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8 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**
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11 Andres Bolinaga, Jr.,

12 Plaintiff,

13 v.

14 Commissioner of Social Security
15 Administration,

16 Defendant.

No. CV-16-02713-PHX-GMS

ORDER

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18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Andres Bolinaga's appeal of the Social
19 Security Administration's decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth
20 below, the Court affirms the decision.

21 **BACKGROUND**

22 On June 8, 2012, Andres Bolinaga applied for disability insurance benefits,
23 alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2010. (Tr. 18.) Bolinaga's claim was denied
24 both initially and upon reconsideration. (*Id.*) He then appealed to an Administrative Law
25 Judge ("ALJ"). (*Id.*) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on September 11, 2014.
26 (Tr. 42.)

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1 In evaluating whether Bolinaga was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step
2 sequential evaluation for determining disability.¹ At step one, the ALJ determined that
3 Bolinaga had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. (Tr.
4 20.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Bolinaga suffered from severe impairments of
5 “coronary artery disease, status post coronary artery bypass graft and stents; and chronic
6 obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).” (*Id.*) At step three, the ALJ determined that
7 none of these impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the
8 Social Security Administration’s listed impairments. (Tr. 27–28.)

9 The ALJ then made the following determination of Bolinaga’s residual functional
10 capacity (“RFC”):²

11 [T]he claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform
12 light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he had
13 environmental limitations and should avoid even moderate
14 exposure to extreme cold, avoid even moderate exposure to
extreme heat, and avoid even moderate exposure to fumes,
odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, etc.

15 ¹ The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
16 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing
supplemental security income). Under the test:

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18 A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she
19 is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2)
20 that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets
21 or equals one of the specific impairments described in the
22 regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of
23 the specific impairments described in the regulations, the
24 claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by
25 proving at step four that in addition to the first two
26 requirements, . . . she is not able to perform any work that she
27 has done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima
28 facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five
to demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant
number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five
determination is made on the basis of four factors: the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience
and education.

27 *Hoopai v. Astrue*, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

28 ² RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his impairments.
See S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).

1 (Tr. 28.) The ALJ therefore found that Bolinaga retained the RFC to perform his past
2 relevant work as a “computer information technology (IT) manager.” (Tr. 32.) The ALJ
3 found that this work best fit the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) listing for
4 “Systems Programmer,” but noted that to the extent the work might also be characterized
5 as “Support Analyst Supervisor” or “Systems Analyst,” Bolinaga retained the RFC to
6 perform those jobs as well. (*Id.*)

7 On June 8, 2016, the Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Tr. 1.)
8 Bolinaga filed the complaint underlying this action on August 10, 2016, seeking this
9 Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits. (Doc. 1.)

10 DISCUSSION

11 I. Standard of Review

12 A reviewing federal court need only address the issues raised by the claimant in
13 the appeal from the ALJ’s decision. *See Lewis v. Apfel*, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir.
14 2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is
15 either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. *Thomas v. Barnhart*,
16 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less
17 than a preponderance.” *Id.* (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant
18 evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as
19 adequate to support a conclusion.” *Id.* (quotation omitted).

20 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining
21 credibility, and resolving ambiguities. *Andrews v. Shalala*, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
22 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational
23 interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” *Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*
24 *Admin.*, 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the
25 reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either
26 outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” *Matney v.*
27 *Sullivan*, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). However, the Court
28 “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a

1 ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” *Id.* (citing *Hammock v. Bowen*, 879 F.2d
2 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Nor may the Court “affirm the ALJ’s . . . decision based on
3 evidence that the ALJ did not discuss.” *Connett v. Barnhart*, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.
4 2003).

5 **II. Analysis**

6 Bolinaga contends that the ALJ (1) failed to consider evidence that would
7 demonstrate that Bolinaga met the step three listing for coronary artery disease; (2) failed
8 to correctly categorize Bolinaga’s past relevant work; and (3) improperly discredited
9 Bolinaga’s pain testimony based on his daily activities.

10 **A. Step Three Listing**

11 At step three, the ALJ must “consider[] whether the [claimant’s] impairment or
12 combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment.” *Burch v. Barnhart*,
13 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Bolinaga contends that the ALJ should have found
14 Bolinaga to meet Listing 4.04(C), for coronary artery disease. That listing is met by:

15 Coronary artery disease, demonstrated by angiography
16 (obtained independent of Social Security disability
17 evaluation) or other appropriate medically acceptable
18 imaging, and in the absence of a timely exercise tolerance test
19 or a timely normal drug-induced stress test, an MC,
preferably one experienced in the care of patients with
cardiovascular disease, has concluded that performance of
exercise tolerance testing would present a significant risk to
the individual, with both 1 and 2:

20 1. Angiographic evidence showing:

21 a. 50 percent or more narrowing of a nonbypassed left main
22 coronary artery; or

23 b. 70 percent or more narrowing of another nonbypassed
coronary artery; or

24 c. 50 percent or more narrowing involving a long (greater
25 than 1 cm) segment of a nonbypassed coronary artery; or

26 d. 50 percent or more narrowing of at least two nonbypassed
coronary arteries; or

27 e. 70 percent or more narrowing of a bypass graft vessel; and

28 2. Resulting in very serious limitations in the ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily

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living.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.04(C).

The ALJ considered, in his earlier step two analysis, numerous medical records that indicate that Bolinaga met the portion of the listing dealing with angiographic evidence. With respect to the narrowing of blood vessels, the ALJ summarized the following records:

The claimant underwent a left heart catheterization and selective coronary angiography on January 22, 2010, which revealed significant narrowing in multiple arteries, and Dr. Khan, a cardiologist, recommended surgical revascularization (Exhibit 8F, p. 84).

[. . .]

On December 7, 2011, the claimant underwent a left heart catheterization, selective coronary angiography, and other diagnostic testing, which revealed a normal left main coronary artery, but a right coronary artery with more than 90% narrowing, and a totally occluded saphenous vein graft (Exhibit 8F, pp. 17–19). The stent-supported angioplasty of the mid right coronary artery was successful (Exhibit 8F, p. 19).

[. . .]

On July 18, 2012, the claimant underwent a left heart catheterization and various angiographies, which revealed severe multi-vessel coronary artery disease with a totally occluded saphenous vein graft (Exhibit 8F, pp. 42–43). A left ventriculography showed an ejection fraction of 60–65% (Exhibit 8F, p. 43).

[. . .]

The claimant was hospitalized at Banner Thunderbird Medical Center from April 29, 2013 to May 1, 2013 for some atypical chest pain (Exhibit 19F, p. 2). The atypical chest pain resolved (*id.*). A cardiac catheterization showed severe multi-vessel coronary artery disease and a totally occluded saphenous vein graft, but medical management was recommended (*id.*). Other diagnoses included hypertension, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, and obesity (*id.*).

[. . .]

On December 22, 2013, the claimant underwent a left heart catheterization and selective coronary angiography (Exhibit 31F, p. 25). The left main artery was angiographically

1 normal, the left anterior descending artery was totally
2 occluded with patent left internal mammary artery graft, the
3 large principal diagonal artery had patent stents, the obtuse
4 marginal branch of the left circumflex artery and right
coronary artery codominant had patent stents, and left
ventricular systolic function was normal (Exhibit 31F, p. 26).

5 (Tr. 21–26.) Thus Bolinaga’s argument that “the ALJ ignored all evidence that would
6 lead to finding Plaintiff met Listing 4.04(C),” (Doc. 12 at 15), is at odds with the ALJ’s
7 opinion. To the extent that the ALJ did not explicitly discuss these records in his step
8 three analysis, it was unnecessary for the ALJ to do so. *See Gonzalez v. Sullivan*, 914
9 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding ALJ’s step three determination when the
10 ALJ “made a five page, single-spaced summary of the record” but did not “state what
11 evidence supported the conclusion that appellant’s impairments do not meet or exceed the
12 Listing of Impairments”).

13 Nor does this evidence alone establish that Bolinaga meets Listing 4.04(C); as the
14 Supreme Court has explained, “[f]or a claimant to show that his impairment matches a
15 listing, it must meet *all* of the specified medical criteria” and “an impairment that
16 manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”
17 *Sullivan v. Zebley*, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). The ALJ cited substantial evidence
18 indicating that Bolinaga’s coronary artery disease did not “result[] in very serious
19 limitations in the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily
20 living.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.04(C).

21 For example, the ALJ noted that in February 2010, Bolinaga “denied any
22 significant shortness of breath, was able to ambulate, denied chest pain, except for
23 incisional pain of the sternum, and denied syncope or palpitations.” (Tr. 21.) In June
24 2012, Bolinaga suffered from “vertigo/dizziness” but there was no indication that this
25 was related to his coronary artery disease, as the treating physician “concluded that the
26 dizziness was of unclear etiology.” (Tr. 23.) Likewise, while Bolinaga complained in
27 April 2014 of intermittent pulmonary symptoms, “aggravated by moderate activity,” (Tr.
28 27), the records of that visit indicate that these symptoms were related to his COPD,

1 rather than coronary artery disease. (Tr. 2145.)

2 It is the claimant's burden to demonstrate that his impairment meets or equals a
3 listing. *Burch*, 400 F.3d at 683. Bolinaga fails to address the "serious limitations"
4 criterion of Listing 4.04(C) in his opening brief altogether, and while he points to certain
5 limitations in his reply brief, he only ties one to his coronary artery disease specifically—
6 as opposed to his COPD or pain from his shattered sternum. That asserted limitation is
7 that Bolinaga "was hospitalized ten times for his coronary artery disease" during the time
8 period at issue. But Bolinaga points to no authority holding that sporadic
9 hospitalizations, without more, satisfy the "serious limitations" criterion of Listing
10 4.04(C). Indeed, courts have expressly declined in other contexts to "presum[e] that any
11 condition requiring temporary hospitalization is disabling." *Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.*, 119
12 F.3d 305, 317 (5th Cir. 1997) (Americans with Disabilities Act); *see also Taylor v. U.S.*
13 *Postal Serv.*, 946 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th Cir. 1991) (Rehabilitation Act). It was not error
14 in this context for the ALJ to find that ten hospitalizations—a number of which appear to
15 be for only one night—spread out over nearly five years did not seriously interfere with
16 Bolinaga's activities of *daily* life. Moreover, as the ALJ noted, many of the records of
17 these hospital visits indicate that the chest pain for which the claimant was admitted was
18 not related to heart disease.

19 Further, the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of the two state agency physicians
20 who found that Bolinaga did not meet a listing at step three. (Tr. 61–97.) While an ALJ
21 is not bound by the state agency physicians' opinion as to whether a claimant meets or
22 equals a listing, he must give such evidence appropriate weight. *See S.S.R. 96-6p*, 1996
23 WL 374180, at *3 (July 2, 1996).

24 In sum, the ALJ had substantial evidence by which he could reasonably conclude
25 that Bolinaga had not met his burden at step three.

26 **B. Past Relevant Work**

27 In determining at step four that Bolinaga could perform his past relevant work, the
28 ALJ wrote the following:

1 The claimant has past relevant work as a computer IT
2 manager, which he has described as a technical manager or
3 help desk supervisor/system administrator in the computer
4 software business, and which he performed at the medium
5 level of exertion. The claimant performed this work within
6 the last 15 years at a substantial gainful activity level and long
7 enough to learn how to do it. Initially, a State Agency
8 disability analyst determined that the claimant's past relevant
9 work is best characterized in the Dictionary of Occupational
10 Titles (DOT) as User Support Analyst Supervisor (DOT
11 032.132-010), which is sedentary and skilled (SVP 8) work,
12 and/or Systems Analyst (DOT 030.167-014), which is
13 sedentary and skilled (SVP 7) work. On reconsideration, a
14 State Agency disability analyst determined that claimant's
15 past relevant work is best characterized in the DOT as
16 Systems Programmer (DOT 030.162-022), which is sedentary
17 and skilled (SVP 7) work. The undersigned may take
18 administrative notice of the DOT and adopts the
19 characterization of Systems Programmer. Given that all of
20 these DOT characterizations are for sedentary work and none
21 of them requires exposure to temperature extremes or
22 pulmonary irritants, the ultimate outcome of this case will
23 remain the same even if a reviewing authority were to choose
24 User Support Analyst Supervisor and/or Systems Analyst.

25 In comparing the claimant's residual functional capacity with
26 the physical and mental demands of this work, the
27 undersigned finds that the claimant was able to perform it as
28 generally performed. The residual functional capacity given
above . . . does not preclude the performance of the
occupation of Systems Programmer, User Support Analyst
Supervisor, and Systems Analyst as generally performed.

(Tr. 32.)

