



parties.” Johnson v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3245167, \*1 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 1999)). “[A]dverse rulings alone do not provide a party with a basis for holding that the court's impartiality is in doubt.” Id. (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Muhammad appears to seek recusal because she is unhappy with the court’s rulings in this case and in another case filed by Muhammad. The only things she points to in order to demonstrate bias are the prior rulings of the court in cases involving her as a party. She has made no showing of circumstances which would meet the necessary threshold for recusal or disqualification of a district court judge. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2004) (district court did not err in denying motion to disqualify under § 144 where movant presented no evidence that judge harbored a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party). The circumstances in this case would not support a finding that a fully informed lay observer would entertain such doubt about the undersigned’s impartiality. As such, the court does not find that recusal is necessary. Accordingly, Muhammad’s motion for recusal (Doc. 13) is **DENIED**.

**DONE and ORDERED** this 16th day of September, 2010.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE