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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

**MDY INDUSTRIES, LLC,**  
Plaintiff and Counterdefendant,

vs.

**BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,  
and VIVENDI GAMES, INC.,**  
Defendants and Counterclaimants,

**Case No.: CV06-02555-PHX-DGC**

**Response To Defendants' Motion For  
Summary Judgment by Plaintiff MDY  
Industries, LLC And Third Party  
Defendant Michael Donnelly With  
Supporting Memorandum Of Points  
And Authorities**

**The Honorable David G. Campbell**

**BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,  
and VIVENDI GAMES, INC.,**  
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

vs.

**MICHAEL DONNELLY, an individual**  
Third-Party Defendant.

**Oral Argument Requested**

Table of Contents

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

I. Legal Standard..... - 1 -

II. Introduction/Background..... - 1 -

III. The Court should deny Blizzard’s motion with respect to its copyright claims because Blizzard relies exclusively on *Ticketmaster* – a case that cannot be reconciled with the law of the Ninth and other Circuits. .... - 2 -

    A. Federal case law, including the Ninth Circuit, consistently holds that a mere breach of a copyright license violates copyright only when the breach pertains to an exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106..... - 3 -

    B. Other than *Ticketmaster*, Blizzard has not cited to any case that supports Blizzard’s claim that ANY breach of a copyright license equals copyright infringement ..... - 4 -

    C. Blizzard’s view could not possibly be the law; otherwise, Blizzard could assert punitive copyright remedies against its customers for ANY non-copyright-related breach of contract. .... - 6 -

IV. Even if Blizzard correctly relied upon *Ticketmaster*, admissible material facts preclude summary judgment for Blizzard’s copyright claims. .... - 8 -

V. Blizzard’s attempt to leverage its copyright beyond the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act is copyright misuse and bars Blizzard from the relief it seeks here. .... - 8 -

VI. The Court should deny Blizzard’s motion with respect to its DMCA claims because Blizzard relies exclusively on *Ticketmaster* – a case that cannot be reconciled with the law of the Ninth and other Circuits and because *Ticketmaster* is not a case involving piracy..... - 11 -

    A. Because no reasonable relationship exists between access obtained by Glider’s avoidance of Warden or Scan.dll and copyright protection of Blizzard’s WoW game client, MDY cannot be liable under the DMCA..... - 12 -

    B. Blizzard’s Warden and Scan.dll programs are not “effective access control” measures under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(b), so MDY cannot violate § 1201(a)(1) or § 1201(b)(1) as a matter of law..... - 13 -

        1. Warden is a data reporting process, not an effective access control measure. .... - 14 -

        2. Scan.dll is not an effective access control measure..... - 15 -

    C. MDY’s Glider program is not primarily designed and marketed as a circumvention device, nor does Glider have a limited commercial purpose.. - 16 -

1	VII. Because MDY has not acted improperly by creating, marketing and	
2	selling its independently created aftermarket software to Blizzard’s WoW	
3	users, MDY has not tortiously interfered with Blizzard’s contractual relations. ....-	18 -
4	A. Because Blizzard’s EULA and TOU are anti-competitive and restrain trade, a	
5	reasonable jury could find that Blizzard’s agreements violate public policy . -	18 -
6	B. A reasonable jury could find that MDY did not act improperly by advertising and	
7	marketing its Glider software .....	20 -
8	C. A reasonable jury could find that Donnelly was not motivated by a malicious	
9	intent to harm Blizzard or WoW .....	23 -
10	D. A reasonable jury could find that MDY did not intend to interfere with Blizzard’s	
11	contracts.....	24 -
12	E. A reasonable jury could find that MDY did not damage Blizzard .....	25 -
13	VIII. CONCLUSION .....	26 -
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

1 Plaintiff MDY Industries, LLC (“MDY”) and Third-Party Defendant, Michael  
2 Donnelly (“Donnelly”) (collectively “MDY” or “plaintiffs”) respond to the defendants’  
3 Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (“Blizzard”) and Vivendi Games, Inc. (“Vivendi”)  
4 (collectively, “Blizzard”) Motion for Summary Judgment. This response is supported by  
5 the separate Statement of Disputed Facts (“MDY’s SDF”) filed with this brief and the  
6 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

## 8 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

### 9 I. Legal Standard

10 In the context of summary judgment, the Court should view disputed evidence in  
11 light most favorable to the nonmoving party.<sup>1</sup> The Court should deny Summary  
12 judgment if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”<sup>2</sup>  
13

### 14 II. Introduction/Background

15 At bottom, this is a contract case concerning how people who legally acquire and  
16 install Blizzard's WoW game software make use of that software's functionality (which  
17 gives a massive multiplayer video game experience). These users all have the legal right  
18 to install the WoW software onto their computer hard drives.<sup>3</sup> While on its face *MAI*  
19 *Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc* says that such installation technically involves  
20 copying the program from disks (or via permissible downloading from Blizzard), such  
21 “copying” does not require a finding of copyright infringement.<sup>4</sup>

22 Blizzard contracts with its users, via Blizzard’s End User License Agreement  
23

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24 <sup>1</sup> Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

25 <sup>2</sup> *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

26 <sup>3</sup> 17 U.S.C. § 117.

27 <sup>4</sup> See, e.g., *Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp.*, 203 F.3d 596, fn.9 (9th Cir.  
28 2000)(noting that cases like *MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.*, 991 F.2d 511  
(9th Cir. 1993) do not apply when the relevant facts involve “reverse engineering to gain  
access to unprotected functional elements.”)

1 (“EULA”) and Terms of Use (“TOU”), in an attempt to regulate the way a person plays  
2 the game - the relevant provision here is Blizzard's demand that WoW players not play  
3 WoW with so-called "bot" programs that automate certain aspects of WoW's function.  
4 Blizzard believes that enforcement of this condition is important to its business model.  
5 As a matter of contract law, Blizzard may have an enforceable agreement with its users.  
6 The issue, however, is whether Blizzard can use copyright to enforce this particular  
7 aspect of Blizzard's business model.

8 The answer must be "No." Otherwise, copyright becomes the enforcer of every  
9 agreement regulating the use of commodities containing software, from automobiles to  
10 washing machines. Congress designed copyright laws to regulate the market for copies  
11 and performances of copyright-protected works. Copyright is not designed and is ill-  
12 equipped to serve as a general business regulation statute.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, Arizona  
13 common law does not enable Blizzard to control a company's legitimate efforts to sell a  
14 product on the open market under a tort theory of liability simply because Blizzard may  
15 object to the product and its effect on Blizzard's business model.

16 **III. The Court should deny Blizzard's motion with respect to its copyright claims**  
17 **because Blizzard relies exclusively on *Ticketmaster* – a case that cannot be**  
18 **reconciled with the law of the Ninth and other Circuits.**

19 Blizzard contends that copyright infringement occurs every time one of its  
20 customers breaches its EULA and the computer subsequently loads portions of Blizzard's  
21 World of Warcraft (“WoW”) software into Random Access Memory (“RAM”) – even if  
22 the EULA breach does not infringe an exclusive right granted by the Copyright Act.<sup>6</sup>  
23 Blizzard is legally incorrect. Breaching a EULA term violates copyright only if the  
24 breach also violates an exclusive right granted by the Copyright Act. Blizzard relies

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25 <sup>5</sup> *Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp.*, 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir.  
26 2000)(copyright owners who want “a lawful monopoly on the functional concepts in its  
27 software, [] must satisfy the more stringent standards of the patent laws.”)

28 <sup>6</sup> *See*, *Blizzard Ent., Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Mot. For Sum. J. (“Blizzard's MSJ”)*,  
at 5-7.

1 upon *Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Technologies, Inc.*,<sup>7</sup> which is not helpful because  
2 *Ticketmaster* cannot be reconciled with the balance of federal case law, including  
3 prevailing Ninth Circuit law.<sup>8</sup>

4 A. Federal case law, including the Ninth Circuit, consistently holds that a mere  
5 breach of a copyright license violates copyright only when the breach  
6 pertains to an exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106.

7 The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a “licensee infringes the owner’s  
8 copyright if its use exceeds the scope of its license.”<sup>9</sup> This statement does not mean that  
9 every copyright license breach violates copyright as Blizzard suggests it does. Rather,  
10 “[T]he critical question is not the existence but the license’s scope. The license must be  
11 construed in accordance with the *purposes* underlying federal copyright law.”<sup>10</sup> In  
12 *S.O.S.*, the “use” the copyright owner complained about was the defendant’s “copying  
13 and modification of the software.”<sup>11</sup> The Court held the act of breaching the parties’  
14 license agreement led to copyright infringement because *the act itself* violated the  
15 Copyright Act.

16 The Ninth Circuit is not alone. In fact, the Federal Circuit cited *S.O.S.* in its ruling  
17 in *Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering and Consulting, Inc.*<sup>12</sup>  
18 *Storage Tech* viewed the *S.O.S.* as standing for “the entirely unremarkable position that  
19 ‘uses’ that violate a license agreement constitute copyright infringement only when those  
20

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>7</sup> *Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc.*, 507 F.Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

23 <sup>8</sup> The District Court’s ruling in *Ticketmaster* is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Oral  
24 argument is currently set for May 7, 2008.

25 <sup>9</sup> *See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.*, 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989).

26 <sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 1087-88 (emphasis added); *accord Sony v. Connectix*, 203 F.3d at fn.9 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
27 2000)(noting that cases like *MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.*, 991 F.2d 511  
28 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993) must be construed within the greater context of copyright law and thus  
cannot be applied blindly).

<sup>11</sup> *S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.*, 886 F.2d at 1085.

<sup>12</sup> *Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g. and Consulting, Inc.*, 421 F.3d  
1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

1 uses would infringe in the absence of any license agreement at all.”<sup>13</sup> *Storage Tech*  
2 explained why Blizzard’s view of copyright law is overbroad: <sup>14</sup>

3 As an example, consider a license in which the copyright owner grants a  
4 person the right to make one and only one copy of a book with the caveat  
5 that the licensee may not read the last ten pages. Obviously, a licensee who  
6 made a hundred copies of the book would be liable for copyright  
7 infringement because the copying would violate the Copyright Act’s  
8 prohibition on reproduction and would exceed the scope of the license.  
9 Alternatively, if the licensee made a single copy of the book, but read the  
10 last ten pages, the only cause of action would be for breach of contract,  
11 *because reading a work does not violate any right protected by copyright*  
12 *law.*

13 In this case, Blizzard alleges that its EULA grants the licensee the right to make  
14 copies of its WoW software by having it loaded into the licensee’s RAM with the caveat  
15 that the licensee will not use “bot” programs such as Glider. As in *Storage Tech*, mere  
16 use of an independently-created aftermarket software program with WoW could not  
17 possibly infringe Blizzard’s copyrights in WoW in the absence of Blizzard’s EULA.  
18 Thus, when Blizzard’s licensees play WoW with Glider, they are no different from the  
19 readers of “the last ten pages” in the *Storage Tech* example.

20 While the use of aftermarket third party software may exceed the EULA’s scope,  
21 it does not violate Blizzard’s protected rights under the copyright laws. As a result, the  
22 use of Glider does not facilitate a breach of Blizzard’s copyrights under the EULA.  
23 Without primary copyright infringement, MDY can neither contributorily nor vicariously  
24 infringe Blizzard’s copyrights as a matter of law.

25 B. Other than *Ticketmaster*, Blizzard has not cited to any case that supports  
26 Blizzard’s claim that ANY breach of a copyright license equals copyright  
27 infringement

28 Blizzard cites Ninth Circuit cases in support of its position, but none of them apply

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<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 1316.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

1 to the present facts. For example, Blizzard cites *LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia*  
2 *Homes*<sup>15</sup> for the proposition that any copyright license breach is also a breach of contract.  
3 Upon closer inspection, however, *LGS Architects, Inc.* does not stand for the broad  
4 purpose that Blizzard cites it for. In *LGS Architects*, Plaintiff LGS was an architectural  
5 firm, while the Defendant Concordia built homes.<sup>16</sup> LGS and Concordia entered into a  
6 licensing agreement that permitted Concordia to use certain of LGS's copyrighted  
7 architectural plans for a specified building project.<sup>17</sup> Concordia also used LGS's plans on  
8 a second project, not covered by their agreement.<sup>18</sup> The Court concluded that "Concordia  
9 exceeded the scope of its license when it used the four architectural plans in the  
10 construction" of the second project.<sup>19</sup>

11 In formulating its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated that a "license *must*  
12 *be construed in accordance with the purposes underlying federal copyright law.* Chief  
13 among these purposes is the protection of the author's rights."<sup>20</sup> The Court explained that  
14 "when a license is limited in scope, *exploitation of the copyrighted work* outside the  
15 specified limits constitutes infringement."<sup>21</sup> In *LGS*, Concordia's *copying* of the plans on  
16 a project that exceeded the license's scope is what led to the infringement. As stated in  
17 *Storage Tech*, Concordia's unauthorized copying comprised copyright infringement  
18 because the unauthorized activity would have been infringing even in the absence of the  
19 license agreement.<sup>22</sup> Unlike in the present case, however, Concordia did not merely  
20 breach a non-copyright related term in its license agreement. By copying the  
21 architectural plans, Concordia exceeded the copyright license's scope, and violated an  
22 exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106.

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>15</sup> *LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes*, 434 F.3d 1150 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).

25 <sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 1151-52.

26 <sup>17</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>18</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 1157-58.

<sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 1157 (emphasis added), *citing*, *S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.*, 886 F.2d at 1088).

<sup>21</sup> *LGS Architects, Inc.*, 434 F.3d at 1156 (emphasis added).

<sup>22</sup> *Storage Tech.*, 421 F.3d at 1316.



1           Blizzard also cites to *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*<sup>23</sup>; *A&M Records, Inc. v.*  
2 *Napster, Inc.*<sup>24</sup>; and *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.*<sup>25</sup> Because  
3 none of those cases actually holds that any breach of a copyright license also violates the  
4 Copyright Act, MDY can distinguish each of these cases with the present facts. In all of  
5 those cases, *Perfect 10*,<sup>26</sup> *A&M Records*,<sup>27</sup> and *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios*,<sup>28</sup> the  
6 accused directly violated an exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106.

7           In this light, Blizzard’s desperately relies on *Ticketmaster*. If *Ticketmaster* were  
8 the law, surely it would not be the only case to support Blizzard’s position. If anything,  
9 these cases further support MDY’s position that a person commits copyright infringement  
10 by exceeding a copyright license only if the act itself violates one of the exclusive rights  
11 under 17 U.S.C. § 106. At a minimum, Ninth Circuit law cannot reconcile Blizzard’s  
12 claim<sup>29</sup> that a licensee is liable for copyright infringement for breaching any license term.  
13 *Ticketmaster* directly conflicts with every other federal circuit that has considered the  
14 issue.

15           C.     Blizzard’s view could not possibly be the law; otherwise, Blizzard could  
16 assert punitive copyright remedies against its customers for ANY non-  
17 copyright-related breach of contract.

18           Blizzard contends that it’s EULA “conditions users’ ability to copy WoW on their  
19 doing so within the license’s scope of the license.”<sup>30</sup> Blizzard notes that the “first  
20

21 <sup>23</sup> *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 487 F.3d 701 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007).

22 <sup>24</sup> *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001).

23 <sup>25</sup> *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.*, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).

24 <sup>26</sup> In *Perfect 10*, the allegedly infringing act pertained to a search engine that facilitated  
the *distribution* of copyrighted photos.

25 <sup>27</sup> In *A&M Records*, the allegedly infringing act involved the use of a software program  
whose sole purpose was to facilitate the *distribution* of copyrighted music.

26 <sup>28</sup> In *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios*, the allegedly infringing act involved the use of a  
peer-to-peer file sharing program facilitating the *distribution* of copyrighted music and  
27 movies.

28 <sup>29</sup> See Blizzard’s MSJ, at 5.

<sup>30</sup> Blizzard’s MSJ at 6.

1 paragraph of the EULA states: ‘IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS  
2 AGREEMENT, YOU ARE NOT PERMITTED TO INSTALL, COPY, OR USE THE  
3 GAME.’” The EULA further notes that ‘Any use, reproduction ... of the Game not  
4 expressly authorized by the terms of this License Agreement is expressly prohibited.’”<sup>31</sup>

5 Under Blizzard’s reading of *Ticketmaster*, Blizzard’s EULA makes a breach of  
6 ANY term in the agreement a predicate for copyright infringement. If true, Blizzard  
7 could recover for copyright infringement for violating the EULA/TOU if the user plays  
8 WoW after:

- 9 • Intentionally providing a false address or sharing the user’s login information  
10 with a third party (Paragraph 3 of Blizzard’s current TOU)<sup>32</sup>;
- 11 • Providing matchmaking services while playing the game (TOU - Paragraph  
12 4(a));
- 13 • “Attempting” to disrupt the game server (TOU - Paragraph 4(c));
- 14 • Using a character name that impersonates a famous person (TOU - Paragraph  
15 5(i));
- 16 • Using vulgar language in Wow’s chat feature (TOU - Paragraph 5(ii));
- 17 • Doing “anything that Blizzard considers contrary to ‘the essence’ of the  
18 program” (TOU - Paragraph 5(iii));
- 19 • Selling, or even the mere “offering” to sell a user account to a third party (TOU  
20 - Paragraph 8).

21 The Ninth Circuit cases described above, or other Circuit Court decisions like  
22 *Storage Tech* do not support Blizzard’s position. This Court should reject Blizzard’s  
23 argument that it can sue a user, much less a third party as in this case, for copyright  
24 infringement simply by breaching or facilitating a breach of a non-copyright related term  
25 in its EULA. The Court should deny Blizzard’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the  
26 issues of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against MDY.

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27 <sup>31</sup> Blizzard’s Statement of Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment  
28 (“Blizzard’s SOF”) ¶ 89-90.

<sup>32</sup> MDY’s SDF – Exhibit T.

1 **IV. Even if Blizzard correctly relied upon *Ticketmaster*, admissible material facts**  
2 **preclude summary judgment for Blizzard’s copyright claims.**

3 For example, the parties dispute whether Blizzard has ever terminated one of its  
4 licenses pursuant to the EULA’s terms.<sup>33</sup> The parties dispute the EULA or TOU  
5 precluded “bots.”<sup>34</sup> The parties dispute that terms Blizzard contends MDY’s customers  
6 breached were within the reasonable expectations of MDY or its customers as required  
7 under Arizona law.<sup>35</sup> Finally, a factual dispute exists regarding whether the “RAM  
8 copying” Blizzard alleges here is the same as the RAM copying from *MAI* decision.<sup>36</sup>

9 **V. Blizzard’s attempt to leverage its copyright beyond the exclusive rights**  
10 **granted by the Copyright Act is copyright misuse and bars Blizzard from the**  
11 **relief it seeks here.**

12 Copyright misuse occurs when a copyright owner attempts to leverage its  
13 copyright in a manner that exceeds the Copyright Act’s statutory grant.<sup>37</sup> Here, Blizzard  
14 misuses its copyrights by asserting copyright violations as the basis of all of its claims  
15 against MDY. More specifically, Blizzard’s unilateral and restrictive licensing scheme,  
16 i.e., its EULA and TOU, is a transparent attempt to bootstrap the Copyright Act’s  
17 powerful remedies onto mere breaches of contract. While Blizzard attempts to justify its  
18 actions under the guise of “protecting its business,” the manner in which Blizzard acts  
19 here constitutes copyright misuse.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, under the facts presently before the

20 <sup>33</sup> MDY’S Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) ¶ 71.

21 <sup>34</sup> MDY’S SDF ¶ 74.

22 <sup>35</sup> MDY’S SDF ¶ 74-75; *see, Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters*, 140 Ariz.  
23 383 (1984)(terms of adhesion contracts that are not within the reasonable expectations of  
the non-drafter are not enforceable).

24 <sup>36</sup> MDY’S SDF ¶ 142.

25 <sup>37</sup> *A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001)(noting,  
26 “The defense of copyright misuse forbids a copyright holder from “secur[ing] an  
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office.”

27 <sup>38</sup> *See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds*, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (expressly  
28 rejecting Blizzard’s notion: “The need of [the first creator] to protect its investment does  
not outweigh the public’s right under our system to expect competition and the benefits  
that flow therefrom...”).

1 Court, MDY’s business, not Blizzard’s, is the business the law should protect.

2 The Fourth Circuit first expressly recognized Copyright misuse in *Lasercomb*  
3 *America, Inc. v. Reynolds*.<sup>39</sup> Other Circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have since  
4 adopted *Lasercomb’s* misuse doctrine.<sup>40</sup> In *Lasercomb*, the plaintiff developed a  
5 software program that assisted in the making of steel rule dies used to cut cardboard for  
6 folding into boxes and cartons.<sup>41</sup> After obtaining a copy of plaintiff’s software,  
7 defendants created a competing program that "was almost entirely a direct copy of  
8 [plaintiff’s program], and marketed it as its own CAD/CAM die-making software."<sup>42</sup> The  
9 trial court entered judgment for plaintiff and awarded damages to plaintiff – including  
10 punitive damages -- for copyright infringement and fraud. Despite expressly noting that  
11 “there is no question that defendants engaged in unauthorized copying, and the  
12 purposefulness of their unlawful action is manifest from their deceptive practices,” the  
13 Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis of plaintiff’s copyright misuse.<sup>43</sup>

14 Because of the restrictive software license that plaintiff unilaterally tied to  
15 plaintiff’s software, the Fourth Circuit reversed.<sup>44</sup> In pertinent part, the *Lasercomb*  
16 license barred its licensees from writing, developing, producing or selling computer  
17 assisted die making software.<sup>45</sup> In effect, the *Lasercomb* license restricted the  
18 independent original creation of other software programs.<sup>46</sup> The court noted that terms in  
19  
20

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21 <sup>39</sup> 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).

22 <sup>40</sup> *A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001); *Practice*  
23 *Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. American Med, Assoc.*, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); *see, also, DSC*  
24 *Communications Corp, v. DGI Technologies, Inc.*, 81 F.3d 597, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1996);  
*Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc.*, 342 F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir.  
2003).

25 <sup>41</sup> *Lasercomb*, 911 F.2d at 971.

26 <sup>42</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>43</sup> *Id.* at 971, 979.

28 <sup>44</sup> *Id.* at 973.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

<sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 978.

1 a licensing agreement designed to protect *copying* were permissible.<sup>47</sup> But going beyond  
2 statutory copyrights to stifle the independent origination of different software  
3 impermissibly violated public policy:

4       The misuse arises from Lasercomb's attempt to use its copyright in a  
5       particular expression, the Interact software, to control competition in an  
6       area outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die  
7       manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust  
8       violation.<sup>48</sup>

8       The doctrine of copyright misuse arises from two foundational, yet divergent  
9       policies: competition and innovation.<sup>49</sup> On one hand, promoting competition is the  
10      foundation of our legal-economic system.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, encouraging innovation is  
11      the foundation of both our copyright and patent systems.<sup>51</sup> To encourage innovation and  
12      creativity, our copyright and patent systems grant limited statutory monopolies that  
13      prevent direct competition for the statutory term of protection.<sup>52</sup> The patent and  
14      copyright systems not only permit indirect competition in the form of competing  
15      inventions and works of authorship, the law encourages it.<sup>53</sup> The incentives of these  
16      limited monopolies promote not only the creation of the first invention or work of  
17      authorship, but subsequent ones as well. As a result, copyright misuse occurs once a  
18      copyright owner seeks to impose contractual restrictions that impede or prevent a person

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20 <sup>47</sup> *Id.* (“Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying of the Interact  
21 code.”)

22 <sup>48</sup> *See id.* at at 979.

23 <sup>49</sup> *See id.* at 977 (“A patent or copyright is often regarded as a limited monopoly – an  
24 exception to the general public policy against restraints of trade.”)

25 <sup>50</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>51</sup> *See id.* at 974-975 (for the evolution of our copyright and patent laws); *see also, e.g.,*  
27 *Video Pipeline*, 342 F.3d at 204 (“the underlying policy rationale for the misuse doctrine  
28 set out in the Constitution's Copyright and Patent Clause: “to promote the Progress of  
Science and useful Arts,” *quoting* U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.)

<sup>52</sup> *See Lasercomb*, 911 F.2d at 975 (“To encourage such efforts, society grants authors  
exclusive rights in their works for a limited time.”)

<sup>53</sup> *See e.g., Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992).

1 from creating and disseminating newer and non-infringing copyrighted works.<sup>54</sup>

2 In this case, Blizzard complains that “bots” harm its business model.<sup>55</sup> To protect  
3 its business model, Blizzard now requires that its licensees agree not to use bots. The  
4 Copyright Act does not, however, grant Blizzard the right to control whether or not its  
5 users can use bots,<sup>56</sup> any more than it gives book publishers the right to control where,  
6 when, or with what owners of copies can read their books. As such, Blizzard misuses its  
7 copyrights by attempting to control its licensees’ use of independently created and  
8 noninfringing third party software.<sup>57</sup>

9 Blizzard’s misuse here is not the first time Blizzard has misused its copyrights to  
10 protect its business model.<sup>58</sup> From November, 2005 through January, 2005, Blizzard  
11 unsuccessfully tried to use its EULA to misuse its copyright against a third-party who  
12 tried to do nothing more than sell a book that detailed how to level a WoW character  
13 from 1 to 70 in only eight days.<sup>59</sup>

14 **VI. The Court should deny Blizzard’s motion with respect to its DMCA claims**  
15 **because Blizzard relies exclusively on *Ticketmaster* – a case that cannot be**  
16 **reconciled with the law of the Ninth and other Circuits and because**  
17 ***Ticketmaster* is not a case involving piracy.**

18 Blizzard contends that mere circumvention of any software protection measure  
19 violates the DMCA. Again, Blizzard overstates the law. Only circumvention *coupled*  
20 *with* access to a protected work to facilitate a copyright violation creates liability under

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>54</sup> See *Lasercomb*, 911 F.2d at 979.

23 <sup>55</sup> Whether or not Blizzard is actually being harmed is questionable. Admissible evidence  
24 suggests that Blizzard actually benefits from Glider. MDY’S SDF ¶¶ 92, 121-31.

25 <sup>56</sup> A “copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention — conferring only  
26 ‘the sole right of multiplying copies.’” *Mazer v. Stein*, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); accord  
27 17 U.S.C. § 106.

28 <sup>57</sup> “Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is  
given only to the expression of the idea — not the idea itself.” *Mazer v. Stein*, 347 U.S.  
201, 217 (1954).

<sup>58</sup> See, MDY’s SDF ¶¶ 143-46.

<sup>59</sup> The details of Blizzard’s illegal acts are detailed in MDY’s SDF ¶¶ 143-46.

1 the DMCA. As before, although Blizzard's relies on *Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG*  
2 *Technologies, Inc.*,<sup>60</sup> the balance of federal case law, including prevailing Ninth Circuit  
3 law rejects *Ticketmaster's* holdings.

4  
5 A. Because no reasonable relationship exists between access obtained by Glider's  
6 avoidance of Warden or Scan.dll and copyright protection of Blizzard's WoW  
7 game client, MDY cannot be liable under the DMCA.

8 As discussed in more detail in MDY's Motion for Summary Judgment, the DMCA  
9 does not extend to *every* act of electronic circumvention.<sup>61</sup> The DMCA extends only to  
10 circumvention measures that enable access to a protected work for the purpose of illegal  
11 copying, i.e., pirating works. In other words, the DMCA requires a nexus between  
12 "access" and the "protection" offered by copyright. No nexus exists – and DMCA  
13 liability does not attach – when efforts to circumvent technological protection *merely*  
14 *enable rightful access* to a protected work for the purpose of using it without copying,  
15 making derivative works, or distributing the work.<sup>62</sup>

16 In addition to *Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies*,<sup>63</sup> the Sixth Circuit in  
17 *Lexmark* held that a person must have a "purpose" to facilitate the piracy of protected  
18 content to violate the DMCA. The Court stated,

19 "Lexmark would have us read this statute in such a way that any time a  
20 manufacturer intentionally circumvents any technological measure and  
21 accesses a protected work it necessarily violates the statute regardless of its  
22 "purpose." Such a reading would ignore the precise language — "for the  
23 purpose of" — as well as the main point of the DMCA — *to prohibit the*  
24 *pirating of copyright-protected works* such as movies, music, and  
computer programs. If we were to adopt Lexmark's reading of the statute,  
manufacturers could potentially create monopolies for replacement parts  
simply by using similar, but more creative, lock-out codes. Automobile

25 <sup>60</sup> *Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc.*, 507 F.Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

26 <sup>61</sup> MDY's MSJ at 14-17.

27 <sup>62</sup> *See id.*; *see also, Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies*, 381 F.3d 1178, 1195  
28 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(emphasis ours); *accord Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. v. M & S*  
*Technologies*, at 16 (N.D.Ill. 3-4-2008)(following *Chamberlain* and *Storage Tech.*).

<sup>63</sup> *See* MDY's MSJ at 16-17 for a discussion of the *Chamberlain* case.

1 manufacturers, for example, could control the entire market of replacement  
2 parts for their vehicles by including lock-out chips. Congress did not  
3 intend to allow the DMCA to be used offensively in this manner, but rather  
4 only sought to reach those who circumvented protective measures "for the  
5 purpose" of pirating works protected by the copyright statute. ***Unless a  
6 plaintiff can show that a defendant circumvented protective measures for  
7 such a purpose, its claim should not be allowed to go forward.***<sup>64</sup>

8 In this case, Blizzard cannot argue that Glider facilitates infringement of  
9 Blizzard's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act for its WoW game client software.<sup>65</sup>  
10 Likewise, Blizzard cannot argue that its server software is easier to copy or distribute by  
11 a player using Glider. Or, that its game client is more vulnerable to unauthorized copying  
12 or distribution by players who use Glider. To the extent such dispute exists, such dispute  
13 would preclude summary judgment.

14 B. Blizzard's Warden and Scan.dll programs are not "effective access control"  
15 measures under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(b), so MDY cannot violate §  
16 1201(a)(1) or § 1201(b)(1) as a matter of law.

17 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) requires that Blizzard's Warden and Scan.dll software  
18 programs "effectively control access" to its WoW client software code or the Blizzard  
19 server code. Recall, evading Warden does NOT give access to the server CODE but only  
20 the code's functionality, as in *Chamberlain* and *Lexmark*.<sup>66</sup> Technological measures that  
21 restrict one form of access, but leave another route wide do not "effectively control  
22 access" and do not give rise to DMCA liability.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, when a technological  
23 measure controls a third-party's ability to make use of a computer software code, but  
24 does not control the third-party's ability to access the software code to read or copy the  
25 code, the technological measure is not an effective access control measure, because it is  
26 the *code*, not the code's functionality, that copyright protects.<sup>68</sup>

27 <sup>64</sup> *Lexmark*, 387 F.3d at 552 (emphasis added) (Merritt, J., concurring).

28 <sup>65</sup> Affidavit of Michael M. Donnelly ("Donnelly Aff.") ¶ 36.

<sup>66</sup> 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) and (a)(3)(b)(emphasis ours).

<sup>67</sup> *Lexmark*, 387 F.3d at 547.

<sup>68</sup> *See id.* at 546-47.



1           1.     Warden is a data reporting process, not an effective access control measure.

2           Blizzard asserts that it designed Warden to “prohibit WoW users who utilize  
3 ‘cheats,’ ‘bots,’ and other unauthorized programs with WoW from accessing Blizzard’s  
4 copyrighted WoW content.”<sup>69</sup> MDY disputes Blizzard’s assertion.<sup>70</sup> Warden does not  
5 prohibit WoW users from accessing copyrighted WoW code. Blizzard limits Warden’s  
6 utility to two functions: (1) Warden scans a licensee’s computer RAM to determine if the  
7 licensee is playing WoW with third party software that Blizzard prohibits under its  
8 EULA or TOU,<sup>71</sup> and (2) if Warden detects an unauthorized software program, Warden  
9 notifies Blizzard.<sup>72</sup> Blizzard then reviews the data and decides whether it will close the  
10 licensee’s WoW account.<sup>73</sup>

11           Blizzard also asserts that once Warden detects an unauthorized program, Warden  
12 can immediately “kick users out of the game” or “ban a user’s account so that the user  
13 cannot log in.”<sup>74</sup> Even if Blizzard’s assertion was true, Blizzard’s statement is at least  
14 misleading. Even if Warden does ban an account, or kick a user out of the game –  
15 thereby depriving the user of access to the game’s *functionality*, Warden in no way  
16 prevents the user from copying or distributing the copyright-protected *code*. Therefore,  
17 Warden does not control access to the copyright-protected work.<sup>75</sup>

18           Blizzard admits that Warden cannot prevent a person from copying, modifying,  
19 distributing, or even examining copies of the WoW client software.<sup>76</sup> In other words,  
20 even though Warden can prevent a user from *playing* the game, Warden cannot preclude  
21 a user from *copying* the WoW software code either by copying WoW’s game CDs,  
22 copying WoW’s software code installed on the user’s hard drive, or by loading the

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>69</sup> Blizzard’s MSJ at 11.

25 <sup>70</sup> MDY’s SDF ¶ 132-35.

26 <sup>71</sup> MDY’s SDF ¶ 132-35.

27 <sup>72</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>73</sup> *Id.*

<sup>74</sup> Blizzard’s MSJ SOF ¶ 115-19.

<sup>75</sup> MDY’s SDF at ¶ 135.

<sup>76</sup> *Id.*

1 software code into RAM memory to examine it. As the Court in Lexmark analogized:

2 “Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a house ‘controls  
3 access’ to a house whose front door does not contain a lock and just as one  
4 would not say that a lock on any door of a house ‘controls access’ to the  
5 house after its purchaser receives the key to the lock, it does not make sense  
6 to say that this provision of the DMCA applies to otherwise-readily-  
accessible copyrighted works.”

7 Warden does not “lock” any part of the WoW software code. Warden is a data  
8 reporting computer software program that does not control access to any part of the WoW  
9 game client software or the WoW server software. Consequently, Warden is not an  
10 access control measure, let alone an effective access control measure, for any work  
11 protected under 17 U.S.C. § 106 as defined under § 1201(a)(3)(B). Because Warden is  
12 not an effective access control mechanism, MDY cannot violate the DMCA. Thus, the  
13 Court should deny Blizzard’s Motion as a matter of law.

14 2. Scan.dll is not an effective access control measure

15  
16 Blizzard also alleges that its Scan.dll software code prevents unauthorized copying  
17 of WoW code by preventing a user from accessing the WoW game if Scan.dll detects an  
18 unauthorized software program that violates its EULA. Blizzard argues that because  
19 MDY’s Glider program is able to evade detection from Scan.dll, MDY violates the  
20 DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision. Blizzard again overstates the law.

21 Blizzard’s Scan.dll software code is an even less effective attempt to control  
22 access to the WoW software code than Warden. Scan.dll’s only function is to detect  
23 third-party software when the user *first* loads WoW into RAM.<sup>77</sup> After a user loads the  
24 WoW game code into RAM, Scan.dll stops functioning.<sup>78</sup> Although Scan.dll can control  
25 whether a licensee can access the WoW game client software to *play* the WoW game  
26 during the initial loading of the WoW game client, Scan.dll cannot control whether a

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>77</sup> MDY’s SDF ¶¶ 136-139.

<sup>78</sup> *Id.*

1 licensee can *access* the WoW game client software code for the purpose of examining,  
2 copying, making derivative works or distributing copies of WoW.<sup>79</sup> In fact, Scan.dll  
3 cannot prevent the licensee *from manually loading the game client into RAM*.<sup>80</sup> Even if  
4 Scan.dll detects prohibited software code – it can only stop the licensee from *playing*, not  
5 copying, the WoW software code.<sup>81</sup>

6 As discussed above pertaining to Warden, Blizzard’s Scan.dll software does not  
7 protect access to Blizzard’s copyrights.<sup>82</sup> Because Scan.dll cannot prevent a person from  
8 (1) accessing or copying the WoW software code, and (2) a person can easily remove  
9 Scan.dll from his computer by simply deleting the file in his directory, the Court cannot  
10 consider it to be an *effective* access control measure for any work protected as defined  
11 under § 1201(a)(3)(B). At a minimum, a question of fact exists as to whether Glider  
12 circumvents Scan.dll at all.<sup>83</sup>

13 Therefore, for all the reasons discussed above, neither Scan.dll nor Warden are  
14 effective measures that control access to a copyright-protected work. Neither Warden  
15 nor Scan.dll can prevent a person from copying, distributing, or making derivative works  
16 based upon Blizzard’s WoW software code. Thus, as a matter of law, the Court should  
17 deny Blizzard’s Motion on the issue of its DMCA claim.

18  
19 C. MDY’s Glider program is not primarily designed and marketed as a  
circumvention device, nor does Glider have a limited commercial purpose.

20 Blizzard argues that because Glider is designed and marketed as a circumvention  
21 device, and that Glider has only a limited commercially significant purpose, MDY is  
22 liable under the DMCA’s anti-trafficking provisions.<sup>84</sup> For the reasons set forth above,  
23 MDY has not violated the DMCA by selling Glider, and thus cannot be liable under the  
24

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25 <sup>79</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>80</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>81</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>82</sup> *Id.* ¶ 138.

<sup>83</sup> MDY’s SDF, at ¶ 136-38.

<sup>84</sup> Blizzard’s MSJ at 13.

1 anti-trafficking sections either. Thus, how MDY markets Glider, or whether Glider has a  
2 limited commercial purpose, is not material to liability. Nonetheless, even if such facts  
3 were material, the parties dispute them.

4 First, MDY did not design Glider to circumvent Warden and Scan.dll. Donnelly's  
5 sole motive for designing Glider was to create a tool to assist him personally in  
6 shortening the time it required to level his WoW game character to the highest level.<sup>85</sup> In  
7 fact, MDY did not add code to Glider's software that enabled it to avoid detection by  
8 Warden until *over four months* after MDY began commercially selling Glider.<sup>86</sup> MDY  
9 added the code only after Blizzard first banned one of MDY's customer's accounts so  
10 that MDY could protect its economic interest in the company that Donnelly had built  
11 over the previous six months. MDY needed to continue selling Glider to do just that.<sup>87</sup>

12 Second, MDY continuously updates Glider's ability to avoid detection from  
13 Warden only as a countermeasure to Blizzard's detection efforts.<sup>88</sup> MDY does not  
14 continue to update its code to avoid Warden so that MDY can pirate any software code  
15 that Blizzard creates. MDY updates its Glider code solely to protect its business.

16 Finally, Glider has many commercial uses other than "to circumvent Warden."<sup>89</sup>  
17 MDY and Donnelly have marketed Glider since its beginning as an add-on software  
18 program to assist WoW players in advancing their character's level faster than normal.<sup>90</sup>  
19 MDY has also made it known that physically handicapped players can use Glider to help  
20 them play the game if they have trouble using a computer keyboard.<sup>91</sup> Additionally,  
21 since October, 2007, MDY has developed additional features in Glider's platform so that  
22 MDY can sell Glider for use with several other computer games similar to WoW.<sup>92</sup>

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23 <sup>85</sup> MDY SDF ¶ 44.

24 <sup>86</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>87</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>88</sup> MDY SDF ¶ 140.

27 <sup>89</sup> *Id.* ¶ 42.

28 <sup>90</sup> *Id.* ¶ 44.

<sup>91</sup> *Id.* ¶ 42

<sup>92</sup> *Id.*

1 Clearly, Blizzard’s assertion that Glider has no commercial use other than to circumvent  
2 Warden is false.

3 **VII. Because MDY has not acted improperly by creating, marketing and selling its**  
4 **independently created aftermarket software to Blizzard’s WoW users, MDY**  
5 **has not tortiously interfered with Blizzard’s contractual relations.**

6 In addition to all of MDY’s reasons cited in its opening brief for its Motion for  
7 Summary Judgment, Blizzard’s copyright misuse also bars it from seeking equitable  
8 relief arising from its copyrights. Thus, the Court cannot grant summary judgment to  
9 Blizzard for its tortious interference with contract (“TIWC”) claim.<sup>93</sup> In addition,  
10 regardless of Blizzard’s Copyright misuse, disputed material facts preclude the entry of  
11 summary judgment. First, a reasonable jury could find that Blizzard’s EULA and TOU  
12 violate public policy by restraining trade and because of the agreements’ anti-competitive  
13 nature. Second, a reasonable jury could find that Blizzard cannot prove that MDY acted  
14 improperly. Third, a reasonable jury could find that Blizzard cannot prove that MDY  
15 *solely* acted with malice. Fourth, a reasonable jury could find that Blizzard cannot prove  
16 that MDY intended to interfere with Blizzard’s contracts. Finally, a reasonable jury  
17 could find that Blizzard cannot prove any damages.

18 A. Because Blizzard’s EULA and TOU are anti-competitive and restrain trade, a  
19 reasonable jury could find that Blizzard’s agreements violate public policy

20 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774, an alleged interferer is not  
21 liable for TIWC if the contract at issue effectively violates “an established public  
22 policy:<sup>94</sup>

23 One who by appropriate means causes the non-performance of an illegal  
24 agreement or an agreement having a purpose or effect in violation of an  
25 established public policy is not liable for pecuniary harm resulting from the  
26 nonperformance.

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>93</sup> See, *infra*, section V.

<sup>94</sup> Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 774.

1 As a result, as long as the third-party contract's relevant provisions contract operate  
2 adversely to public policy, courts will not find TIWC – even if the court finds all the  
3 other TIWC elements.<sup>95</sup>

4 By its own terms, §774 is not limited to situations where contracts are  
5 unambiguously illegal. Anti-competitive provisions or provisions that restrain trade are  
6 enough to bar TIWC liability. In fact, the comments to §774 expressly state that such  
7 provisions are common provisions that bar a finding of TIWC.<sup>96</sup>

8 A common type of contract regarded as contrary to public policy is a  
9 contract tending to monopoly or undue restraint of trade (sic). In some  
10 cases this result may be the avowed purpose of the agreement in question;  
11 in others this may be the effect in view of the administration of the  
agreement or other circumstances, whether or not it is the purpose.

12 ...  
13 If, however, the restriction works prejudice to both interests by tending to  
14 create a monopoly or by unduly restraining trade, it is regarded as in  
violation of a clear public policy.

15 §774 expressly illustrates how an otherwise valid contact could not be used as a  
16 basis for TIWC liability even when the contract breached expressly forbids the very  
17 result that occurs.<sup>97</sup>

18 A, a cinema exhibitor in the town of X has a contract with the chief cinema  
19 producers that they will not permit any first-run pictures to be shown in X  
20 except at his theatre. B builds a cinema theatre in X. He is not liable for  
21 inducing one or more of the producers to license him for a first-run cinema  
in breach of the contract with A, if he does not use wrongful means.

22 In this case, Blizzard contends that its EULA prohibits its licensees from using  
23 independently created aftermarket software with WoW.<sup>98</sup> Like B in the example, MDY  
24 cannot be liable for inducing a user to use MDY's Glider software even if such use  
25

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26 <sup>95</sup> See *id.*, cmt. b.

27 <sup>96</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>97</sup> *Id.*, Illustration 4.

<sup>98</sup> Blizzard's MSJ, Section V.

1 breaches Blizzard's contract because to do so would be anti-competitive and restrain  
2 trade. Just like there is no law that prevents B from opening his theater, there is no law  
3 that prevents MDY from selling its software. The Court should deny Blizzard's motion  
4 for summary judgment as a matter of law.

5 B. A reasonable jury could find that MDY did not act improperly by advertising  
6 and marketing its Glider software

7 To survive summary judgment, Blizzard must demonstrate that MDY's actions  
8 were illegal – or at least inequitable – for the Court to consider the actions to be  
9 tortious.<sup>99</sup> Actions that comply with the law, of course, will not be considered tortious.  
10 The law has long permitted reverse engineering of copyrighted software for the purpose  
11 of achieving interoperability between aftermarket software and copyrighted software.<sup>100</sup>  
12 The DMCA goes further by expressly permitting a person to circumvent technological  
13 measures the purpose of achieving interoperability between aftermarket software and  
14 copyrighted software.<sup>101</sup> In this way, copyright law expressly authorizes the steps  
15 needed to make, use and sell independently created aftermarket software – that is,  
16 aftermarket software intended solely for use with another person's copyrighted game.<sup>102</sup>  
17 Moreover, copyright law's purpose is to encourage artists, writers and even computer  
18 programmers to create new ideas artistic and literary works, including independently  
19 created aftermarket software, which will reach the marketplace.<sup>103</sup>

20 In stark contrast, Blizzard believes that it can use TIWC to achieve the opposite  
21

22 <sup>99</sup> See, MDY's MSJ, at 18–23 for a more detailed discussion of applicable law.

23 <sup>100</sup> See, *Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *Sony*  
24 *Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp.*, 203 F.3d 596 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

25 <sup>101</sup> See, Anti-Circumvention Rulemaking Hearing, at 44-56, at  
26 <http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/hearings/transcript-may9.pdf> (testimony of  
27 Professor Jane Ginsburg), attached to MDY's SDF as **Exhibit L**.

28 <sup>102</sup> *Id.*; see also, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(3); *Lexmark Intern. v. Static Control Components*,  
387 F.3d 522 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004).

<sup>103</sup> See, *Sony v. Connectix Corp.*, 203 F.3d 596, 605-08 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000)(the "ultimate aim"  
of the Copyright Act is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good.")

1 result – i.e., to prevent independently created aftermarket software from reaching the  
2 marketplace. In support of its position, Blizzard contends that TIWC applies because  
3 Glider has “no utility” and it is not an “independent good.”<sup>104</sup> In addition to ignoring the  
4 law of the previous paragraph, the law does not give Blizzard’s assertions weight.<sup>105</sup>  
5 Comparatively, the Court can only consider Glider “independently created software” –  
6 much more so than the defendant’s software in *Lexmark*.<sup>106</sup>

7 In support of its TIWC theory, Blizzard cites *Am. Airlines v. Platinum World*  
8 *Travel*.<sup>107</sup> The central issue in *Am. Airlines* involved a promotional frequent flyer reward  
9 program that plaintiff American Airlines offered its customers.<sup>108</sup> Before enrolling a  
10 customer in the program, American Airlines required each customer to contractually  
11 agree not to sell any reward to a third-party.<sup>109</sup> The defendants in the case operated a  
12 business that brokered the frequent flyer rewards American Airlines issued.<sup>110</sup> The  
13 District Court entered summary judgment on the issue of TIWC and the decision was  
14 upheld on appeal.<sup>111</sup>

15 Even though some facts of *Am. Airlines* are analogous to the case at bar, it is not  
16 particularly helpful. First, as opposed to the facts in *Lexmark*, Congress did not expressly  
17 authorize the defendant’s acts. In fact, the court in *Am. Airlines* actually noted  
18 defendant’s failure to point out any authority for its position.<sup>112</sup> Second, as an “air  
19 carrier,” the court found that plaintiff American Airlines was statutorily exempt from the  
20 federal and state unfair practices laws.<sup>113</sup> Here, Blizzard enjoys no exemption from

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21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>104</sup> Blizzard’s MSJ at 14.

23 <sup>105</sup> See, e.g., MDY’s SDF ¶¶ 42, 44, 140; MDY’s SOF ¶¶ 38-46.

24 <sup>106</sup> *Lexmark*, 387 F.3d at 550 (mere checksum program to complete “handshake”  
25 enough).

26 <sup>107</sup> 769 F.Supp. at 1208, *aff’d* 967 F.2d 410 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992).

27 <sup>108</sup> *Am. Airlines*, 769 F.Supp. at 1204.

28 <sup>109</sup> *Id.*

<sup>110</sup> *Id.*

<sup>111</sup> *Id.* at 1208.

<sup>112</sup> *Id.* at 1207.

<sup>113</sup> *Id.* at 1205.



1 unfair competition laws. Third, unlike plaintiff American Airlines, Blizzard has misused  
2 its copyrights and has attempted to unilaterally extend the reach of copyright law through  
3 contract in an anti-competitive manner. Fourth, the court *Am. Airlines* expressly decided  
4 as a misappropriation case. In fact, the court stated that defendants’ acts went “far  
5 beyond” mere misappropriation of information.<sup>114</sup>

6 The defendants business goes far beyond misappropriation of information.  
7 Rather, the defendants are misappropriating the actual services of the  
8 plaintiff.

9 Here, MDY has not misappropriated anything from Blizzard.<sup>115</sup> Blizzard sells  
10 WoW. MDY’s Glider does not permit users to play WoW without paying for it. MDY’s  
11 Glider requires users to pay for, and log into a valid WoW account just like any other  
12 WoW user. MDY’s Glider does not modify or change any WoW software or coding.  
13 MDY independently created Glider as an aftermarket software application that permits its  
14 users to play WoW on auto-pilot.<sup>116</sup>

15 Lastly, even though Glider avoids detection by Blizzard’s spyware (Warden),  
16 MDY’s actions are not the same as the defendants’ actions in *Am. Airlines*. Unlike MDY  
17 (whose actions Copyright law promotes), the defendants in *Am. Airlines* were the central  
18 figures in “an elaborate system of deception enlisting the aid of plaintiff’s customers”,  
19 which included “booking false reservations.”<sup>117</sup>

20 Blizzard may argue that, like the defendant in *Am. Airlines*, MDY deceives  
21 Blizzard by actively avoiding detection from Warden. The Court should note that when  
22 MDY started selling Glider, Glider did not originally avoid detection. MDY did not  
23 include detection avoidance as a feature of Glider because Donnelly never believed that  
24 the use of Glider with WoW would violate Blizzard’s EULA.<sup>118</sup> MDY added this feature

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25 <sup>114</sup> *Id.* at 1207 (emphasis ours).

26 <sup>115</sup> MDY’s SOF ¶¶ 34-45.

27 <sup>116</sup> MDY’s SDF ¶ 154.

28 <sup>117</sup> *Id.* at 1203.

<sup>118</sup> MDY’s SDF ¶ 141.