29 Bolinaga asserts that the ALJ erred in classifying his past relevant work as
30 Systems Programmer, in part because "[t]here is no indication that Plaintiff did any
31 programming or coding at his past job or that he knows how to code." (Doc. 12 at 18.)
32 But the DOT's description of Systems Programmer does not include programming or
33 coding as such:

34 Coordinates installation of computer operating system
35 software and tests, maintains, and modifies software, using
36 computer terminal: Reads loading and running instructions
37 for system software, such as task scheduling, memory
38 management, computer file system, or controlling computer
input and output, and loads tape into tape drive or transfers
software to magnetic disk. Initiates test of system program
and observes readout on monitor of computer system to detect
errors or work stoppage. Enters code changes into computer
system to correct errors. Analyzes performance indicators,

1 such as system's response time, number of transactions per
2 second, and number of programs being processed at once, to
3 ensure that system is operating efficiently. Changes system
4 software so that system performance will meet objectives.
5 Reviews computer system capabilities, workflow, and
6 scheduling limitations to determine if requested changes to
7 operating system are possible. Writes description of steps
8 taken to modify system and procedures required to implement
9 new software. Assists users having problems with use of
10 system software. May train users, COMPUTER OPERATOR
11 (clerical) 213.362-010, and COMPUTER PROGRAMMER
12 (profess. & kin.) 030.162-010 to use system software. May
13 prepare workflow charts and diagrams to modify system
14 software. May visit vendors to observe demonstration of
15 systems software. May administer and monitor computer
16 program that controls user access to system. May review
17 productivity reports and problem records to evaluate
18 performance of computer system.

19 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 030.162-022, 1991 WL 646545
20 (2016).

21 Bolinaga described his past relevant work in similar terms. He did help desk
22 work, where people would call with questions about both software and hardware. (Tr.
23 45.) He "supervised technicians helping software customers" and helped customers with
24 complicated questions himself, as well as "maintained [an] in-house computer and
25 network." (Tr. 217.) It was reasonable for the ALJ to classify this work as a System
26 Programmer, even if Bolinaga's description of his past work did not include every task
27 listed in the DOT. *See Gutierrez v. Colvin*, 844 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that
28 the DOT describes occupations, not jobs, and that consequently it may include tasks that
are not essential for a specific job within a broad occupational classification).

The ALJ found that Bolinaga retained the RFC to perform this work. As Systems
Programmer is classified as "sedentary work," and Bolinaga's RFC permits him to
perform up to "light work," this was not erroneous. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) ("If
someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work,
unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit
for long periods of time."). Nor did the ALJ err, as Bolinaga asserts, in failing to
consider whether changes in computer technology between 2008 and the present day

1 make Bolinaga’s past relevant work less relevant. *See* 20 C.F.R. 404.1560(b)(3) (“If we
2 find that you have the residual functional capacity to do your past relevant work, we will
3 determine that you can still do your past work and are not disabled. We will not consider
4 your vocational factors of age, education, and work experience or whether your past
5 relevant work exists in significant numbers in the national economy.”).

6 The claimant bears the burden of showing at step four that he cannot perform his
7 past relevant work. *Pinto v. Massanari*, 249 F.3d 940, 844 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ did
8 not err in concluding that Bolinaga did not meet this burden.

9 C. Credibility Analysis

10 The ALJ found that Bolinaga’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence
11 and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained
12 in this decision.” (Tr. 29.) In so doing, the ALJ found that (1) “[t]he objective medical
13 evidence and claimant’s treatment history support the need for work restrictions, but they
14 do not substantially support the claimant’s allegation that he is unable to work”; and (2)
15 “[t]he claimant’s reported activities and demonstrated abilities contradict the alleged
16 degree of impairment severity.” (Tr. 29–30.)

17 Bolinaga does not address the numerous portions of the medical record that
18 contradict his assertions of an inability to work as cited to by the ALJ. “Contradiction
19 with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective
20 testimony.” *Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir.
21 2008). As the ALJ noted, Bolinaga’s treating physicians consistently told him to
22 exercise. (Tr. 30, 405, 1488, 1500, 2268, 2277.) The ALJ reasonably inferred that
23 Bolinaga’s “treating sources would [not] make such a recommendation unless they
24 believed the claimant capable of doing so safely.” (Tr. 30.)

25 The ALJ reasonably relied on numerous portions of the record indicating that
26 Bolinaga’s symptoms were not as severe as he testified. For example, in December 2012,
27 Bolinaga reported that he suffered “mild” dyspnea, “occasionally,” which was aggravated
28 by activity such as climbing stairs and running. (Tr. 24, 1579.) He denied any chest

1 pressure, fatigue, or substernal chest pain. (Tr. 24, 1579.) The following month, in
2 January 2013, he reported that he had not had any significant anginal-type chest pains.
3 (Tr. 24, 1842.) In March 2013, while Bolinaga complained of fatigue while doing yard
4 work, he also denied any chest discomfort, any anginal-type episodes, and any shortness
5 of breath. (Tr. 24, 1837.) In September 2013, Bolinaga reported difficulty walking due
6 to lower extremity pain, but said he was doing “okay” from a cardiac standpoint and had
7 had no anginal-type episodes. (Tr. 25, 2243.) In October 2013, he again reported
8 “intermittent” and “mild” dyspnea but denied chest pressure and substernal chest pain.
9 (Tr. 25, 1984.)

10 Further, the record demonstrates that Bolinaga performed well on medical exercise
11 tests. In June 2013, Bolinaga performed a six-minute walk test; he walked 1,000 feet,
12 was only “very slightly (just noticeabl[y])” out of breath, saw his heart rate increase from
13 73 beats per minute to 90, and his oxygen saturation decrease from 92% to 90%. (Tr. 25,
14 1934.) Likewise, in November 2013, Bolinaga performed a stress test, in which he
15 reached his target heart rate, had normal EKG readings, and saw his shortness of breath
16 resolve in the recovery phase. (Tr. 26, 2255.)

17 Bolinaga only challenges the sufficiency of the ALJ’s reasoning as to Bolinaga’s
18 daily activities.³ (Doc. 12 at 20–22.)

19 Daily activities that are “transferable to a work setting” may be used to discredit a
20 claimant’s testimony of work-preclusive symptoms. *See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*
21 *Admin.*, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ primarily relied on two function
22 reports completed by Bolinaga to demonstrate that Bolinaga engaged in daily activities
23 that are transferable to the work setting. (Tr. 30–31, 225, 252.) In those reports,
24 Bolinaga reported that on an average day he would:

25 Feed cats, dogs, myself, take medicine, water plants in yard,

26
27 ³ In his Reply, Bolinaga briefly addresses the treating physicians’ recommendation of
28 exercise, and the results of a single exercise test. (Doc. 17 at 6.) He does not address the
other medical records the ALJ discussed, and at any rate, arguments not raised in the
opening brief are waived. *Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 189 F.3d 851, 858
n.4 (9th Cir. 1999).

1 read, watch TV, nap in morning, read, watch TV, clean
2 house, nap in afternoon, try to ride exercise bike, take
3 medicine, read, watch TV, eat, go to sleep. Also clean litter
4 box for cats.

5 (Tr. 223.) He reported that he went to “church, grocery store, [and] college class” on a
6 regular basis, though was not always able to do so, and that he could usually finish what
7 he started. (Tr. 227–28.) He was able to drive a car. (Tr. 253.) The ALJ accurately
8 summarized the contents of these reports, including that certain activities could only be
9 completed “when able.” (Tr. 31.)

10 The Ninth Circuit has previously found that a claimant’s “ability to fix meals, do
11 laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child” may suffice as a
12 clear and convincing reason to discredit his testimony of being unable to work. *Morgan*,
13 169 F.3d at 599–600. Here, similarly, Bolinaga’s ability to fix meals, do housework and
14 sometimes yardwork, care for pets, and maintain an active—albeit sometimes limited—
15 social life is a clear and convincing reason that he has the ability to work, especially
16 given that his past relevant work is sedentary. Bolinaga reported that his medical
17 conditions do not affect his ability to see, hear, talk, concentrate, follow instructions, get
18 along with others, use his hands, understand, remember, or complete tasks. (Tr. 228,
19 255.) That these abilities remain unaffected, and that Bolinaga carries out other activities
20 in spite of certain limitations, serve as clear and convincing evidence that he is capable of
21 working.

22 The ALJ thus had substantial evidence in the record which he could reasonably
23 interpret as contradicting Bolinaga’s assertions of work-preclusive symptoms. The Court
24 does not second-guess the ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of the record, *Matney*, 981
25 F.2d at 1016, and this reasonable interpretation—along with Bolinaga’s daily activities—
26 is a clear and convincing reason to find Bolinaga’s symptom testimony less than fully
27 credible.

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
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CONCLUSION

The ALJ did not err in denying Bolinaga’s application for benefits, and the decision is affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is **AFFIRMED**. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this case and enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 19th day of June, 2017.



Honorable G. Murray Snow
United States District Judge