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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**  
8

9 Eric Putnam,

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 Michael J. Astrue, et al.,

13 Defendants.

No. CV-12-00543-PHX-JAT

**ORDER**

14  
15 Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to  
16 the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 34). The Court now rules on the Motion.

17 **I. Background**

18 On April 23, 2010, a Social Security Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found  
19 Plaintiff "not disabled" under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff exhausted his appeals at  
20 the agency, and subsequently filed this lawsuit. This Court reversed and remanded the  
21 ALJ's decision, finding error in the ALJ's exclusive reliance on the Medical-Vocational  
22 Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. § 404(P) app. 2 ("grids"):

23 . . . . The ALJ accepted the fact that Plaintiff has diminished use of his left  
24 hand, but concluded that this limitation is irrelevant because Plaintiff is  
25 right-handed and Plaintiff's right hand is unaffected. (TR 26). However,  
26 because the ALJ accepts the fact that Plaintiff has diminished use of his left  
27 hand, Plaintiff is incapable of performing jobs requiring bilateral manual  
28 dexterity.

1           Where a claimant is limited to sedentary work and has a permanent  
2 injury to one hand which precludes jobs requiring bilateral manual  
3 dexterity, reliance on the grids is legal error. *Fife v. Heckler*, 767 F.2d  
4 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the ALJ committed legal error by  
5 relying on the grids in this case.

6           Moreover, where the grids “do not accurately and completely  
7 describe [Plaintiff’s] limitations,” “the ALJ [is] *required* to take the  
8 testimony of a vocational expert,” and failing to do so is reversible error.  
9 *Tackett v. Apfel*, 180 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in  
10 original). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s inability to use his left hand  
11 renders the grids inapplicable. Nonetheless, the ALJ failed to hear  
12 testimony from a vocational expert. Accordingly, the ALJ committed  
13 reversible error.

14 (Doc. 32 at 12–13).

15           Plaintiff then filed the current Motion, requesting attorney’s fees and costs under  
16 the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).

## 17 **II. Discussion**

18           On a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA, a prevailing party  
19 is entitled to attorney’s fees unless the government’s position was substantially justified  
20 or special circumstances would make an award unjust. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A);  
21 *Perez-Arellano v. Smith*, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the EAJA, the  
22 government’s position includes both its litigating position and the action or failure to act  
23 by the agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).  
24 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined “substantially justified” as “justified to a  
25 degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 565  
26 (1988) (affirming Ninth Circuit’s holding that substantially justified means having a  
27 reasonable basis both in law and fact); *see also Abela v. Gustafson*, 888 F.2d 1258, 1264  
28 (9th Cir. 1989). The government bears the burden of showing that its position was

1 substantially justified. *Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition*, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir.  
2 2005).

3 The Government correctly points out that the standard of review of a social  
4 security decision (“substantial evidence” standard) and the standard for awarding EAJA  
5 attorney’s fees (“substantially justified” standard) are not synonymous. The Ninth Circuit  
6 has made clear, however, that because the reversal of an agency decision is a “strong  
7 indication” that the agency’s position was not substantially justified, it would be  
8 “unusual” to reverse an agency decision and not award attorney’s fees under the EAJA.  
9 *Meier v. Colvin*, 727 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Thangaraja v. Gonzales*, 428  
10 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir.2005)).

11 The error at issue here is the ALJ’s failure to utilize a vocational expert in light of  
12 the fact that Plaintiff’s left hand injury rendered the grids inapplicable. (Doc. 32 at 12–  
13 13). The Ninth Circuit has held that the grids can be used to determine that a claimant is  
14 not disabled only under certain circumstances:

15 The grids are an administrative tool the Secretary may rely on when  
16 considering claimants with substantially uniform levels of impairment.  
17 They may be used, however, only when the grids accurately and completely  
18 describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations. When a claimant’s non-  
19 exertional limitations are “sufficiently severe” so as to significantly limit  
20 the range of work permitted by the claimant’s exertional limitations, the  
21 grids are inapplicable. In such instances, the Secretary must take the  
22 testimony of a vocational expert, and identify specific jobs within the  
23 claimant’s capabilities.

24 *Burkhart v. Bowen*, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations and citations  
25 omitted). This Court held that the ALJ erred by relying on the grids to deem Plaintiff not  
26 disabled, despite finding Plaintiff had diminished use of his left hand—a limitation which  
27 the grids do not take into account. (Doc. 32 at 12–13).

28 Plaintiff argues that this error was not substantially justified because the ALJ’s

1 error was a legal mistake and thus cannot be a close question. Plaintiff points out that this  
2 Court relied on Ninth Circuit case law to determine that the ALJ erroneously relied  
3 exclusively on the grids, and that under S.S.R. 85-15, limitations on dexterity narrow the  
4 number of jobs a claimant can perform.

5 The Government argues that the ALJ was substantially justified in not using a  
6 vocational expert because Plaintiff's injuries were arguably not severe. The Government  
7 reasons that the ALJ "did not include a manipulative limitation in his residual functional  
8 capacity assessment, and expressly relied upon the residual functional capacity  
9 assessment of Robert Estes, M.D., who found no manipulative impairment." (*Id.*)  
10 (internal emphasis and citations omitted). The Government also points out that  
11 "neurologists Harry S. Morehead, M.D., and Daniela Caltaru, M.D., concluded that  
12 Plaintiff's left-sided weakness was nonphysiologic or 'rather functional,' indicating that  
13 they found the nature and extent of such limitation questionable." (*Id.*). Furthermore, the  
14 Government argues that S.S.R. 85-15, cited by Plaintiff, specifically notes that a  
15 vocational expert "would not ordinarily be required where a person has a loss of ability to  
16 feel the size, shape, temperature, or texture of an object by the fingertips, since this is a  
17 function required in very few jobs." In short, because the severity of Plaintiff's left arm  
18 injury was "questionable" and the need for a vocational expert is not always needed to  
19 make these determinations, the Government argues that it was a close question whether  
20 the ALJ could rely solely on the grids to make a disability determination.

21 The Court agrees with the Government. Reasonable minds could disagree as to  
22 whether Plaintiff's left hand injury "sufficiently severe" to require a vocational expert.  
23 *Burkhart v. Bowen*, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, as the Government  
24 points out, there was testimony on the record that Plaintiff's left hand injury was not very  
25 severe, and that his left-sided weakness was questionable. Additionally, S.S.R. 85-15  
26 does not definitively require vocational experts to be used in *all* cases involving  
27 limitations on fingering or manipulation. Rather, the rule specifically states that such  
28 experts "may be needed," and that even where a claimant has lost the ability to feel the

1 size, shape, temperature, or texture of objects with his hand, a vocational expert “would  
2 not ordinarily be needed.” Therefore, although the Court found that a vocational expert  
3 should have been used, the ALJ’s failure to obtain vocational expert testimony was  
4 substantially justified.


5 **III. Conclusion**

6 Accordingly,

7 **IT IS ORDERED** that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant  
8 to the Equal Access to Justice Act, (Doc. 34), is **DENIED**.

9 Dated this 12th day of January, 2015.

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James A. Teilborg  
Senior United States District Judge