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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**
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9 Don't Waste Arizona Incorporated,

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 Hickman's Egg Ranch Incorporated,

13 Defendant.
14

No. CV-16-03319-PHX-GMS

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

15 According to the stipulation of the parties, the Court held a trial without a jury
16 regarding the Plaintiff's Complaint on October 17, 2018. The Court hereby makes its
17 findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.

18 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

19 1. Defendant Hickman's Egg Ranch, Inc. ("Hickman's") owns and operates
20 Desert Pride Farms, which is located at 41625 West Indian School Road in Tonopah,
21 Arizona ("Tonopah Facility").

22 2. Hickman's also owns and operates a facility that is located at 32902 West
23 Ward Road and 32425 West Salmone Highway in Arlington, Arizona ("Arlington
24 Facility").

25 3. Plaintiff Don't Waste Arizona ("DWA") is a non-profit organization
26 dedicated to protecting the Arizona environment. Certain members of DWA live in the
27 vicinity of the two facilities owned by Hickman's.

28 4. A natural byproduct of the decomposition of chicken waste is ammonia,

1 which is included among the chemical compounds that are listed as extremely hazardous
2 substances under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
3 (“EPCRA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050; *see also* 40 C.F.R. § 302.4.

4 5. The purpose of EPCRA is “to encourage and support emergency planning
5 efforts at the State and local levels and to provide the public and local governments with
6 information concerning potential chemical hazards present in their communities.” 52 ed.
7 Reg. at 13378 (Apr. 22, 1987).

8 6. Although the figures vary from month to month, documents produced by
9 Hickman’s show that the Arlington Facility housed as many as 4,127,267 laying hens in
10 May 2013 while the Tonopah Facility housed as many as 3,344,877 laying hens in
11 January 2017.

12 7. Both the Tonopah and Arlington Facilities emitted into the air over 100
13 pounds per day of ammonia from animal waste during the timeframes relevant to this
14 proceeding.¹

15 8. Individuals from both Arlington and Tonopah testified that they could smell
16 ammonia regularly at their residences following the construction of both the Arlington
17 and Tonopah Facilities.

18 9. Where releases of hazardous substances are continuous, the EPCRA
19 reporting requirement is satisfied if an initial notice is provided to the National Response
20 Center (“NRC”), the State Emergency Response Commission (“SERC”), and the Local
21 Emergency Planning Committee (“LERC”) in the state in which the release occurs. 40
22 C.F.R. § 302.9. Prior to the passage of the FARM Act, EPA determined that release of
23 hazardous substances from animal waste typically qualify for continuous release
24 reporting. *See* Final Rule, (Dec. 18, 2008), 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948 at 76,952.

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28 ¹ Hickman’s witness Dr. Burns estimates that 1,896 pounds per day of ammonia is produced from the Arlington facility, and 1,599 pounds per day is produced at the Tonopah facility. (Doc. 61, Ex. 4 at 3).

1 10. In 2006, Hickman’s submitted a letter to the Environmental Protection
2 Agency (“EPA”) Office of Regulatory Enforcement. There, Hickman’s acknowledged
3 the Arlington Facility “may generate routine air emissions of ammonia in excess of the
4 reportable quantity of 100 pounds per 24 hours,” and that “a rough estimate of those
5 emissions is approximately 125 pounds per 24 hours, but this estimate could be
6 substantially above or below the actual emission rate.” (Defendant’s Trial Ex. 101). At
7 the time, EPA was developing an emission rate factor to estimate the amount of ammonia
8 generated by large agricultural operations. The letter further explained that because an
9 emission rate factor was under development, when EPA finalized that emission rate,
10 Hickman’s would “notify [EPA] of any reportable release pursuant to CERCLA section
11 103 or EPCRA section 304.” (*Id.*). EPA did not ultimately produce an emission rate
12 factor for ammonia from chicken waste.

13 11. On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff served written notice on Hickman’s of its intent
14 to file a citizen’s action under provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
15 Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 and EPCRA,
16 based on Hickman’s alleged failure to submit notification under these statutes that
17 reportable quantities of hydrogen sulfide and ammonia had been released at the Arlington
18 and Tonopah Facilities.

19 12. Nearly five months later, Plaintiff filed its Complaint. (Doc. 4). The
20 Complaint alleged that Hickman’s violated EPCRA because it failed to file the necessary
21 reports regarding the release of ammonia at the Arlington Facility and the Tonopah
22 Facility. Hickman’s filed an answer denying liability on October 21, 2016. (Doc. 11).

23 13. There are additional agricultural operations within two to five miles of the
24 Arlington and Tonopah facilities, including multiple dairy farms that produce cow waste.
25 (Defendant’s Trial Ex. 106). Ammonia is also a natural byproduct of cow waste.

26 14. Once the chicken waste is dried at its facilities, Hickman’s processes the
27 chicken waste and sells it as a fertilizer to facilities in neighboring areas.

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1 15. Hickman’s regularly tested for ammonia and hydrogen sulfide emissions on
2 the premises of both facilities.

3 16. In March 2017, Hickman’s filed compliance reports with the NRC, SERC
4 and LERC. (Doc. 107 at 6). Hickman’s also filed an update to these reports in March
5 2018. (*Id.*).

6 17. After the construction of the Arlington and Tonopah facilities, individuals
7 living near the facilities filed complaints with the Arizona Department of Environmental
8 Quality (“ADEQ”) and other environmental agencies. ADEQ has never found that
9 Hickman’s was in violation of state or federal environmental laws.

10 18. Earlier this year, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
11 2018. The act incorporated at Division S, Title XI the Fair Agricultural Reporting
12 Method Act (“FARM Act”), which amended Section 103 of CERCLA to eliminate any
13 reporting requirement for air emissions from animal waste or the decomposition of
14 animal waste. EPCRA’s reporting requirements under section 304 extend to releases that
15 “require[] a notification under section 103(a) of [CERCLA].” 42 § U.S.C. 11004.

16 19. EPA recently issued a Guidance Document detailing when EPCRA applies
17 to farms engaged in “routine agricultural operations.” EPA Office of Land and
18 Emergency Management, *How Do the Reporting Requirements in EPCRA Section 304*
19 *Apply to Farms Engaged in “Routine Agricultural Operations”?* (Apr. 27, 2018),
20 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/web_document_placeholder.pdf
21 (“EPA Guidance 2018”).

22 20. On September 25, 2018 this Court issued an order clarifying various legal
23 issues before the trial without a jury. (Doc. 130) (“Clarifying Order”). Among other
24 issues, the Clarifying Order found that the FARM Act was not retroactively applicable,
25 that Plaintiff has the burden to prove that the release resulted in exposure to persons
26 outside the facility, and that Defendant has the burden to prove that the release falls
27 within the exemption at 42 U.S.C. § 11021(e)(5). (Clarifying Order at 10–11).

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1 **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

2 Defendant has conceded that Plaintiff has standing to prosecute this action under
3 EPCRA. So the Court will only analyze the merits issues. Due to the passage of the
4 FARM Act, however, this Order only considers whether Hickman’s violated EPCRA by
5 not making a required continuous release report concerning ammonia release prior to
6 March 28, 2017.

- 7 **1. Prior to the passage of the Farm Act, ammonia generated as a**
8 **byproduct of chicken waste was an “extremely hazardous material”**
9 **released into the environment that triggered reporting requirements**
10 **under EPCRA.**

11 EPCRA directs the EPA Administrator to list hazardous substances along with the
12 amount of substance that must be released in order to trigger EPCRA reporting
13 requirements. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(2) (directing the Administrator to publish a list
14 of extremely hazardous substances within 30 days). The list of extremely hazardous
15 substances can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. Under EPCRA section 11004(a), merely
16 possessing a hazardous substance is not enough to trigger reporting requirements.
17 Specifically, EPCRA requires a notification only “if a release of an extremely hazardous
18 substance . . . occurs from a facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1)–(2).

19 Ammonia is an extremely hazardous substance listed under 40 C.F.R. § 302.4.
20 Chicken waste is not listed under 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, nor is it “released” into the
21 environment.

- 22 **2. The release of ammonia at both the Arlington and Tonopah Facilities**
23 **does not fall within the statutory exemption at 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(4).**

24 Under EPCRA, a release is not reportable if it “results in exposure to persons
25 solely within the site or sites on which a facility is located.” 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(4). As
26 discussed in the Clarifying Order, the burden to establish that the ammonia releases
27 resulted in exposures to persons outside the facility falls on DWA, who must establish
28 that persons were exposed to the ammonia by the preponderance of the evidence. Unlike
the release provision, which requires 100 pounds of ammonia to be released to trigger the

1 reporting requirement *see* 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, the implementing regulations do not require
2 a specific amount of exposure to persons to avoid liability under 11004(a)(4). Thus, *some*
3 level of exposure to ammonia outside the site is sufficient to trigger the reporting
4 requirement.

5 The parties do not dispute that Hickman’s released more than 100 pounds of
6 ammonia into the ambient air daily during the relevant time period for this lawsuit.
7 Indeed, Hickman’s own expert found that the amount of ammonia generated at each
8 facility likely exceeded 1500 pounds each day. Several individuals from both Arlington
9 and Tonopah also testified that they could smell ammonia regularly at their residences
10 following the construction of both the Arlington and Tonopah Facilities.

11 That Hickman’s later measured zero ammonia parts per million at the facility
12 borders once a month does not demonstrate that no persons were ever exposed to
13 ammonia from the facilities during the relevant time frame. Plaintiff’s dispute whether
14 the device used by Hickman’s to measure ammonia at the facility is even designed to
15 make measurements of ammonia in the ambient air. (Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 33).
16 Hickman’s admits that it employs no machinery to capture, store, or otherwise prevent
17 the gaseous ammonia from entering the ambient air. And while there are other
18 agricultural operations in the vicinity of Hickman’s, it is not plausible that releasing
19 thousands of pounds of ammonia into the ambient air daily for a period of years did not
20 regularly result in exposure to persons outside the facility. Accordingly, the release at
21 issue here does not fall within the exemption in 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(4).

22 **3. Ammonia released as a byproduct of chicken waste is not a hazardous**
23 **material “used in a routine agricultural operation.”**

24 In April 2018, EPA issued a guidance document that describes the activities that
25 fall within the routine agricultural operation exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 11021(e)(5).
26 In that guidance document, EPA reasoned that “the feeding and breeding of animals, as
27 well as the expected handling and storage of the animals’ waste, would also be
28 considered a routine agricultural operation,” and interpreted 42 U.S.C. §11021(e)(5) to

1 include “handling and storage of waste for potential use as a fertilizer.” See EPA
2 Guidance 2018.

3 As discussed in this Court’s Clarifying Order, “policy statements, agency manuals
4 and enforcement guidelines . . . do not warrant *Chevron*-style deference.” *Christensen v.*
5 *Harris County*, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). When executive guidance does not warrant
6 *Chevron* deference, courts should still give some weight to agency interpretations
7 depending on the thoroughness of its consideration, validity of its reasoning, consistency
8 with earlier and later pronouncements, and its general power to persuade. See *Skidmore v.*
9 *Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

10 EPCRA generally requires reporting of all releases of hazardous materials that
11 were “produced, used, or stored” at a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1). In a separate
12 subsection, EPCRA clarifies that the term “hazardous materials” does not cover “any
13 substance to the extent it is *used in* routine agricultural operations or is a fertilizer held
14 for sale by a retailer to the ultimate customer.” 42 U.S.C. § 11021(e)(5) (emphasis
15 added). The statutory provision by its terms does not exempt *all* activities at routine
16 agricultural operations from reporting requirements under EPCRA. It specifically limits
17 the exemption to hazardous materials “*used in* routine agricultural operations.” 42 U.S.C.
18 § 11021(e)(5) (emphasis added). Had Congress wanted to exempt all substances at
19 routine agricultural operations from reporting requirements, it could have simply stated
20 that routine agricultural operations are entirely exempt.

21 “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
22 omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
23 purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” *Keene Corp. v. United States*, 508
24 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also *Bailey v.*
25 *United States*, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (distinction in one provision between “used” and
26 “intended to be used” creates implication that related provision’s reliance on “use” alone
27 refers to actual and not intended use). Because Congress deployed the phrase “produced,
28 used or stored” when defining what releases are reportable, but only deployed the word

1 “used” when defining this exemption, Congress likely did not intend to exclude releases
2 from materials that are produced or stored at, but not ultimately used in routine
3 agricultural operations, with the exception of a fertilizer held for sale to the ultimate
4 consumer.

5 “Used” is defined as “employed in accomplishing something.” WEBSTER’S
6 THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2524 (1961). Hickman’s does not employ the
7 ammonia in accomplishing any ultimate goal or objective. The gaseous ammonia is
8 instead a mere byproduct of the agricultural operation. Thus, the ammonia does not
9 qualify as a material “used in” a routine agricultural operation.

10 **4. Ammonia released as a byproduct of chicken waste is not “a fertilizer**
11 **held for sale to the ultimate consumer.”**

12 The statutory language exempts hazardous materials from the EPCRA reporting
13 requirements if that material “is a fertilizer held for sale to the ultimate consumer.” 42
14 U.S.C. § 110021(e)(5). It is possible that the EPA Administrator could list common
15 fertilizers under the EPCRA reporting requirements, and Congress was probably aware of
16 that possibility when it was drafting 110021(e)(5). And those fertilizers, if held for sale
17 by a facility, and subsequently released into the environment, would fit within the
18 exemption. But the gaseous ammonia released by the chicken waste itself is not a
19 fertilizer held by Hickman’s.² Instead, the ammonia is a *byproduct* of a material—the
20 chicken waste—that is eventually converted to a fertilizer. That Hickman’s later
21 processed the chicken waste and sold it as a fertilizer does not transform the gas released
22 by the chicken waste at an earlier stage into a fertilizer. So even assuming this Court
23 would find that the chicken waste was a fertilizer, a gaseous byproduct released by its
24 decomposition would not qualify for the exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 110021(e)(5).

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28 ² A fertilizer is defined as “a substance (as manure, lime or commercial fertilizer)
used to fertilize soil; *esp* one chemically prepared that supplies nutrients.” WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 840 (1961).

1 **5. The Court will impose a penalty below the maximum amount for an**
2 **emissions reporting violation for each of the Hickman's Facilities.**

3 The Court finds that Hickman's failed to comply with the written notice
4 requirement under EPCRA for 592 days for the Tonopah Facility, and for 1,825 days for
5 the Arlington Facility. Hickman's violations here essentially amount to two failures to
6 report a continuous emissions release. *See* Final Rule, (Dec. 18, 2008), 73 Fed. Reg.
7 76,948 at 76,952. If considered a continuous emissions release, the maximum penalties
8 under EPCRA for each release are \$25,000 dollars.

9 EPA published an Enforcement Response Policy for its own enforcement actions
10 that may also be used as a guideline here. *See* EPA Office of Regulatory Enforcement
11 and Compliance Assurance, *Enforcement Response Policy For Sections 304, 311 and 312*
12 *of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act*, (Sept. 30, 1999),
13 <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/epcra304.pdf> ("ERP"). While the
14 Court is not required to apply the ERP guidelines, both parties agree that the Court should
15 look to the ERP to help determine what penalty to impose on Hickman's.

16 The ERP lays out four factors to weigh in determining whether or not to impose
17 the maximum daily penalty: the nature of the violation, the extent of the violation, the
18 gravity of the violation, and the circumstances of the violation. ERP at 9-17. EPA also
19 lists adjustment factors for penalties, including the ability to pay and continue in
20 business, the prior history of violations, the degree of culpability, the economic benefit of
21 non-compliance, and other matters as justice may require. ERP at 22-28. Penalties
22 imposed by EPA under this rubric in the past for violations range from \$7,735 to
23 \$278,000. (Doc. 107, Ex. A).

24 When determining the circumstances surrounding a violation, EPA looks at any
25 actual problems that first responders and emergency managers encountered due to a
26 failure to notify, the effect noncompliance has on the LEPC's ability to plan for chemical
27 emergencies, and the potential for emergency personnel, the community and the
28 environment to be exposed to hazards posed by noncompliance.

1 None of these factors point towards imposing a harsh penalty. There were no
2 actual problems that emergency personnel encountered due to Hickman’s lack of
3 reporting, and Hickman’s failure to report did not impact the LEPC’s ability to plan for
4 chemical emergencies. And while Hickman’s failure to report the ammonia emissions
5 likely deprived the community of some information regarding hazardous substances in
6 their community, many members of the public were aware of the facilities and the
7 ammonia they emit. The noncompliance *itself* did not greatly increase the likelihood of
8 the public to be exposed to hazardous materials.³ After all, these releases are not illegal
9 under any other statute.

10 Other adjustment factors point in favor of a modest fine. Hickman’s does not have
11 a history of prior violations under EPCRA or other environmental statutes. There is no
12 evidence that Hickman’s gained any meaningful economic advantage over other
13 agricultural operations by not reporting the ammonia emissions under EPCRA. ERP at
14 28. And a severe penalty issued here could threaten Hickman’s ability to stay in
15 business.

16 The ERP also allows for consideration of “other matters as justice may require.”
17 ERP at 31. The law surrounding reporting requirements for animal waste under EPCRA
18 has been in flux since EPCRA was passed in 1986. *See* 1987 Final Rule; 2008 Final
19 Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948 (Dec. 18, 2008), *vacated by Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA*, 853
20 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017); EPA Guidance 2018.⁴ To date, EPA has still failed to develop

22 ³ In the 2008 Final Rule on this subject, EPA stated that reports regarding
23 emissions from animal waste “are unnecessary because, in most cases, a federal response
is impractical and unlikely.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,956.

24 ⁴ Congress recently exempted these types of releases from reporting under
25 CERCLA when it passed the FARM Act. EPA recently proposed new regulations
26 exempting animal waste emissions from reporting requirements under EPCRA—a
27 necessary consequence of the amendments to CERCLA. *See* EPA, Proposed
28 Amendment to Emergency Release Notification Regulations on Reporting Exemption for
Air Emissions from Animal Waste at Farms; Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-10/documents/proposed_epcra_amendment_signed_10-30-18.pdf. The proposed
regulation incorporates the FARM Act’s exemption of animal waste to EPA’s existing
regulations under EPCRA.

1 an emission rate factor for estimating the amount of ammonia emissions from chicken
2 waste at agricultural operations like Hickman's. Unlike many other instances where EPA
3 has implemented harsh penalties on large agricultural operations, Hickman's has not been
4 found to violate any other environmental statutes in this proceeding, such as the Clean
5 Water Act or CERCLA. (Doc. 107, Ex. A). And Hickman's has recently come into
6 compliance with EPCRA and filed a continuous emissions release report for both the
7 Arlington and Tonopah Facilities. After the passage of the FARM Act, no agricultural
8 operation will be penalized for failing to report emissions generated from animal waste,
9 because they are no longer subject to the reporting requirements of EPCRA.

10 At trial, Plaintiff's counsel pointed to three pieces of evidence to suggest that a
11 large fine should be imposed on Hickman's. First, Plaintiff argued that the letter
12 submitted to EPA in 2006 should be considered evidence that Hickman's was aware that
13 the Arlington Facility needed to submit reports under EPCRA. Second, Plaintiff pointed
14 to the numerous complaints filed by individuals living in the Arlington and Tonopah
15 areas. Finally, Plaintiff points to the fact that Hickman's failed to take any action to come
16 into compliance with EPCRA after it received Plaintiff's 60-day notice letter.

17 The first two pieces of evidence seem to cut against assessing a harsh penalty
18 against Hickman's. The letter indicates that the regulating agency was aware of
19 Hickman's emissions at the Arlington facility and chose not to request further action.
20 And the fact that ADEQ, after receiving all of these complaints, did not require
21 Hickman's to take further action, supports the conclusion that Hickman's was not acting
22 in bad faith here. Hickman's regularly coordinates with state regulators, and there is no
23 evidence that Hickman's is in violation of *any* other state or federal environmental laws.
24 But Hickman's did fail to take any action after Plaintiffs filed their 60-day Notice, and
25 even after the Complaint in this case was filed.

26 Because Hickman's failed to comply with EPCRA, the Court will assess a fine of
27 1,500 dollars for each facility, totaling 3,000 dollars. This amount is below other EPA
28 enforcement actions where there were violations of other environmental laws, and will

1 not be so harsh as to put Hickman's out of business.

2 Any conclusion of law deemed a finding of fact is so adopted.

3 **CONCLUSION**

4 For the reasons stated above, the Court enters judgment in Plaintiff's favor in the
5 amount of three thousand dollars (\$3,000.00). Plaintiff is directed to file a Notice and
6 lodge a proposed final judgment on or before **November 16, 2018**.

7 Dated this 2nd day of November, 2018.

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
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G. Murray Snow
Chief United States District Judge