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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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9 PH4 Corporation, and Del Webb) No. CV 08-0501-PHX-SMM  
Corporation, )

10

Plaintiffs, )

**ORDER**

11

vs. )

12

Sun City Real Estate, LLC, and Sharon )

13

Jones, )

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Defendants. )

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16 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs PH4 Corporation and Del Webb Corporation's  
17 ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 22) and Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Dkt.  
18 29).

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**BACKGROUND**

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21 Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March, 13, 2008, alleging claims for trademark and  
22 trade name infringement and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a), A.R.S.  
23 §§ 44-1451 and 44-1460.05, and the common laws of the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs also  
24 alleged a claim for unjust enrichment under the common law of the State of Arizona.  
25 Defendants Sharon Jones and Sun City Real Estate, LLC ("Defendants") were properly served  
26 on May 17, 2008. Although Defendant Sharon Jones entered a pro se notice of appearance  
27 on June 10, 2008 (Dkt. 14), neither of the Defendants filed an answer to the complaint.

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28 Pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk of Court  
entered default in this matter on June 23, 2008. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

1 Default Judgment on September 23, 2008 (Dkt. 22). Plaintiffs requested a number of  
2 different remedies, including a permanent injunction, as well as attorneys' fees. The Court  
3 held a hearing on October 9, 2008 to determine the amount of damages sustained by  
4 Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants' actions. At the hearing, Plaintiffs stated that they were  
5 only seeking a permanent injunction and attorneys' fees. Defendant Sharon Jones contested  
6 the awarding of attorneys' fees, and the Court advised the parties to reach an agreement  
7 regarding attorneys' fees. The Court gave Plaintiffs until October 24, 2008 to file a motion  
8 for attorneys' fees.

9 On October 24, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and stated that  
10 "the parties were unable to come to an agreement regarding fees" (Dkt. 29). The Court then  
11 issued an Order stating that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 54(d) and LRCiv 54.2(b), "the  
12 last day for Defendants Sun City Real Estate, LLC and Sharon Jones to file a response to the  
13 motion for attorney fees is November 17, 2008" (Dkt. 30, Order dated October 28, 2008).  
14 Defendants did not file a response to the motion for attorneys' fees.

### 15 STANDARD OF REVIEW

16 It is within the district court's discretion whether or not to enter default judgment.  
17 Albade v. Albade, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Seven factors are generally  
18 considered before entering default judgment: "(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff,  
19 (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the  
20 sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts;  
21 (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy ... favoring  
22 decisions on the merits." Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1986).

### 23 DISCUSSION

24 The Complaint in this matter was served upon Defendants on May 17, 2008 and  
25 proof of service was filed (Dkts. 15 and 16). Cf. Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main  
26 Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985) (noting that default judgment void without  
27 personal jurisdiction). The Clerk of Court entered default against Defendants on June 23,  
28 2008.

1 Entry of default effects an admission of all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint  
2 by the defaulted party. Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).  
3 Entry of default is proper where, as in the present case, the facts established by the default  
4 support the causes of action pled in the Complaint. The Complaint also supports the finding  
5 that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief requested in the memorandum in support of default  
6 judgment, which does not differ in kind from the relief requested in the Complaint. Henry  
7 v. Sneiders, 490 F.2d 315, 317 & n.2 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1974). Moreover, there are no policy  
8 considerations to preclude the entry of default judgment of the type requested. See Eitel, 782  
9 F.2d 1at 1471-1472.

10 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs requested relief in the form of a permanent injunction  
11 and attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs also requested various other remedies, but no longer seek  
12 them.

13 **I. Permanent Injunction**

14 **A. Availability under Federal and State Law**

15 Under A.R.S. § 44-1451, the owner of a registered mark may proceed by civil action  
16 against any person who infringes upon his mark by, among other things, using the registered  
17 mark in connection with services that is likely to cause confusion, cause a mistake or deceive  
18 a person as to either the affiliation or origin of the services. A.R.S. § 44-1451(A)(1). The  
19 court “may grant injunctions to restrain any of such acts [listed in this section] as the court  
20 deems just and reasonable.” A.R.S. § 44-1451(B)(1).

21 Federal trademark law is nearly identical to the Arizona statute and also provides for  
22 injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. § 1116. The federal law also states that any such injunction may  
23 include a provision directing the defendant to file with the court and serve on the plaintiff a  
24 report in writing under oath setting forth in detail the manner and form in which the  
25 defendant has complied with the injunction, within thirty days after service of such injunction  
26 or any reasonable time the court directs. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).

