

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION

STANLEY MILLER, #245426,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10-CV-818-ID
	)	[WO]
	)	
BOB RILEY, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Stanley Miller [“Miller”], a state inmate, in which he challenges the constitutionality of the Alabama Community Notification Act, *Ala. Code* 1975 § 15-20-20 et seq. (1975, as amended) [“the Act”], on a multitude of grounds. In his complaint, Miller seeks issuance of a preliminary injunction preventing further application and enforcement of the Act. *Plaintiff's Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1* at 14. The court therefore construes this request as a motion for preliminary injunction. On November 9, 2010, the defendants filed an answer and special report in opposition to the complaint and all relief requested therein.

**I. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district court....” *Palmer v. Braun*, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002). This court may grant a preliminary injunction only if Miller demonstrates each of the following prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a

substantial threat irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. *Palmer*, 287 F.3d at 1329; *McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson*, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 *Cate v. Oldham*, 707 F.2d 1176 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp.*, 697 F.2d 1352 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). “In this Circuit, [a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the “burden of persuasion” as to the four requisites.” *McDonald's*, 147 F.3d at 1306; *All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc.*, 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989) (a preliminary injunction is issued only when “drastic relief” is necessary); *Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A.*, 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless of the party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. *Church v. City of Huntsville*, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); *see also Siegel v. Lepore*, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (noting that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper”). “The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.” *Northeastern Fl. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of*

*Jacksonville, Fl.*, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.1990).” *Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.*, 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001).

## **II. DISCUSSION**

The court has thoroughly reviewed the plaintiff's complaint and the response thereto filed by the defendants. Turning to the first prerequisite for issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, the court finds that Miller, at this stage of the proceedings, has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Miller also fails to demonstrate a substantial threat that he will suffer the requisite irreparable injury absent issuance of a preliminary injunction. The third and fourth factors, balancing potential harm to the parties and the public interest element, weigh more heavily in favor of the defendants at this juncture. Thus, Miller has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the existence of each prerequisite necessary to warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction.

## **III. CONCLUSION**

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motion for preliminary injunction filed by the plaintiff be DENIED.
2. This case be referred back the undersigned for additional proceedings.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before November 29, 2010 the parties may file objections to the Recommendation. Any objection must specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be

considered by the District Court. The parties are further advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings in the Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues addressed in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982); *see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982); *see also Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to September 30, 1981.

Done this 12th day of November, 2010.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.  
WALLACE CAPEL, JR.  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE