

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

NOV 21 2023

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ALDO DONAI MEJIA ROMERO,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney  
General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1247

Agency No.  
A088-809-507

MEMORANDUM\*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 14, 2023\*\*

Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Aldo Donai Mejia Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

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\* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

\*\* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Conde Quevedo v. Barr*, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Mejia Romero failed to establish he was or would be persecuted on account of a political opinion or other protected ground. *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias*, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (an applicant “must provide *some* evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial”); *Sagaydak v. Gonzales*, 405 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (to establish a nexus to political opinion, petitioner must show “(1) that [he] had either an affirmative or imputed political opinion, and (2) that [he was] targeted *on account of* that opinion.”).

Because Mejia Romero does not challenge the agency’s determination that the recruitment-based particular social group is not cognizable, we do not address it. *See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder*, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).

Thus, Mejia Romero’s asylum claim fails. Because Mejia Romero failed to establish any nexus at all, he also failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. *See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch*, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017).

Mejia Romero’s contentions regarding newly-raised particular social groups are not properly before the court because he failed to raise them before the BIA. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required); *see*

*also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2023) (section 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule).

We do not address Mejia Romero’s contentions as to whether the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to protect him, internal relocation, and discretion because the BIA did not deny relief on these grounds. *See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder*, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because Mejia Romero does not contest the BIA’s determination that he waived challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT protection, we do not address it. *See Lopez-Vasquez*, 706 F.3d at 1079-80.

We do not consider the materials Mejia Romero references in his opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. *See Fisher v. INS*, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

**PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.**