

1 **II. Motion for Default Judgment.**


2 Because Bryant's default has been properly entered (*see* Dkt. ##6, 11, 12), the Court
3 has discretion to grant default judgment against Bryant pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal
4 Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Aldabe v. Aldabe*, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).
5 Factors the Court should consider in deciding whether to grant default judgment include
6 (1) the possibility of prejudice to Plaintiffs, (2) the merits of the claim, (3) the sufficiency of
7 the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning
8 material facts, (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring
9 a decision on the merits. *See Eitel v. McCool*, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

10 Because Plaintiffs do not address the *Eitel* factors (*see* Dkt. #16), the Court will deny
11 the motion for default judgment without prejudice. Plaintiffs shall have until **March 20,**
12 **2009** to refile the motion. In discussing the second and third *Eitel* factors, Plaintiffs shall
13 specifically address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the complaint states
14 a claim for relief against Bryant given that the claim against the NFL Players Association has
15 been dismissed. Specifically, with the labor organization having been dismissed from the
16 case, does the Court have subject matter jurisdiction under the LMRA, and can Plaintiffs
17 state a claim against an individual player under the LMRA? *See* 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (granting
18 district courts jurisdiction over actions "by or against labor organizations").

19 **IT IS ORDERED:**

- 20 1. Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment (Dkt. #16) is **denied** without prejudice.
21 2. Plaintiffs shall have until **March 20, 2009** to file a new motion for default
22 judgment.

23 DATED this 24th day of February, 2009.

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David G. Campbell
United States District Judge