

“reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly.”
Wallace v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2012).

Hope’s motion falls well short of these standards in several ways. First, and most importantly, Hope both reiterates arguments made in his summary-judgment response and raises argument that could have been made earlier by once again asserting that ALDOT’s evidentiary submission implicitly demonstrates that it discriminated against Hope with respect to the timing of his mid-appraisal evaluations and his personnel recommendations. The main difference between Hope’s contentions in the motion and the arguments in his summary-judgment response are the specific coworkers he has identified as receiving better treatment than he did. Additionally, he reasserts the contention from his summary-judgment briefing that ALDOT’s discovery responses were insufficient, this time claiming that “if ALDOT had furnished the Annual Appraisal dates with the Mid-Appraisal dates this would have been a check to validate the correct time for the Mid-Appraisals.” Doc. 52 at 2. But there is nothing in the record establishing that Hope asked for this information, and ALDOT is under no affirmative duty to provide information that he did not request. *See* Doc. 45 at 4 (showing Hope’s request for the dates his coworkers received mid-appraisal evaluations).

Hope also has failed to argue, let alone demonstrate, that there has been either an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or clear error necessitating reconsideration of any portion of the court’s decision to grant the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Hope’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 52) is DENIED.

DONE this 8th day of August, 2018.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'G' followed by a cursive 'B' and a trailing flourish.

GRAY M. BORDEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE