



her UIM policy. Ferguson claims that she provided State Farm with all necessary documentation and that State Farm took no steps to process her claim. Ferguson filed suit in April 2011 and asserted claims for a host of statutory violations (some of which can be characterized as “bad faith” claims), breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

### **III. DISCUSSION**

Rule 42(b) states that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”<sup>1</sup> “Bifurcation is particularly appropriate when resolution of a single claim or issue could be dispositive of the entire case.”<sup>2</sup> In insurance cases, courts frequently bifurcate bad faith claims when they would be precluded by resolution of a breach-of-contract claim in the insurance company’s favor.<sup>3</sup>

As plaintiff points out, even if a jury determined that State Farm was not liable on Ferguson’s breach-of-contract claim, plaintiff’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would go forward. That is because Ferguson’s bad faith claims are largely based on State Farm’s inaction. Consequently, bifurcation would neither expedite nor economize this case. State Farm’s argument that settlement of the UIM claim or a verdict in the range of what Ferguson has already recovered would reduce the likelihood that plaintiff would pursue the bad faith claim is speculative. If the claim is not settled, or a jury finds that Ferguson is entitled to more than what she has already recovered, then two trials would be necessary and judicial economy would not be furthered.

State Farm’s primary argument is that the bad faith claims should be severed to avoid prejudice. State Farm’s argument is conclusory—State Farm does not explain how

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<sup>1</sup>Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

<sup>2</sup>*Drennan v. Maryland Cas. Co.*, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007 (D. Nev. 2005) (citing *O’Malley v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.*, 776 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1985)).

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., *id.* at 1007–08.

the evidence that might support a bad faith claim would “prejudice the outcome of a trial on the UIM claim.”<sup>4</sup> State Farm relies heavily on *Gibson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.*,<sup>5</sup> to support its position that evidence intended to prove anything beyond “liability, causation and damages”<sup>6</sup> is prejudicial, irrelevant, or both. But State Farm ignores a critical distinction—the plaintiff in *Gibson* “did not allege bad faith on the part of” the insurer.<sup>7</sup> The court noted specifically that “insurer bad faith was not an issue.”<sup>8</sup> State Farm’s argument “that the trial in this case on the UIM claim should be handled the same as in *Gibson*” is therefore not persuasive.<sup>9</sup>

State Farm has not advanced an argument that severance would be convenient. Because the court has determined that Ferguson’s bad faith claims need not be severed, State Farm’s request for a protective order staying discovery on those claims is moot.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

For the reasons above, State Farm’s motion at docket 12 to sever plaintiff’s bad faith claims pursuant to Federal Rule 42(b) is **DENIED**. State Farm’s request for a protective order staying discovery on plaintiff’s bad faith claims is **DENIED**.

Ferguson’s motion at docket 20 for oral argument is **DENIED** as moot.

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 18<sup>th</sup> day of October 2011.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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<sup>4</sup>Doc. 12 at 7.

<sup>5</sup>153 P.3d 312 (Alaska 2007).

<sup>6</sup>Doc. 12 at 5.

<sup>7</sup>*Gibson*, 153 P.3d at 315.

<sup>8</sup>*Id.* at 316.

<sup>9</sup>Doc. 12 at 8.