawsuit

19 45. In their Complaint, the studios say they are suing VidAngel because it 20 is allegedly operating an "unlicensed VOD streaming service" even though 21 VidAngel is operating a remote filtering service under the FMA.

22 46. Plaintiffs claim that "The FMA requires that any copy or performance 23 made pursuant to that statute be otherwise 'authorized'— that is, not violating the 24 copyright owner's other exclusive rights." Complaint (Dkt No. 1), ¶ 44. Under this 25 position, the authority to filter content in the home resides with the studios, not with 26 the family. This position would essentially repeal the FMA, which does not require 27 any consent from the studios to filtering (consent they would definitely not give).

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47. The ultimate irony is that the studios will not sell a streaming license 2 that permits filtering to anyone, putting companies like VidAngel in a Catch-22 3 position. Indeed, 10 years after the studios were compelled by the FMA to dismiss a 4 lawsuit with ClearPlay, the market has yet to see a studio-licensed streaming 5 product that supports filtering.

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DVDs and Blu-ray Discs Are the Only "Authorized" Copies of Plaintiff's Movies Available for Filtering

8 48. Due to the agreement the studios have made with the Directors Guild of 9 America ("DGA"), major studio agreements with their distributors have language 10 similar to the Sony/Google agreement posted on WikiLeaks (which I found doing a 11 Google search for "VOD license agreement"): 12

CUTTING, EDITING AND INTERRUPTION. Licensee [Google] shall not make, or authorize any others to make, any modifications, deletions, cuts, alterations or additions in or to any Included Program without the prior written consent of Licensor [Sony]. For the avoidance of doubt, no panning and scanning, time compression or similar modifications shall be permitted. Without limiting the forgoing, Licensee shall not delete the copyright notice or credits from the main or end title of any Included Program or from any other materials supplied by Licensor hereunder. No exhibitions of any Included Program hereunder shall be interrupted for intermission, commercials or any other similar commercial announcements of any kind.

19 49. Discovering this language in the studios' actual agreements helped me 20realize that this was the reason Google was forced to remove technical support for 21 filtering HD content on the Chromecast and was forced to seek permission from the 22 studios to enable filtering on Google Play. 23 50. What's more, when the studios sign a deal for the rights to a specific

24 title, they seem to be required to include the following language in all of their

25 agreements. For example, in Sony's agreement for the movies Fury and American

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26 Hustle, the following language binds Sony:

[Sony] shall have the right...to make any and all changes and

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a) Discs will increasingly become less available and may eventually be phased out of existence.

purchase a streaming license that allows for filtering. For example:

b) New customers complain about VidAngel's buy/sellback model and ask why they can't just rent the movies.

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modifications in the Picture; provided, [Sony] shall comply with any contractual right of first opportunity to make such changes granted to Director.

51. Given this language and the studio interpretation of the FMA, this language trickles down through all agreements and ultimately hands the authority to make any changes to the movie back to the director of the movie.

52. The legislative history of the FMA reflect that the DGA refused to testify or cooperate with Congress in any way when FMA was being debated in Congress. The DGA and the studios would not seek a business deal with filtering companies in 2004. And these are the same organizations who have not filled the market need for filtering for the last decade, leading a few brothers from Idaho to ask themselves, "Why isn't there filtering for streaming?"

ask themselves, "Why isn't there filtering for streaming?" 53. If the court were to interpret the law as argued by the studios, then VidAngel will not be able to operate under the "transmitted" language of the FMA because the studios will not sell VidAngel a license that permits filtering. In fact, they are unable to do so without cooperation from the DGA. And lack of cooperation from the DGA is the reason the FMA was passed by Congress in the first place. VidAngel is the only entity that provides a filtering service under the FMA for those viewing title on modern mobile devices such as smartphones, tablets, and SmartTVs.

VidAngel Would Love to Purchase a Filtered Streaming License

VidAngel has various business reasons for which it is preferable to

- 1 d) There is a lot of overhead and waste in managing a vault of physical 2 discs.
- 3 Acquiring physical discs through retailers is time consuming and e) 4 difficult.

5 f) When customer demand exceeds our supply, VidAngel has to send 6 customers out-of-stock notices. VidAngel sent out almost 60,000 unique customers over 250,000 out of stock notices last month alone. This means that VidAngel 8 turned away 250,000 requests for streams that it could have received income for if it 9 had a standard VOD distribution agreement that allows for filtering.

10 When VidAngel purchases more discs than it is ultimately able to sell, g) 11 it ends up with hundreds or thousands of discs that it will never sell.

55. VidAngel assumed that it needed to have significant size before the studios would ever consider a filtered licensing deal. Some contacts in Hollywood told me to wait until we had over 1 million users, preferably over 5 million.

56. In fact, VidAngel started talking with a local distributor in Utah about a licensing deal in May of 2016, before the lawsuit. This distributor has agreed to licensing its latest film to VidAngel because it has not signed an agreement with the DGA and can permit filtering of content.

19 57. After Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, VidAngel inquired of some of the 20 plaintiffs whether they were open to a business solution rather than litigation.

21 58. VidAngel also met with Sony, Lionsgate and Paramount about a 22 licensing deal since those studios had not sued them. VidAngel has reached out to 23 many others. These studios have either said, "this is complicated legally," or 24 "maybe we can solve the problem with the airline cut," or "you have to get the DGA 25 to agree first." Multiple studios said they would get back to me after meeting with 26 their legal teams and never did.

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Finally, I am aware that my counsel has emailed counsel for Disney 59.

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and offered to make certain changes to VidAngel's model and that Plaintiffs'
counsel responded: "my clients absolutely will not engage in any joint licensing
discussions." Counsel for VidAngel then offered to abandon its FMA exemption
defense (and with it the requirement that consumers must purchase copies of discs)
and instead pay a streaming license fee to stream filtered content, noting that this
arrangement would resolve Disney's DMCA and infringement claims. Disney has
not responded to this offer.

8 60. It appears that VidAngel is back to 2005 again, with no business
9 solution available to VidAngel.

<u>New Releases on VidAngel Generate</u> <u>Revenue Share Similar to Studio Contracts</u>

12 Over its history, much of VidAngel's revenue comes from the sale and 61. 13 filtered streaming of popular movies within the first four weeks of their release. 14 Each new release DVD or Blu-ray is purchased by VidAngel and is then sold to its 15 customers (after it is bought back by VidAngel) on average 16 times. The average 16 net revenue for each transaction over VidAngel's history is \$1.20. The average cost 17 for a new release DVD or Blu-ray is \$15.01. This means that VidAngel, on average, 18 contributes \$15.01 in capital for total revenue of \$19.20. In other words, the studios 19 receive approximately 78% of all of the revenue VidAngel receives on a new release 20title. By comparison, the Google Play and VUDU VOD Distribution Agreements 21 with Sony calls for Sony to receive 70% of the revenue day one, and receive 65% 22 for the four weeks thereafter for all new release rentals.

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VidAngel Maintains It Has Robust Records of Every Transaction In Its History Related to Each of Plaintiffs' Titles

25 62. VidAngel maintains records of every transaction. Those records
26 include the date purchased, date sold back, amounts paid to purchase and sell back,
27 the specific disc purchased and filters used. VidAngel maintains that data for every
28

DECLARATION OF NEAL HARMON

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1 || title VidAngel users have ever filtered and streamed.

2 VidAngel Will Suffer Tremendous Hardship If an Injunction Issues 3 63. In the event that VidAngel is enjoined on October 24, 2016, the 4 following financial damages (immediate, and future) would be incurred in the 5 estimated 18-month timeframe for the trial to occur: 6 . VidAngel is a. 7 currently operating at a , this includes 8 Hosting, Credit Card Fees, and Tagging Costs. 9 10 b. VidAngel expects to have a user base of 11 by April 2018 (18 months from the injunction hearing). With a 12 , and a 13 , the If VidAngel were to be enjoined, the total value of the customers 14 15 lost would be c. In Apr 2018, VidAngel's monthly revenue run rate is projected to 16 17 per month, or an annual be at 18 If VidAngel achieves this goal in the timeframe 19 projected, the company would be valued at, or above, 20. All of this potential market value would be lost if VidAngel is enjoined. 21 22 VidAngel, formed just three years ago, has only 20 full-time employees. To date, 23 VidAngel has been capitalized with over \$3.6 million and has spent over a third of 24 that capital, \$1.2 million, purchasing discs. 25 26 27 28 <u>659</u> - A 23 DECLARATION OF NEAL HARMON

BAKER MARQUART LLP 2029 CENTURY PARK EAST, 16TH FLOOR Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel: (424) 652-7800 • Fax: (424) 652-7850 BAKER MARQUART LLP 2029 CENTURY PARK EAST, 16TH FLOOR Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel: (424) 652-7850

1 64. VidAngel developed its filter-and-stream technology just as consumer 2 preferences were beginning to move away from getting physical DVDs/Blu-ray 3 discs to watch on a home television to having content streamed to them to watch on all sorts of devices, which now are only infrequently a television set. Consumers 4 5 increasingly want to avoid having to obtain discs and want the freedom to watch 6 content on tablet, laptop, and desktop computers, smart telephones, and other 7 devices, and want to be able to watch content wherever they may be, in private. As 8 consumer preferences involving digital technologies always do, the preference for 9 streamed content is happening rapidly and the bulk of the transition will likely be 10 complete in less than three years. VidAngel is the only company currently 11 streaming filtered content to customers. (The only other content filtering service 12 sells devices that consumers may use at home to filter the content of physical DVD 13 and Blu-ray discs being watched on a television set.) As the sole competitor 14 offering to provide filtered streamed content to modern devices, VidAngel 15 obviously has a significant head start over potential competitors in developing its 16 technology and increasing its know-how. Further, VidAngel owes a large portion of 17 its success to the highly capable and competent employees and independent 18 contractors it has attracted, trained, and retained. Were VidAngel to be enjoined 19 during the pendency of this action, it would lose all the advantages described above. 20 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of 21 America that the foregoing is true and correct. 22 Executed on September 12, 2016, at Provo, Utah. 23 24 25 26 Neal Harmon

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1	Ryan G. Baker (Bar No. 214036)			
2	rbaker@bakermarquart.com Jaime Marquart (Bar No. 200344)			
3	jmarquart@bakermarquart.com Scott M. Malzahn (Bar No. 229204)			
4	smalzahn@bakermarquart.com Brian T. Grace (Bar No. 307826)			
5	bgrace@bakermarquart.com BAKER MARQUART LLP			
6	2029 Century Park East, Sixteenth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067			
7	Telephone: (424) 652-7800 Facsimile: (424) 652-7850			
8	Peter K. Stris (Bar No. 216226) peter.stris@strismaher.com			
9	Brendan Maher (Bar No. 217043) brendan.maher@strismaher.com			
10	Elizabeth Brannen (Bar No. 226234) elizabeth.brannen@strismaher.com			
11	Daniel Geyser (Bar No. 230405) daniel.geyser@strismaher.com			
12	STRIS & MAHER LLP 725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1830			
13	Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 995-6800			
14	Facsimile: (213) 261-0299			
15	David W. Quinto (Bar No. 106232) dquinto@VidAngel.com			
16	3007 Franklin Canyon Drive Beverly Hills, California 90210			
17	Telephone: (213) 604-1777 Facsimile: (732) 377-0388			
18	Attorneys for Defendant and			
19 20	Counterclaimant VidAngel, Inc.			
20	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUDT			
21 22	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
22	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION			
23 24				
24	LUCASFILM LTD. LLC; TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM	FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT		
23 26	CORPORATION; AND WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,	TO ORDER OF THE COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 (Dkt. 75)		
27	Plaintiffs,	VIDANGEL'S MEMORANDUM OF		
28	VS.	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN		
- A	661 - VIDANGEL'S OPPOSITION TO PLA	AINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION		




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INTRODUCTION

Disney and three other Hollywood studios ("Disney") have sued VidAngel, a
small Utah-based company that operates an online video streaming service designed
to enable lawful owners of movies to filter out objectionable content before viewing
those movies at home. According to Disney, VidAngel is a copyright pirate that
chooses to steal rather than "negotiate and pay for the rights they use." *See*Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities ("MPAS") at 1:22-23. Like
many of its movies, however, Disney's story is pure fantasy.

9 When that story is fully told, three things are clear: (1) VidAngel is no pirate. It spent over a third of its capital contributions to buy DVD and Blu-ray 10 discs sold by the studios and re-sells them to consumers, many of whom would not 11 otherwise watch the movies recorded on them. (2) Disney is no victim. It is a bully 12 that, acting in concert with other powerful companies, has long engaged in an 13 unlawful effort to block any online filtering services for the at-home viewing of 14 15 lawfully purchased movies. And (3) this lawsuit is about *filtering*, not piracy. It is an elegantly disguised attempt by Disney's lawyers to accomplish what its lobbyists 16 could not: obstruction of the Family Home Movie Act of 2005 ("FMA"). 17

18 Currently before this court is Disney's motion for a preliminary injunction
19 seeking to shut down VidAngel's operations pending resolution of this
20 litigation. That motion must be denied.

It is well settled that a party seeking the "extraordinary remedy" of a preliminary injunction must "clearly show" that it is likely to succeed on the merits; that it will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and that an injunction is in the public interest. *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Disney has not met—and cannot meet—its burden on *any* (let alone all four) of those factors.

27 <u>First</u>, Disney cannot establish that any of its claims are likely to
28 succeed. VidAngel's service is both legal and fair.

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It is legal because nothing VidAngel does can reasonably be construed as 1 infringement or circumvention under federal law. Any possible confusion on that 2 issue was conclusively resolved by Congress over a decade ago. The FMA 3 authorizes for-profit companies to stream lawfully purchased movies for home 4 viewing with objectionable content filtered out pursuant to each customer's 5 individual choice. Disney vigorously opposed the FMA. They lost, but have 6 7 continued their war against filtering by refusing to license any company ever to filter lawfully purchased content for home viewing. Without apparent irony, Disney 8 9 insists that VidAngel's DVD-based business model is illegal, when it is Disney's 10 misconduct that has effectively made that model the only way in which FMAauthorized filtering can be meaningfully made available to American families. 11

VidAngel's service is also fair. Contrary to Disney's intimations and accusations, every VidAngel customer must actually purchase a Disney movie before it is streamed for their home viewing. If Disney's view of the law were adopted, anyone who wanted to purchase and have a filtered movie streamed for home-viewing would be forced to pay Disney *twice* for that privilege: once for the DVD and once to watch it. That's unfair.

18 Second, Disney cannot show that VidAngel's continued operation pending 19 trial would cause any irreparable harm. After receiving letters from VidAngel in July and August of 2015, Disney (and all five other major studios) discussed 20 21 VidAngel's service for almost a year before Disney (but not three other major studios) elected to file this action. Less than two weeks after receiving VidAngel's 22 23 first letter, Disney established a VidAngel account, and the major studios exchanged 24 over 1,300 emails related to VidAngel in the ten-plus months before suit. Disney 25 then waited several more months before seeking to enjoin VidAngel's service. That 26 is not how Big Hollywood responds to pirates, *however small*, and it is not how they react to those who traffic in DMCA circumvention technologies aimed at facilitating 27 piracy. In those cases, the studios have always acted quickly and in concert. Here, 28

in contrast, Disney took a year, not to build a case against a pirate, but to decide how
 to neutralize an act of Congress. Such extraordinary delay bars injunctive relief.

<u>Finally</u>, Disney cannot prove that the balance of hardships tips decisively in
its favor or that the public interest supports a preliminary injunction. To the
contrary, the balancing of hardships weighs strongly in favor of VidAngel, the only
participant in a nascent market being suppressed by Disney. Moreover, as
evidenced by the half-million families it has already served, that market serves an
important public interest recognized by Congress when it passed the FMA.

9

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

10 This case is about *filtering*, not piracy. And Disney is going to lose, because 11 Congress said so. Specifically, the FMA authorizes for-profit companies such as 12 VidAngel to stream lawfully purchased movies for home viewing with objectionable 13 content filtered out pursuant to each customer's individual choice. Disney and the other major studios vigorously opposed the FMA. They lost, but have continued 14 15 their war against filtering by refusing to license any company to filter content. 16 Declaration of Jaime Marquart ("Marquart Dec."), Ex. B at Tr. 83:20-84:21. That 17 de facto ban has necessitated VidAngel's DVD-based business model, which makes the filtering authorized by the FMA meaningfully available to American families. 18 19 To correct the highly misleading narrative set forth by Disney, we begin with a brief 20 summary of the relevant factual history.

- 21
- 22

A. <u>Prior to 2005, Disney Used Copyright Litigation to Prevent</u> <u>Customers Who Purchased Movies for Home Viewing From</u> Filtering Objectionable Content.

Before 2005, the motion picture studios sued every service that tried to provide filtered content to consumers. H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 7 (2005). Like today, Disney and its allies attempted to use scorched-earth litigation tactics to bully smaller players. As the House Judiciary Committee noted with some incredulity, Disney and its allies had sued companies *lawfully* providing filtering services under the pre-FMA legal regime: "Testimony provided by the Register on June 17, 2004,

makes clear that some parties to the suit should not face liability for their current
actions." *Id.* at 5. *See also* H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 3 (2004) ("The Committee is
... concerned that one service that has adopted a model that is already legal under
existing law is embroiled in litigation."). The Committee also observed that if
Disney and its allies had allowed the "airline and broadcast versions [of movies to].
... be[] made available for sale to the public," new legislation (which became the
FMA) might not have been needed. H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 3 (2004).

8 Indeed, it was precisely because Big Hollywood refused to acknowledge the
9 moral rights of American families to filter objectionable content that Congress
10 changed the law by enacting the FMA over 11 years ago.

11

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B. <u>Congress Enacted the FMA to Ensure that Families Could Watch</u> <u>Filtered Content in Private</u>

There is no serious doubt concerning the purpose of the FMA. It was enacted 13 to ensure "that existing copyright and trademark law cannot be used to prevent a 14 parent from deciding what their children see in the privacy of their own home" 15 because Congress did "not take kindly to those who would presume to tell parents 16 how they decide what is best for their children." 150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 (Sept. 17 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). Congress sought to "shield[] 18 companies that make movie-filtering systems from liability for copyrighting 19 infringement," id., and "ensure" that technology that helps parents "determine what 20 their children see on the screen" would "not face continued legal challenges." Id. 21 (statement of Rep. Smith). 22

Congress wanted to "allow for technology innovation to flourish without having to face continued legal challenges" and without "requir[ing] limits to be placed on content the studios develop." *Id.* (statement of Rep. Cannon). At the same time, though, Congress wanted to allow other use of "*available* technology to skip over portions of a movie." 151 CONG. REC. H2114-01 (Apr. 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). It was "time for the rights of parents not to be

- 1 tied up in the courts any longer." *Id.*
- Congress believed strongly that families should be allowed to filter content
 shown at home. The FMA's House sponsor succinctly explained that need:

Just as the author of a book should not be able to force someone to read that book in any particular manner or order, a studio or director should not be able to force our children to watch a movie in a particular way. No one can argue with a straight face it should be against the law to skip over a few pages or even entire chapters of a book. So, too, it should not be illegal to skip over a few words or scenes in a movie. The Family Movie Act ensures that parents have such rights.

8 150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 (Sept. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Lamar
9 Smith). Congressman Cannon observed that the FMA was intended to allow parents
10 "to protect their children from the sex, violence, profanity and other objectionable
11 materials that are found in movies" by "clarifying the exemption in the copyright

12 infringement law allowing people to skip, mute or avoid scenes on DVDs." *Id.*

As explained below, the legislative choices that Congress made in the FMA
were *directly* intended to prevent studios or directors from using litigation to block
parental filtering they disliked.

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C. <u>Congress's Decision to Authorize For-Profit Companies to Stream</u> <u>Lawfully Purchased Movies for Filtered Home Viewing Was</u> Knowingly Made Over Disney's Vigorous Opposition.

Disney and all the major studies—as well as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and the Directors Guild of America (DGA)—fought *intensely* to prevent the passage of the FMA. *See, e.g.*, H.R. REP 109-33(1) at 70. Their central grievance was the same as here, namely, that *only* Disney and its friends should have the right to make "editorial decisions" about movies. The FMA was problematic because it stopped studios from invoking copyright law to block filtering they did not bless. *Id*.

As Disney's Capitol Hill allies explained in a minority report reflecting the reason for Disney's opposition to the FMA: "The issue in the debate [is] *who should make editorial decisions about what movie content children see: parents or a forprofit company*," H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 69 (emphasis added). The minority

report further noted that the FMA "does not require that filtering be done with the
permission of the content creator or owner, but rather creates an *exemption from copyright* and trademark *liability for filtering*." *Id.* at 74 (emphasis added). Indeed,
Congresswoman Watson memorably complained that the FMA would "shield[]
companies that make movie-filtering systems from liability for copyrighting
infringements." *Id.* Exactly.

Then and now, Disney and its allies were and are motivated by the same goal:
to prevent *any* parental filtering.¹ For Disney, home-viewing was and is an all or
nothing proposition: "[D]on't let your children watch a movie unless you approve of
the content of the entire movie." H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I) at 72. In Disney's
preferred world, parents' only recourse should be to rely on its G, PG, PG-13, R,
and NC-17 rating system, which according to Disney, "effectively enable[s] parents
to steer their children away from movies they consider inappropriate." *Id*.²

In the considered judgment of Congress, that view was an unacceptable insult
to the right of parents to control content in their own home in accord with their
constitutionally-protected values. At the same time, Congress was acutely sensitive

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²⁷ H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I) at 7.

¹⁸ ¹ The inability to completely control what is filtered underlies several of Disney's alleged "irreparable injuries." *See* Cittadine Dec., ¶¶ 5, 15-17, 21-34. If that were correct, Disney would be irreparably injured every time a movie-watcher closed his eyes to avoid seeing a scary scene.

² Of course, as the House Judiciary Committee wryly observed, Disney fails to assert the moral rights of movie directors when such is inconvenient to Disney:

The Committee is aware of numerous motion pictures being edited for screen size, content, and time purposes with or without the director's consent so that a motion picture can be displayed on the 48-3 aspect ratios of standard definition televisions, or an airplane with objectionable language remove, and on television channels in the traditional 90 or 120-minute time slots. The Committee sees no difference between the impact upon the moral rights of directors of such modifications and someone wanting to prevent certain content from being displayed on their television.

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to the prospect that the studios and directors might never license third parties to
 stream filtered content to consumers. Accordingly, the FMA was drafted to permit
 third parties to filter *without consent* and without liability for intellectual property
 claims the studios and directors might assert.

5 To that end, the FMA amended section 110 of the Copyright Act to provide that "the following are *not* infringements of copyright: . . . (11) the making 6 7 imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member of a private household, of limited 8 portions of audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance . . . 9 transmitted to that household for private home viewing, from an authorized copy of the motion picture . . . if no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is 10 11 created" 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (emphasis added). The Lanham Act was 12 similarly amended. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(3)(A).

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D. <u>In Furtherance of Its Unlawful Agreements with the DGA, Disney</u> <u>Prohibits Filtering in All Streaming Licenses</u>

14 Disney and other MPAA member studios have entered into an agreement with 15 the DGA ("DGA Agreement") that prohibits all but very limited editing or cutting 16 of their major motion pictures and does not allow any form of filtering under the 17 FMA. (Dkt. No. 11). VidAngel has counter-complained against Disney for 18 antitrust violations with respect to the DGA Agreement, alleging that the agreement 19 is part of a concerted effort to prohibit the lawful provision of online filtering 20 services pursuant to the FMA. Id.

Disney's witness, Tedd Cittadine, admitted that no plaintiff in this case has

ever licensed any VOD provider to filter streamed movies. Marquart Dec., Ex. B at

Tr. 83:20-84:21. He further admitted that his company's standard VOD agreements

all have a term similar to the one in the VOD agreement between Sony and Google

Play. Marquart Dec., Ex B at Tr. 343:6-21. That agreement prohibits the VOD

provider from "mak[ing], or authoriz[ing] any others to make, any modifications,

deletions, cuts, alterations or additions" in or to any of Disney's titles sold by the

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VOD provider. Harmon Dec., ¶ 48; Quinto Dec., ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. A. The terms of 1 2 service of VOD providers likewise prevent users from filtering Disney titles they buy from a VOD provider. Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 26, 29, 30, Exs. G & H. To obviate this 3 4 motion, VidAngel offered to enter into a standard VOD license agreement with 5 Disney that allowed for filtering. Harmon Dec., ¶ 59; Quinto Dec., ¶ 2-4. Disney (*i.e.*, each plaintiff in this litigation) refused to consider its offer. *Id.* The reason is 6 7 simple. Disney does not want the market for filtering its licensed VOD titles to exist. 8

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E. <u>Unable to Obtain a License from Disney, VidAngel Has Developed</u> <u>an FMA Authorized Streaming Business Model That Enables</u> <u>Customers Who Purchase Movies for Home Viewing to Filter</u> <u>Objectionable Content.</u>

11 The Declarations of VidAngel's CEO, Neal Harmon, and its technological 12 expert, Dr. Sigurd Meldal, explain in detail how VidAngel lawfully acquires DVDs 13 of Disney's titles, sells those discs to its users, and then streams filtered versions of 14 those titles to the lawful owners of those discs for private home viewing. Harmon 15 Dec., ¶ 20, 26, 61; Meldal Dec., ¶ 33-44. The declarations provide much more 16 detail on how the technology works, but the letters VidAngel sent to Disney and 17 other studios *well over a year ago* explained its basic service quite succinctly: (1) 18 VidAngel "purchases [a] disc for the customer and stores it in a physical vault;" (2) 19 using proprietary technology, it "streams" the contents of the disc to the customer 20in a filtered format chosen by the customer; then (3) it "re-purchase[s] the disc at a 21 discount from the sale price. . .based on the length of time the customer has owned 22 the disc." Harmon Dec., ¶ 22, Ex. B. VidAngel has spent over a third of its capital 23 contributions to buy digital video discs and Blu-ray discs (collectively, "DVDs") 24 sold by the studios and re-sells them to consumers, many of whom would not 25 otherwise watch the movies recorded on them. Id., \P 63. To date, VidAngel has 26 spent over \$1,200,000 to purchase content sold by the studios. *Id.* No fixed copy of 27 an altered work is ever created. Id. This service complies with the FMA. 28

1	LEGAL STANDARD
2	A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy never awarded as of
3	right." Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. Indeed, the remedy is appropriate only if the movant
4	proves "[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer
5	irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities
6	tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20.
7	When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a technology, as Disney does here, a court
8	should exercise particularly great restraint. As the Supreme Court observed in the
9	seminal Sony Betamax case: "[t]he judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections
10	afforded by copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring
11	theme," Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984), and
12	"it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited
13	monopoly that should be granted to authors to give the public appropriate access
14	to their work product." Id. at 429.
15	ARGUMENT
16	I. DISNEY IS NOT LIKELY TO PREVAIL.
17	Disney is not likely to prevail on either its first claim for relief, for Copyright
18	infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4), or its second claim for relief, for violation of
19	the DMCA 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). Knowing that it cannot demonstrate a
20	likelihood of success on its first and most important cause of action, for copyright
21	infringement, Disney focuses first on its second, DMCA claim, in its moving papers.
22	Not only does that argument put the cart before the horse, it reveals the inherent
23	infirmity in Disney's logic. This Court's analysis of the copyright infringement
24	claims should shed light on the larger purpose of the DMCA, which was intended to
25	protect against copyright infringement.
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-9-VIDANGEL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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Α.

Disney Will Not Succeed on Its Reproduction and Public Performance Copyright Claims.

In contending that VidAngel violates Disney's exclusive rights to reproduce
and publicly perform its copyrighted works, Disney ignores that it gave up certain
rights, and the subsequent owners acquired other rights, when physical copies of
Disney's DVDs were lawfully sold in the market.

6 Disney first argues that VidAngel's intermediate copies violate its 7 reproduction right, citing only case law in which a defendant acted unlawfully by 8 making copies *capable of being viewed by consumers*. But, the case law draws a 9 clear distinction between unlawful copies, which can be viewed by consumers, and 10 lawful "intermediate" copies, which cannot. VidAngel does not make any copy that 11 a consumer could watch, even if given access to the relevant files. After decrypting 12 discs it owns, VidAngel creates intermediate files that are not capable of being 13 watched. (Intermediate files can be compared to computer source code, which is 14 unusable until it has been compiled and converted into object code.) VidAngel tags 15 the files for over 80 types of content, breaks them into approximately 1,300 fragments that contain no more than 10 seconds of content (and frequently less), 16 17 encrypts those fragments, and stores them in a secure, access-controlled location in the cloud. Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 33-38. A consumer given access to the content at any 18 19 point before his or her disc purchase and selection of filters would be unable to 20 watch it. Such intermediate copies are thus not "copies" as defined by the 21 Copyright Act and, as a matter of law, do not give rise to infringement claims. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 997 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entm't, 22 Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 1999); Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 23 24 811 (9th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, the U.S. Copyright Office's most recent triennial report to
Congress noted that both legislative history and a Central District of California
decision militated in favor of the creation of an exemption for making personal
copies of discs one owns (a practice known as "format-shifting") before concluding

that the policy judgments related to it "are complex and thus best left to Congress or 1 2 the courts." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Docket No. 2014-07, EXEMPTION TO 3 PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS SYSTEMS FOR 4 ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES (2015). Various courts have addressed the issue 5 and noted that the owner of a disc may make a personal copy. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD 6 7 Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2009); U.S. v. Elcom 8 Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002). And, here, Congress has spoken. 9 Nor is the streaming of filtered copies to customers who have purchased DVDs a public performance. The Supreme Court has declared that a transmission 10 11 of a copyrighted program is not made to "the public" when it is made "to those who 12 act as owners or possessors of the relevant product." Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510 (2014). Disney characterized that statement as dictum, 13 but the Court took pains to craft a "limited holding" that would not discourage "the 14 15 emergence or use of different kinds of technologies." *Id.* It further suggested that the public service right is not be infringed when – as with a filtering service – "the 16 user of a service pays primarily for something other than the transmission of 17 18 copyrighted works" Id. at 2511. Because VidAngel streams filtered versions 19 of motion pictures created at the direction of and owned by its customers, it is 20 simply untrue that VidAngel engages in public performances.

Disney's argument requires the Court to find that Congress intended that consumers be charged twice to watch a movie once. That is not the law. The FMA requires that any consumer watching filtered content must first have lawfully purchased a copy (*i.e.*, a DVD), thus ensuring that the studios receive a royalty payment. Then, says Disney, the consumer must pay a separate streaming fee to watch that copy. But nothing in the FMA suggests that Disney should be paid twice

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when consumers watch a filtered movie once. 3 Indeed, that suggestion is especially 1 2 absurd given that Disney does not even provide the filtering service.

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B. In Any Event, the FMA Shields Companies Like VidAngel From Liability Under any Provision of the Copyright Act.

Even assuming Disney is likely to succeed on the merits of its reproduction 5 and public performance claims, VidAngel has a strong FMA defense. The FMA 6 expressly provides that a third party may filter and transmit content as specified by a 7 lawful owner of a copy so long as a fixed copy of the altered content is not created. 8 VidAngel complies with those requirements. Disney's argument that VidAngel's 9 service necessarily violates its public performance right unless Disney chooses to 10 grant a license to VidAngel would improperly give Disney a veto power over the 11 FMA. If accepted by the Court, Disney's argument would render the first, and now 12 most important, provision of the FMA (allowing a third party to filter and stream the 13 content of a disc owned by a consumer) meaningless. In actuality, Congress made 14 filtering legal without the studios' consent.

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The FMA must be read to give it purpose. As Judge Learned Hand observed, 16 "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence . . . to 17 remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish." *Cabell* 18 v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 19 397 (1995) ("When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its 20amendment to have real and substantial effect."); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 21 (2004) ("A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so 22 that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant "); Corley v. 23

- 24 ³ Congress intended that the studios would be compensated only through the sale of copies of movies: "the bill would impose a private-sector mandate on copyright owners. [It] would limit the right of copyright owners to collect compensation under copyright law from persons using or manufacturing a 25 26technology that enables making limited changes to a motion picture for a private home viewing." H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 22; H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 6 27 (2004).
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1 *United States*, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (same).

Here, Congress enacted the FMA to provide a legislative solution to the 2 3 studios' refusal to cooperate with third parties seeking to satisfy consumer demand 4 for filtered motion pictures. Congress intended that "directors may not control every detail of how their works are displayed, particularly for a legal copy aired in 5 the privacy of a consumer's home." H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 3 (2004). To ensure 6 7 that neither the studios nor the directors could deny the public the ability to enjoy filtered content in the privacy of their homes, the FMA "does not require that 8 9 filtering be done with the permission of the content creator or owner, but rather 10 creates an exemption from copyright and trademark liability for filtering." Id. at 11 76. Disney's argument that a filtering service (like VidAngel) needs the identical 12 permissions it would have needed *before* the FMA's enactment would render this 13 provision meaningless.

VidAngel streams "authorized" (not bootlegged) copies of physical discs that
it obtains on the legal market. Harmon Dec., ¶ 20. It is not required to obtain any
further authorization from Disney to engage in its filtering service. *See* 17 U.S.C.
110(11); 150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 (Sept. 28, 2004) ("The making imperceptible
must be 'from an authorized copy of a motion picture.' Thus, skipping and muting
from an unauthorized to 'bootleg' copy of a motion picture would not be exempt.")

20 Disney does not dispute that VidAngel transmits filtered motion pictures for 21 private home viewing at the direction of members of private households. Nor can it. Under the Copyright Act, "[t]o 'transmit' a performance. . .is to communicate it 22 23 by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place 24 from which they are sent." 17 U.S.C §101. "This legislation contemplates that any altered performances of the motion picture would be made either directly by the 25 26 viewer or at the direction of a viewer where the viewer is exercising substantial choice over the types of content they choose to skip or mute." 150 CONG. REC. 27 28 H7654-01 (Sept. 28, 2004). That unquestionably occurs here, as VidAngel's

customers select the filters that they wish to apply to each motion picture
transmitted to them for private viewing in the home. Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 37(b)(xi)-(xii).
Tellingly, Disney's papers ignore entirely the one case actually construing the
FMA.⁴ In *Huntsman v. Soderbergh*, No. 02-M-1662 (MJW) (D. Colo. filed Aug.
29, 2002), all the major studios counter complained against ClearPlay and 11 other
small businesses ("ClearPlay") that employed a variety of technologies to allow the
public to watch filtered motion pictures. Disney alleged that:

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[ClearPlay had found a] profitable business in providing to certain audiences, bowdlerized versions of other peoples' movies. Rather than go to the effort . . . of . . . producing . . . their own movies . . . they simply take the Studios' movies and alter them without authorization by removing the material they think this audience will not want.

Motion Picture Studio Def. Answer and Counterclaims, *Huntsman v. Soderbergh*, No. 02-M-1662 (MJW), 2005 WL 1993421 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005),
2002 WL 1993421, ¶ 23.

14 ClearPlay offered edited versions "of the Hottest Movies." Id. at ¶ 62. Its 15 "editing service and software utilize[d] 'ClearPlay Filters' and 'ClearPlay Guides' 16 that [we]re created for each motion picture title." Id. at ¶ 63. Disney alleged that ClearPlay "created, duplicated, rented, sold, or otherwise publicly distributed 17 unlawfully edited" copies of movies (*id.* at \P 86) and that ClearPlay had additionally 18 19 "created . . . film specific software files which, when used in conjunction with 20 DVDs containing the Studios' motion pictures, create unlawfully edited or 21 otherwise altered versions of the Studios' motion pictures." Id. at ¶ 115. Like 22 VidAngel's technology, ClearPlay's filtering technology did not create fixed copies 23 of the filtered works.

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Because the action was still pending when the FMA took effect, the claims

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 ⁴ That omission could not have resulted from oversight in that 3 of the 4 plaintiffs herein—Disney, Fox, and Warner Bros.—lost.
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against ClearPlay had to be dismissed. The court explained: "the effect of the
Family Movie Act is that Congress has made a policy decision that those who
provide the technology to enable viewers to edit films for their private viewing
should not be liable to the copyright owners *for infringing their copyright protections* or to the directors for the Lanham Act claims, and that removes this
court's jurisdiction over any further controversy. . . ." 2005 WL 1993421, at *2
(emphasis added).

8 The upshot is quite simple: if a filtering service complies with the FMA, that 9 service need not satisfy any other provisions of the Copyright Act: "The Committee 10 strongly believes that subject to certain conditions, copyright and trademark law 11 should not be used to limit a parent's right to control what their children watch in 12 the privacy of their own home." H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 5.

Those "certain conditions" were spelled out in the House Report (as well as in 13 the text of the statute itself): "This new subsection ensures that U.S. copyright law 14 15 does not prohibit . . . the use of any filtering service or technology that mutes or skips content, provided the service or technology: 1. 'is confined to private, in-16 home use; 2. 'for the household of the purchasing consumer only; and 3. 'does not 17 create a fixed copy of the alternate version." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Further, 18 19 "technology used to filter certain material out of movies for private viewing would not constitute a violation of copyright or trademark law." Id. at 21 (emphasis 20 21 added). The Report explained what was not exempted: "The Act does not create an exemption for actions that result in fixed copies of altered works." Id. at 7. 22

Moreover, Disney's argument that "VidAngel's server copy segments are fixed because they are [allegedly] stored for more than a transitory duration" is legally and factually meritless. MPAS at 22, fn. 11. The term "fixed copy" in the FMA clearly is distinguishable from intermediate copies made incident to the filtering process, and it cannot be reasonably construed as prohibiting the creation of such copies. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 110(11); *Alvarez v. Tracy*, 773 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th

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Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing the doctrine of *expressio unius est* 1 2 exclusio alterius). Congress' intent was to prohibit third parties from creating and 3 selling a single fixed, altered version of a motion picture to the public at large: 4 There is a basic distinction between a viewer choosing to alter what is visible or audible when viewing a film, the focus of this legislation, and a separate entity choosing to create and distribute a single, altered version to members of the public. The section 110(11) exemption only applies to viewer directed changes to the viewing experience, and not 5 6 the making or distribution of actual altered copies of the motion 7 picture. 8 150 CONG. REC. S11852-01 (Nov. 24, 2004); see also 150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 9 (Sept. 24, 2004). 10 VidAngel's Service Does Not Violate the Copyright Act's **C**. Anticircumvention Provisions Found in the DMCA. 11 Disney contends that VidAngel circumvents access control measures in 12 violation of \S 1201(a)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. \S 1201(a)(1)(A). This 13 statutory provision was added to the Copyright Act as part of the Digital Millennium 14 Copyright Act ("DMCA"). As such, Disney refers to VidAngel's alleged violation 15 of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) as its DMCA claim. 16 The DMCA claim asserted by Disney is specious. To be sure: because 17 Disney encrypts DVDs "to prevent unauthorized access to their content on Discs," 18 MPAS at 12:8-9, and VidAngel decrypts them, Disney's argument has superficial 19 appeal. The argument, however, is based on a fundamental misapprehension of both 20 the DMCA's text and VidAngel's service. 21 Section 1201(a)(3)(A) of the Copyright Act expressly defines what it means 22 "to circumvent a technological measure" as, *inter alia*, "to decrypt an encrypted 23 work. . . without the authority of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 24 But VidAngel buys authorized copies of Disney's DVDs. Harmon Dec., ¶ 20, 61; 25 Meldal Dec., ¶ 33. And it sells them to its customers, who are able to view (with 26 filtering) what they have purchased. *Id.* That is not circumvention. 27 Contrary to Disney's contention, the FMA legislative history does not evince 28 -16-685 VIDANGEL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

a clear intent to prohibit VidAngel from decrypting DVDs for the purpose of 1 accessing a disk to filter audio and visual content. That history merely shows that 2 Congress was aware that "some copy protection technologies rely on matter placed 3 4 into the audio or video signal" and the FMA "does not allow the skipping of technologies or other copy-protection-related matter for the purpose of defeating 5 150 CONG. REC. S11852-01 (Nov. 24, 2004) (emphasis copy protection." 6 7 added). On the other hand, "it is expected that skipping and muting of content in the actual motion picture will be skipped or muted at the direction of the viewer based 8 9 on that viewer's desire to avoid seeing or hearing the action or sound in the motion picture." Id. Thus, in balancing the legitimate interests of the viewer and the 10 11 copyright holder, Congress expressed its intention that the FMA's safe harbor not be 12 misused for the purpose of thwarting "copy protection technologies." *Id.*

13 At most, what VidAngel does could be considered as decrypting content for 14 the purpose of allowing it to be viewed in another way, a procedure known as reformatting or "space shifting." VidAngel does so at the request of disc purchasers 15 who elect to have their DVD content streamed to them rather than receiving the 16 physical discs. As former Solicitor General Don Verrilli assured the Supreme Court 17 in Grokster while representing the major record labels and movie studios, his clients 18 19 agreed that space shifting is legal. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Metro-20 Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480).

21 Moreover, the DMCA should not be construed so broadly as to gut the FMA 22 of its effectiveness. It is undisputed that, when the FMA was enacted in April 2005, 23 the *only* existing technology capable of allowing consumers to receive filtered 24 content streamed to them required that DVDs be decrypted and intermediate copies 25 be made. Marquart Dec., Ex A at Tr. 79:7-80:24, 80:19-82:14; Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 19-26 23.) While Disney argues this is "irrelevant as a legal matter" (MPAS at 13:7), Congress surely did not intend to enact an impotent statute that would have no 27 practical effect. To the contrary, "[t]he plain meaning of [the FMA] exempts from 28

actions brought under U.S. copyright and trademark law the 'making imperceptible 1 2 ... of limited portions of audio or video content provided no fixed copy is created." 3 H.R. REP 109-33(I) at 6-7 (emphasis added). That exemption is limited only in that 4 "[t]he Act does not create an exemption for actions that result in fixed copies of 5 altered works." Id. The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee explained that, "this legislation, the Family Movie Act, clarifies that existing copyright and 6 7 trademark law cannot be used to prevent a parent from utilizing available 8 technology to skip over portions of a movie they may find objectionable." 151 9 CONG. REC. H2114-01 (Apr. 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).

Tellingly, Disney defends its DMCA claim based principally on *MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.*, 629 F.3d 928, 952-55 (9th Cir.
2010) ("*MDY*"). But MDY simply did not turn on 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). And,
perhaps more importantly, the *MDY* court noted the tension between antitrust law
and the doctrine of copyright misuse; indeed, it expressly cautioned against DMCA
application when, as here, antitrust issues are present. *Id.* at 951.⁵

16 In any event, the remedies section of the DMCA portion of the Copyright Act 17 makes clear that to redress violations, courts "may not impose a prior restraint on free speech," 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1), which is essentially what Disney seeks, and 18 19 courts should be especially wary of imposing such a restraint at a preliminary stage. 20 Cf. Overstreet v. United Bros. of Carpenters and Joiners, 409 F.3d 1199, 1218 (9th 21 Cir. 2005). Even if this provision is ultimately (and incorrectly) found to support an 22 award of damages, the DMCA ought not to serve as the basis for enjoining 23 VidAngel's service.

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⁵ The Court should act with restraint for the additional reason that the Electronic Frontier Foundation recently filed suit in the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of the precise DMCA provision, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), at issue herein. Ex. A to Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), *Green v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, Case No. 1:16-cv-01492-EGS, (D.D.C. filed on July 21, 2016).

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D. <u>Even if VidAngel Is in Technical Violation of the Law, Its Service</u> <u>Is a Protected Fair Use.</u>

2 If VidAngel's service is found to be in technical violation of the FMA, it is 3 nonetheless entitled to protection as a "fair use." As the Supreme Court recently 4 explained, "[t]he ultimate goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and 5 understanding. ... [W]hile authors are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the ultimate, primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access 6 7 to knowledge copyright seeks to advance by providing rewards for authorship." 8 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. 9 Ct. 1658 (2016); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 10 (1994) (Fair Use furthers "copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of 11 Science and useful Arts."). To determine whether a particular use of a work is fair, the factors considered: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it 12 is of a commercial nature⁶ or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of 13 the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 14 15 relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 16 potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Campbell at 576-77; 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Court should also consider the clear legislative intent to make 17 filtering services such as VidAngel's service available to the public and the public 18 19 interest in allowing children to be protected from inappropriate content.

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1. VidAngel's Service Is Highly Transformative.

The central inquiry in evaluating the purpose and character of the use of a copyrighted work is to determine whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative." *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579. A work is "transformative" when it does not "merely supersede the objects of the original creation" but rather serves a

- ²⁶ ⁶ Under the FMA, it is irrelevant that VidAngel is a for-profit business. *See* H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 69-74; 17 U.S.C. § 110(11).
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 new and different function. Id.; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d

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 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007).

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3 VidAngel's filtering service transforms films that many people find offensive 4 or inappropriate for children into family-friendly content as judged by each viewer. 5 By its very nature, VidAngel's service is transformative in that it alters the content of the works as seen by different viewers in different ways. Each user is privately 6 7 streamed a customized version of the work that no longer contains the content the 8 viewer finds objectionable. The vast majority of VidAngel users would not watch 9 the content streamed to them without filters. Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 37-40. VidAngel makes the unwatchable watchable, thus furthering congressional intent to provide 10 11 families with access to content they otherwise would not consume, and creates a 12 new audience for the filtered works. VidAngel's highly transformative service weighs heavily in favor of finding fair use. 13

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2. Plaintiffs' Works Are Especially Amenable to Fair Use

15 "Published works are more likely to qualify as fair use [than unpublished
16 works] because the first appearance of the artist's expression has already occurred."
17 *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).

18 VidAngel filters exclusively published works. Because the copyright owner's
19 expression of those works occurs before VidAngel's use, this factor favors fair use.

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3. VidAngel's Users May Access Plaintiffs' Works Only for Transformative Purposes

In determining whether a use is fair, courts assess the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work that is "made accessible to the public for which it may serve as a competing substitute." *Authors Guild*, 804 F.3d at 221-222. VidAngel's service allows individual users to control how much of a film is made imperceptible. Each user is required to apply at least one (substantive) filter, and VidAngel's system never allows the public to access any original, unaltered work. VidAngel's data show that the overwhelming majority of users (96 percent) apply

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multiple filters. Harmon Dec., ¶ 37. Thus, the amount of Plaintiffs' works made
accessible is determined by each user and is always limited to the amount necessary
to create that particular user's desired filtered work. VidAngel users *never* watch
exact copies of the original films. Moreover, VidAngel's filtered content is not a
substitute for Plaintiffs' original works.

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4. VidAngel's Lawful Filtering Service Increases Disney's Disc Sales.

The "single most important element of fair use" is the impact of the use on the 8 traditional market for the copyrighted work. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation 9 Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1986). To defeat a claim of fair use, the copyright 10 holder must point to the market harms that result from secondary use substituting for 11 the original work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 ("cognizable market harm" is 12 limited to "market substitution"). This factor "requires the Court to strike a balance 13 between the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal 14 gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied." Columbia Pictures 15 Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 16 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981)). 17

VidAngel does not harm the market for unfiltered movies because filtered 18 movies are not a substitute for them. As a rule, VidAngel cannot offer filtered 19 movies until *after* the unfiltered originals have been shown in theaters, released on 20collector's edition discs, and streamed to audiences. See Harmon Dec., ¶ 29-30. 21 Because VidAngel does not make fixed copies of filtered works, it cannot compete 22 in the pay or free television market. VidAngel's filtering service *increases* the 23 market for Disney's works. Over 51% of VidAngel customers would not watch 24 Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 37-40. VidAngel lawfully those movies without filtering. 25 purchases thousands of discs to resell to these unique customers. In fact, VidAngel 26 has spent over one-third of its capital contributions to purchase discs. Id., ¶ 61. 27

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5. The *Clean Flicks* Fair Use Analysis Is Inapposite

Disney's reliance on *Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh*, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) is inapposite because it was not decided under the FMA. Clean Flicks made *fixed* copies of edited films, which is expressly prohibited by the FMA. *Id.* at 1240. The FMA was also inapplicable because CleanFlicks, rather than its customers, decided what to filter. Here, no fixed copy of the filtered work is ever made and each user chooses what to filter. Accordingly, VidAngel's service is clearly fair use to the extent it is not exempted by the FMA.

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DISNEY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE IRREPARABLE HARM.

A. Disney's Year-and-a-Quarter Delay Demonstrates That an Injunction Is Unnecessary to Prevent Immediate and Irreparable Harm.

Disney relies heavily on Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV Systems, 12 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011), to support its irreparable harm argument. 13 But in that case, the plaintiffs – who were represented by Disney's counsel herein, 14 Glenn Pomerantz and Kelly Klaus – brought suit against an online DVD rental 15 service called Zediva within 18 days of Zediva's launch. Even so, counsel took 16 pains to explain their delay in seeking an injunction.⁷ Significantly, they alleged 17 that because Zediva had 137 titles available for rent, it posed an imminent threat. 18 By comparison, VidAngel had over 750 titles available when it notified 16 studios 19 and networks, including Disney, of its service with not one but *two* letters in July 20and August of 2015. VidAngel explained that it: (1) "purchases the DVD or Blu-ray 21 disc for the customer and stores it in a physical vault;" (2) "streams" the contents of 22 the disc to the customer in a filtered format chosen by the customer; and (3) then 23

- ⁷ In *WTV Systems*, plaintiffs' counsel submitted a declaration emphasizing the
 speed with which plaintiffs filed suit. RJN Ex. B. When the parties stipulated to
 expedited discovery, the stipulation recited that the additional time required for
 discovery would not evidence any delay. Here, however, the parties stipulated only
 that the continuance of the preliminary injunction hearing from October 24 to
 October 31, 2016, would not constitute evidence of delay.
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"re-purchase[s] the disc at a discount from the sale price. . .based on the length of
time the customer has owned the disc." Harmon Dec., ¶ 22, Ex. B. VidAngel added
that it had grown from 43 to 4848 users in just under six months (a 10,000% growth
rate) and wished to buy directly from studios "to scale its business." *Id.* The letters
invited Disney to access its service, ask questions, and express any objections.
Notwithstanding that the harm alleged Disney alleges herein is the same as in *WTV Systems*, Disney took almost a year and a quarter longer to seek an injunction.

Delay in requesting a preliminary injunction is inconsistent with a claim of 8 9 irreparable harm. Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th 10 Cir. 1985) ("long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of 11 urgency and irreparable harm."); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A][3][c] (unreasonable delay can defeat irreparable 12 injury and the delay "need not be great"). Denying an unreasonably delayed request 13 for injunctive relief furthers the purpose of such relief – to maintain the status quo. 14 15 See, e.g., Citibank N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1985) (10-week delay 16 following notice of infringement was unreasonable); Hanginout, Inc. v. Google, 17 Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1132–33 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (seven-month delay in filing suit, and even more before seeking preliminary injunction, was inexcusable); Valeo 18 19 Intell. Prop., Inc. v. Data Depth Corp., 368 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 20 2005) (three-month delay belied claims of irreparable harm).

21 Disney seemingly learned of VidAngel in December 2014, when it apparently 22 called provisions in its agreements with Google to Google's attention, thus causing 23 Google to alter the Chromecast technology to render VidAngel's service 24 unworkable. Harmon Dec., ¶ 10-13. Evidently to hide evidence of that, Plaintiffs 25 refused to search for or produce any e-mail communications related to VidAngel 26 sent before late July 2015. Marquart Dec., Ex. E. Disney's further year-and-aquarter delay in scheduling a preliminary injunction hearing after receiving 27 VidAngel's July 2015 letter negates its claims of irreparable harm. After receiving 28

1 VidAngel's first letter, Disney opened a VidAngel account on August 6, 2015. 2 Harmon Dec., ¶ 22, Ex. C. Also on August 6, 2015, 18 mostly legal employees of 3 Plaintiffs and other MPAA studios and 7 MPAA lawyers exchanged e-mails and 4 messages about VidAngel. Marquart Dec., Ex. D. On August 20, 2015, Plaintiffs e-5 mailed renowned litigation counsel, Tom Nolan of Skadden Arps, about VidAngel. Id. On August 28, 2015, Plaintiffs e-mailed Kelly Klaus, Glen Pomerantz and 6 7 Jonathan Blavin of Munger Tolles, about VidAngel. Id. In all, 59 employees of Plaintiffs, the MPAA, or other MPAA studios exchanged 124 messages concerning 8 9 VidAngel in August 2015 alone. Id. Plaintiffs' in-house counsel and outside counsel discussed VidAngel over 1,300 times by e-mail alone before filing suit. Id. 10 11 Yet, Plaintiffs failed to send any cease-and-desist letter or other objection to 12 VidAngel prior to filing. Harmon Dec., ¶ 22. Their delay prejudiced VidAngel and Hundreds of thousands of families now rely on VidAngel's filtering 13 it users. service, and VidAngel invested millions in its distribution model (and enriched 14 15 Plaintiffs by doing so), in reliance upon the studios' silence. Harmon Dec., ¶ 30.

The authority Disney cites to justify its delay is inapposite. The primary case
Disney quotes to explain its delay – *Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.*, 134 S.
Ct. 1962 (2014) – did not involve a preliminary injunction and did not address
irreparable harm. At issue was whether asserting a laches defense precluded the
issuance of a *permanent* injunction. Particularly after *eBay* and *Winter* – which
require a showing of imminent actual harm – Plaintiffs' delay negates any claim of
irreparable harm.⁸

⁸ Disney will likely rely upon another case in which they were involved, *American Broad. Cos.*, 2012 WL 3854042 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), in which delay of roughly one year was excused, but only because defendant's business relied on an untested technology perceived as not viable. Further, (1) most of the delay occurred while Aereo operated in "stealth" mode before its public announcement; (2) when it finally announced itself, the plaintiffs were unsure whether Aereo was viable; (3) Aereo operated in an invitation only, beta-testing phase for much of the delay; (4) Aereo loomed large only after it announced the commercial launch of its service in (footnote continued)

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B. Disney's Alleged Harms Are Caused by the FMA, Not VidAngel.

A plaintiff must also present evidence of actual harm suffered as a direct result of the defendant's actions. *Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C.*, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2012), *aff'd* 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); *see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 653 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) (Perfect 10 did not prove a sufficient causal connection between irreparable harm to its business and Google's search service). If there is not a sufficient causal nexus between the alleged irreparable injury and the alleged wrongdoing, an injunction will not issue. *Garcia v. Google, Inc.*, 786 F.3d 733, 748 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing *Perfect 10*, 653 F.3d at 982); *Bird-B-Gone, Inc. v. Bird Barrier Am., Inc.*, 2013 WL 11730662, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013).

11 In Dish, Fox alleged that Dish's "Autohop" service, which allowed 12 subscribers to skip commercials in recorded Fox television shows, infringed. 905 F. 13 Supp. 2d at 1095. To ensure Autohop functioned properly, Dish made "quality 14 assurance" ("QA") copies of Fox's shows. Id. Fox sought a preliminary injunction, 15 arguing that the QA copies resulted in irreparable harm by causing a "loss of 16 control" of Fox's copyrights. The court found that Fox did not establish irreparable 17 harm *caused by Dish. Id* at 1110. It held that the alleged harms flowed from the 18 *non-infringing* ad-skipping function the copies facilitated. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit 19 affirmed: "[i]n refusing to enjoin Dish from creating these [QA] copies, the district 20court correctly concluded that the harms Fox identified—including 'loss of control 21 over its copyrighted works and loss of advertising revenue'----did not 'flow from' the 22 quality assurance copies themselves, but from the entire Autohop program." Fox 23 Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d at 1072. It concluded, "the market harm 24

New York City, one month before suit; and (5) Aereo admitted that it would not have changed its business plan if it had received a cease-and-desist letter and was gearing up for litigation. *Id.* at 28. Here, VidAngel was publicly launched in July 2015 and had considerably more subscribers than even Aereo had when ABC sued it.

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1 that Fox and its *amici* allege results from the automatic commercial-skipping, not
2 the recording of programs" *Id.* at 1069.

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3 Here, legitimate filtering under the FMA, not infringement by VidAngel, 4 causes the "harms" alleged by Disney. First, Disney alleges harm to its right to 5 control how, when and through which channels consumers view its works. By definition, filtering under the FMA occurs without Disney's consent, and Disney 6 7 may not control how others view those works. Second, Disney alleges that VidAngel undermines its ability to license unfiltered content for streaming, but the 8 9 FMA does not require a license to stream filtered content. Third, Disney claims 10 VidAngel disrupts its ability to secure and protect its content, but the FMA allows 11 the transmission of filtered content. Thus, Disney does not have any right to review 12 and approve VidAngel's service (which is very secure in any event). Meldal Dec. 13 ¶ 34, 38-39. Fourth, Disney argues that VidAngel could prevent the development 14 of the online streaming market through inferior user-viewing experiences. Again, the FMA allows filtered transmissions without Disney's consent. 15 Moreover, 16 VidAngel's streaming service is independently rated as superior to Disney's (and to 17 that of any other third party streaming service). Harmon Dec., ¶ 27.

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C. Disney's Alleged Harms Are Speculative.

19 Disney's irreparable injury analysis depends on a premise invalidated by the 20 Supreme Court: that a presumption of irreparable harm applies to copyright 21 infringement claims. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392-3; Flexible Lifeline Sys., 654 22 F.3d at 995-996 (9th Cir. 2011); *Dish Network*, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (requiring 23 an "independent showing" that plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm). A 24 threatened loss of prospective customers, goodwill or reputation supports irreparable 25 harm only if it is not speculative. Rent-A-Center v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991); Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Super. 26 Ct., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the plaintiff's claimed lost goodwill 27 28 and "untold" customers as too speculative).

1 Disney's "evidence" in support of its four alleged irreparable harms is 2 supplied only by Tedd Cittadine who at his deposition could offer no evidence that 3 VidAngel was actually causing *any* of the hypothetical harms to which he testified. 4 VidAngel has provided its disc-based filtered streaming service since the beginning 5 of 2015 and over 500,000 families have now used it. Harmon Dec., ¶ 25, 30. Logic suggests that if any of the speculated harms were real, there would now be 6 7 evidence of actual injury. Yet, Cittadine had no evidence: (1) of actual harm caused by VidAngel to Disney's "control of its copyrights" (Marguart Dec., Ex. A at 8 9 Tr. 196:8-13, 197:18-25); (2) that any VOD provider actually complained about 10 VidAngel or that VidAngel ever even came up in negotiations with them (*id.*, Ex. B 11 at Tr. 227:23-228:19); (3) that VidAngel undermined Disney's ability to secure and 12 protect its content online (*id.*, Ex. A at Tr. 240:14-24); or (4) that VidAngel hindered 13 Disney's development of the on-demand streaming market through inferior user Id. at 263:11-18.9 Cittadine also acknowledged that the four 14 experiences. hypothetical "harms" existed when Disney received VidAngel's July 2015 letter.¹⁰ 15 16 Cittadine's hypotheticals are based upon a false assumption that VidAngel is 17 a copyright pirate, like the filing-sharing networks shut down by courts. When

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⁹ Owing to the admission that Plaintiffs have no evidence of inferior viewer experience, Disney cites to the Ehler declaration, Ex. L, for the proposition that VidAngel's social media pages reflect a few consumer complaints of "poor streaming quality." Exhibit L reflects just 9 complaints from January 2016 through July 2016. In almost all the screen captures, VidAngel responds to the consumer issue and promises to quickly resolve it, which is not "evidence" of any widespread consumer issue with VidAngel. To the contrary, VidAngel's service is growing precisely because it provides a quality viewing experience. Harmon Dec., ¶ 26-28.

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¹⁰ Cittadine admitted that Fox would have had the same concern about VidAngel's security in July 2015 that it did in June 2016, when it applied for a 24 preliminary injunction. Marquart Dec., Ex. A at Tr. 245:18-246:21. Cittadine admitted that VidAngel offered to allow Fox to look at its security architecture in July of 2015. *Id.* at 244:13-18. Cittadine also admitted that he did not know 25 26 whether Fox ever took VidAngel up on that offer (in fact, Fox did not). Id. at 244:25-245:7. 27

asked for Disney's evidence that VidAngel was causing harm to its right to control
its intellectual property, Cittadine referenced "piracy that costs our business billions
of dollars." Marquart Dec., Ex. A at Tr. 195:19-23. Cittadine stated that: (1)
"piracy obviously encourages people to watch consumer content without paying for
it" (*id.* at 198:17-19); (2) "piracy undermines our ability to try and build a legitimate
marketplace" (*id.* at 199:9-12); and (3) piracy "challenges us when we're trying to
negotiate business deals with our clients." *Id.* at 200:16-20.

8 Plaintiffs have now demonstrated that the claimed irreparable injuries are 9 purely pretextual. After Cittadine declared that VidAngel's "out-of-stock" notices harmed Disney by creating a poor user experience (Cittadine Dec., at ¶¶ 29-30), 10 11 VidAngel offered to negotiate a reasonable license fee to stream filtered content in 12 lieu of sending out-of-stock notices pending resolution of this action. Quinto Dec., ¶ 2-4 and Ex. A. Plaintiffs' counsel responded: "my clients absolutely will not 13 engage in any joint licensing discussions." Id., ¶ 3. Counsel for VidAngel then 14 15 offered to abandon its FMA exemption defense (and with it the requirement that 16 consumers must purchase copies of discs) and instead pay a license fee to stream 17 filtered content, noting that such arrangement would resolve Disney's DMCA and infringement claims.¹¹ Plaintiffs never responded to the offer. Id., $\P 4$. 18

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D. <u>Disney's Alleged Harms Are Economic.</u>

Economic injury alone will not support a finding of irreparable harm because
it can generally be remedied by money damages. *Pyro Spectaculars N., Inc. v. Souza*, 861 F. Supp.2d 1079, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing *Rent-A-Center*, 944 F.2d
at 603). A preliminary injunction is appropriate only if the record establishes that

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 ¹¹ VidAngel's counsel described the many reasons why VidAngel would prefer
 to license content for streaming from Plaintiffs rather than continue its current
 physical DVD-based model, including that the studios will someday stop selling
 DVDs and that movies are usually released for streaming prior to their DVD release,
 requiring VidAngel customers to wait for this content. Quinto Dec., Ex. E.

the harm is not economic. *Id.* If a defendant in a copyright infringement action
 maintains accurate records from which damages can be calculated, the harms are not
 irreparable. *See Capitol Records v. Redigi*, No. 1:12-cv-00095, Order Denying
 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012) and transcript of ruling
 on preliminary injunction. RJN., Ex. C.

6 In Dish, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11, the Central District denied a preliminary 7 injunction because the damages were calculable. Fox accused Dish of copying its 8 programs, which could be purchased from services like iTunes, without paying for 9 them. The fact that "Fox has licensing agreements with other companies shows that 10 the *copies* of Fox Programs have a market value that other companies already pay in 11 exchange for the right to use the copies." *Id.* So too here. The *same* VOD market is 12 at issue and any damages are both economic and easily calculable. The Ninth 13 Circuit agreed that monetary damages could compensate Fox for the loss of its 14 copies, reasoning that Fox's existing VOD licenses could "at the very least" 15 constitute a starting point or aid in calculating damages. Fox Broad. Co., 747 F.3d 16 at 1073. It also found that the appropriate market to consider was that for Fox's 17 VOD licenses (iTunes, Hulu, etc.). Id. at 1070, 1073.

As in *Dish* and *Redigi*, the value of VidAngel's sales can be calculated.
VidAngel has records of every transaction – including purchase date, sell-back date,
amount paid, and filters selected – for every title it has ever filtered and streamed.
Harmon Dec., ¶ 62. Thus, any damages caused by VidAngel are easily calculable.

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III. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS WEIGHS AGAINST A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

If its service is enjoined, VidAngel, whose only business is providing the filtering service at issue, would suffer an unimaginable financial hardship that could impair its ability to defend this action before the merits are decided. Where there are no more than "serious questions going to the merits," the moving party must show that "the balance of hardships tips sharply in [its] favor." *All for the Wild Rockies v.*

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Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011); *Lopez v. Brewer*, 680 F.3d 1068,
 1072 (9th Cir. 2012).

3 "In evaluating the balance of hardships a court must consider the impact 4 granting or denying a motion for a preliminary injunction will have on the 5 respective enterprises. Thus the relative size and strength of each enterprise may be pertinent to this inquiry." Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 6 7 827 (9th Cir. 1993). When a larger, established corporation seeks a preliminary 8 injunction against a start-up, courts consistently refuse to enjoin the start-up's 9 business operations. See, e.g., LucasArts Entm't Co. v. Humongous Entm't Co., 815 F. Supp. 332, 338 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to enjoin "a start-up company with 10 limited financial resources" because it "depends to a large extent on sales of its 11 12 products to pay its employees and operating expenses" and its "customers may lose 13 their trust and confidence in the young company's ability to deliver goods on time"); 14 OG Int'l, Ltd. v. Ubisoft Entm't, No. C 11-04980 CRB, 2011 WL 5079552, at *11 15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); Ossur Holdings, Inc. v. Bellacure, Inc., No. C05-16 1552JLR, 2005 WL 3434440, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2005).

17 The hardships strongly favor VidAngel, which has but 20 full-time employees. Harmon Dec., ¶ 63. This injunction would prevent it from filtering any 18 19 motion pictures owned or licensed by Disney, and would cast doubt on the legality 20 of its entire business enterprise. Additionally, VidAngel's goodwill would be 21 seriously damaged as customers could not reliably depend upon VidAngel to filter 22 many popular motion pictures. In contrast, Disney are four of the world's largest 23 movie studios and have "presented little evidence regarding the harm [they] 24 allegedly [are] suffering, other than the harm presumptively caused by copyright infringement."¹² See Activant Sols., Inc. v. Wrenchead, Inc., No. C 03-3376 VRW, 25

Plaintiffs do not attempt to balance the hardships, but dismiss VidAngel's hardships as legally irrelevant based on the assumption that they have demonstrated (footnote continued)

1 2004 WL 1887529, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004).

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IV.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST STRONGLY FAVORS ALLOWING FAMILIES TO USE VIDANGEL'S FILTERING SERVICE.

3 "The public interest analysis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 4 requires [the court] to consider 'whether there exists some critical public interest 5 that would be injured by the grant of preliminary relief." Indep. Living Ctr. v. 6 Maxwell–Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 659 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott 7 Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). "If. . . the impact of an injunction 8 reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a potential for public consequences, the 9 public interest will be relevant to whether the district court grants the preliminary 10 injunction." Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2009) 11 (citing Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2002)). 12 See also Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1022 ("When deciding whether to issue a 13 narrowly tailored injunction, district courts must assess the harms pertaining to 14 injunctive relief in the context of that narrow injunction"). Further, when "an 15 injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest ... the court may in 16 the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the 17 parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff." Weinberger 18 v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–13 (1982).

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A. <u>The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Protected the Public from</u> <u>Offensive Content.</u>

The courts and Congress have frequently protected families from offensive content while in the privacy of their homes. The following are but a few examples. In *Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept.*, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the

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^{a likelihood of success. (Mot. at 31-32.) That is not the case. In any event, where, as here, the balance of hardships tips strongly in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate a stronger likelihood of success on the merits.} *MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist.*, 132 F.3d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1997).

Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing anyone who received material that he or 1 2 she perceived as erotically arousing or sexually provocative to request that the Postmaster General order the sender not to send further mailings because there is no 3 4 constitutional right to send unwanted materials into someone's home. It was 5 irrelevant that the recipient could simply choose to throw the unwanted mail away: "[T]he asserted right of a mailer . . . stops at the outer boundary of every person's 6 7 domain." Id. at 738. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the 8 Court noted that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too 9 young to read," id. at 749, and held that the FCC has the power to regulate indecent 10 radio broadcasts. Id. at 731, 738. The Supreme Court also upheld the issuance of notices of liability to Fox Television Stations for permitting "fleeting" expletives 11 12 during nationally broadcast awards shows (although a later decision excused the fines). See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). In Reno v. 13 ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme Court noted that it has "repeatedly 14 15 recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 16 materials." Id. at 875 (citing cases). Of especial significance here, it noted that a 17 less restrictive alternative to banning all indecent speech on the Internet would be to 18 "require[e] that indecent material be 'tagged' in a way that facilitates parental 19 control of material coming into their homes." Id. at 879.

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B. <u>VidAngel Serves an Important Public Interest.</u>

21 The public interest in protecting every person's right to watch filtered content in private would be severely undercut by the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 22 23 Consumers are rapidly shifting their viewing preferences toward mobile devices, 24 tablets, and SmartTVs. VidAngel is the only entity that provides a filtering service under the FMA for those viewing methods. Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 8, 24, Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 25 26 52-53. An injunction would affect the largest and fasting growing segment of 27 filtered content viewers. As reflected by the overwhelming support of countless families and community leaders, VidAngel serves an important public interest. See 28

Declarations of Timothy F. Winter; Donna Rice Hughes; Harry Jackson; Connor
 Boyack; Matt Kibbe; David Bozell; L Brent Bozell III; David Barton; Gary Bauer;
 Gary Marx; George E. Roller; Patrick Trueman; Rebecca Hagelin; Rick Green;
 Andrea Lafferty; Theodore Baehr; Tim Barton; Bryan and Diane Schwartz; Bob
 Waliszwewski; and Tim Wildmon.

An injunction would also reach far beyond the parties by destroying the 6 7 market for filtered films. See Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1139 (overturning a preliminary injunction in part because it "clearly reached non-parties and implicated issues of 8 9 broader public concern that could have public consequences."). Moreover, due to Disney's unreasonable delay in bringing its motion, over 500,000 families have used 10 11 VidAngel's service to provide family-friendly entertainment options. Harmon Dec., ¶ 30. The Court should not end the public's ability to watch filtered movies before a 12 13 final determination of the parties' rights. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312.

14 15

V. ANY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE CONDITIONED ON THE POSTING OF A BOND OF NOT LESS THAN \$50 MILLION.

A preliminary injunction may issue "only if the movant gives security in an 16 amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by 17 any party wrongfully enjoined or restrained." F.R.C.P. § 65(c); Squaxin Island 18 Tribe v. Washington, 781 F. 2d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1986). A party that is wrongfully 19 enjoined may be limited to the amount of the bond as its recovery. Buddy Sys., Inc. 20v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F. 2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1976). Thus, "[w]hen setting the 21 amount of security, district courts should err on the high side," because "an error in 22 the other direction produces irreparable injury." Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott 23 Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir. 2000). In analogous circumstances, courts in this 24 circuit typically require multi-million dollar bonds.¹³

 ¹³ See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001)
 (\$5 million); MGM v. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
 (\$6 million); see also Design Furnishings, Inc. v. Zen Path, LLC, 2010 WL (footnote continued)

VidAngel occupies a uniquely advantageous market position. It developed its 1 2 filter-and-stream technology just as consumer preferences were beginning to shift 3 from viewing physical discs on a home television to streaming content on all sorts of 4 devices. Consumers increasingly want the freedom to watch content wherever they 5 may be, on tablet, laptop, smart telephones, and other devices. As consumer preferences involving digital technologies always do, the change in preference for 6 7 streamed content is happening rapidly and will likely be complete in under three 8 years. VidAngel enjoys a unique market position as the only company currently 9 streaming filtered content to customers. (The only other content filtering service on 10 the market sells devices that consumers may use at home to filter the content of 11 physical DVDs being watched on a television set.) As the sole company offering to 12 provide filtered streaming content, VidAngel enjoys a significant head start over 13 potential competitors in developing its technology, patenting its break-throughs, and 14 increasing its know-how. VidAngel would lose this enormous head start if it were 15 enjoined. Loss of market share, especially during a critical period in a company's 16 growth, is, of course, an irreparable injury. See Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. 17 Pardini, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Further, VidAngel owes a large portion of its success to the highly capable and competent employees and 18 19 independent contractors it has attracted, trained, and retained. Were VidAngel to be 20 enjoined during the pendency of this action, it would lose all the advantages 21 described above.

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resolution on the merits and would cause it serious financial loss.

The injunction threatens to put VidAngel out of business before any

To date.

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1	VidAngel has been capitalized with over \$3.6 million. Harmon Dec., ¶ 63. In the
2	next 18 months (a cautious estimate of the time it will take to get to trial), VidAngel
3	is expected to earn and the company's fair market value
4	would be . Harmon Dec., ¶ 63. But if its entire business is
5	wrongfully enjoined, VidAngel would lose all its value. Id.
6	The devastating financial repercussions of an injunction also would severely
7	hamper VidAngel's ability to properly fund the litigation of its antitrust claims
8	against the counterclaim defendants, which are well-funded and established giants in
9	the entertainment industry. Disney, the DGA, and others have entered into written
10	agreements that are clearly designed to prohibit the lawful provision of online
11	filtering services. These agreements unreasonably restrain the market for licensed
12	VOD filtered streaming. An injunction would jeopardize the pursuit of these
13	legitimate claims on behalf of this suppressed market. Thus, VidAngel requests a
14	bond of not less than \$50,000,000.
15	CONCLUSION
16	For the reasons explained above, Disney's motion should be denied.
17	
18	DATED: September 12, 2016 Respectfully submitted,
19	
20	By: /s/ Jaime W. Marquart
21	Jaime W. Marquart BAKER MARQUART LLP 2020 Contury Bark Fast Sixteenth Floor
22	BAKER MARQUART LLP 2029 Century Park East, Sixteenth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 (424) 652-7800
23	(424) 652-7850 (facsimile)
24	Attorneys for Defendant and
25	Counterclaimant VidAngel, Inc.
26	
27	
28	
- A.	-35- VIDANGEL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	GLENN D. POMERANTZ (SBN 112503 glenn.pomerantz@mto.com KELLY M. KLAUS (SBN 161091) kelly.klaus@mto.com ROSE LEDA EHLER (SBN 296523) rose.ehler@mto.com ALLYSON R. BENNETT (SBN 302090) allyson.bennett@mto.com MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, Thirty-Fifth Flo Los Angeles, California 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
9	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
10	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA
11	WESTERN	DIVISION
12	DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.; LUCASFILM LTD. LLC:	Case No. 16-cv-04109-AB (PLAx)
13 14	TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION and WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,	UNREDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT PROPOSED TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL
15 16 17	Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants, vs.	PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
18	VIDANGEL, INC., Defendant and Counter-	Judge: Hon. André Birotte Jr.
19	Claimant.	Date: October 24, 2016
20		Time: 10:00 a.m. Crtrm.: 4
21		Filed concurrently herewith: (1) Declaration of Tedd Cittadine
22		(2) Declaration of Rose Leda Ehler
23		(4) Declaration of Robert Schumann
24		(5) [Proposed] Order(6) Application to File Under Seal
25		Trial Date: None Set
26		
27 28		
20		
- A	705 - NOTICE OF MC	TION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 16-CV-04109-AB (PLAX)

1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 24, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., before the 3 Honorable André Birotte Jr., in Courtroom 4 of the United States District Court for 4 the Central District of California, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, 5 California 90012, Plaintiffs Disney Enterprises, Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (collectively, 6 7 "Plaintiffs") will and hereby do move for a Preliminary Injunction restraining 8 Defendant VidAngel, Inc. ("VidAngel") and all of its officers, agents, servants, 9 employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation or 10 privity with any of them, from: [1] violating Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to § 1201(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), by 11 circumventing technological measures that effectively control access to Plaintiffs' 12 13 copyrighted works on DVDs and Blu-ray discs; and [2] infringing by any means, directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs' exclusive rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act, 14 id. § 106, including by reproducing or publicly performing Plaintiffs' copyrighted 15 16 works.

17 This Motion is made on the following grounds as explained in the 18 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and supporting papers: 19 Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because the record 1. 20evidence clearly shows that VidAngel: (a) uses "ripping" software to circumvent 21 technological protection measures on DVDs and Blu-ray discs that effectively 22 control access to Plaintiffs' copyrighted motion pictures and television shows on 23 those discs, thereby violating § 1201(a); (b) copies the resulting unprotected digital 24 files containing Plaintiffs' works to a computer system, thereby infringing Plaintiffs' 25 exclusive rights to reproduce their works under § 106(1); and (c) transmits 26performances from the unauthorized copies that VidAngel makes to the public, 27 thereby infringing Plaintiffs' exclusive rights to perform their works publicly under 28 § 106(4).

1	2. VidAngel's defenses to violating Plaintiffs' rights are meritless.							
2	3. Absent a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm,							
3	including with respect to their ability to exercise their exclusive rights, their							
4	relationships and goodwill with authorized licensees, and the development of the							
5	market for on-demand streaming. The balance of equities tips decidedly in							
6	Plaintiffs' favor, and an injunction is in the public interest.							
7	This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion; the attached							
8	Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Declarations of Tedd Cittadine							
9	("Cittadine Decl."), Rose Leda Ehler ("Ehler Decl."), Kelly M. Klaus ("Klaus							
10	Decl.") and Robert Schumann ("Schumann Decl.") and Exhibits thereto; all							
11	documents on file in this action; and such further or additional evidence or							
12	argument as may be presented before or at the time of the hearing on this Motion.							
13								
14	DATED: August 22, 2016 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP							
15								
16								
17	By: /s/ Kelly M. Klaus							
18	KELLY M. KLAUS							
19	Attorney for Plaintiffs							
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	10-C V-04107-AB (FLAA)

1	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2	INTRODUCTION
3	Defendant VidAngel operates an online on-demand video streaming service
4	that blatantly violates Plaintiffs' rights under the DMCA and the Copyright Act:
5	• VidAngel starts by circumventing the technological protection
6	measures on DVDs and Blu-ray discs (collectively, "Discs") that
7	control access to the digital media files of Plaintiffs' copyrighted
8	movies and television shows—or, as VidAngel's employees say, they
9	"rip[]" the movies—a violation of § 1201(a) of the DMCA. Schumann
10	Decl. ¶¶ 7, 35-38, 43, Ex. C at 23; Dkt. 11(Counter-Complaint) ¶ 61.
11	• VidAngel then copies to computer servers the copyrighted works that
12	VidAngel has ripped—a violation of Plaintiffs' exclusive rights to
13	reproduce their works under § 106(1) of the Copyright Act. Schumann
14	Decl. ¶¶ 37, 40-42, Ex. C at 23-25; Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 58:1-4. ¹
15	• VidAngel then streams performances of those copyrighted works over
16	and over again to numerous VidAngel customers, i.e., "to the public"—
17	a violation of Plaintiffs' exclusive rights to publicly perform their
18	works under § 106(4). Schumann Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. C at 23-25; Ehler
19	Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 90:18-22.
20	Legitimate on-demand streaming services—e.g., iTunes, Amazon and Google
21	Play—run their businesses without illegally circumventing and with authorization to
22	copy and stream Plaintiffs' works. These legitimate services negotiate and pay for
23	the rights they use. VidAngel does not, and it thereby acquires an unjust
24	competitive advantage that VidAngel touts in its advertising. Id. Ex. A (examples).
25	
26	¹ All transcript references are to the 30(b)(6) deposition of VidAngel's CEO, Neal Harmon on August 11, 2016, excerpts at Ehler Decl., Ex. EE. The "Tr." references
27	are to the page and line of the original deposition transcript rather than the page as
28	consecutively numbered in the Exhibits.
_ ^	-1- 716 - PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

VidAngel's illegal conduct threatens imminent, irreparable harm by depriving 1 2 Plaintiffs of their rights to control their content, interfering with relationships with 3 licensees, and undercutting the growth of the legitimate on-demand streaming 4 market. Even VidAngel's followers recognize VidAngel causes harm. Id. Ex. C ("I 5 could watch Star Wars 7 on VidAngel (only filtering one small thing) for \$1 before any other video streaming service had it available. If you guys are allowed to rip, 6 7 stream, and resell DVDs, the other streaming services will want to do it too - it's 8 only fair.").

VidAngel tries to defend its service with three meritless arguments.

10 First, VidAngel argues that Congress sanctioned all of its unlawful conduct under the Family Movie Act of 2005 ("FMA"), 17 U.S.C. § 110(11), because 11 VidAngel allows its users to select content "filters" that skip or mute content from 12 13 streamed movies. The claims at issue have nothing to do with the filtering aspects of VidAngel's service, and the FMA provides VidAngel no shelter on this motion. 14 15 The FMA says that one does not infringe copyright by making motion picture content "imperceptible" (or providing software that does the same) in the context of 16 17 private home viewing. *Id.* The FMA does not say that a business that filters thereby 18 has a total exemption from the DMCA or from having to license the right to copy 19 and publicly stream movies. On the contrary, the FMA makes clear that the relevant 20filtering must be done from an "authorized copy," which VidAngel does not make 21 and from which it does not stream. Id.; see 151 Cong. Rec. S501-S502 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (Sen. Hatch) ("[A]n infringing transmission of a performance to a 22 23 household, [is] not rendered non-infringing by section 110(11) by virtue of the fact that limited portions [of the performance] are made imperceptible."). Filtering does 24 25 not make an underlying unlicensed service legal. And the FMA provides no defense 26 to circumventing, which is "distinct from infring[ing]." MDY Indus., LLC v. 27 Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).

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1 Second, VidAngel claims it does not violate the public performance right 2 because it makes only "private" performances to users who "purchase" Discs from 3 VidAngel. That is wrong. When it streams movies over the Internet, VidAngel is 4 "transmitting" performances to users. Transmissions infringe § 106(4) where, as 5 here, the defendant makes them "to the public, by means of any device or process, 6 whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 7 receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different 8 times." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "[t]o perform ... a work 'publicly'"). A long 9 line of precedent construing this provision (the "Transmit Clause")—including in 10 the Supreme Court's recent decision in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)-makes it clear that VidAngel's online, on-11 12 demand transmissions are public performances. They do not become "private" 13 performances just because VidAngel purports to "sell" its users the Discs (which 14 VidAngel then immediately offers to buy back for a net access price of \$1 a day). 15 VidAngel's "buy-sellback" scheme is an artifice—what its CEO called a "creative way" to compete while trying to be "buttoned up legally." Ehler Decl. Ex. DD at 16 17 366. This sleight of hand does not cure VidAngel's infringement. What matters is 18 whether VidAngel is transmitting performances to the public, not the label that VidAngel uses to describe its transactions. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509 ("[W]hen 19 20 Aereo streams the same television program to multiple subscribers, it 'transmit[s] 21 ... a performance' to all of them"). VidAngel publicly performs without a license. 22 Third, VidAngel argues that Plaintiffs forfeited the right to a preliminary 23 injunction because they did not immediately sue VidAngel when its outside litigator (and recently appointed General Counsel) sent letters describing parts of the service 24 25 to Plaintiffs and other motion picture studios in July 2015. Dkt. 11, Ex. A. At that point, as noted in those letters, VidAngel had fewer than 5,000 users and described 26 27 its service as being in a "limited beta." Id. The letters did not say when VidAngel 28would launch publicly, and Plaintiffs could not have known whether the service

would survive, let alone thrive. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[e]ven if an 1 2 infringement is harmful, the harm may be too small to justify the cost of litigation." 3 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1976 (2014). Copyright 4 owners do not have to immediately sue anyone who infringes, or forever lose the 5 right to seek a preliminary injunction; such a requirement would lead to unnecessary 6 litigation and burdens on the courts. VidAngel started to advertise more 7 aggressively earlier this year and gained traction in the press and online blogs; it 8 now has more than [100,000] active monthly users (and more than [400,000] total) 9 and continues to grow. Ehler Decl. Ex. D; id. Ex. AA at 317. Plaintiffs were 10 justified in suing when they did, and they satisfy all the requirements for injunctive 11 relief.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs And Their Copyrighted Works A.

Plaintiffs, directly or through affiliates, invest substantial resources and effort 14 15 to produce and distribute some of the most popular and critically acclaimed movies 16 and television programs in the world. Their works include, among many others, 17 Frozen (2013) (Disney), Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015) (Lucasfilm), Avatar 18 (2009) (Fox), and Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone (2001) (Warner Bros.).

19 Copyright protection is critical to Plaintiffs' ability to obtain a return on their 20 substantial investments in these and other works and to underwrite the production of 21 new creative content, often at great financial risk. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 8. A studio will spend tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars producing, distributing and 22 23 marketing a major motion picture. Id. \P 7. Third parties that wish to exercise 24 Plaintiffs' rights to exploit their works must negotiate to obtain those rights. Id. ¶ 14. 25

26 Plaintiffs employ different strategies to make their content available to meet 27 consumer demand, but each Plaintiff tries to tailor the value and price for each offering—or "distribution channel"—to the willingness of customers (and licensees) 28PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - Al719 -

to pay for those offerings. *Id.* ¶ 9. Plaintiffs distribute and license their content for
home entertainment across a number of channels. These include, among others:
(1) physical Discs; (2) digital download through services like iTunes, VUDU or
Amazon Video; (3) on-demand streaming for short-term viewing on a pertransaction fee (e.g., iTunes Store or Google Play Store); or (4) subscription ondemand streaming (e.g., Netflix or Hulu). *Id.*

7 Plaintiffs' strategic process of releasing their content across different 8 distribution channels and to different licensees over time is called "windowing." Id. ¶ 15. A Plaintiff may decide to release specific titles only through certain channels 9 10 for a prescribed period, e.g., releasing titles for purchase on Discs or digital download before releasing them to on-demand streaming. Id. ¶¶ 15, 33. Plaintiffs 11 12 often negotiate higher licensing fees in exchange for granting a licensee the 13 exclusive right to perform a movie or television show during a particular time period. Id. ¶ 15. The online and digital channels have become increasingly 14 15 important revenue sources. *Id.* ¶ 10.

Especially in this digital age, to exercise their exclusive rights under
copyright, Plaintiffs must protect their content from piracy and unauthorized use.
Technological protection measures that control access (here, "access controls") are
one way in which Plaintiffs ensure that copies of their content stored on Discs
cannot be easily copied and disseminated digitally. Schumann Decl. ¶¶ 20, 27. The
access controls that encrypt the digital files on Discs can lawfully be unencrypted
for playback or copying only by authorized devices. *Id.* ¶¶ 20-34.

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B.

VidAngel Builds Its Business By Exploiting Plaintiffs' Rights

VidAngel's Decision To Create An Unlicensed Service
 In the fall of 2013, VidAngel first launched a standalone filtering service
 through a web browser plug-in. Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 135:12-136:7. This
 technology permitted a user to apply filters to content streamed from YouTube (and
 if a full-length movie, obtained legitimately through Google Play). *Id*.

In the fall of 2014, VidAngel decided to "pivot" its business to its current 1 2 service, which does not simply provide filtering but offers unauthorized streaming 3 for a daily fee. Id. Ex. V at 217; Id. Ex. EE at Tr. 136:8-12. VidAngel knew from surveying users who stopped using its prior service that [47% of them "didn't want 4 5 to pay for rentals on YouTube/Google Play."] Id. Ex. V at 227. It also had 6 information that only 1% of Americans would actually pay to watch filtered 7 versions of movies if you charged them to use a filter. *Id.* Ex. E at 61. VidAngel 8 decided that, rather than provide filters to run on streams from licensed services, it would rip and copy Discs and charge users for streaming. When investors 9 10 questioned whether the company was getting into a [declining business (movies on Discs)], Mr. Harmon, the CEO, assured them that ["VidAngel is NOT a disc service. 11 VidAngel is a *streaming* service."] *Id.* Ex. W at 234 (emphasis added).² 12 13 From the outset of its "pivot," VidAngel knew it would need licenses to run a streaming business. VidAngel, however, decided on a strategy of asking for 14 15 forgiveness, not permission. As Mr. Harmon put it in a fall 2014 email to an 16 investor: ["[i]n the future we plan to negotiate licenses for content directly from Hollywood (as Netflix) did. ... We need disc[s] right[] [now] on the streaming 17 18 platform (which is growing at over 20 percent annually), not an upward trend in disc sales."] Id.; see also id. Ex. DD at 366 (Feb. 2015: Mr. Harmon saying VidAngel 19 would "have to be a lot bigger" to "get licensing from Hollywood. . . . Until then, 20 21 we sell DVDs and Blu-Rays to you, vault them in our warehouse, and stream you a 22 filtered movie. The buyback system was the most creative way we could come up 23 with in order to offer you the value of a Redbox while staying buttoned up 24 legally."); id. Ex. X at 257 (Sept. 2015: Mr. Harmon saying VidAngel [" 25 At deposition, Mr. Harmon claimed this email was discussing a model for users to 26 "trade or share" their own Discs. Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 146:8-148:6. But the 27 statement that VidAngel would be a ["streaming service," "NOT a disc service,"] was true regardless of the source of Discs. Id. Ex. W at 234. 28 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 2

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2. How VidAngel Works

4 For every movie or TV show it streams, VidAngel first rips a digital copy of 5 the content from a single Disc. Id. Ex. EE at Tr. 127:6-131:7; Schumann Decl. 6 37-39, 42, Exs. C at 23, D. Using RedFox AnyDVD HD software—popularly 7 known as a "ripping" tool—VidAngel circumvents the technological protections— 8 CSS, AACS, BD+—that Plaintiffs use to control access to their content. Ehler Decl. 9 Ex. S. VidAngel previously used the same software sold by the same developers 10 and staff of SlySoft, a ripping software company whose owner was found guilty of distributing illegal circumvention tools. Id. Exs. F, EE at Tr. 68:9-69:16. 11

After circumventing the access controls, VidAngel copies the underlying
digital files (i.e., the movie or television show) onto its computers and then saves
additional copies on leased third-party servers. Schumann Decl. ¶ 40-42. VidAngel
uses the ripped digital copies stored on those servers to stream content. *Id.*; Ehler
Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 90:18-22.

17 VidAngel charges customers for its on-demand streaming through a sham
18 "buy-sellback" scheme. VidAngel adopted this scheme as part of the "pivot,"
19 believing that it provided a loophole from public performance liability in light of
20 dicta in the *Aereo* decision. *Id.* Ex. V at 217. As discussed at pp. 18-21, *infra*,
21 VidAngel's reliance on "buy-sellback" does not change its liability. The facts
22 showing "buy-sellback" to be a fiction, however, speak volumes about VidAngel's
23 credibility in defending its service.

24 "Buy-sellback" works like this: Users pay an upfront fee of \$20, purportedly
25 to "purchase" a physical Disc. *Id.* Ex. P at 181, 198 ("like a 'security deposit").
26 VidAngel then associates the user with an individual Disc that VidAngel has bar27 coded and stored at its facility (the so-called "vault copy"). *Id.* Ex. EE at Tr. 51:528 20; 184:22-185:9. The user does not control or possess the vault copy; VidAngel

does. Id. at 124:21-25. VidAngel claims that, upon request, it will transfer 1 possession of the vault copy to the user. Id. at 228:21-229:1. To date, however, 2 3 VidAngel has received only [eight] requests from users to receive the physical Disc and has returned only [four] Discs—out of more than [1.5 million] purported "sales" 4 thus far in 2016 alone. *Id.* at 229:2-12; 189:21-190:8.³ 5

Furthermore, VidAngel does not actually stream from the vault copy-the 6 7 copy that VidAngel claims the customer "owns." *Id.* at 127:6-20. Rather, VidAngel 8 circumvents the access controls on a Disc, copies the content and then streams from 9 the ripped copy that resides on VidAngel's leased server. Id. at 130:20-131:17. 10 VidAngel then encourages the user to "sell back" the Disc at a "buyback" price that goes down by \$1 or \$2 for each 24-hour period. Id. Ex. G at 93-94 (VidAngel 11 promotional clips on YouTube).⁴ The net effect is that the user pays \$1 or \$2 a day 12 13 for on-demand access to stream the movie or television show-daily prices which VidAngel prominently features in its advertising. Id. Ex. G. 14

15 VidAngel constantly encourages users to treat the service as an online rental service, which they can do by simply clicking to "sellback" the movie for credit. 16 Among other things, VidAngel provides: (1) an icon in the corner of the viewing 17 18 screen, allowing the user to initiate sellback during the stream; (2) a sellback 19 "popup" box at the end of the movie; (3) a link to sellback in the user dashboard;

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³ Other inconsistencies expose the fiction that VidAngel is performing the contents 21 of a Disc the user "owns." For example, the [four] users who actually requested and 22 received physical Discs can still stream the same content via VidAngel-proving the stream comes from a different copy. Id. at 235:6-21. And, users who want to 23 watch a television show "purchase" access only to a single episode. Id. Ex. H. 24 Discs of Plaintiffs' television shows contain entire seasons. If a user actually "owned" the Disc, the user could watch the full season. 25

⁴ "How VidAngel \$1 Movie Works in 15 Seconds" is available on YouTube at 26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=map6EIP41bY (last visited Aug. 21, 2016). 27

- "How \$1 Movies Work on VidAngel Sellback" is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvcF4x1d0xo (last visited Aug. 21, 2016).
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(4) an email reminder about the sellback option after 24 hours; and (5) until this
 lawsuit, an "auto-sellback" default setting, whereby users would automatically set
 their devices to sellback, and thus be assured the equivalent of a rental transaction.
 Id. Ex. BB at 336-37.

5 3. VidAngel's Escalating Marketing And Recent Growth 6 VidAngel's strategy has involved rapidly growing its user base. In July 2015, 7 VidAngel had fewer than 4,848 users, but ambitious growth plans. Dkt. 11, Ex. A at 8 3. A November 2015 investor presentation projected that for 2016, VidAngel would 9 reach [] in revenue; for 2017, [] customers and [10 customers and [] in revenue; and for 2018,] customers and] in revenue—with projected profit margins of []. Ehler 11 Decl. Ex. Y at 283. 12 13 To achieve these ends, VidAngel this year embarked on an aggressive marketing campaign, explicitly contrasting its \$1-a-day (or \$2 for HD) price 14 15 (because it foregoes license fees) with the more typical \$4.99 or \$5.99 daily fee charged by licensed services; VidAngel also boasts of its ability to offer movies not 16 available on other services. Ehler Decl. Exs. A, B. VidAngel's users have 17 18 responded to VidAngel's marketing cues: One more thing I love about VidAngel is that I can easily download NEW movies cheaper than anywhere else! I probably won't edit this one for our family, but I'm so 19 20happy I can still just rent it for \$2 a night! 21 Id. Ex. I at 98; see also id. at 101 ("We bought Star Wars and sold it back for a total 22 23 of \$1 when it was like \$5 to rent on Amazon. So even if you don't need content 24 cleaned, it's a great video service."). 25 This spring, VidAngel began adding more of Plaintiffs' works to its service, 26with a particular focus on marketing movies as soon as they were released on Disc. 27 On April 5, 2016, VidAngel offered Star Wars: The Force Awakens. Id. Ex. J.

28 April 5 was the same day that *The Force Awakens* was released for purchase on

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1 Disc and digital download, but was not yet available to the on-demand streaming 2 market. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 16. VidAngel also released Disney's Zootopia, Warner 3 Bros.'s Batman v. Superman: Dawn of Justice and Keanu, and Fox's DeadPool and 4 The Revenant, among others, within a week of their release on Disc and, for some of these titles, before they were released on any other on-demand streaming service. 5 Ehler Decl. Ex. N. 6

7 By June 2016, when Plaintiffs filed suit, VidAngel had grown to nearly 8 [500,000] monthly transactions across well over [100,000] monthly active users. Id. 9 Ex. AA at 315, 317. VidAngel had also streamed over [1.5 million] movies in the 10 first half of 2016. Id. Ex. EE at Tr. 189:21-190:8. VidAngel continues to 11 aggressively market its service using Plaintiffs' copyrighted content.

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C. VidAngel's Letters To Plaintiffs And Other Studios, And This Lawsuit

14 Late last summer, VidAngel's then-outside counsel, David Quinto, sent letters 15 to Plaintiffs or their corporate parents, ostensibly expressing interest in purchasing 16 more Discs directly from each company. Dkt. 11, Ex. A. Mr. Quinto sent the letters 17 to General Counsels, not to people in business development. He purported to 18 describe VidAngel's nascent service, which he said was in "limited beta" testing. 19 *Id.* at 3. Mr. Quinto said nothing about VidAngel circumventing the access-control 20measures on Discs. He said nothing about VidAngel marketing its service for \$1-a-21 day on-demand streaming through its "buy-sellback" scheme or offering Plaintiffs' 22 content before that content was available to authorized licensees.

23 Plaintiffs started investigating their potential legal claims against VidAngel 24 almost immediately after receiving Mr. Quinto's letter. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 35. 25 Starting earlier this year, VidAngel launched a much broader advertising offensive 26 and started to gain traction in the press and on blogs, and its service started to grow 27 to significant user numbers. On June 9, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this suit.

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In response, VidAngel modified certain aspects of its service. Before being 1 2 sued, VidAngel allowed users to filter for either the opening or closing credits as the 3 single required filter, meaning users could stream essentially the entire movie without filters (users could even set this as the default filter).⁵ Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at 4 5 Tr. 247:24-248:21. To the chagrin of its users, VidAngel suspended this option in response to this litigation, although users still must only select one filter to use the 6 service.⁶ Id. at 246:10-247:22. 7 8 ARGUMENT 9 Plaintiffs satisfy all the requirements for a preliminary injunction: They 10 likely will succeed on the merits and suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief; the balance of equities tip in their favor, and an injunction is in the public 11 interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 12 PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF 13 I. THEIR CLAIMS 14 Plaintiffs Will Succeed On Their DMCA Claim Α. 15 16 To prevail on their circumvention claim, Plaintiffs must prove that VidAngel "circumvent[s] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 17 protected" by copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). A violation of the DMCA is 18 19 "independent of traditional copyright infringement," and no "nexus" to copyright 20 21 ⁵ This was a popular option particularly for Disney works. When VidAngel offered 22 this option, customers watched [23.61%] of streams of Up, [22.36%] of streams of 23 Finding Nemo, [20.91%] of streams of Monsters, Inc., [20.46%] of streams of Wall-*E* and [20.36%] of streams of *Big Hero* 6 essentially unfiltered by selecting only the 24 credits filter. Ehler Decl. Ex. CC. For Warner Bros.'s An Innocent Man, customers 25 viewed [44.90%] of streams using only this filter. Id. ⁶ Users were upset that they would have to filter actual movie content (rather than 26 the credits) to cheaply stream movies: "@VidAngel and you took away censoring 27 the end credits which was an easy choice if I didn't really want to censor anything." Ehler Decl. Ex. FF; *id* Ex. K (examples); *see also id*. Ex. O. 28

infringement is required. *See MDY Indus.*, 629 F.3d at 946, 949, 952 (expressly
 declining to adopt a "infringement nexus requirement") (emphasis added).

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VidAngel Circumvents The Technological Protection Measures That Control Access To Plaintiffs' Works On Discs

5 A technological measure effectively controls access to a copyrighted work if, 6 "in the ordinary course of its operation, [it] requires the application of information, 7 or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access 8 to the work." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Plaintiffs use CSS, AACS and BD+ to prevent 9 unauthorized access to their content on Discs. Schumann Decl. ¶ 20, 27. All three 10 qualify as DMCA access controls. See id. ¶¶ 20-34; Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD *Copy Control Ass'n*, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("CSS . . . 11 12 effectively controls access to . . . copyrighted DVD content"); 321 Studios v. Metro 13 Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 14 15 2000). 16 VidAngel circumvents these access controls. To circumvent is "to 17 descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, 18 bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority 19 of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A). VidAngel admits that it "uses 20 a commercially available software program to automatically allow read-access for 21 the purpose of mounting the DVD [and Blu-ray] files for uploading onto a 22 computer, in the process removing restrictions on DVD [and Blu-ray] encryption." 23 Dkt. 11 ¶ 50(ii) (emphasis added); see Ehler Decl. Ex. S (invoice for AnyDvd HD); 24 Schumann Decl. ¶ 35-39. In short, VidAngel circumvents technological measures 25 that control access, and is liable under § 1201(a). 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 727 -- A

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
VidAngel Has No Defense To Its Violation Of § 1201(a) a. The DMCA Makes No Exception For Businesses That Want To Circumvent To Provide Filters

VidAngel argues that its circumvention is lawful because "the making of a 4 5 decrypted copy [is] the necessary first step in making a lawfully purchased DVD capable of being filtered." See Dkt. 11 (Counter-Complaint) ¶ 61-62. That is not 6 7 true as a factual matter and is irrelevant as a legal matter. As VidAngel admits, 8 other services provide software that allows consumers to apply filters to Discs they have purchased. See id. ¶ 34 (describing ClearPlay's DVD-filtering service). What 9 10 VidAngel means is that circumventing is a "necessary first step" for the type of business VidAngel wants to run—one that provides unauthorized on-demand access 11 to content streamed from copies ripped from Discs. Circumvention makes it easier 12 13 and cheaper for VidAngel to run its business, but that does not make the circumvention lawful. 14

VidAngel's circumvention does not fit into any enumerated exception to the
anti-circumvention right or any additional exception promulgated by the Librarian
of Congress.⁷ 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j). Where, as here, "Congress explicitly
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not
to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent." *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (quotations omitted).

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b. The FMA Does Not Authorize Circumvention

VidAngel argues that the FMA shows Congress's intent to exempt VidAngel
from § 1201(a) liability. The FMA's text and legislative history show the opposite
is true.

5 The FMA addresses a narrowly specified type of activity (the making imperceptible of certain audio and video), which, if it falls within the FMA is "not 6 7 an infringement[] of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). Section 1201, however, 8 provides a separate cause of action that is not a claim of infringement. As the Ninth 9 Circuit explained—in the course of declining to adopt the requirement of a "nexus" 10 between a DMCA violation and infringement—the DMCA "create[d] a new anticircumvention right in § 1201(a) distinct from infringement." See MDY Indus., 11 12 629 F.3d at 950 (emphasis added). "Infringement" is the violation of one of 13 copyright's exclusive rights, which are found in § 106. It is not the same as 14 circumvention. The FMA further states that nothing in that exception to 15 infringement (§ 110(11)) "shall be construed to imply further rights under section 16 106 of this title, or to have any effect on defenses or limitations on rights granted 17 under any other section of this title or under any other paragraph of this section." 17 18 U.S.C. § 110 (final sentence) (emphasis added). Section 1201(a) embodies rights and defenses relating to circumvention and not infringement. The FMA by its plain 19 20 language provides VidAngel no defense.

Because "the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent," there is no need to examine legislative history. *Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc.*, 816 F.3d 550, 562 (9th Cir. 2016). But the
legislative history *confirms* that the FMA does not excuse circumvention. The
section-by-section analysis by the FMA's Senate sponsor states that the FMA "does *not* provide any exemption from the anti-circumvention provisions of section 1201,"
and that it:

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1 2 3	would not be a defense to a claim of violation of section 1201 that the circumvention is for the purpose of engaging in the conduct covered by this new exemption in section 110(11) [the FMA], just as it is not a defense under section 1201 that the circumvention is for the purpose of engaging in any other non-infringing conduct.
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5	151 Cong. Rec. S502 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005); see id. ("Any suggestion that support
6	for the exercise of viewer choice requires violation of either the copyright in the
7	work or of the copy protection schemes that provide protection for such work should
8	be rejected."). ⁸ The FMA provides VidAngel no defense to its § 1201(a) violations.
9	c. There Is No Fair Use Exemption To § 1201(a) Liability
10	The fair use defense under § 107 does not apply to § 1201(a) violations. See,
11	e.g., Dish Network, L.L.C. v. Vicxon Corp., No. 12-CV-9-L WVG, 2013 WL
12	3894905, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) ("[P]otential lawful or fair use is not a
13	defense to § 1201(a) when its requirements are established."); United States v.
14	<i>Crippen</i> , No. CR 09-703 PSG, 2010 WL 7198205, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010)
15	("A reading of § 1201(c) that adds the fair use arrow to a defendant's § 1201(a)
16	quiver contradicts the plain meaning of the statute and must be rejected.").
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18	⁸ When Congress first considered the FMA, in 2004, Representative Goodlatte
19	expressed concern that it might interfere with copyright owners' rights under § 1201. Hearing on H.R. 4586, Serial No. 94 (June 17, 2004) at 84. He asked about
20	including an explicit provision to make clear that the FMA has no effect on § 1201.
21	<i>Id.</i> In a letter, the Register of Copyrights stated that such an explicit provision was unnecessary because "[t]he anticircumvention provisions of section 1201 apply even
22	in cases where circumvention is carried out in order to engage in an act that is not an
23	act of infringement under the copyright statute." <i>Id.</i> at 89. The Register advised against including a specific statement confirming the inapplicability of the FMA to
23	§ 1201 claims, noting such a provision could create needless confusion regarding
25	the other exemptions from infringement in § 110 (where the FMA is codified) and
	elsewhere in the Copyright Act: "To include in this new exemption a reference to section 1201 when none of the other exemptions in section 110 or elsewhere in the
26	Copyright Act make such reference will imply that those existing exemptions also
27	apply to liability under the anticircumvention provisions, when it should be clear that they do not." <i>Id</i> .
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"[T]he decision not to make fair use a defense to a claim under Section 1 2 1201(a) was quite deliberate." *Reimerdes*, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322. Congress was 3 well aware "that technological controls on access to copyrighted works might erode 4 fair uses by preventing access even for uses that would be deemed 'fair,'" and 5 "struck a balance among the competing interests." Id. (citing Commerce Com. Rep. 25-26). Reading a fair use defense into § 1201(a) would upset that balance and be 6 7 contrary to the statute. *Crippen*, 2010 WL 7198205, at *5 (§ 1201(a) is a 8 "rebalancing of interests that attempts to deal with special problems created by the 9 so-called digital revolution"; "[t]hat balancing [is] done by the DMCA, not by 10 adding fair use to the circumvention equation") (citation omitted). **B**. **Plaintiffs Will Succeed On Their Copyright Infringement Claims** 11 12 Plaintiffs easily establish prima facie infringement claims because they 13 (1) "show ownership" and (2) demonstrate a violation of "at least one exclusive right" (sections 1 and 2, infra). A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 14 15 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). VidAngel's claimed defenses are meritless (section 3, *infra*). 1. Plaintiffs Own Or Control Valid Copyrights In The Works 16 That VidAngel Exploits 17 18 Certificates of registration issued by the Copyright Office for the copyrighted 19 works identified in the Complaint are included with this filing. Klaus Decl. Exs. A-20 **RR**. The certificates create a presumption of copyright validity and ownership. 17 21 U.S.C. § 410(c); United Fabrics Int'l, Inc. v. C&J Wear, Inc., 630 F.3d 1255, 1257 22 (9th Cir. 2011). It is undisputed that VidAngel currently offers all the works listed 23 in Exhibit A to the complaint and, unless enjoined, will continue to offer these 24 works and other future releases. Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 27:19-29:14; 30:3-20; 25 31:6-37:4. VidAngel Violates Plaintiffs' Exclusive Rights To Reproduce And Publicly Perform Their Copyrighted Works 2. 26 27 28 VidAngel infringes at least two distinct § 106 rights, each of which is PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - Al731 -

1 sufficient to render VidAngel liable.

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a. VidAngel Violates Plaintiffs' Exclusive Right To Reproduce Their Works By Making Copies

4 Plaintiffs have the exclusive right "to reproduce" their works "in copies." 17 5 U.S.C. § 106(1). VidAngel admits to making copies of Plaintiffs' works onto 6 computer system and third-party servers, thereby violating the reproduction right. 7 Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 58:1-4. This is infringement. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 8 Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (transferring digital work "from a 9 permanent storage device to a computer's RAM [or storage]" infringes the 10 reproduction right); see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 11 CIV. 8407, 2014 WL 5089743, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) ("uploaded copies" 11 12 of works violate reproduction right). 13 b.

VidAngel Violates Plaintiffs' Exclusive Right To Publicly Perform Their Copyrighted Works

VidAngel Publicly Performs Plaintiffs' Works

16 Plaintiffs have the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). VidAngel violates that right under the Transmit 17 Clause. VidAngel "transmits" "performances" "of the work[s]." 17 U.S.C. § 101 18 19 (definition of public performance and "to transmit"); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508 20 (Internet streams trigger the Transmit Clause). And VidAngel streams "to the 21 public," i.e., VidAngel's thousands of users. Under the Transmit Clause, the fact 22 that VidAngel's users receive those performances "in separate places" and "at 23 different times" does not change the fact that VidAngel is performing "to the 24 public." 17 U.S.C. § 101; Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.

i.

VidAngel's public performance liability follows from Transmit Clause
precedent. *Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.*, 749 F.2d 154 (3d
Cir. 1984), held that a remote video rental service—wherein patrons selected videos
from a store, which transmitted performances from the videos to private in-store

booths—violated the public performance right. The court held that the store
 "show[ed] each copy [of a movie] repeatedly to different members of the public,"
 and that the service was "essentially the same as a movie theatre, with the additional
 feature of privacy." *Id.* at 159.

On Command Video Corporation v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F.
Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991), held that a hotel's "electronic rental" system—in which
the hotel rented movies to guests and transmitted performances from the main office
to individual hotel rooms—infringed the public performance right. The court held
that the "relationship between the transmitter of the performance, On Command,
and the audience, hotel guests," was "a commercial, 'public' one regardless of
where the viewing takes place." *Id.* at 788.

Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003
(C.D. Cal. 2011) ("Zediva"), held that the Zediva service—which streamed
performances from DVDs and DVD players purportedly assigned to specific
users—violated the public performance right. *Id.* at 1006-07, 1010.

And *Aereo* held that Internet streaming of content captured from over-the-air
broadcast signals by thousands of separate antennae—each of which, Aereo
claimed, was assigned separately to individual subscribers—infringed. The Court
squarely rejected Aereo's claim that its technical design (using an individual
antenna to make a separate transmission path to each user) made the performances
private. *Aereo*, 134 S. Ct. at 2508-09 (noting subscribers would not "care much"
about the service's technical design).

Like its predecessors, VidAngel "transmits" (by streaming) performances "to
the public" (its users). VidAngel's liability is clear.

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claims support for this argument in dicta from *Aereo*, stating that a different analysis
 might apply where users "receive performances in their capacities as owners or
 possessors of the underlying works." *Aereo*, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. This argument
 fails.

5 First, the Court's description of the ownership/possessory relationship that 6 might be relevant is plainly inapplicable to VidAngel. The Court said that the 7 difference between a valet returning cars to their owners and a dealership selling 8 new cars provided a potential analogy to the private/public distinction: "we would 9 not say that the [valet] provides cars 'to the public' . . . [w]e would say that a car 10 dealership . . . provide[s] cars to the public, for it sells cars to individuals who lack a pre-existing relationship to the cars." Id. The Court said Aereo was more like a car 11 12 dealership because it "transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack 13 any prior relationship to the works." Id. The same is true of VidAngel, whose users have no "prior relationship" with the works they watch, but instead receive access 14 15 by paying VidAngel a fee.

16 Second, as Aereo and the other cases discussed above make clear, courts must 17 look at the reality of what the defendant is doing rather than the stratagem it 18 employs to characterize its performances as private. The Court rejected Aereo's 19 claim that associating each user with an antenna made its streams private 20performances. The Court explained that this gimmickry did not "render Aereo's 21 commercial objective any different from that of cable companies," and did not "significantly alter the viewing experience." Id. at 2508. It is unfathomable that the 22 23 courts in Redd Horne, On Command, and Zediva would have deemed the performances private if the defendants had said they were "selling" videos to 24 customers and "buying them back" after each performance. 25

The courts' focus on substance rather than labels is fatal to VidAngel's
"private performance" argument. VidAngel streams the same copyrighted works to
multiple users ("the public") in a manner that is fundamentally the same as other on-

demand services. VidAngel's own internal documents make it clear that 1 ["VidAngel is NOT a disc service. VidAngel is a *streaming* service."] Ehler Decl. 2 3 Ex. W at 234 (emphasis added). VidAngel's labeling the transaction a "sale" does not affect the user's viewing experience. Given that only [eight] users have ever 4 5 requested a copy of the Disc they purportedly "bought"—out of [millions] of purported "sales"-it is obvious that VidAngel's users do not treat the service as 6 selling them Discs. Id. Ex. EE at Tr. 189:21-190:8, 229:2-12; see also id. Ex. I at 7 120 ("VidAngel – An Honest Review"⁹). VidAngel's business model depends on 8 consumers treating the "buy-sellback" option just like an on-demand streaming 9 10 rental service, and it encourages this behavior at every turn by repeatedly reminding users to "sellback," sending email reminders, and even offering "auto-sellback." Id. 11 at Ex. BB at 336-37. VidAngel's labeling of the transaction cannot disguise what is 12 really taking place.¹⁰ 13 Third, even if VidAngel were right (which it is not) that the Court should look 14 15 at how VidAngel characterizes its service (at least in its legal papers as opposed to 16 its marketing materials), that would not help VidAngel. VidAngel streams 17 performances to paying subscribers from a master copy stored on a server (not a 18 Disc temporarily assigned to the user) in the same way licensed services do—*except* 19 VidAngel's master copy is unauthorized and VidAngel has no license to stream. 20 21 22 ⁹ "VidAngel – An Honest Review" is available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KG7xgmDHF40 (last visited Aug. 21, 2016). 23 ¹⁰ In analogous contexts, courts have recognized "rentals" couched as "sales" 24 through a sell-buyback structure as gimmicks and held that it is the substance that 25 matters. A & M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting buyback scheme under Record Rental Amendment of 1984); Central 26 Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 957, 964 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting buyback scheme under Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990). 28 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - Al735 -16-CV-04109-AB (PLAX) Schumann Decl. ¶¶ 7, 42. In sum, VidAngel's attempt to characterize its
 performances as private fails.

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None of VidAngel's Defenses Excuse Its Infringementa. The FMA Does Not Excuse VidAngel's Infringement

5 The statutory text and Congress's clear intent establish that the FMA is
6 narrow and does not exempt VidAngel's infringement of Plaintiffs' rights.

First, as a textual matter, the FMA exempts only (1) "the making
imperceptible" and (2) "the creation or provision of a computer program or other
technology that enables such making imperceptible." 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). Every
other word in the FMA narrows the circumstances in which these two exemptions to
§ 106 apply. The savings clause, moreover, clarifies the FMA shall not be
"construed to imply further rights under" § 106. *Id.* § 110 (final sentence).

13 VidAngel argues that a business that offers filtering software has statutory authorization to publicly perform Plaintiffs' works because the FMA permits 14 15 filtering "during a performance . . . transmitted to that household for private home viewing." Dkt. 11 (Counter-Complaint) ¶ 65 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) 16 17 (omissions in original)). The plain text of the FMA defies this reading. VidAngel's 18 reading ignores the requirement that the performance be from an "authorized copy." 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). If Congress wanted to grant filtering businesses a total 19 20 exemption from copyright infringement—a radical notion with no historical 21 support—it would have said that directly. The fact that the transmission must come from an "authorized copy" of the copyrighted work makes clear that Congress did 22 23 not provide a blanket exemption to the reproduction or public performance right. *Id.* VidAngel's answer to this is that it purchases authorized copies of Plaintiffs' movies 24 on Discs. But VidAngel does not stream from those Discs (and even if it did, it 25 26would still be publicly performing them without the necessary license, as discussed 27 above). VidAngel does not stream from an "authorized copy;" it streams from a 28

1	ripped digital copy that it obtained by violating § 1201(a) and then by violating
2	Plaintiffs' reproduction right. ¹¹ Schumann Decl. ¶¶ 35-42.
3	The FMA was "targeted narrowly and specifically" at the act of filtering and
4	did not impact other rights and obligations under the Copyright Act. The statute
5	was not intended to be a blanket license for every business that engaged in
6	filtering. ¹²
7	b. VidAngel's Affirmative Defense Of Fair Use Does Not Excuse Its Infringement
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9	VidAngel must show it likely will succeed on its defense that copying and
10	publicly performing Plaintiffs' works are fair uses. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
11	Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007). VidAngel cannot meet its burden. All
12	four factors that § 107 directs the Court to consider weigh against VidAngel.
13	
14	¹¹ Even if VidAngel's reading were correct—which it is not—VidAngel could not
15	rely on the statute because it [
16]. Schumann Decl. Ex. C at 25; Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 95:22-96:14. The FMA only applies "if no fixed copy of the altered version of the
17	motion picture is created by such computer program or other technology." 17
18	U.S.C. § 110(11). VidAngel's documents make clear that it [
19	Schumann Decl. Ex. C at 25. A copy is fixed if it is "sufficiently permanent or
20	stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." <i>MAI Sys. Corp.</i> , 991 F.2d at 518 (citing 17
21	U.S.C. § 101). VidAngel's server copy segments are fixed because they are stored
22	for more than a transitory duration. <i>Id.</i> (software loaded to a computer's RAM is fixed, even if for the sole purpose of viewing the system and running an error log).
23	¹² Senator Hatch, a sponsor of the bill, explained that the FMA "would not exempt
24	from liability an otherwise infringing performance, or a transmission of a performance, during which limited portions of audio or video content of the motion
25	picture are made imperceptible" and infringing performances "are not rendered non-
26	infringing by section 110(11) by virtue of the fact that limited portions of audio or video content of the motion picture being performed are made impercentible during
27	video content of the motion picture being performed are made imperceptible during such performance or transmission." 151 Cong. Rec. S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005)
28	(Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).
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i. VidAngel's Wholesale Copying And Publicly Performing Plaintiffs' Works Are Commercial And Non-Transformative

The first factor asks whether VidAngel's use is commercial and
transformative. *Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g*, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir.
2008).

6 VidAngel's use of Plaintiffs' works obviously is commercial: VidAngel
7 copies and publicly performs Plaintiffs' works to profit in its business. *Harper &*8 *Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). VidAngel's
9 commercial use weighs against fair use because VidAngel "stands to profit from
10 exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price."
11 *Leadsinger*, 512 F.3d at 530 (quotations omitted).

VidAngel's commercial use is not transformative. A transformative use adds
"something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
[work] with new expression, meaning or message." *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music*, *Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). VidAngel's wholesale copying of Plaintiffs' works
"in their entirety" to its computer system adds nothing new to those works and is not
transformative. *Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc.*, 227
F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000).

19 VidAngel's public performance of those works—in which VidAngel makes 20 the entire copied work available to users and allows them to selectively filter out 21 small portions of Plaintiffs' works— also is not transformative. Removing portions 22 of the works obviously does not add anything new to them. VidAngel instead is 23 "simply rebroadcast[ing] for entertainment purposes [works] that Plaintiffs 24 rightfully own"-which is not transformative. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. 25 Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds 26 as recognized in Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); see Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) ("neither 27 28minor cropping nor the inclusion of headlines or captions transformed the

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copyrighted [photographs]"); Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 ("where 1 2 the use is for the same intrinsic purpose as the copyright holder's, such use seriously 3 weakens a claimed fair use") (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. 4 Authors Guild. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 225 (2d Cir. 2015) (while Google 5 Books' display of "snippets" of text was held to be transformative, court expressly stated that "[i]f Plaintiffs' claim were based on Google's converting their books into 6 7 a digitized form and making that digitized version accessible to the public, their 8 claim would be strong").