27 **B. Ninth Circuit's Factors for Permanent Injunction**

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1 A district court cannot issue an injunction unless the moving party satisfies the court  
2 that relief is needed because “there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation.”  
3 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). The determination that such  
4 danger exists must “be based on appropriate findings supported by the record.” Federal  
5 Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 869 F.2d 1256, 1263 (9th Cir.1989); Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). Rule  
6 65(d) does not require the district court to make an explicit finding that future violations are  
7 likely, but the district court must at least make explicit findings from which a finding of a  
8 likelihood of future violations could be inferred. Furgatch, 869 F.2d at 1263.

9 When finding a likelihood of future violations, the court must look at the totality of  
10 the circumstances. S.E.C. v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980). The factors for  
11 permanent injunction are not individual prerequisites, which is clear from an examination of  
12 the cases in which courts have approved the granting of injunctions. Id. at 656 (citations  
13 omitted).

14 Factors that a district court may consider in making this finding include: 1) the  
15 degree of scienter involved; 2) the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction; 3) the  
16 defendant’s recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct; 4) the extent to which the  
17 defendant’s professional and personal characteristics might enable or tempt him to commit  
18 future violations; and 5) the sincerity of any assurances against future violations. U.S. v.  
19 Laerdal Mfg. Corp., 73 F.3d 852, 854-855 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Furgatch, 869 F.2d at 1263,  
20 n. 5).

21 Here, Plaintiff PH4 Corporation stated in their Complaint that they are the owners  
22 of the trademark SUN CITY and its variations (Dkt. 1, ¶ 1). The SUN CITY Mark is the  
23 subject of numerous federal registrations for the SUN CITY services, and it is also the  
24 subject of Arizona state trademark registrations (Dkt. 1, ¶ 11-12). Further, Plaintiff PH4  
25 Corporation stated that they license the SUN CITY Mark to Plaintiff Del Webb, who is the  
26 registrant of the trademark in Arizona (Dkt. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Sun  
27 City Real Estate, LLC and Sharon Jones have been offering real estate agency and brokerage  
28 services under the mark Sun City Real Estate, which infringes upon Plaintiffs’ rights to the

1 SUN CITY Mark (Dkt. 1, ¶ 16-17). By the entry of default, Defendants admitted all of the  
2 well-plead allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. Plaintiffs stated  
3 a proper claim against Defendants, and this Court may grant an injunction as it deems just  
4 and reasonable. See A.R.S. § 44-1451(B)(1).

5         However, this Court must consider the Ninth Circuit's factors for issuing a permanent  
6 injunction. With regards to factors 1 and 3, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have  
7 "knowingly and intentionally been using the SUN CITY Mark in connection with their real  
8 estate agency and brokerage services to reap the benefits of the good will associated with the  
9 SUN CITY Mark" (Dkt. 1, ¶ 18). With regards to factors 2 and 5, Plaintiffs also assert that  
10 they "have sent numerous cease and desist letters to Defendants demanding that they cease  
11 doing business under the SUN CITY Mark" and "Defendants have refused to cease offering  
12 real estate agency and brokerage services under the SUN CITY Mark" (Dkt. 1, ¶ 17). Also  
13 with regards to factor 5, Defendants did not respond to the Complaint so there have been no  
14 assurances against future violations. There is no evidence about the fourth factor,  
15 Defendants' professional and personal characteristics that might enable or tempt him to  
16 commit future violations.

17         At the hearing on October 9, 2008, Defendant Sharon Jones stated that she did not  
18 contest the permanent injunction, but at the same time she did not believe she was infringing  
19 on Plaintiffs' trademark and trade name. After assessing the totality of the circumstances,  
20 this Court finds that there is a likelihood of future violations. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 655.  
21 Therefore, the Court will issue a permanent injunction because "there exists some cognizable  
22 danger of recurrent violation," which is supported by the record. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.  
23 at 633; Furgatch, 869 F.2d at 1263; Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). The Court will direct Defendants  
24 to file with the Court and serve on Plaintiffs a report in writing under oath setting forth in  
25 detail the manner and form in which Defendants have complied with the injunction, within  
26 thirty days after service of such injunction or any reasonable time the court directs. See 15  
27 U.S.C. § 1116(a).

28 **II. Attorneys' Fees**



