

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL D. ANDERSON, #156270,)
)
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Plaintiff,)
)
)
v.) CASE NO. 2:06-CV-620-WKW
) [WO]
)
)
PAUL WHALEY, et al.,)
)
)
Defendants.)

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Michael D. Anderson [“Anderson”], a state inmate, challenges his custody classification. Anderson names the State of Alabama as one of the defendants in this cause of action.

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that Anderson’s claims against the State of Alabama should be dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).¹

I. DISCUSSION

The State of Alabama is immune from suit. *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). Moreover, “a State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983 . . .” *Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 65, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (1989). Thus, Anderson’s

A prisoner who is allowed to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this court will have his complaint screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

claims against this defendant are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” and are due to be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii). *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).²

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims against the State of Alabama be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).
2. The § 1983 claims presented against Paul Whaley, Mike Slatton, and A. Coleman be referred back to the undersigned for further proceedings.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before August 1, 2006 the parties may file objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

Although *Neitzke* interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2), the analysis contained therein remains applicable to the directives contained in the present statute.

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See *Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, *en banc*), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 20th day of July, 2006.

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE