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and appointed by the Maricopa County Superior Court, could not be sued without the permission of that court. After denying Sell's earlier motions to dismiss based on immunity, the bankruptcy court ruled *sua sponte* that based on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Barton v. Barbour, that a receiver cannot be sued without leave from the appointing court. 104 U.S. 126, 128 (1881). Because Coleman had failed to obtain permission from the Superior Court, the bankruptcy court determined that Coleman was without authority to act and dismissed Coleman's claims. At issue in this case is whether Sell was acting as a receiver while serving on the board of directors, or whether he was acting as a director, separate from his responsibilities as the receiver for American National Mortgage Partners ("ANMP").

After an oral ruling, the trial court held that Sell was the receiver for ANMP, and therefore the <u>Barton</u> doctrine applied. (Excerpt of R. 401). It is unclear, however, from the briefs and the record that each side presented if Sell's actions resulted in a material change of position, such that he was no longer acting under the protection of his title as receiver, but took on the responsibilities of becoming a paid board member, or whether his protection as a receiver carried over to his duties as a board member.

Without a factual determination if Sell's actions on the board were within the scope of his duties as the receiver for ANMP, this Court cannot make a determination if the trial court ruled appropriately in applying the <u>Barton</u> doctrine. Based on the record and the briefs filed by both parties, there is a significant question of fact over which role Sell was occupying when he sat on the board of directors. For example, Coleman alleges that Sell attempted to collect from Castle's insurance policy to pay for his defense in this action. (Appellant Br. 11). This allegation raises the issue of whether Sell's attempt to collect from Castle's insurance policy for his defense converts his role as a matter of law from being a receiver attempting to collect the assets of ANMP, to a board member with a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of Castle. Effective review of these issues is not possible based on the record and briefing currently before this Court. Therefore, this Court will remand the matter

to the bankruptcy court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this order.

Accordingly,

**IT IS ORDERED**, that the matter is **REMANDED** to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether or not Sell was acting as a receiver or a board member while sitting on the Castle board of directors.

DATED this 6<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2009.

Stephen M. McNamee United States District Judge