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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

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DLC DermaCare LLC, an Arizona  
limited liability company,

No. CV-10-333-PHX-DGC

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Plaintiff,

**ORDER**

10

vs.

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Sixta Castillo, R.N., et al.,

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Defendants.

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DLC DermaCare LLC began franchising dermatology clinics in 2004. It brought  
15 suit against numerous franchisees, their spouses, and certain other defendants in early 2010.  
16 The complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and  
17 fair dealing, misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark and service mark infringement,  
18 unfair competition, tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy. Doc. 1.

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Motions to compel arbitration and dismiss or stay this action have been filed by  
20 Defendants Johnathan Munoz, Michele Connor, Timothy Bode, and Bobbie Bode (Doc. 74),  
21 by Defendants Theresa Gulbranson, Scott Gulbranson, Lisa Vanbockern, Quality Skincare,  
22 LLC, Charles Goforth, the Charles H. Goforth Charitable Trust, Steven Goforth, Teri  
23 Goforth, Marc Wilson, and Daniel McDonald (Doc. 112), and by Defendants Anshu and  
24 Nora Jain (Doc. 114). The motions are fully briefed. Docs. 100, 113, 120, 121, 125, 126.  
25 For reasons that follow, the motions will be granted with respect to all Defendants except  
26 Lisa Vanbockern.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The request for oral argument (Doc. 112) is denied because the issues have been fully  
briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court's decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);  
*Partridge v. Reich*, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

1 Plaintiff franchised dermatology clinics pursuant to two agreements: a Master  
2 Regional Franchise Agreement (“MRA”) and a Clinic Franchise Agreement (“CFA”).  
3 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 16, 31. The MRA expressly provides that disputes relating to that agreement  
4 are subject to arbitration (Doc. 114-1 at 26):

5           **19.4 Arbitration.** All disputes and claims relating to this Agreement,  
6 the rights and obligations of the parties under this Agreement, or any other  
7 claims or causes of action relating to the performance of either party, and/or  
8 the purchase of your rights under this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration  
at the office of the American Arbitration Association in Maricopa County,  
Arizona in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act and the commercial  
rules of the American Arbitration Association[.]

9 The CFA provides for arbitration of all disputes arising out of that agreement except claims  
10 for injunctive relief to prevent irreparable harm (Doc. 24-1 at 38):

#### 11           **14.2 Mediation and Arbitration of Disputes**

12           (a) If the parties are unable to informally resolve any dispute arising out of  
13 this Agreement either during or after its term, including the question as to  
14 whether any particular matter can be arbitrated, the Parties agree to mediate  
15 their disputes in Maricopa County, Arizona, with the option that if mediation  
16 does not yield a result acceptable to both Parties, the dispute shall be resolved  
through binding arbitration to be conducted in Maricopa County, Arizona.  
Mediation and arbitration will not apply for those matters where injunctive  
relief is sought or needed to prevent irreparable harm. Such injunctive relief  
shall be brought in federal or state court in Maricopa County, Arizona[.]

17 Each moving Defendant, other than Lisa Vanbockern, entered into an MRA and/or a CFA.  
18 Doc. 1 ¶ 31(b), (f), (n), (o).

19           As the Court previously has explained (Doc. 59 at 2), “[t]he standard for  
20 demonstrating arbitrability is not high.” *Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.*, 175 F.3d 716, 719 (9th  
21 Cir. 1999). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq.* (“FAA”), broadly provides that  
22 written agreements to arbitrate disputes “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” except  
23 upon grounds that exist at common law for the revocation of a contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  
24 Absent a valid contract defense, the FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by  
25 a district court, but instead mandates that district courts *shall* direct the parties to proceed to  
26 arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” *Dean Witter*  
27 *Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd*, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). The district court’s role under the FAA is  
28 “limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does,

1 (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” *Chiron Corp. v. Ortho*  
2 *Diagnostic Sys., Inc.*, 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).

