## NOT FOR PUBLICATION

**FILED** 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

**DEC 4 2023** 

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

No. 22-10233

Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No. 5:20-cr-00112-BLF-1

v.

TRUNG NGUYEN,

MEMORANDUM\*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 14, 2023 San Jose, California

Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Trung Nguyen timely appeals his sentence of 36 months of imprisonment, following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Reviewing de novo the district

<sup>\*</sup> This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In an unopposed motion, Docket No. 13, the government asks us to take judicial notice of court records involving a defendant in another case, <u>United States v.</u> (continued)

court's interpretation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and reviewing for abuse of discretion the district court's application of the Guidelines, <u>United States</u>

v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), we affirm.

The district court correctly applied Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) in calculating Defendant's base offense level. Defendant sustained a state felony conviction for a controlled substance offense in 2010. Thus, when he committed the instant offense in 2019, he "committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense[.]" U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

It is irrelevant that a state court reduced Defendant's 2010 conviction to a misdemeanor in 2020, pursuant to California Proposition 64. Alteration of a state conviction must occur <u>before</u> the commission of the federal offense for that conviction no longer to qualify as a felony for sentencing purposes. <u>See United States v. Padilla</u>, 387 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that, under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), a change to a state conviction "must occur <u>before</u> the erstwhile felon takes possession of a firearm" for it to preclude a conviction under

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>Palmer</u>, 183 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 1999). The Government presents these documents to establish that the timeline underlying <u>Palmer</u> differs from the timeline in this case. But the sequence of events in <u>Palmer</u> is evident from the background section of that opinion and, in any event, we are bound by the holding and reasoning within <u>Palmer</u> itself. The motion is therefore DENIED because the materials "are not relevant to the disposition of this appeal." <u>Cuellar v. Joyce</u>, 596 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir. 2010).

§ 922(g)(1) (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Yepez, 704 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (interpreting Guidelines § 4A1.1(d) and holding that a state court's altering of a defendant's probation status after the commission of a federal offense "can have no effect on a defendant's status at the moment he committed the federal crime" (emphasis added)). United States v. Palmer, 183 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 1999), on which Defendant principally relies, is distinguishable; there, the state restoration of civil rights occurred before the defendant committed the federal crime. Id. at 1015–16.

## AFFIRMED.