1 to Glider solely as a countermeasure to Blizzard’s unilateral attempt to take away what  
2 Donnelly believed was a rightful software business.<sup>119</sup> Likewise, a reasonable jury could  
3 find that Blizzard’s EULA permitted because Glider does not enable a user to do  
4 anything more than a human can do. Glider simply automates keystrokes to permit the  
5 Glider user to do something more productive.<sup>120</sup>

6 C. A reasonable jury could find that Donnelly was not motivated by a malicious  
7 intent to harm Blizzard or WoW

8 The question whether a desire to interfere with the plaintiff’s contractual relations  
9 motivated the defendant is a major factor, if not the *most important factor* in determining  
10 whether the interference is “improper.”<sup>121</sup> As long as the actor’s motive is at least  
11 partially supported by a proper purpose, the actor has not tortiously interfered.<sup>122</sup> *Malice*  
12 *must be the sole motivator* for the actor to interfere *tortiously*.<sup>123</sup> For example, “a  
13 competitor does not act improperly if his purpose, at least in part, is to advance his own  
14 economic interests.”<sup>124</sup>

15 Blizzard submits statements that MDY made as evidence that malice was MDY’s  
16 sole motivator.<sup>125</sup> MDY’s statements do not indicate a motive to maliciously harm  
17 Blizzard. If anything, MDY’s statements demonstrate the lengths MDY had to go to  
18 protect its economic interests in maintaining its business, not that MDY harbors ill will  
19 toward Blizzard. Even if a reasonable jury could interpret MDY’s statements as hostile,  
20 ill will is not enough by itself. Ill will coupled with proper motivation, like a viable

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>119</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>120</sup> MDY’s SOF ¶¶ 38-45.

24 <sup>121</sup> Restatement 2d of Torts, § 767, cmt. d.

25 <sup>122</sup> *Bar J Bar Cattle v. Pace*, 158 Ariz. at 485 (“even if [defendant] had an improper  
26 motive, that fact would not necessarily make him liable in tort. One who interferes with  
27 the contractual rights of another for a legitimate competitive reason does not become a  
28 tort-feasor simply because he may also bear ill will toward his competitor.”)

<sup>123</sup> *Id.*; *see also*, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 767, cmt. d.

<sup>124</sup> *Bar J Bar Cattle*, 158 Ariz. at 485, *citing with approval*, Restatement (Second) of  
Torts § 768(1)(d).

<sup>125</sup> Blizzard’s MSJ at 16-17.

1 business, defeats Blizzard's claim. At a minimum, the parties dispute whether MDY  
2 maliciously sold Glider, which at a minimum, may be a question for a jury to decide.

3  
4 D. A reasonable jury could find that MDY did not intend to interfere with  
Blizzard's contracts

5 To obtain summary judgment, Blizzard must have irrefutable evidence that MDY  
6 had the "specific intent" to cause the interference.<sup>126</sup> Even Blizzard agrees that it must  
7 show that MDY "intended or knew" that a breach of contract was "substantially certain"  
8 to occur as a result of Glider.<sup>127</sup>

9 Blizzard's own motion implicitly admits that Blizzard cannot show that MDY  
10 intended or knew that Glider use with WoW would breach the EULA/TOU when  
11 Donnelly created Glider and when MDY began selling Glider in June, 2005.<sup>128</sup> Even  
12 when viewing the facts in Blizzard's favor, Blizzard only evidence is statements MDY  
13 made in its FAQ as early as September 2005 that Blizzard's EULA was overly broad and  
14 a user could possibly breach the EULA by using Glider with WoW.

15 In addition, a reasonable jury could find that MDY did not have the "specific  
16 intent" to cause the interference because Blizzard's agreements did not originally prohibit  
17 "bots."<sup>129</sup> It was only after Donnelly filed this lawsuit that Blizzard unilaterally elected to  
18 modify its TOU expressly to exclude bots.<sup>130</sup> Thus, at least until Blizzard changed its  
19 contract, a reasonable jury could find that MDY lacked the specific intent to interfere  
20 with Blizzard's agreements.

21 Furthermore, Blizzard has cited no case for the proposition that Blizzard can take  
22

23  
24 <sup>126</sup> *Antwerp Diamond Exchange of America, Inc. v Better Business Bureau of Maricopa  
County, Inc.*, 130 Ariz. 370 (1985).

25 <sup>127</sup> Blizzard's MSJ at 15, lines 4-5.

26 <sup>128</sup> Blizzard's MSJ at 15, lines 10-14 (noting only "at least September 2005").

27 <sup>129</sup> MDY's SDF ¶ 67; *see also, Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters*, 140 Ariz.  
383 (1984)(terms of adhesion contracts that are not within the reasonable expectations of  
the non-drafter are not enforceable).

28 <sup>130</sup> MDY's SDF ¶ 67; *see also, MDY's SOF* ¶15-18.

1 away a business that MDY lawfully started. In other words, Blizzard cannot on its own  
2 whim, modify its EULA to unilaterally strip MDY of its software business, or any other  
3 entity such as Brian Kopp of his unauthorized WoW guidebook business, when Glider  
4 did not violate Blizzard’s EULA or TOU in the first instance.

5 E. A reasonable jury could find that MDY did not damage Blizzard

6  
7 Blizzard bears the burden of showing that MDY’s alleged wrongful conduct was a  
8 substantial factor in Blizzard’s loss.”<sup>131</sup> While a jury usually determines the conduct  
9 caused damage, the “mere possibility of causation is not enough” to defeat summary  
10 judgment.<sup>132</sup> Even if an inteferor’s conduct contributed "only a little" to the claimant’s  
11 injury, the claimant still “must show at trial that the injury would not have occurred ‘but  
12 for’ the [interferor’s] conduct.”<sup>133</sup>

13 In this case, Blizzard cannot present evidence of any harm that Glider caused.<sup>134</sup>  
14 MDY’s expert has concluded that Blizzard’s calculations are speculative and unsupported  
15 by any controlled economic study.<sup>135</sup> If anything, Glider has increased Blizzard’s  
16 revenues.<sup>136</sup> Even if Blizzard has suffered damage as a result of “bots,” Blizzard cannot  
17 attribute any damage explicitly to Glider – a program that is very different than the other  
18 “bots.”<sup>137</sup> At a minimum, the parties dispute certain material facts that preclude the Court  
19 from granting summary judgment.

20  
21  
22 <sup>131</sup> See, MDY’s MSJ at 24; *Agilysys, Inc. v. Vipond* No. CV-04-2023-PHX-DGC, at 5 (D.  
Ariz. September 13, 2006).

23 <sup>132</sup> *Grafitti-Valenzuela v. Phoenix*, 513 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 20, at 12 (Ariz.App. 9-27-2007)  
24 citing *Badia v. City Of Casa Grande*, 195 Ariz. 349, 357 (App. 1999)(“Sheer speculation  
25 is insufficient to establish the necessary element of proximate cause or to defeat summary  
judgment.”)

26 <sup>133</sup> *Grafitti-Valenzuela*, 513 Ariz. Adv. Rep. at 12.

27 <sup>134</sup> MDY’s SDF ¶¶ 147-53

28 <sup>135</sup> *Id.*

<sup>136</sup> *Id.*

<sup>137</sup> *Id.*

1 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Blizzard's motion for summary  
3 judgment on all counts.

4  
5 **Venable, Campillo, Logan & Meaney, P.C.**

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

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