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6	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7	FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
8	JAY JEFFERS, JR.,)
9) Plaintiff,)
10) v.) CIV 04-0572 PHX MHM (LOA)
11) JOSEPH ORTEGA, REBECCA) ORDER
12	SPURLOCK, CORPORAL WILLIAMS,) DR. LIZARRAGA,)
13	Defendants.
14 15)
15 16	Before the Court is Defendant Lizarraga's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint [Docket No. 86] pursuant
10	to Rule 12(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
17	I Procedural History
19	Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Pinal County Jail
20	from December 16, 2000, through April 2, 2001. On March 22,
21	2004, Plaintiff, proceeding <i>pro se</i> , filed a complaint pursuant
22	to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional
23	rights. On September 3, 2004, the Court ordered Defendants
24	Ortega, Williams, and Spurlock to answer the allegation that
25	they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious
26	medical needs in violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
27	rights. <u>See</u> Docket No. 9.
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	Dockets.Justia.co

Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint to add 1 2 Dr. Lizarraga as a defendant in this matter on March 29, 2005, 3 and another motion to amend his complaint on May 4, 2005. See Docket No. 23 & Docket No. 39. Pursuant to an order of the 4 5 Court, Plaintiff lodged a proposed amended complaint on June 3, 2005. On June 9, 2005, the Court ordered Plaintiff to serve the 6 7 amended complaint on Defendants Williams and Ortega, and to 8 serve the amended complaint on Defendant Lizarraga. See Docket No. 44. Defendants Ortega, Williams, and Spurlock answered the 9 amended complaint on August 1, 2005. See Docket No. 49. 10 On September 20, 2005, Defendant Lizarraga filed an answer to the 11 amended complaint. See Docket No. 75. 12

13 Defendant Lizarraga filed a motion to dismiss the 2005. 14 amended complaint on October 11, Docket 86. No. 15 Defendant asserts Plaintiff's claims against him must be 16 dismissed because Plaintiff did not file his section 1983 applicable limitations. 17 complaint within the statute of Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on December 23, 2005. 18 Docket No. 115 & Docket No. 116.¹ Defendant filed a reply to the 19 20 response on January 26, 2006. See Docket No. 126.

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II DISCUSSION

A. Standard for granting a motion to dismiss

In reviewing the defendants' motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the district court views the facts as presented in the pleadings the light most favorable in to the all plaintiffs, accepting as true the

¹ Defendants Ortega, Williams, and Spurlock filed a motion for partial summary judgment on December 16, 2005. <u>See</u> Docket No. 109.

allegations in their complaint and treating 1 as false those allegations in the answer that 2 contradict the plaintiffs' allegations. 3 Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 4 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he allegations of the 5 non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations 6 7 of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be 8 false."); Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The standard for granting a Rule 9 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that 10 11 of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim."); 12 Pooley v. National Hole-In-One Assoc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109 (D. Ariz. 2000). 13

14 Judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), 15 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may be granted when the pleadings indicate that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 16 in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. 17 See Enron Oil Training & Transp. Co. v. Welbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132 18 19 F.3d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). When deciding a motion to 20 dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as 21 true and construe them in the light most favorable to the 22 See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 23 plaintiff. 24 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 25 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). Additionally, pro se complaints are held to a less strict standard than those drafted 26 by counsel. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 27 28

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1 285, 292 (1976). It is not appropriate to dismiss a pro se 2 prisoner's civil rights action unless it is "beyond doubt that 3 the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 4 which would entitle him to relief." <u>Id.</u>

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2. Statute of limitations

6 Defendant Lizarraga asserts Plaintiff's Eighth 7 Amendment claim against him must be dismissed because Plaintiff 8 did not file his complaint within the two-year statute of 9 limitations applicable to section 1983 actions filed by Arizona 10 inmates.

11 The federal courts apply state statutes of limitation 12 to claims brought by prisoners pursuant to section 1983. See 13 <u>Wilson v. Garcia</u>, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (1985). In Arizona, the relevant statute of limitations is two 14 15 years. See, e.g., DeLuna v. Farris, 841 F.2d 312, 313 (9th Cir. 1988); Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986). 16 Additionally, "federal courts 17 must apply not only the 18 statute of appropriate state limitations, but also the 19 applicable state rule for tolling that statute of limitations 20 for actions brought under § 1983." DeLuna, 841 F.2d at 314. The tolling provisions for prisoners civil rights suits in 21 Arizona are contained in Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-502. 22 Pursuant to this statute, imprisonment tolls the applicable 23 24 statute of limitations until the date the prisoner discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, his right to 25 sue the defendant. Id. at 315. 26

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1	However, when a section 1983 claim accrues and the
2	relevant statute of limitations begins to run against the
3	claimant is determined according to federal law. <u>See</u> <u>Wilson</u> ,
4	471 U.S. at 275, 105 S. Ct. at 1946-47; <u>Elliott v. City of Union</u>
5	<u>City</u> , 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). Within the Ninth
6	Circuit Court of Appeals, the statute of limitations in a
7	section 1983 action begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or
8	has reason to know, that he has been injured. See Kimes v.
9	Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A claim accrues when
10	the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the
11	basis of the cause of action.").
12	The discovery rule provides a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of
13	the injury which is the basis of the cause of action. The cause is known when the immediate
14	physical cause of the injury is discovered The Ninth Circuit has stated repeatedly the
15	plaintiff need not also know the identity of the person who caused the injury. Thus, the
16	statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the plaintiff knows he or she has been
17	injured and knows the physical cause of that injury.
18	<u>Clavette v. Sweeney</u> , 132 F. Supp. 2d 864, 874-75 (D. Or. 2001)
19	(internal citations and quotations omitted).
20	Plaintiff's section 1983 action asserts Defendant
21	Lizarraga was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
22	needs from December 16, 2000, through April 2, 2001, in
23	violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The section 1983
24	action was not filed within the applicable two-year statute of
25 26	limitations. Plaintiff's claim accrued no later than April 2,
26 27	2001, and Plaintiff's complaint was not filed until March of
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2004, almost three years later. See Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 1 2 911, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1999); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 3 993 (9th Cir. 1999); DeLuna, 841 F.2d at 314-15; Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 4 5 1995) ("Thus, for purposes of a § 1983 claim, a cause of action accrues either when the plaintiff has knowledge of his claim or 6 7 when he is put on notice--e.g., by the knowledge of the fact of 8 injury and who caused it -- to make reasonable inquiry and that inquiry would reveal the existence of a colorable claim."). 9

Plaintiff asserts in response to the motion to dismiss: "The Federal courts should not determine the length of time in which a Plaintiff has to bring a civil action based on the states limitation time length law." Docket No. 114. Plaintiff further contends:

> The Federal courts further should base their limitation on the nature of the repeated claims that are brought against them ... Plaintiff filed befor[e] the 3 years limitation law ended, in which I was told that any person seeking to file a lawsuit file it within 3 years must after anv incident happens.

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Id. at 2. Plaintiff further contends that his complaint is not untimely with regard to Defendants Williams, Ortega, and Spurlock, asserting that his damages with regard to these Defendants continues to "accrue." <u>Id.</u>

Plaintiff knew or should have known of Defendant Lizarraga's involvement in the alleged civil rights violation on or before April of 2001 and, therefore, the two-year statute of limitations regarding the civil rights violation stated in his

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section 1983 action filed in March of 2004 expired prior to his bringing suit. Therefore, the section 1983 claims as against Defendant Lizarraga must be dismissed with prejudice. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Lizaragga's motion to dismiss the amended complaint [Docket No. 86] is Plaintiff's amended complaint is hereby dismissed granted. with prejudice. DATED this 23rd day of August, 2006. Mary H. Murguja nited States District Judge -7-Case 2:04-cv-00572-MHM-LOA Document 150 Filed 08/24/2006 Page 7 of 7