

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
 SOUTHERN DIVISION

FRANK REESE, JR.,	:	
	:	
Petitioner.	:	
	:	
vs.	:	CIVIL ACTION 10-0451-CB-M
	:	
TREY OLIVER,	:	
	:	
Respondent.	:	

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an Alabama inmate which was referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. This action is now ready for consideration. The state record is adequate to determine Petitioner's claims; no federal evidentiary hearing is required. It is recommended that this habeas petition be dismissed as time barred and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondent Trey Oliver and against Petitioner Frank Reese, Jr. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Petitioner was convicted of first degree sexual abuse, following a plea, in the Circuit Court of Mobile County on September 17, 2008 for which he received a sentence of ten years

in the state penitentiary (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3; Doc. 6, p. 3). Reese did not appeal the conviction or sentence (Doc. 1, p. 3); likewise, Petitioner has never filed a State Rule 32 petition challenging his conviction or sentence (see Doc. 6, p. 6).<sup>1</sup> Petitioner filed a complaint with this Court on August 18, 2008, raising the following claims: (1) Reese's plea was not voluntarily and knowingly given; and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel (Doc. 1).

Respondent has answered the petition, arguing that it should be dismissed as it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations period (Doc. 6, pp. 6-7). Respondent refers to provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter *AEDPA*) which amended, in pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The specific provision states as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

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<sup>1</sup> Though Petitioner filed a State habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of a State statute requiring convicted sex offenders to have a verifiable residence before being released from custody (see Doc. 6, p. 4; *cf.* Doc. 1, p. 4), that action is not related to this action.

review.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. *Goodman v. United States*, 151 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998).

Reese's conviction became final on October 29, 2008, the last day he could have appealed his conviction;<sup>2</sup> on October 29, 2009, the grace period expired for Petitioner to file this action. Reese's habeas corpus petition was not filed in this Court until September 18, 2010, more than ten months after the grace period had expired.

Clearly, Petitioner's habeas corpus petition was filed well beyond the one-year grace period and filed in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Though given the opportunity to do so (see Docs. 7-8), the Court finds that Petitioner has provided no cause for ignoring the dictates of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: this action is time-barred.

For the reasoning stated herein, it is recommended that this habeas petition be dismissed as time-barred and that

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<sup>2</sup>"In a criminal case a notice of appeal by the defendant shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (six weeks) after pronouncement of the sentence, provided that the notice of appeal may be oral, as provided in Rule 3(a)(2)." Ala.R.App.P. 4(b)(1).

judgment be entered in favor of Respondent Trey Oliver and against Petitioner Frank Reese, Jr. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS  
AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION  
AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. **Objection.** Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); *Lewis v. Smith*, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge's Recommendation" within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party's arguments that the magistrate judge's recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an

abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. **Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 22<sup>nd</sup> day of December, 2010.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE