1	NOT FOR PUB	LICATION	FILED	
2 3 4	UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT		OCT 26 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS	
5 6	FOR THE NINT			
	APRIL E. DIGGS,	No. 17-56729		
	Plaintiff-Appellant,	D.C. No. 5:17-cv-0)1089-AG-KK	
	v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; et al.,	MEMORANDUM	*	
	Defendants-Appellees.			
7 8 9 10 11	Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding			
12	Submitted October 22, 2018** Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges. April E. Diggs appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing her			
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17	action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and			
18	state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.	S.C. § 1291. We revie	ew de novo the	
19	district court's dismissal under Federal Rule	e of Civil Procedure		

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** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

^{*} This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th
 Cir. 2011). We affirm.

3	The district court properly dismissed Diggs's action because Diggs failed to	
4	allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556	
5	U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient	
6	factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its	
7	face" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 15 U.S.C.	
8	§§ 1692e, 1692f, 1692g; Cal. Civ. Code § 2934a(d) ("Once recorded, the	
9	substitution [of trustee] shall constitute conclusive evidence of the authority of the	
10	substituted trustee or his or her agents to act pursuant to this section."); Cal. Civ.	
11	Code § 3412; Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218, 518-19 (Cal. App.	
12	2011) (noting that § 2934a does not preclude attorney-in-fact from signing	
13	substitution on behalf of beneficiary).	
14	The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Diggs leave to file	
15	an amended complaint because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.	
16	Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth	
17	standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper	
18	when amendment would be futile).	
19	The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of	

20 publicly recorded documents. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688

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(9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard review and explaining that court may take
 judicial notice of matters of public record).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Diggs's motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Diggs failed to show that her
opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss would have precluded dismissal or that
leave to amend would not have been futile. *See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,* 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

10 in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright*, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

11 **AFFIRMED.**