3 The MFA expressly provides for arbitration of “[a]ll disputes and claims” relating  
4 to that agreement. Doc. 114-1 at 26. The CFA expressly provides for arbitration of  
5 “any dispute” arising out of that agreement except where “injunctive relief is sought or  
6 needed *to prevent irreparable harm.*” Doc. 24-1 at 38 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not  
7 sought preliminary injunctive relief. While the complaint’s prayer for relief includes a  
8 request for a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from engaging in certain conduct  
9 (Doc. 1 at 38-40, ¶ 4), each of the eight claims for relief requests monetary damages. *Id.* ¶¶  
10 73-128. The “summary of complaint” section makes clear that as a result of Defendants’  
11 misconduct, including the alleged continuing violation of post-termination obligations,  
12 Plaintiff “has suffered and will continue to suffer *damages* in an amount to be proven at  
13 trial[.]” *Id.* ¶ 9 (emphasis added). The sole cause of action asserting irreparable harm,  
14 misappropriation of trade secrets, specifically alleges that Plaintiff has “sustained *monetary*  
15 *damages*” in an amount “not less than \$500,000 for each franchise location.” *Id.* ¶ 95  
16 (emphasis added).

17 The Supreme Court has made clear that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable  
18 issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration[.]” *Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury*  
19 *Constr. Corp.*, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); *see EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.*, 534 U.S. 279, 289  
20 (2002). Given this “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” *Lozano v. AT&T Wireless*  
21 *Services, Inc.*, 504 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2007), and in light of the express terms of the  
22 parties’ agreement to arbitrate – including the provision that questions of arbitrability are  
23 themselves subject to arbitration (Doc. 24-1 at 38) – the Court concludes that each claim of  
24 the complaint is subject to arbitration. This conclusion is consistent with Plaintiff’s own  
25 complaint: the franchise agreements “allow the parties [to] resolve any disputes through  
26 binding arbitration” (Doc. 1 ¶ 11) and Plaintiff will pursue its claims – including the claim  
27 for misappropriation of trade secrets – “through binding arbitration if so ordered by the  
28 court” (*id.* ¶¶ 81, 96).

1           It is worth noting that the conclusion that all claims for relief are subject to arbitration  
2 is not inconsistent with the Court’s order granting Defendant Susan Epstein’s motion to  
3 compel arbitration and dismiss. Docs. 24, 59. Plaintiff did not dispute that it sought no  
4 injunctive relief against Ms. Epstein. *See* Doc. 24-2. The Court, therefore, had no reason to  
5 determine whether the complaint’s request for a permanent injunction rendered certain claims  
6 non-arbitrable.

7           The Court will compel arbitration and dismiss the claims against each moving  
8 Defendant with the exception of Lisa Vanbockern. *See Simula*, 175 F.3d at 726 (affirming  
9 dismissal in favor of arbitration); *Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co.*, 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th  
10 Cir. 1988) (same). It is not clear to the Court why Vanbockern is included in the motion to  
11 compel arbitration and dismiss filed by the Gulbranson Defendants. Doc. 112. Vanbockern  
12 has filed an answer to the complaint. Doc. 111. She “is not and has never been a Dermacare  
13 Franchisee or Master Regional Franchisee.” Doc. 112 at 2 n.1; *see* Doc. 1 ¶ 2. Because no  
14 “valid agreement to arbitrate” exists between Plaintiff and Vanbockern, *Chiron Corp.*, 207  
15 F.3d at 1130, any request on her part to compel arbitration and dismiss claims will be denied.


16           **IT IS ORDERED:**

- 17           1       The motions to compel arbitration and dismiss (Docs. 74, 112, 114) are  
18                   **granted** as to the following Defendants: Johnathan Munoz (named in the  
19                   complaint as Jonathon Munoz), Michele Connor, Timothy Bode, Bobbie Bode  
20                   Theresa Gulbranson, Scott Gulbranson, Quality Skincare, LLC, Charles  
21                   Goforth, the Charles H. Goforth Charitable Trust, Steven Goforth, Teri  
22                   Goforth, Marc Wilson, Daniel McDonald, Anshu Jain, and Nora Jain. The  
23                   motion to compel arbitration and dismiss (Doc. 112) is **denied** with respect to  
24                   Defendant Lisa Vanbockern.
- 25           2.       Plaintiff and moving Defendants other than Lisa Vanbockern are directed to  
26                   comply with applicable mediation and arbitration provisions set forth in the  
27                   Master Regional Franchise Agreement and the Clinic Franchise Agreement.
- 28           3.       The claims asserted against moving Defendants other than Lisa Vanbockern

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are **dismissed**.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2010.



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David G. Campbell  
United States District Judge