

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

DAVID CALHOUN, # 158430,)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	
v)	Civil Action No. 2:09cv356-TMH
)	[WO]
LEON FORNISS, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Respondents.)	

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed on April 6, 2009, by David Calhoun, an Alabama inmate currently incarcerated at Staton Correctional Facility.¹ Calhoun challenges a murder conviction entered against him in 1990 by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alabama, arguing that the court was without jurisdiction to try him and that his incarceration in state prison is invalid.

DISCUSSION

A review of the records of this court indicates that on March 20, 1997, Calhoun filed a previous habeas petition pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the same 1990 murder conviction imposed on him by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

¹Although the present petition is date-stamped “received” on April 20, 2009, Calhoun avers that he signed the petition on April 6, 2009. A *pro se* inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. *Houston v. Lack*, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); *Adams v. United States*, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); *Garvey v. Vaughn*, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] must assume that [the instant petition] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Calhoun] signed it...” *Washington v. United States*, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).

See Calhoun v. Nagle, et al., Civil Action No. 2:97cv378-MHT. In that prior habeas action, this court denied Calhoun relief from the Montgomery County murder conviction and dismissed his petition with prejudice, finding that his claims for relief lacked merit. *Id.* at Doc. Nos. 71 & 74.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), “[b]efore a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” “A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals” and may be granted “only if [the assigned panel of judges] determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)].” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B) and (C). It is clear from the pleadings filed by Calhoun that he has not received an order from a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider a successive application for habeas relief. “Because this undertaking [is Petitioner’s] second habeas corpus petition and because he had no permission from [the Eleventh Circuit] to file a second habeas petition, ... the district court lack[s] jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.” *Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons and Paroles*, 273 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the present petition for habeas corpus relief is due to be denied and this case summarily dismissed. *Id.* at 934.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that:

1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed by filed by Calhoun on April 6, 2009, be DENIED.

2. This cause of action be DISMISSED in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), as Calhoun has failed to obtain the requisite order from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing a federal district court to consider his successive habeas application.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before June 1, 2009, the parties may file objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v.*

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See *Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (*en banc*), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 19th day of May, 2009.

/s/Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE