## **NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AVON DAVIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CROSSON, Dr.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-17015

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02831-MCE-CKD

MEMORANDUM\*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 10, 2018\*\*

Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Avon Davies appeals pro se from the district court's

order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion.

\* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

\*\* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

## FILED

JUL 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 834 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir.2016). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davies's motion for a preliminary injunction because Davies failed to establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his eye-related medical issue. *See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco*, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff seeking preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in the public interest).

We do not consider Davies's contentions regarding the district court's order denying reconsideration of the magistrate judge's earlier orders because that order is outside the scope of this appeal.

## AFFIRMED.