9 The court in *Clean Flicks of Colo. v. LLC v. Soderbergh*, 433 F. Supp. 2d 10 1236 (D. Colo. 2006), considered and rejected the same fair use defense that 11 VidAngel makes. The defendants there mechanically edited movies to remove content and therefore had no FMA defense. The court held that the defendants also 12 13 had no fair use defense. The court emphasized that the defendants (1) added nothing to the movies, (2) only removed small amounts of content, and (3) did so for 14 15 commercial gain. *Id.* at 1241. All of those findings apply to VidAngel.

ii. Plaintiffs' Copyrighted Works Are Highly Creative 16 17 Plaintiffs' works are highly creative, and "the nature of the copyrighted work" 18 favors Plaintiffs. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d at 629 19 (motion pictures "are creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core of copyright protection"). 20

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VidAngel Copies The Entirety Of Plaintiffs' Works And Publicly Performs Substantially The Entirety iii. Of Them

VidAngel copies Plaintiffs' works in their entirety. Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 23 24 112:19-113:2. This weighs strongly against fair use. See Monge, 688 F.3d at 1180 25 (no fair use where defendant copied photographs in their entirety). VidAngel's 26 public performances omit some portions of each work. See Ehler Decl. Ex. Q 27 (removing "nudity/graphic violence/f-bomb . . . took out 14min" from *Deadpool*). 28But VidAngel always performs the "heart" of the works, and this factor weighs PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - Al739 -

against VidAngel. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d
 at 630; L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992).

iv.

3 4 VidAngel's Service Undermines Existing And Potential Markets For Plaintiffs' Works

5 The fourth factor considers current market harm and "whether unrestricted 6 and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a 7 substantially adverse impact on the potential market' for the original." *Campbell*, 8 510 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted). Where, as here, the defendant uses the works 9 "for commercial gain, the likelihood of market harm may be presumed." 10 Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 531-32 (quotations omitted); see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (presumption of market harm "makes common sense" in cases involving "copying 11 12 of the original in its entirety for commercial purposes") (quotation marks and 13 alterations omitted). To rebut this presumption, VidAngel must "bring forward 14 favorable evidence about relevant markets." Arista Records LLC v. Myxer, Inc., No. 15 CV 08-03935 GAF, 2011 WL 11660773, at *43 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)). 16 17 This VidAngel cannot do.

18 VidAngel plainly undermines existing and developing markets for Plaintiffs' 19 works. VidAngel's own marketing materials and strategy compare it to legitimate 20on-demand streaming services such as iTunes, Google Play, Amazon Video, and 21 Netflix. Ehler Decl. Exs. A, B. Further, as explained by the Senior Vice President, 22 Digital Distribution at Fox, VidAngel undercuts the market for Plaintiffs' works in a 23 number of ways. Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 16-22; 26-34. For example when VidAngel 24 released Star Wars: The Force Awakens on the same day it was released to Disc and 25 for digital download, VidAngel was "competing directly with these other exclusive 26viewing options and preempting legitimate on-demand streaming services" which did not yet have rights to stream that title. Id. ¶ 16. Likewise, "[b]y offering 27 28consumers on-demand streaming at a lower price —which VidAngel can offer only

because it misappropriates Fox's content—VidAngel threatens the business of all of
 [Fox's licensees] who have negotiated legal, authorized licenses [with Fox and other
 Plaintiffs] for those rights." *Id.* ¶ 20. Many VidAngel customers are using the
 service because of its price as compared to authorized services—a differential that
 exists only because VidAngel does not pay for the rights it exploits. Ehler Decl. Ex.
 I (examples).

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- In sum, fair use is not a defense to VidAngel's blatant infringement.
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c. The First Sale Doctrine Does Not Authorize VidAngel's Copying or Streaming

10 VidAngel claims that Plaintiffs' attempt to enforce their reproduction and public performance rights violates the first sale doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a),¹³ 11 because VidAngel buys Discs and resells them via its "buy-sellback" model. Dkt. 12 13 11 (Counter-Complaint) ¶¶ 53-59. Even if VidAngel were actually selling Discs (which it is not), the argument would be a red herring. The first sale doctrine 14 15 applies only to Plaintiffs' right of distribution, which is not at issue here. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 280-81 (4th Cir. 1989) 16 17 ("the first sale doctrine has no application to the rights of the owner of a copyright 18 guaranteed by § 106, except the right of distribution"); *Capitol Records, LLC v.* ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he first sale defense 19 20 does not apply to ReDigi's infringement of those [reproduction] rights."); Peker v. 21 Masters Collection, 96 F. Supp. 2d 216,221 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("no defense that 22 [defendant] used a lawfully acquired object to achieve its unlawful goal of 23 copying"). 24

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¹³ "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of *a particular copy*... lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of *that copy*" 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (emphasis added).

1 2 II.

PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT AN INJUNCTION

A court may find that a copyright owner's harm is likely "irreparable" for
many reasons, including that a particular loss is "difficult to replace," "difficult to
measure," or of a kind "that one should not be expected to suffer." *Salinger v. Colting*, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010). VidAngel's illegal conduct puts Plaintiffs
at risk of suffering imminent, irreparable harms; VidAngel's "delay" defense does
not change this fact.

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A. VidAngel's Unauthorized Service Causes Immediate And Irreparable Harms

11 First, VidAngel interferes with Plaintiffs' basic right to control how, when 12 and through which channels consumers can view their copyrighted works. "As the 13 copyright holders, Plaintiffs have the exclusive right to decide when, where, to whom, and for how much they will authorize transmission of their Copyrighted 14 15 Works to the public." Zediva, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citation omitted). Where defendants operate an "infringing service without the normal licensing restrictions 16 17 imposed by Plaintiffs, [it] interfere[s] with Plaintiffs' ability to control the use and 18 transmission of their Copyrighted works, thereby, causing irreparable injury." Id. at 19 1012 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs' exclusive rights under copyright are critical to 20 providing Plaintiffs the opportunity to earn a return on their substantial 21 investments-often tens of millions of dollars for a major motion picture-in 22 creating content. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 7-8. This harm is ongoing and worsening as 23 VidAngel continues to add Plaintiffs' works and grow its user base. Id. ¶ 34.

Plaintiffs exercise their rights through agreements with authorized
distributors. Some licenses grant the licensee an exclusive time window for
performing a title. *Id.* ¶ 15. The price for such a license is based, in part, on the
promise and scope of exclusivity. *Id.* VidAngel operates without any license and
performs Plaintiffs' works during negotiated exclusivity periods. As of this filing,

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1 VidAngel offers (at least) two of Plaintiffs' works—The Martian and Brooklyn— 2 during periods these works are exclusive to an authorized licensee, HBO. Id. ¶ 30. 3 As noted, VidAngel offered Star Wars: The Force Awakens when no service had rights to distribute it for on-demand streaming. Id. ¶ 16; Ehler Decl. Ex. J. 4 5 VidAngel flaunts its interference with exclusive windows as a competitive advantage over authorized services by expressly promoting titles that are available 6 7 on VidAngel but "NOT on Netflix." Ehler Decl. Ex. A at 13-15, 23-38. VidAngel 8 thus interferes with Plaintiffs' exercise of their exclusive rights and frustrates 9 Plaintiffs' ability to negotiate for similar rights in the future. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 17, 10 36.

11 Second, VidAngel threatens harm to Plaintiffs' relationships and goodwill with authorized distributors by undermining their ability to provide licensed 12 13 offerings. See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1115 14 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (irreparable harm includes "damage to goodwill"). VidAngel 15 poses a threat to the businesses of Plaintiffs' legitimate licensees and, in turn, to 16 Plaintiffs' relationships with them and the goodwill Plaintiffs have worked to create. 17 Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 18-22. VidAngel's users often compare the service to Plaintiffs' 18 licensees, commenting that they prefer VidAngel because it provides inexpensive 19 access to Plaintiffs' copyrighted works. See Ehler Decl. Ex. I (examples). 20Licensees complain to Plaintiffs that their business suffers from competition with unlicensed services that offer low-cost or free content because they do not obtain 21 22 licenses. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 19. VidAngel's unrestrained conduct thus threatens the 23 legitimate online distribution market. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22; see WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 24 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that unrestrained unauthorized Internet 25 retransmissions of broadcast programming "would encourage" other services to 26follow suit, diminish plaintiffs' negotiating position, adversely affect "quantity and 27 quality of efforts put into creating" new works, and "drastically change the industry, 28 to plaintiffs' detriment").

1 Third, VidAngel threatens harm to Plaintiffs' ability to secure and protect 2 their content in the online environment. Online distribution carries with it a 3 heightened risk of piracy because the Internet facilitates the ability to exploit 4 copyrighted content on a mass scale. Cittadine Decl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs require 5 licensees to employ specified security measures to prevent piracy. Id. ¶ 25. Because 6 VidAngel streams Plaintiffs' works without negotiating a license, Plaintiffs are 7 deprived of their right to impose those terms on VidAngel. Id. VidAngel 8 jeopardizes Plaintiffs' content and harms Plaintiffs' relationships with licensees who 9 are required to abide by security requirements to which VidAngel is not bound. Id.

10 Fourth, VidAngel threatens harm to the overall development of the on-11 demand streaming market by the provision of inferior user-viewing experiences. 12 See Zediva, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (Zediva "threatens the development of a 13 successful and lawful video on demand market by offering a sub-optimal customer experience and, thus, tarnishing customers' perception of video on demand as an 14 15 attractive option for viewing Plaintiffs' Copyrighted Works."). Plaintiffs require their licensees to have quality controls, which maintain predictable standards and 16 17 allow customers to view Plaintiffs' movies under consistently positive conditions. 18 Cittadine Decl. ¶ 27. VidAngel threatens these efforts and provides an inferior userviewing experience that tarnishes Plaintiffs' brands because it is not bound to 19 20comply with Plaintiffs' quality controls. *Id.* This possibility is not merely 21 theoretical: VidAngel's social media pages contain customer complaints about the service's poor streaming quality. Ehler Decl. L (attaching numerous examples). 22

VidAngel also threatens the lawful market by confusing consumers that
VidAngel is engaged in lawful conduct. *See Zediva*, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1013
(finding that the Zediva service threatened "to create incorrect but lasting
impressions with consumers about what constitute[d] lawful video on demand
exploitation" of copyrighted works). VidAngel publicly justifies its unlicensed

activities as "legal" under the FMA. Ehler Decl. Ex. M. But VidAngel's service is
 not legal, and it creates incorrect expectations about the value of Plaintiffs' content.

3 4 **B**.

Plaintiffs' Motion Is Timely, And VidAngel's Assertions of "Delay" Do Not Negate Irreparable Harm

5 VidAngel has asserted that Plaintiffs face no irreparable harm because they 6 did not sue as soon as they learned of VidAngel when they received Mr. Quinto's 7 letters in July 2015. Plaintiffs are not required to act immediately to sue, or to seek 8 to enjoin, every potential infringer. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1976 ("Even if an 9 infringement is harmful, the harm may be too small to justify the cost of 10 litigation."). A rule that required a copyright holder to pursue every possible 11 threat—no matter how nascent—would generate a rash of litigation and motion 12 practice, which would not serve the Courts, the parties, or the public interest. See 13 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 82 (D. Mass. 1990) 14 ("Prudent business judgment, Rule 11, and basic common sense required [the 15 plaintiff] first to ascertain that the threat to its intellectual property interest was 16 serious, and that its legal position was sound, before filing suit.") (internal 17 quotations omitted). Courts are "loath to withhold relief" solely on the ground that a 18 party delayed seeking an injunction. Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990 (9th 19 Cir. 2014) (citing Lydo Enters., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th 20 Cir. 1984)).

21 Plaintiffs filed this suit when VidAngel's conduct was sufficiently egregious 22 to require litigation and when it was apparent VidAngel would continue operating. 23 See Arc of Cal., 757 F.3d at 991 ("The significance of such a prudent delay in 24 determining irreparable harm may become so small as to disappear."). To require 25 Plaintiffs to "sue soon, or forever hold [their] peace" would force Plaintiffs to mount 26a federal case to stop services that might never get off the ground—which is often 27 the case. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1976 (describing "seemingly innocuous infringements"). Plaintiffs filed suit after they had conducted their investigation and 28

analysis, and when it was clear that litigation was necessary to stop VidAngel's
 illegal conduct.

3 Moreover, each new title that VidAngel offers gives rise to a new infringement claim and inflicts new immediate, irreparable harm.¹⁴ Id. at 1969 4 5 ("[e]ach wrong gives rise to a discrete 'claim' that 'accrue[s]' at the time the wrong occurs"). VidAngel has added more and more of Plaintiffs' titles in recent months 6 7 and promises to continue to do so, especially with Plaintiffs' most popular releases. 8 Ehler Decl. Exs. N (examples of titles recently added); EE at Tr. 32:9-37:4, R 9 (VidAngel offers new movies that reach more than [\$10 million] in domestic sales). 10 The harm that VidAngel causes is not over and done with, but continuing and growing. The time a party takes initially in seeking judicial protection "is not 11 particularly probative in the context of ongoing, worsening injuries." Arc of Cal., 12 13 757 F.3d at 990-91 (citations omitted). VidAngel's growth, increased marketing and more brazen conduct have increased the immediacy and magnitude of the harm 14 15 to Plaintiffs, further justifying injunctive relief. See id.

16 17 III. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS TIPS DECISIVELY FOR PLAINTIFFS

The threat of harm to Plaintiffs, as demonstrated above, is substantial. In
contrast, VidAngel "cannot complain of the harm that will befall it when properly
forced to desist from its infringing activities." *Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co.*,
64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1995), *superseded on other grounds by* 17 U.S.C.
§ 117(c); *see Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp.*, 125 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir.
1997) ("Where the only hardship that the defendant will suffer is lost profits from an

- ²⁵ $||_{14}$ For example, on July 20, 2016, VidAngel made *Batman v. Superman: Dawn of* Justice (Ultimate Edition) available, when that title was not yet available to
- 26 || Justice (Ottimate Edition) available, when that title was not yet available to legitimate on-demand streaming services. See Ehler Decl. Ex. N at 155. On August
- $\begin{bmatrix} 27 \\ 28 \end{bmatrix}$ 4, VidAngel offered *Keanu*, when that title was not yet available to legitimate ondemand services. *See id.* at 157.

activity which has been shown likely to be infringing, such an argument in defense
merits little equitable consideration") (quotations and citations omitted); *Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp.*, 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Since [small start-up
defendant] does not (and cannot) claim any *legitimate* hardships as a result of being
enjoined from committing unlawful activities, and Apple would suffer irreparable
and immeasurable harms if an injunction were not issued, this factor weighs
strongly in favor of Apple's motion.").

8 VidAngel does not suffer a legitimate hardship if it is enjoined because the
9 very core of its business involves circumvention and infringement. The fact that
10 VidAngel's litigation counsel sent letters to a number of general counsel makes
11 clear that VidAngel knew from the outset it was on thin ice. Nonetheless, VidAngel
12 proceeded at its peril.

13

IV. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

14 Upholding copyright protection is in the public interest. See Eldred v. 15 Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2002) ("[t]he economic philosophy behind the 16 [Copyright] [C] lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 17 personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 18 authors and inventors") (citation omitted); Kelly v. Primco Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-14-19 07263 BRO, 2015 WL 10990368 at *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015) ("[I]t is virtually 20axiomatic that the public interest can only be served by upholding copyright protections "); Realnetworks, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 943 ("By making it a 21 22 DMCA violation to distribute products that enable consumers to override copyright 23 owner preferences against unauthorized copying, Congress determined that the 24 public interest is best served by outlawing such products."). 25 VidAngel's circumvention violations and infringements undermine

Congress's purposes in the DMCA and Copyright Act. Congress believed that
content owners must have exclusive rights, as set forth in § 106, and also the ability
to safeguard access to their works, in order to be able to earn returns on their (often

1	substantial) investments. VidAngel's violation of Plaintiffs' rights flouts Congress's
2	goals and harms Plaintiffs. An injunction serves the public interest in upholding the
3	law.
4	V. MINIMAL SECURITY SHOULD BE REQUIRED
5	The required security need not be substantial. See Zediva, 824 F. Supp. 2d at
6	1015 (requiring \$50,000 bond). Any hardship VidAngel faces results from its
7	voluntary decision to build a business around violating Plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs
8	respectfully submit that security in the amount of \$50,000 is appropriate.
9	CONCLUSION
10	The Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
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12	DATED: August 22, 2016 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
13	DATED. August 22, 2010 WONOLK, TOLLES & OLSON LEI
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15	By: /s/ Kelly M. Klaus
16	KELLY M. KLAUS
17	Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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- Л	16-CV-04109-AB (PLAX)

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on August 22, 2016, I authorized the electronic filing of
3	the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will
4	send e-mail notification of such filing to all registered parties. I certify under
5	penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing
6	is true and correct.
7	
8	DATED: August 22, 2016 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
9	
10	By:/s/ Kelly M. Klaus
11	Kelly M. Klaus
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